i have been glancing over two or three of the appreciations of tennyson appropriate to his centenary, and have been struck with a curious tone of coldness towards him in almost all quarters. now this is really a very peculiar thing. for it is a case of coldness to quite brilliant and unquestionable literary merit. whether tennyson was a great poet i shall not discuss. i understand that one has to wait about eight hundred years before discussing that; and my only complaint against the printers of my articles is that they will not wait even for much shorter periods. but that tennyson was a poet is as solid and certain as that roberts is a billiard-player. that tennyson was an astonishingly good poet is as solid and certain as that roberts is an astonishingly good billiard-player. even in these matters of art there are some things analogous to matters of fact. it is no good disputing about tastes—partly because some tastes are beyond dispute. if anyone tells me that

there is fallen a splendid tear

from the passion-flower at the gate;

or that

tears from the depth of some divine despair

is not fine poetry, i am quite prepared to treat him as i would one who said that grass was not green or that i was not corpulent. and by all common chances tennyson ought to be preserved as a pleasure—a sensuous pleasure if you like, but certainly a genuine one. there is no more reason for dropping tennyson than for dropping virgil. we do not mind virgil’s view of augustus, nor need we mind tennyson’s view of queen victoria. beauty is unanswerable, in a poem as much as in a woman. there were victorian writers whose art is not perfectly appreciable apart from their enthusiasm. kingsley’s yeast is a fine book, but not quite so fine a book as it seemed when one’s own social passions were still yeasty. browning and coventry patmore are justly admired, but they are most admired where they are most agreed with. but “st. agnes’ eve” is an unimpeachably beautiful poem, whether one believes in st. agnes or detests her. one would think that a man who had thus left indubitably good verse would receive natural and steady gratitude, like a man who left indubitably good wine to his nephew, or indubitably good pictures to the national portrait gallery. nevertheless, as i have said, the tone of all the papers, modernist or old-fashioned, has been mainly frigid. what is the meaning of this?

i will ask permission to answer this question by abruptly and even brutally changing the subject. my remarks must, first of all, seem irrelevant even to effrontery; they shall prove their relevance later on. in turning the pages of one of the papers containing such a light and unsympathetic treatment of tennyson, my eye catches the following sentence: “by the light of modern science and thought, we are in a position to see that each normal human being in some way repeats historically the life of the human race.” this is a very typical modern assertion; that is, it is an assertion for which there is not and never has been a single spot or speck of proof. we know precious little about what the life of the human race has been; and none of our scientific conjectures about it bear the remotest resemblance to the actual growth of a child. according to this theory, a baby begins by chipping flints and rubbing sticks together to find fire. one so often sees babies doing this. about the age of five the child, before the delighted eyes of his parents, founds a village community. by the time he is eleven it has become a small city state, the replica of ancient athens. encouraged by this, the boy proceeds, and before he is fourteen has founded the roman empire. but now his parents have a serious set-back. having watched him so far, not only with pleasure, but with a very natural surprise, they must strengthen themselves to endure the spectacle of decay. they have now to watch their child going through the decline of the western empire and the dark ages. they see the invasion of the huns and that of the norsemen chasing each other across his expressive face. he seems a little happier after he has “repeated” the battle of chalons and the unsuccessful siege of paris; and by the time he comes to the twelfth century, his boyish face is as bright as it was of old when he was “repeating” pericles or camillus. i have no space to follow this remarkable demonstration of how history repeats itself in the youth; how he grows dismal at twenty-three to represent the end of medi?valism, brightens because the renaissance is coming, darkens again with the disputes of the later reformation, broadens placidly through the thirties as the rational eighteenth century, till at last, about forty-three, he gives a great yell and begins to burn the house down, as a symbol of the french revolution. such (we shall all agree) is the ordinary development of a boy.

now, seriously, does anyone believe a word of such bosh? does anyone think that a child will repeat the periods of human history? does anyone ever allow for a daughter in the stone age, or excuse a son because he is in the fourth century b.c. yet the writer who lays down this splendid and staggering lie calmly says that “by the light of modern science and thought we are in a position to see” that it is true. “seeing” is a strong word to use of our conviction that icebergs are in the north, or that the earth goes round the sun. yet anybody can use it of any casual or crazy biological fancy seen in some newspaper or suggested in some debating club. this is the rooted weakness of our time. science, which means exactitude, has become the mother of all inexactitude.

this is the failure of the epoch, and this explains the partial failure of tennyson. he was par excellence the poet of popular science—that is, of all such cloudy and ill-considered assertions as the above. he was the perfectly educated man of classics and the half-educated man of science. no one did more to encourage the colossal blunder that the survival of the fittest means the survival of the best. one might as well say that the survival of the fittest means the survival of the fattest. tennyson’s position has grown shaky because it rested not on any clear dogmas old or new, but on two or three temporary, we might say desperate, compromises of his own day. he grasped at evolution, not because it was definite, but because it was indefinite; not because it was daring, but because it was safe. it gave him the hope that man might one day be an angel, and england a free democracy; but it soothed him with the assurance that neither of these alarming things would happen just yet. virgil used his verbal felicities to describe the eternal idea of the roman imperium. tennyson used his verbal felicities for the accidental equilibrium of the british constitution. “to spare the humble and war down the proud,” is a permanent idea for the policing of this planet. but that freedom should “slowly broaden down from precedent to precedent” merely happens to be the policy of the english upper class; it has no vital sanction; it might be much better to broaden quickly. one can write great poetry about a truth or even about a falsehood, but hardly about a legal fiction. the misanthropic idea, as in byron, is not a truth, but it is one of the immortal lies. as long as humanity exists, humanity can be hated. wherever one shall gather by himself, byron is in the midst of him. it is a common and recurrent mood to regard man as a hopeless yahoo. but it is not a natural mood to regard man as a hopeful yahoo, as the evolutionists did, as a creature changing before one’s eyes from bestial to beautiful, a creature whose tail has just dropped off while he is staring at a far-off divine event. this particular compromise between contempt and hope was an accident of tennyson’s time, and, like his liberal conservatism, will probably never be found again. his weakness was not being old-fashioned or new-fashioned, but being fashionable. his feet were set on things transitory and untenable, compromises and compacts of silence. yet he was so perfect a poet that i fancy he will still be able to stand, even upon such clouds.