hitherto we have considered an aristocracy, so far as it takes its name from one city, which is the head of the whole dominion. it is now time to treat of that, which is in the hands of more than one city, and which i think preferable to the former. but that we may notice its difference and its superiority, we will pass in review the foundations of dominion, one by one, rejecting those foundations, which are unsuited to the present kind, and laying in their place others for it to rest upon.
2. the cities, then, which enjoy the right of citizenship, must be so built and fortified, that, on the one hand, each city by itself may be unable to subsist without the rest, and that yet, on the other hand, it cannot desert the rest without great harm to the whole dominion. for thus they will always remain united. but cities, which are so constituted, that they can neither maintain themselves, nor be dangerous to the rest, are clearly not independent, but absolutely subject to the rest.
3. but the contents of the ninth and tenth sections of the last chapter are deduced from the general nature of aristocracy, as are also the proportion between the numbers of the patricians and the multitude, and the proper age and condition of those that are to be made patricians; so that on these points no difference can arise, whether the dominion be in the hands of one or more cities. but the supreme council must here be on a different footing. for if any city of the dominion were assigned for the meeting of this supreme council, it would in reality be the head of the dominion; and, therefore, either they would have to take turns, or a place would have to be assigned for this council, that has not the right of citizenship, and belongs equally to all. but either alternative is as difficult to effect, as it is easy to state; i mean, either that so many thousands of men should have to go often outside their cities, or that they should have to assemble sometimes in one place, sometimes in another.
4. but that we may conclude aright what should be done in this matter, and on what plan the councils of this dominion ought to be formed, from its own very nature and condition, these points are to be considered; namely, that every city has so much more right than a private man, as it excels him in power (chap. ii. sec. 4), and consequently that every city of this dominion has as much right within its walls, or the limits of its jurisdiction, as it has power; and, in the next place, that all the cities are mutually associated and united, not as under a treaty, but as forming one dominion, yet so that every city has so much more right as against the dominion than the others, as it exceeds the others in power. for he who seeks equality between unequals, seeks an absurdity. citizens, indeed, are rightly esteemed equal, because the power of each, compared with that of the whole dominion, is of no account. but each city's power constitutes a large part of the power of the dominion itself, and so much the larger, as the city itself is greater. and, therefore, the cities cannot all be held equal. but, as the power of each, so also its right should be estimated by its greatness. the bonds, however, by which they should be bound into one dominion, are above all a senate and a court of justice (chap. iv. sec. 1). but how by these bonds they are all to be so united, that each of them may yet remain, as far as possible, independent, i will here briefly show.
5. i suppose then, that the patricians of every city, who, according to its size, should be more, or fewer (sec. 3), have supreme right over their own city, and that, in that city's supreme council, they have supreme authority to fortify the city and enlarge its walls, to impose taxes, to pass and repeal laws, and, in general, to do everything which they judge necessary to their city's preservation and increase. but to manage the common business of the dominion, a senate is to be created on just the same footing as we described in the last chapter, so that there be between this senate and the former no difference, except that this has also authority to decide the disputes, which may arise between cities. for in this dominion, of which no city is head, it cannot be done by the supreme council. (see chap. vi. sec. 38.)
6. but, in this dominion, the supreme council is not to be called together, unless there is need to alter the form of the dominion itself, or on some difficult business, to which the senators shall think themselves unequal; and so it will very rarely happen, that all the patricians are summoned to council. for we have said (chap. viii. sec. 17), that the supreme council's function is to pass and repeal laws, and to choose the ministers of the dominion. but the laws, or general constitution of the whole dominion, ought not to be changed as soon as instituted. if, however, time and occasion suggest the institution of some new law or the change of one already ordained, the question may first be discussed in the senate, and after the agreement of the senate in the matter, then let envoys next be sent to the cities by the senate itself, to inform the patricians of every city of the opinion of the senate, and lastly, if the majority of the cities follow that opinion, it shall then remain good, but otherwise be of no effect. and this same order may be observed in choosing the generals of the army and the ambassadors to be sent to other realms, as also about decrees concerning the making of war or accepting conditions of peace. but in choosing the other public officials, since (as we showed in sec. 4) every city, as far as can be, ought to remain independent, and to have as much more right than the others in the dominion, as it exceeds them in power, the following order must necessarily be observed. the senators are to be chosen by the patricians of each city; that is, the patricians of one city are to elect in their own council a fixed number of senators from their colleagues of their own city, which number is to be to that of the patricians of that city as one to twelve (chap. viii. sec. 30); and they are to designate whom they will to be of the first, second, third, or other series; and in like manner the patricians of the other cities, in proportion to their number, are to choose more or fewer senators, and distribute them among the series, into a certain number of which we have said the senate is to be divided. (chap. viii. sec. 34.) by which means it will result, that in every series of senators there will be found senators of every city, more or fewer, according to its size. but the presidents and vice-presidents of the series, being fewer in number than the cities, are to be chosen by lot by the senate out of the consuls, who are to be appointed first. the same order is to be maintained in appointing the supreme judges of the dominion, namely, that the patricians of every city are to elect from their colleagues in proportion to their number more or fewer judges. and so it will be the case, that every city in choosing officials will be as independent as possible, and that each, in proportion to its power, will have the more right alike in the senate and the court of justice; supposing, that is, that the order observed by senate and court in deciding public affairs, and settling disputes is such in all respects, as we have described it in the thirty-third and thirty-fourth sections of the last chapter. 1
7. next, the commanders of battalions and military tribunes are also to be chosen from the patricians. for as it is fair, that every city in proportion to its size should be bound to levy a certain number of soldiers for the general safety of the whole dominion, it is also fair, that from the patricians of every city in proportion to the number of regiments, which they are bound to maintain, they may appoint so many tribunes, captains, ensigns, etc., as are needed to discipline that part of the military, which they supply to the dominion.
8. no taxes are to be imposed by the senate on the subjects; but to meet the expenditure, which by decree of the senate is necessary to carry on public business, not the subjects, but the cities themselves are to be called to assessment by the senate, so that every city, in proportion to its size, should pay a larger or smaller share of the expense. and this share indeed is to be exacted by the patricians of every city from their own citizens in what way they please, either by compelling them to an assessment, or, as is much fairer, by imposing taxes on them.
9. further, although all the cities of this dominion are not maritime, nor the senators summoned from the maritime cities only, yet may the same emoluments be awarded to the senators, as we mentioned in the thirty-first section of the last chapter. to which end it will be possible to devise means, varying with the composition of the dominion, to link the cities to one another more closely. but the other points concerning the senate and the court of justice and the whole dominion in general, which i delivered in the last chapter, are to be applied to this dominion also. and so we see, that in a dominion which is in the hands of several cities, it will not be necessary to assign a fixed time or place for assembling the supreme council. but for the senate and court of justice a place is to be appointed in a village, or in a city, that has not the right of voting. but i return to those points, which concern the cities taken by themselves.
10. the order to be observed by the supreme council of a single city, in choosing officials of the dominion and of the city, and in making decrees, should be the same that i have delivered in the twenty-seventh and thirty-sixth sections of the last chapter. for the policy is the same here as it was there. next a council of syndics is to be formed, subordinate to the council of the city, and having the same relation to it as the council of syndics of the last chapter had to the council of the entire dominion, and let its functions within the limits of the city be also the same, and let it enjoy the same emoluments. but if a city, and consequently the number of its patricians be so small that it cannot create more than one syndic or two, which two are not enough to make a council, then the supreme council of the city is to appoint judges to assist the syndics in trials according to the matter at issue, or else the dispute must be referred to the supreme council of syndics. for from every city some also out of the syndics are to be sent to the place where the senate sits, to see that the constitution of the whole dominion is preserved unbroken, and they are to sit in the senate without the right of voting.
11. the consuls of the cities are likewise to be chosen by the patricians of their city, and are to constitute a sort of senate for it. but their number i cannot determine, nor yet do i think it necessary, since the city's business of great importance is transacted by its supreme council, and matters concerning the whole dominion by the great senate. but if they be few, it will be necessary that they give their votes in their council openly, and not by ballot, as in large councils. for in small councils, when votes are given secretly, by a little extra cunning one can easily detect the author of every vote, and in many ways deceive the less attentive.
12. besides, in every city judges are to be appointed by its supreme council, from whose sentence, however, let everyone but an openly convicted criminal or confessed debtor have a right of appeal to the supreme court of justice of the dominion. but this need not be pursued further.
13. it remains, therefore, to speak of the cities which are not independent. if these were founded in an actual province or district of the dominion, and their inhabitants are of the same nation and language, they ought of necessity, like villages, to be esteemed parts of the neighbouring cities, so that each of them should be under the government of this or that independent city. and the reason of this is, that the patricians are chosen by the supreme council, not of the dominion, but of every city, and in every city are more or fewer, according to the number of inhabitants within the limits of its jurisdiction (sec. 5). and so it is necessary, that the multitude of the city, which is not independent, be referred to the census of another which is independent, and depend upon the latter's government. but cities captured by right of war, and annexed to the dominion, are either to be esteemed associates in the dominion, and though conquered put under an obligation by that benefit, or else colonies to enjoy the right of citizenship are to be sent thither, and the natives removed elsewhere or utterly destroyed.
14. and these are the things, which touch the foundations of the dominion. but that its condition is better than that of the aristocracy, which is called after one city only, i conclude from this, namely, that the patricians of every city, after the manner of human desire, will be eager to keep, and if possible increase their right, both in their city and in the senate; and therefore will try, as far as possible, to attract the multitude to themselves, and consequently to make a stir in the dominion by good deeds rather than by fear, and to increase their own number; because the more numerous they are, the more senators they will choose out of their own council (sec. 6), and hence the more right (sec. 6) they will possess in the dominion. nor is it an objection, that while every city is consulting its own interest and suspecting the rest, they more often quarrel among themselves, and waste time in disputing. for if, while the romans are debating, saguntum is lost: 2 on the other hand, while a few are deciding everything in conformity with their own passions only, liberty and the general good are lost. for men's natural abilities are too dull to see through everything at once; but by consulting, listening, and debating, they grow more acute, and while they are trying all means, they at last discover those which they want, which all approve, but no one would have thought of in the first instance. but if anyone retorts, that the dominion of the dutch has not long endured without a count or one to fill his place, let him have this reply, that the dutch thought, that to maintain their liberty it was enough to abandon their count, and to behead the body of their dominion, but never thought of remoulding it, and left its limbs, just as they had been first constituted, so that the county of holland has remained without a count, like a headless body, and the actual dominion has lasted on without the name. and so it is no wonder that most of its subjects have not known, with whom the authority of the dominion lay. and even had this been otherwise, yet those who actually held dominion were far too few to govern the multitude and suppress their powerful adversaries. whence it has come to pass, that the latter have often been able to plot against them with impunity, and at last to overthrow them. and so the sudden overthrow of the said republic 3 has not arisen from a useless waste of time in debates, but from the misformed state of the said dominion and the fewness of its rulers.
15. this aristocracy in the hands of several cities is also preferable to the other, because it is not necessary, as in the first described, to provide against its whole supreme council being overpowered by a sudden attack, since (sec. 9) no time or place is appointed for its meeting. moreover, powerful citizens in this dominion are less to be feared. for where several cities enjoy liberty, it is not enough for him, who is making ready his way to dominion, to seize one city, in order to hold dominion over the rest. and, lastly, liberty under this dominion is common to more. for where one city reigns alone, there the advantage of the rest is only so far considered, as suits that reigning city.
