lisle had heard of the operations that had been carried on by the brigade under general gazelee, under the general supervision of sir william lockhart. the object was to cross by the zolaznu pass, to punish two of the hostile tribes on the other side; to effect a meeting with the khuram column; and to concentrate and operate against the chamkannis, a tribe of inveterate robbers. on the 26th general gazelee started, and the newly-arrived wing of the scottish fusiliers, and two companies of the yorkshires was to follow, on the 28th.
the approach to the pass, which was four miles to the left, was across a very rough country; and as, after advancing four and a half miles, a severe opposition was met with, most of the day was spent in dislodging the tribesmen from the villages, and turning them out of the spurs which covered the approach to the pass. finding it impossible to make the summit that night, they encamped and, although they were fired into heavily, but little damage was done.
at dawn the expedition started again but, by accident, they ascended another pass parallel with the lozacca. at nine o'clock the ghoorkhas and sikhs arrived at the top of the pass. it was very difficult and, as the baggage animals gave great trouble on the ascent, and were unable to go farther, the party camped on the top of the pass.
general lockhart left the camp early that morning, but was also opposed so vigorously that he was obliged to encamp, three miles from the top of the pass, after having burnt all the villages from which he had been fired upon. in the morning he joined the advance party, and went ten miles down the pass. on arriving there, he found that the queen's and the 3rd sikhs had pushed on farther to dargai. this was not the place previously visited of this name, which appears to be a common one in the tirah. plenty of hay and straw stores were found, and the troops were vastly more comfortable than on the previous night.
it was here that lisle had overtaken the column.
next day the whole force was encamped at dargai, where they were received in a friendly manner by the villagers; who expressed themselves willing to pay their share of the fines imposed, and also to picket the hills. the rear guard, of two companies of ghoorkhas and two companies of scottish fusiliers, arrived late in the day. they had met with great opposition. the tribesmen would, indeed, have succeeded in carrying off the guns, had not a company of the ghoorkhas come up and, fighting stubbornly, driven them off.
next morning the headmen of the village were summoned, to explain why they had failed to pay the number of rifles they had promised; and fire was applied to one of their houses. this had an instantaneous effect and, in a quarter of an hour, the rifles were forthcoming and the fine paid.
the force then moved on to esor, where helio communication with the khuram column had been effected and, that day, sir william lockhart and colonel hill--who commanded it--met. the country traversed was a beautiful one. it was admirably cultivated, and the houses were substantially built.
that day two columns went out: one under general gazelee, to collect the fines from one of the tribes; the other commanded by colonel hill, to punish the chamkannis. this was a small, but extremely warlike and hardy tribe. a short time before, they had raided a thousand head of cattle from across our border, and got clear away with them.
a portion of the force was told off, to work its way into the valley by the river gorge, while the main body ascended the path over the kotal. they reached this at a quarter-past ten and, while they were waiting for the head of the column that had gone up the gorge to appear, fire was opened upon them. this, however, was kept down by the guns. it was an hour before the column appeared, but the whole force was not through the defile until it was too late to carry out the destruction of the villages. the column therefore retired, severely harassed, the while, by the enemy.
next day colonel hill was again sent forward, with the border scouts, the 4th and 5th ghoorkhas, part of the queen's, and the khoat battery. they were over the kotal at nine o'clock, and the 5th ghoorkhas and the scouts were sent to hold the hills on the left. the chamkannis had anticipated a sudden visit, and were in force on the left, where they had erected several sangars.
the little body of scouts, eighty men strong, fought their way up the hill; and waited there for the leading company of the 5th. lieutenant lucas, who commanded them, told off half his company to sweep the sangar, and then the remainder dashed at it.
the chamkannis stood more firmly than any of the tribesmen had hitherto done. they met the charge with a volley, and then drew their knives to receive it. the fire of the covering party destroyed their composure and, when the scouts were within thirty yards, they bolted for the next sangar.
lucas carried three of these defences, one after another, and drove the enemy off the hill. the ghoorkhas scouts, who had been engaged thirty-six times during the campaign, had killed more than their own strength of the enemy, and had lost but one man killed and two wounded; and this without taking count of the many nights they had spent in driving off prowlers round the camp.
the work of destruction now began. over sixty villages were destroyed in the valley and, on the following day, the expedition started to withdraw. the lesson had been so severe that no attempt was made, by the tribesmen, to harass the movement.
the column marched down to the camp in the maidan--the adam khels, through whose country they passed, paying the fine, and so picketing many of the adjacent heights as to guard the camp from the attacks of hostile tribesmen. when they reached bara they decided to rejoin the peshawar column, without delay, as the outlook was not promising. the evacuation began on the 7th of december, but the rear guard did not leave till the 9th. it was divided into two divisions in order, as much as possible, to avoid the delay caused by the large baggage column. the 1st division was to march down on the mastura valley, while general lockhart's 2nd division would again face the dwatoi defile. both the forces were due to join the peshawar column, on or about the 14th.
general symonds, with the 1st division, was unmolested by the way. it was very different, however, with lockhart.
the movement was not made a day too soon. clouds were gathering, the wind was blowing from the north, and there was every prospect of a fall of snow, which would have rendered the passage of the bara pass impossible. the 3rd ghoorkhas led the way, followed by the borderers, with the half battalion of the scottish regiment and the dorsets. behind them came the baggage of the brigade and headquarters, the rear of the leading column being brought up by the 36th sikhs. general kempster's brigade followed, in as close order as possible; having detached portions of the 1st and 2nd ghoorkhas, and the 2nd punjab infantry, to flank the whole force.
the malikdin khels were staunch to their word, and not a single shot was fired till the force had passed through the defile. the difficulties, however, were great, for the troops, baggage, and followers had to wade through the torrent, two-thirds of the way. the flanking had used up all the ghoorkhas, and the borderers now became the advance guard.
everything seemed peaceful, and the regiment was halfway across the small valley, when a heavy fire was opened on the opposite hill. general westmacott was in command of the brigade. the borderers were to take and hold the opposite hill, supported by a company of dorsets and of scottish fusiliers. the battery opened fire, while a party turned the nearest sangars on the right flank. by three o'clock the whole of the crests were held, and the baggage streamed into camp. fighting continued, however, on the peaks, far into the night.
no explanations were forthcoming why the enemy should have allowed the force to pass through the defile, without obstruction, when a determined body of riflemen could have kept the whole of them at bay; for the artillery could not have been brought into position, as the defile was the most difficult, of its kind, that a british division had ever crossed.
the day following the withdrawal of the rear guard, it rained in the bara valley, which meant snow in the maidan. the pickets on the heights had a bad time of it that night, as some of them were constantly attacked; and it was not till three in the morning that the baggage came in, the rear guard arriving in camp about ten.
the camp presented a wonderful sight that day, crowded as it was with men and animals. the weather was bitterly cold, and the men were busy gathering wood to make fires. on the hills all round, the sikhs could be seen engaged with the enemy, the guns aiding them with their work. the 36th sikhs, as soon as they arrived, were sent off to occupy a peak, two miles distant, which covered the advance into the rajgul defile. the enemy mustered strong, but were turned out of the position.
the next morning the villages were white with snow. a party was sent on into the rajgul valley, where they destroyed a big village.
immediately after leaving dwatoi, the valley broadened out till it was nearly a mile wide. on the right it was commanded by steep hills; on the left it was, to some extent, cultivated. the 4th brigade this time led the way, the 3rd bringing up the rear.
from the moment when the troops fell in on the 10th, till they reached barkai on the 14th, there was a general action from front to rear. the advance guard marched at half-past seven. at eight o'clock flanking parties were engaged with the enemy in the hills and spurs. serious opposition, however, did not take place until five and a half miles of the valley had been passed.
here the river turned to the right, and the front of the advance was exposed to the fire of a strongly-fortified village, nestling on the lower slope of a hill, on a terrace plateau. the village was furnished with no fewer than ten towers, and from these a very heavy fire was kept up.
the battery shelled the spur; while the sikhs, in open order, skirmished up the terraces to the plateau and, after a brisk fusillade, took the village and burnt it.
a mile farther, the head of the column reached the camping place, which was a strong village built into the river cleft. on the left the 36th sikhs and part of the ghoorkhas cleared the way; while the bombay pioneers, and the rest of the ghoorkhas, became heavily engaged with the enemy in some villages on the right. all along the line a brisk engagement went on. the camp pickets took up their positions early in the afternoon, and a foraging party went out and brought in supplies, after some fighting.
kempster's brigade had not been able to reach the camp, and settled itself for the night three miles farther up the valley. it, too, had its share of fighting.
all night it rained heavily, and the morning of the 11th broke cold and miserable. it was freezing hard; the hilltops, a hundred feet above the camp, were wrapped in snow; and the river had swollen greatly. the advance guard waded out into the river bed, and the whole of the brigade followed, the ghoorkhas clearing the sides of the valley. in a short time they passed into the zakka-khel section of the bara valley.
curiously enough, the opposition ceased here. it may be that the enemy feared to show themselves on the snow on the hilltops; or that, being short of ammunition, they decided to reserve themselves for an attack upon the other brigade. scarcely a shot was fired until the valley broadened out into the akerkhel, where some small opposition was offered by villagers on either bank. this, however, was easily brushed aside.
the advance guard of the 3rd brigade almost caught up the rear guard of the 4th and, by four in the afternoon, its baggage was coming along nicely, so that all would be in before nightfall. the rear guard of the brigade, consisting of the gordons, ghoorkhas, and 2nd punjab infantry, had been harassed as soon as they started and, as the day wore on, the enemy increased greatly in numbers. as the flanking parties fell back to join the rear guard, they were so pressed that it was as much as they could do to keep them at bay.
when about three miles from camp, the baggage took a wrong road. in trying a piece of level ground, they became helplessly mixed up in swampy rice fields. the enemy, seeing the opportunity they had waited for, outflanked the rear guard, and began pouring a heavy fire into the baggage. the flanking parties were weak, for the strain had been so severe that many men from the hospital escort and baggage guard had been withdrawn, to dislodge the enemy from the surrounding spurs.
the pathans were almost among the baggage, when a panic seized the followers. as night began to fall, the officer commanding the gordons, with two weak companies of his regiment, two companies of the ghoorkhas, and a company of the 2nd punjab infantry and some ghoorkhas, found himself in a most serious position. the guns had limbered up and pushed on, and the rear guard remained, surrounded by the enemy, hampered with its wounded, and stranded with doolies. as the native bearers had fled these doolies were, in many cases, being carried by the native officers.
the enemy grew more and more daring, and a few yards, only, divided the combatants. captain uniacke, retiring with a few of the gordons, saw that there was only one course left: they must entrench for the night. he was in advance of the actual rear guard, attempting to hold a house against the fire of quite a hundred tribesmen.
collecting four men of his regiment, and shouting wildly, he rushed at the doorway. in the dusk the enemy were uncertain of the number of their assailants and, in their horror of the bayonet, they fired one wild volley and fled. to continue the ruse, captain uniacke climbed to the roof, shouting words of command, as if he had a company behind him. then he blew his whistle, to attract the rear guard as it passed, in the dark.
the whistle was heard and, in little groups, they fell back with the wounded to the house. it was a poor place, but capable of defence; and the pathans drew off, knowing that there was loot in abundance to be gained down by the river.
as night wore on the greatest anxiety prevailed, when transport officers and small parties straggled in, and reported that tribesmen were looting and cutting up followers, within a mile of camp; and that they had no news to give of the men who composed the rear guard. so anxious were the headquarter staff that a company of the borderers were sent out, to do what they could.
lieutenant macalister took them out and, going a mile up the river, was able to collect many followers and baggage animals, but could find no signs of the rear guard. early in the morning a company of the 2nd punjab infantry went out, as a search party, and got into communication with the rear guard. they were safe in the house; but could not move, as they were hampered with the wounded, and were surrounded by the enemy. two regiments and a mountain battery therefore went out and rescued them from their awkward predicament, bringing them into camp, with as much baggage as could be found.
the casualties of the day amounted to a hundred and fifty animals, and a hundred followers killed. of the combatants two officers were wounded, and fourteen gordons were wounded, and four killed.
owing to the necessity of sending out part of the 4th brigade, to support the cut-off rear of the 3rd brigade, it was impossible to continue the march that day. next morning, the order of the brigade was changed. the 23rd was to lead, handing over a battery of artillery to the 4th, for service in the rear guard. it was also ordered that flanking parties were to remain in position, until the baggage had passed. the advance guard consisted of the 2nd punjab infantry, and the 1st and 2nd ghoorkhas. the others were told off to burn and destroy all villages on either side of the nullah. the baggage of the whole division followed the main guard.
directly the camp was left, the sides of the nullah enlarged and, for half a mile, the road lay through a narrow ravine. the drop was rapid; for the river, swollen by the fallen snow, had become literally a torrent; and the scene with the baggage was one of extreme confusion. the recent disaster had given a frenzied impulse to the generally calm followers, and all felt anxiety to press forward, with an impetus almost impossible to control. the mass of baggage became mixed in the ravine, but at last was cleared off and, when the valley opened, they moved forward at their greatest speed, but now under perfect control.
after this the opposition became less, and the village of gulikhel was reached by the 3rd brigade. the village stands on the left bank of the bara. immediately below it a nullah becomes a narrow gorge, almost impassable in the present state of the river. it is several miles long. there was, however, a road over a neighbouring saddle. the path up from the river was narrow, but sufficient to allow two loaded mules to pass abreast. it wound for some seven miles, over a low hill, until the river bed was again reached.
the next ford was barkhe. the advance guard was well up in the hills by midday, when it met the oxfordshire regiment, which had come out seven miles to meet the force; but the baggage of a division, filing out of the river bed in pairs, is a serious matter, and there was necessarily a block in the rear.
general westmacott moved as soon as the baggage was off but, long before it was through the first defile, his pickets were engaged, and a general action followed. the enemy, fighting with extraordinary boldness, kept within a few yards of the pickets. followers with baggage animals were constantly hit, as they came up but, at half-past ten, the rear guard regiments marched out of camp, under cover of artillery fire.
the fighting was so severe that, within an hour, the ammunition of the 3rd ghoorkhas was expended and, shortly afterwards, the two regiments of the rear guard were forced to call up their first reserve ammunition mules. the march was continued at a rapid pace, until they reached the block caused by the narrowness of the path. here the whole river reach became choked with animals and doolies. the wounded were coming in fast, when the pathans, taking advantage of the block, attacked in great force, hoping to compel the retreating force to make their way down the long river defile.
general westmacott, however, defended his right with energy; the rear-guard regiments supporting each other, while the batteries were in continual action. the borderers, sikhs, and ghoorkhas stood well to their task, till the last of the baggage animals were got out of the river bed.
the country now had become a rolling plateau, intersected by ravines and thickly covered with low jungle, in which the enemy could creep up to within three or four yards of the fighting line. progress was, consequently, very slow. to be benighted in such a country would have meant disaster, so general westmacott selected a ridge, which he determined to hold for the night. the wearied men were just filing up, when a tremendous rush was made by the afridis. for a moment, it seemed as if they would all be enveloped and swept away; but the officers threw themselves into the ranks, magazines were worked freely, and the very bushes seemed to melt away before the hail of shot. the tribesmen were swept back in the darkness, and they never tried a second rush. their firing also slackened very much, and this permitted the men to form a camp, and see to the wounded.
that day the rear guard lost one officer killed and three wounded, eighteen men killed, eighty-three wounded, and six missing. the night in camp was a terrible experience. the troops had been fighting since early morning, the frost was bitter, and they had neither water, food, nor blankets. general westmacott passed the night with the sentry line.
early in the morning the action recommenced and, stubbornly contesting each foot, at times almost in hand-to-hand conflict with tribesmen in the bushes, the rear guard fell back. the summit of the kotal was passed; but the enemy continued to harass their retirement down to the river, where the picket post of the 9th ghoorkhas was reached. the retirement from the tirah had cost a hundred and sixty-four killed and wounded. as a military achievement, this march of lockhart's 2nd division should have a prominent place in the history of the british army.
after a quiet day, the force marched into swaikot. next morning the troops in camp there gathered on each side of the road, cheering their battle-grimed comrades, and bringing down hot cakes to them. it was a depressing sight. the men were all pinched and dishevelled, and bore on their faces marks of the terrible ordeal through which they had just passed.
the advance guard were followed by the wounded. the 4th brigade followed. they were even more marked by hardship and strife than those who had preceded them. then the rear guard marched in, and the first phase of the tirah expedition was at an end.
the expedition had carried out its object successfully. the afridis had been severely punished, and had been taught what they had hitherto believed impossible, that their defiles were not impregnable, and that the long arm of the british government could reach them in their recesses. the lesson had been a very severe one, but it had been attained at a terrible cost. it is to be hoped that it will never have to be repeated.
but while the regiment were resting quietly in their cantonment, there had been serious fighting on the road to chitral. after some hesitation, the government had decided that this post should remain in our hands, and a strong force was therefore stationed at the malakand. this, after clearing the country, remained quietly at the station; until news was received of the attack on our fort at shabkadr, near peshawar, by the mohmunds and, two days later, news came that a large council had been held by the fanatics of various tribes, at which they decided to join the tribes in the upper valley of swat.
on the 14th of august the force set out from thana, under sir bindon blood, on their march for the upper swat. the 11th bengal lancers were sent forward in order to reconnoitre the country. the enemy were found in force near jelala, at the entrance to the upper swat river, their advance post being established in some buddhist ruins on a ridge. the royal west kent, however, advanced and drove them off.
then news came that several thousand of the enemy occupied a front, of some two miles, along the height; their right flank resting on the steep cliffs, and their left reaching to the top of the higher hills. the battery opened fire upon them; and the infantry, coming into action at nine o'clock in the morning, did much execution among the crowded ghazis.
the 31st and 24th punjab infantry, under general meiklejohn, had a long and arduous march on the enemy's left. the movement was successfully carried out; and the enemy, knowing that their line of retreat towards the morah pass was threatened, broke up, a large portion streaming away to their left. the remainder soon lost heart and, although a desperate charge by a handful of ghazis took place, these only sacrificed their lives, without altering the course of events.
the enemy gathered on a ridge in the rear but, by eleven, the heights commanding the road were in the hands of our troops, and the guides cavalry began to file past. when they got into the pass behind the ridge, the enemy were more than a mile away; and could be seen in great numbers, separated by several ravines.
captain palmer, who had pushed forward in pursuit, soon found himself ahead of his men. near him were lieutenant greaves and, thirty yards behind, colonel adams and lieutenant norman. seeing that the enemy were in considerable force, colonel adams directed the troop of cavalry who were coming up to hold a graveyard, through which they had passed, until the infantry could arrive. owing, however, to the noise of the firing, palmer and greaves did not hear him; and charged up to the foot of the hill, hoping to cut off the tribesmen who were hurrying towards them. palmer's horse was at once killed, and greaves fell among the pathans.
adams and fincastle, and two soldiers, galloped forward to their assistance, and were able to help palmer back to the shelter of the graveyard. meanwhile fincastle, who had had his horse killed, tried to help greaves on to adams' horse. while doing so, greaves was again shot through the body, and adams' horse wounded. the two troopers came to their assistance; and maclean, having first dismounted his squadron in the graveyard, pluckily rode out with four of his men. in this way the wounded were successfully brought in; but maclean was shot through both thighs, and died almost instantly. the loss of the two officers, who were both extremely popular, was greatly felt by the force.
the infantry and guns now having arrived, the enemy retired to a village, two miles in the rear. here they were attacked by a squadron of the guides, who dispersed them and drove them up into the hills. in the meantime our camp had been attacked, but the guard repulsed the assailants, with some loss.
the enemy had lost so heavily that they scattered to the villages, and sent in to make their submission. this fight effectually cooled the courage of the natives, and the column marched through their country unopposed, and the tribesmen remained comparatively quiet during the after events.
