“man,” says dr. newman, “is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal.” to see rightly is the first of human qualities; right feeling and right acting are usually its consequences. there are two ways of seeing: one is to comprehend, which is to see all round a thing, or to embrace it; one is to apprehend, which is to see it in part, or to take hold of it. a thing may be really taken hold of which is much too big for embracing. real apprehension implies reality in that which is apprehended. you cannot “take hold” of that which is nothing. the notional grasp which some people seem to have of clouds and mares’ nests is a totally different thing from real apprehension; though what this difference is could scarcely be made clear to those who have no experience of the latter. a man may not be able to convey to another his real apprehension of{7} a thing; but there will be something in his general character and way of discoursing which will convince you, if you too are a man acquainted with realities, that he has truly got hold of what he professes to have got hold of, and you will be wary of denying what he affirms. the man of real apprehensions, or the truly sensible man, has no opinions. many things may be dubious to him; but if he is compelled to act without knowledge, he does so promptly, being prompt to discern which of the doubtful ways before him is the least questionable, on the ground of such evidence as he has. as to what he sees to be true or right, he does not argue with the person who differs from him upon a vital point, but only avoids his company, or, if he be of an irascible temperament, feels inclined to knock him down. of course there are some people who see things which do not exist; but this is lunacy, and beyond the scope of these remarks. real apprehension is emphatically the quality which constitutes “good sense.” common good sense has a real apprehension of innumerable things which those who add to good sense learning and reflection may comprehend; but there is much that must for ever remain matter only of real apprehension to the best seers; that is to say, everything in which the infinite has a part, i.e. all religion, all virtue as distinguished from tem{8}porary expediency, the grounds of all true art, etc. a man may have an immense acquaintance with facts; he may have all history and the whole circle of the sciences on the tip of his tongue; he may be the author of a classical system of logic, or may have so cunningly elaborated a false theory of nature as to puzzle and infuriate the wisest of men: and yet may not really apprehend any part of the truth of life which is properly human knowledge. at the present time it is by politics chiefly that the difference between the two great classes of men is made apparent. for the first time in english history, party limitations coincide almost exactly with the limitations which separate silly from sensible men. if you talk with a sincere gladstonian—and, wonderful to say, there are still many such—you will soon find that he has no real apprehension of anything. he only feebly and foolishly opines.
it is not to be concluded from what has been said that the possession of the apprehending faculty in any way supersedes the good of learning. the power of really apprehending is nothing in the absence of realities to be apprehended. in the great field of ordinary social relationships and duties the subject-matter of such apprehension is largely supplied by individual experience, and the exercise by most men of that faculty is in the main limited to these; so that the praise of “good{9} sense” has acquired a much narrower signification than it ought to bear. genius is nothing but great good sense, or real apprehension, exercised upon objects more or less out of common sight; and the chief ingredient of even the highest and most heroic sanctity is the same apprehension taking hold upon spiritual truths and applying them to the conduct of the interior as well as the exterior life. men with great strength of real apprehension are easily capable of things which inferior characters regard as great self-sacrifices; though to them such things are no more sacrifice than in an ordinary man it would be to exchange a ton of lead for a pound of gold. “their hearts do not forget the things their eyes have seen;” and persons like general gordon or sir thomas more would stare if you called anything they did or suffered by the name of sacrifice.
you cannot read the writings of newman, hooker, pascal, and st. augustine, without being strongly impressed with the presumption that they have a real apprehension of the things they profess to believe; and, since they do not justify in any other way the theory that they are lunatics, a right-minded reader is likewise disposed to think that what they have thus seen exists, and that his not having seen such things does not materially diminish that probability.{10}
and here it may be well to recur to the text of these remarks: “man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal.” all men properly so called—but a good many who walk upright on two legs cannot properly be so called—are seeing, feeling, and acting animals; but very few men, indeed, have as yet attained to be contemplating animals, though the act of contemplation exercised upon the highest objects is, according to all great philosophers, even pagan, the act for which he is created and in which his final perfection and felicity are attained. the act of real apprehension, as it is exerted by ordinary men, and even for the most part by men of extraordinary vigour of intellectual vision, is momentary, however permanent may be its effect upon their principles and lives. men of vigorous apprehension look at the heavens of truth, as it were, through a powerful telescope, and see instantly as realities many living lights which are quite invisible to the common eye. but contemplation—a faculty rare in all times, but wellnigh unheard of in ours—is like the photographic plate which finds stars that no telescope can discover, by simply setting its passively expectant gaze in certain indicated directions so long and steadily that telescopically invisible bodies become apparent by accumulation of impression. such men are prophets and{11} apostles, whether canonical or not. it is by the instrumentality of such men that religions are established and upheld; and the term “verifiable religion” is a piece of mere nineteenth-century slang, when applied to the examination of dogma by such as have probably never had the remotest apprehension of any spiritual reality. certain facts of history relating to religion may or may not be capable of “verification” to the multitude; but the dogmas which are the substance of a religion, can only be really apprehended—assuming them to be real and apprehensible—by the exceedingly few to whom the highest powers of contemplation, which are usually the accompaniments of equally extraordinary virtues, are accorded. the mass of mankind must receive and hold these things as they daily receive and hold a thousand other things—laws, customs, traditions, the grounds of common moralities, etc.—by faith; their real apprehension in such matters extending for the most part only to the discernment of the reasonableness of so receiving and holding them.
now this faculty and habit of really apprehending things, even in its lower and not uncommon degree, is an immeasurable advantage; but it has its drawback. those who possess it are singularly capable of committing the unpardonable sin, the sin against knowledge. “father, forgive them,{12} for they know not what they do” is a petition which he who spoke these words could not have offered for deeds or denials in clear opposition to what a man knows to be true and good. “my name is in him and he will not pardon.” all men agree in calling the spirit of truth—which is the spirit by which truth is really apprehended—holy; and to deny this spirit in deliberate action may, without any appeal to christian doctrine, be proved to be unpardonable by the way such action is known to influence a man’s character. a single act of such denial, if it be in some great and vital matter, often seems to destroy the soul. history affords more than one example of a statesman who has begun life with an eagle eye for truth, a strong and tender love of honour, and everything that makes a man among men. at some crisis of temptation he chooses personal ambition before some clearly apprehended duty of patriotism; and his whole nature seems thenceforward changed: he drops like a scorched fly from the flame—
then takes his doom, to limp and crawl,
blind and despised, from fall to fall.
but the least practical denial of real apprehension of the truth is, to such as have ever had a conscience and have observed themselves, demon{13}strably unpardonable, inasmuch as it destroys a portion of the capacity of the soul. “the remnant” may, indeed, “become a great nation,” but it will be still and for ever a remnant of what it would have been, had it preserved the integrity of its fidelity.
if we knew the secrets of the lives of those—alas! innumerable—who seem to have no real apprehension of anything, none of the light which it is said lighteth every man that cometh into the world, it would probably be found that they have not been born without, but have forfeited their noblest human heritage, by repeated practical denials of the things which they have seen.
