under every dominion the state is said to be civil; but the entire body subject to a dominion is called a commonwealth, and the general business of the dominion, subject to the direction of him that holds it, has the name of affairs of state. next we call men citizens, as far as they enjoy by the civil law all the advantages of the commonwealth, and subjects, as far as they are bound to obey its ordinances or laws. lastly, we have already said that, of the civil state, there are three kinds — democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy (chap. ii. sec. 17). now, before i begin to treat of each kind separately, i will first deduce all the properties of the civil state in general. and of these, first of all comes to be considered the supreme right of the commonwealth, or the right of the supreme authorities.

2. from chap. ii. sec. 15, it is clear that the right of the supreme authorities is nothing else than simple natural right, limited, indeed, by the power, not of every individual, but of the multitude, which is guided, as it were, by one mind — that is, as each individual in the state of nature, so the body and mind of a dominion have as much right as they have power. and thus each single citizen or subject has the less right, the more the commonwealth exceeds him in power (chap. ii. sec. 16), and each citizen consequently does and has nothing, but what he may by the general decree of the commonwealth defend.

3. if the commonwealth grant to any man the right, and therewith the authority (for else it is but a gift of words, chap. ii. sec. 12), to live after his own mind, by that very act it abandons its own right, and transfers the same to him, to whom it has given such authority. but if it has given this authority to two or more, i mean authority to live each after his own mind, by that very act it has divided the dominion, and if, lastly, it has given this same authority to every citizen, it has thereby destroyed itself, and there remains no more a commonwealth, but everything returns to the state of nature; all of which is very manifest from what goes before. and thus it follows, that it can by no means be conceived, that every citizen should by the ordinance of the commonwealth live after his own mind, and accordingly this natural right of being one's own judge ceases in the civil state. i say expressly "by the ordinance of the commonwealth," for, if we weigh the matter aright, the natural right of every man does not cease in the civil state. for man, alike in the natural and in the civil state, acts according to the laws of his own nature, and consults his own interest. man, i say, in each state is led by fear or hope to do or leave undone this or that; but the main difference between the two states is this, that in the civil state all fear the same things, and all have the same ground of security, and manner of life; and this certainly does not do away with the individual's faculty of judgment. for he that is minded to obey all the commonwealth's orders, whether through fear of its power or through love of quiet, certainly consults after his own heart his own safety and interest.

4. moreover, we cannot even conceive, that every citizen should be allowed to interpret the commonwealth's decrees or laws. for were every citizen allowed this, he would thereby be his own judge, because each would easily be able to give a colour of right to his own deeds, which by the last section is absurd.

5. we see then, that every citizen depends not on himself, but on the commonwealth, all whose commands he is bound to execute, and has no right to decide, what is equitable or iniquitous, just or unjust. but, on the contrary, as the body of the dominion should, so to speak, be guided by one mind, and consequently the will of the commonwealth must be taken to be the will of all; what the state decides to be just and good must be held to be so decided by every individual. and so, however iniquitous the subject may think the commonwealth's decisions, he is none the less bound to execute them.

6. but (it may be objected) is it not contrary to the dictate of reason to subject one's self wholly to the judgment of another, and consequently, is not the civil state repugnant to reason? whence it would follow, that the civil state is irrational, and could only be created by men destitute of reason, not at all by such as are led by it. but since reason teaches nothing contrary to nature, sound reason cannot therefore dictate, that every one should remain independent, so long as men are liable to passions (chap. ii. sec. 15), that is, reason pronounces against such independence (chap. i. sec. 5). besides, reason altogether teaches to seek peace, and peace cannot be maintained, unless the commonwealth's general laws be kept unbroken. and so, the more a man is guided by reason, that is (chap. ii. sec. 11), the more he is free, the more constantly he will keep the laws of the commonwealth, and execute the commands of the supreme authority, whose subject he is. furthermore, the civil state is naturally ordained to remove general fear, and prevent general sufferings, and therefore pursues above everything the very end, after which everyone, who is led by reason, strives, but in the natural state strives vainly (chap. ii. sec. 15). wherefore, if a man, who is led by reason, has sometimes to do by the commonwealth's order what he knows to be repugnant to reason, that harm is far compensated by the good, which he derives from the existence of a civil state. for it is reason's own law, to choose the less of two evils; and accordingly we may conclude, that no one is acting against the dictate of his own reason, so far as he does what by the law of the commonwealth is to be done. and this anyone will more easily grant us, after we have explained, how far the power and consequently the right of the commonwealth extends.

7. for, first of all, it must be considered, that, as in the state of nature the man who is led by reason is most powerful and most independent, so too that commonwealth will be most powerful and most independent, which is founded and guided by reason. for the right of the commonwealth is determined by the power of the multitude, which is led, as it were, by one mind. but this unity of mind can in no wise be conceived, unless the commonwealth pursues chiefly the very end, which sound reason teaches is to the interest of all men.

8. in the second place it comes to be considered, that subjects are so far dependent not on themselves, but on the commonwealth, as they fear its power or threats, or as they love the civil state (chap. ii. sect. 10). whence it follows, that such things, as no one can be induced to do by rewards or threats, do not fall within the rights of the commonwealth. for instance, by reason of his faculty of judgment, it is in no man's power to believe. for by what rewards or threats can a man be brought to believe, that the whole is not greater than its part, or that god does not exist, or that that is an infinite being, which he sees to be finite, or generally anything contrary to his sense or thought? so, too, by what rewards or threats can a man be brought to love one, whom he hates, or to hate one, whom he loves? and to this head must likewise be referred such things as are so abhorrent to human nature, that it regards them as actually worse than any evil, as that a man should be witness against himself, or torture himself, or kill his parents, or not strive to avoid death, and the like, to which no one can be induced by rewards or threats. but if we still choose to say, that the commonwealth has the right or authority to order such things, we can conceive of it in no other sense, than that in which one might say, that a man has the right to be mad or delirious. for what but a delirious fancy would such a right be, as could bind no one? and here i am speaking expressly of such things as cannot be subject to the right of a commonwealth and are abhorrent to human nature in general. for the fact, that a fool or madman can by no rewards or threats be induced to execute orders, or that this or that person, because he is attached to this or that religion, judges the laws of a dominion worse than any possible evil, in no wise makes void the laws of the commonwealth, since by them most of the citizens are restrained. and so, as those who are without fear or hope are so far independent (chap. ii. sec. 10), they are, therefore, enemies of the dominion (chap. ii. sec. 14), and may lawfully be coerced by force.

9. thirdly and lastly, it comes to be considered, that those things are not so much within the commonwealth's right, which cause indignation in the majority. for it is certain, that by the guidance of nature men conspire together, either through common fear, or with the desire to avenge some common hurt; and as the right of the commonwealth is determined by the common power of the multitude, it is certain that the power and right of the commonwealth are so far diminished, as it gives occasion for many to conspire together. there are certainly some subjects of fear for a commonwealth, and as every separate citizen or in the state of nature every man, so a commonwealth is the less independent, the greater reason it has to fear. so much for the right of supreme authorities over subjects. now before i treat of the right of the said authorities as against others, we had better resolve a question commonly mooted about religion.

10. for it may be objected to us, do not the civil state, and the obedience of subjects, such as we have shown is required in the civil state, do away with religion, whereby we are bound to worship god? but if we consider the matter, as it really is, we shall find nothing that can suggest a scruple. for the mind, so far as it makes use of reason, is dependent, not on the supreme authorities, but on itself (chap. ii. sec. 11). and so the true knowledge and the love of god cannot be subject to the dominion of any, nor yet can charity towards one's neighbour (sec. 8). and if we further reflect, that the highest exercise of charity is that which aims at keeping peace and joining in unity, we shall not doubt that he does his duty, who helps everyone, so far as the commonwealth's laws, that is so far as unity and quiet allow. as for external rites, it is certain, that they can do no good or harm at all in respect of the true knowledge of god, and the love which necessarily results from it; and so they ought not to be held of such importance, that it should be thought worth while on their account to disturb public peace and quiet. moreover it is certain, that i am not a champion of religion by the law of nature, that is (chap. ii. sec. 3), by the divine decree. for i have no authority, as once the disciples of christ had, to cast out unclean spirits and work miracles; which authority is yet so necessary to the propagating of religion in places where it is forbidden, that without it one not only, as they say, wastes one's time 1 and trouble, but causes besides very many inconveniences, whereof all ages have seen most mournful examples. everyone therefore, wherever he may be, can worship god with true religion, and mind his own business, which is the duty of a private man. but the care of propagating religion should be left to god, or the supreme authorities, upon whom alone falls the charge of affairs of state. but i return to my subject.

11. after explaining the right of supreme authorities over citizens and the duty of subjects, it remains to consider the right of such authorities against the world at large, which is now easily intelligible from what has been said. for since (sec. 2) the right of the supreme authorities is nothing else but simple natural right, it follows that two dominions stand towards each other in the same relation as do two men in the state of nature, with this exception, that a commonwealth can provide against being oppressed by another; which a man in the state of nature cannot do, seeing that he is overcome daily by sleep, often by disease or mental infirmity, and in the end by old age, and is besides liable to other inconveniences, from which a commonwealth can secure itself.

12. a commonwealth then is so far independent, as it can plan and provide against oppression by another (chap. ii. secs. 9, 15), and so far dependent on another commonwealth, as it fears that other's power, or is hindered by it from executing its own wishes, or lastly, as it needs its help for its own preservation or increase (chap. ii. secs. 10, 15). for we cannot at all doubt, that if two commonwealths are willing to offer each other mutual help, both together are more powerful, and therefore have more right, than either alone (chap. ii. sec. 13).

13. but this will be more clearly intelligible, if we reflect, that two commonwealths are naturally enemies. for men in the state of nature are enemies (chap. ii. sec. 14). those, then, who stand outside a commonwealth, and retain their natural rights, continue enemies. accordingly, if one commonwealth wishes to make war on another and employ extreme measures to make that other dependent on itself, it may lawfully make the attempt, since it needs but the bare will of the commonwealth for war to be waged. but concerning peace it can decide nothing, save with the concurrence of another commonwealth's will. whence it follows, that laws of war regard every commonwealth by itself, but laws of peace regard not one, but at the least two commonwealths, which are therefore called "contracting powers."

14. this "contract" remains so long unmoved as the motive for entering into it, that is, fear of hurt or hope of gain, subsists. but take away from either commonwealth this hope or fear, and it is left independent (chap. ii. sec. 10), and the link, whereby the commonwealths were mutually bound, breaks of itself. and therefore every commonwealth has the right to break its contract, whenever it chooses, and cannot be said to act treacherously or perfidiously in breaking its word, as soon as the motive of hope or fear is removed. for every contracting party was on equal terms in this respect, that whichever could first free itself of fear should be independent, and make use of its independence after its own mind; and, besides, no one makes a contract respecting the future, but on the hypothesis of certain precedent circumstances. but when these circumstances change, the reason of policy applicable to the whole position changes with them; and therefore every one of the contracting commonwealths retains the right of consulting its own interest, and consequently endeavours, as far as possible, to be free from fear and thereby independent, and to prevent another from coming out of the contract with greater power. if then a commonwealth complains that it has been deceived, it cannot properly blame the bad faith of another contracting commonwealth, but only its own folly in having entrusted its own welfare to another party, that was independent, and had for its highest law the welfare of its own dominion.

15. to commonwealths, which have contracted a treaty of peace, it belongs to decide the questions, which may be mooted about the terms or rules of peace, whereby they have mutually bound themselves, inasmuch as laws of peace regard not one commonwealth, but the commonwealths which contract taken together (sec. 18). but if they cannot agree together about the conditions, they by that very fact return to a state of war.

16. the more commonwealths there are, that have contracted a joint treaty of peace, the less each of them by itself is an object of fear to the remainder, or the less it has the authority to make war. but it is so much the more bound to observe the conditions of peace; that is (sec. 13), the less independent, and the more bound to accommodate itself to the general will of the contracting parties.

17. but the good faith, inculcated by sound reason and religion, is not hereby made void; for neither reason nor scripture teaches one to keep one's word in every case. for if i have promised a man, for instance, to keep safe a sum of money he has secretly deposited with me, i am not bound to keep my word, from the time that i know or believe the deposit to have been stolen, but i shall act more rightly in endeavouring to restore it to its owners. so likewise, if the supreme authority has promised another to do something, which subsequently occasion or reason shows or seems to show is contrary to the welfare of its subjects, it is surely bound to break its word. as then scripture only teaches us to keep our word in general, and leaves to every individual's judgment the special cases of exception, it teaches nothing repugnant to what we have just proved.

18. but that i may not have so often to break the thread of my discourse, and to resolve hereafter similar objections, i would have it known that all this demonstration of mine proceeds from the necessity of human nature, considered in what light you will — i mean, from the universal effort of all men after self-preservation, an effort inherent in all men, whether learned or unlearned. and therefore, however one considers men are led, whether by passion or by reason, it will be the same thing; for the demonstration, as we have said, is of universal application.