there are things which can never be more than approximately defined, and which, even when so defined, are only to be rightly understood in proportion to the degrees in which they are possessed by those who would attempt to comprehend them. such are, for example, “imagination” and “genius”; which, being faculties that are possessed in a very low degree by nearly all and in a very high degree by extremely few, are matters of the most general interest and the most variable apprehension. that such faculties should, however, as far as possible, be understood is of great practical importance to all persons; inasmuch as it greatly concerns all to know something of the signs, sanctions, and claims of those powers by which they are inevitably more or less ruled, externally and internally.

it is nothing against a definition of an entity{44} which cannot be fully defined to say that such definition is “new.” it was objected against an interpretation by st. augustine of some old testament history or parable, that other authorities had given other interpretations. “the more interpretations the better,” was the saint’s reply. in such cases various definitions and interpretations are merely apprehensions of various sides of a matter not wholly to be embraced or comprehended by any single definition or interpretation. in recent times genius and imagination have come to be widely regarded as one and the same thing. they are not so, however, though they are perhaps indissolubly connected. the most peculiar and characteristic mark of genius is insight into subjects which are dark to ordinary vision and for which ordinary language has no adequate expression. imagination is rather the language of genius: the power which traverses at a single glance the whole external universe, and seizes on the likenesses and images, and their combinations, which are best able to embody ideas and feelings which are otherwise inexpressible; so that the “things which are unseen are known by the things which are seen.” imagination, in its higher developments, is so quick and subtle a power that the most delicate analysis can scarcely follow its shortest flights. coleridge said that it would{45} take a whole volume to analyse the effect of a certain passage of only a few syllables in length. in dealing with such a work as the tempest criticism is absolutely helpless, and its noblest function is to declare its own helplessness by directing attention to beauty beyond beauty which defies analysis. the tempest, like all very great works of art, is the shortest and simplest, and indeed the only possible expression of its “idea.” the idea is the product of genius proper; the expression is the work of imagination. there are cases, however, in which it is hard to distinguish at all between these inseparable qualities. the initiation of a scientific theory seems often to have been due to the action of the imagination working independently of any peculiar direct insight; the analogy-discovering faculty—that is, the imagination—finding a law for a whole sphere of unexplained phenomena in the likeness of such phenomena to others of a different sphere of which the law is known. hence the real discoverers of such theories are scarcely ever those who have obtained the credit of them; for nothing is usually more abhorrent to men of extraordinary imagination than “fact-grinding.” such men, after having flung out their discoveries to the contempt or neglect of their contemporaries, leave the future proof of them to mental mechanics; religiously{46} avoiding such work themselves, lest, as goethe said of himself, they should find themselves imprisoned in “the charnel-house of science.” genius and imagination of a very high kind are not at all uncommon in children under twelve years of age, especially when their education has been “neglected.” the writer can guarantee the following facts from personal witness: a clever child of seven, who could not read, and had certainly never heard of the newtonian theory of gravitation, said to his mother suddenly, “what makes this ball drop when i leave hold of it?—oh, i know: the ground pulls it.” another child, a year or two older, lay stretched on a gravel path, staring intently on the pebbles. “they are alive,” he cried, in the writer’s hearing; “they are always wanting to burst, but something draws them in.” this infantine rediscovery of the doctrine of the coinherence of attraction and repulsion in matter seems to have been an effort of direct insight. the repetition of the newtonian apple revelation seems rather to have been the work of the imagination, tracking likeness in difference; but to discern such likeness is, again, an effort of direct insight, and justifies aristotle’s saying that this power of finding similitude in things diverse is a proof of the highest human faculty, and that thence poetry is worthier than{47} history. the poet’s eye glances from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven; and his faculty of discerning likeness in difference enables him to express the unknown in the terms of the known, so as to confer upon the former a sensible credibility, and to give the latter a truly sacramental dignity. the soul contains world upon world of the most real of realities of which it has no consciousness until it is awakened to their existence by some parable or metaphor, some strain of rhythm or music, some combination of form or colour, some scene of beauty or sublimity, which suddenly expresses the inexpressible by a lower likeness. the vulgar cynic, blessing when he only means to bray, declares that love between the sexes is “all imagination.” what can be truer? what baser thing is there than such love, when it is not of imagination all compact? or what more nearly divine when it is? why? because the imagination deals with the spiritual realities to which the material realities correspond, and of which they are only, as it were, the ultimate and sensible expressions. and here it may be noted, by the way, that nature supplies the ultimate analogue of every divine mystery with some vulgar use or circumstance, in order, as it would seem, to enable the stupid and the gross to deny the divine without actual blasphemy.{48}

profligacy and “fact-grinding” destroy the imagination by habitually dwelling in ultimate expressions while denying or forgetting the primary realities of which they are properly only the vessels. purity ends by finding a goddess where impurity concludes by confessing carrion. which of these is the reality let each man judge according to his taste. “fact-grinding”—which darwin confessed and lamented had destroyed his imagination and caused him to “nauseate shakespeare”—commonly ends in destroying the religious faculty, as profligacy destroys the faculty of love; for neither love nor religion can survive without imagination, which shelley, in one of his prefaces, identifying genius with imagination, declares to be the power of discerning spiritual facts. those who have no imagination regard it as all one with “fancy,” which is only a playful mockery of imagination, bringing together things in which there is nothing but an accidental similarity in externals.