i

he who would duly inquire about the best form of a state ought first to determine which is the most eligible life; while this remains uncertain the best form of the state must also be uncertain; for, in the natural order of things, those may be expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best manner of which their circumstances admit. we ought therefore to ascertain, first of all, which is the most generally eligible life, and then whether the same life is or is not best for the state and for individuals.

assuming that enough has been already said in discussions outside the school concerning the best life, we will now only repeat what is contained in them. certainly no one will dispute the propriety of that partition of goods which separates them into three classes, viz., external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, or deny that the happy man must have all three. for no one would maintain that he is happy who has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice or prudence, who is afraid of every insect which flutters past him, and will commit any crime, however great, in order to gratify his lust of meat or drink, who will sacrifice his dearest friend for the sake of half-a-farthing, and is as feeble and false in mind as a child or a madman. these propositions are almost universally acknowledged as soon as they are uttered, but men differ about the degree or relative superiority of this or that good. some think that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like. to whom we reply by an appeal to facts, which easily prove that mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities; and this is not only matter of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with reason. for, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other instrument, and all things useful are of such a nature that where there is too much of them they must either do harm, or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every good of the soul, the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet useful as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects. no proof is required to show that the best state of one thing in relation to another corresponds in degree of excellence to the interval between the natures of which we say that these very states are states: so that, if the soul is more noble than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the other. again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them.

let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. god is a witness to us of this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in himself and by reason of his own nature. and herein of necessity lies the difference between good fortune and happiness; for external goods come of themselves, and chance is the author of them, but no one is just or temperate by or through chance. in like manner, and by a similar train of argument, the happy state may be shown to be that which is best and which acts rightly; and rightly it cannot act without doing right actions, and neither individual nor state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom. thus the courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the qualities which give the individual who possesses them the name of just, wise, or temperate.

thus much may suffice by way of preface: for i could not avoid touching upon these questions, neither could i go through all the arguments affecting them; these are the business of another science.

let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough for the performance of good actions. if there are any who controvert our assertion, we will in this treatise pass them over, and consider their objections hereafter.

ii

there remains to be discussed the question whether the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state, or different. here again there can be no doubt — no one denies that they are the same. for those who hold that the well-being of the individual consists in his wealth, also think that riches make the happiness of the whole state, and those who value most highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the greatest number; while they who approve an individual for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city is, the happier it is. two points here present themselves for consideration: first (1), which is the more eligible life, that of a citizen who is a member of a state, or that of an alien who has no political ties; and again (2), which is the best form of constitution or the best condition of a state, either on the supposition that political privileges are desirable for all, or for a majority only? since the good of the state and not of the individual is the proper subject of political thought and speculation, and we are engaged in a political discussion, while the first of these two points has a secondary interest for us, the latter will be the main subject of our inquiry.

now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily. but even those who agree in thinking that the life of virtue is the most eligible raise a question, whether the life of business and politics is or is not more eligible than one which is wholly independent of external goods, i mean than a contemplative life, which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy of a philosopher. for these two lives — the life of the philosopher and the life of the statesman — appear to have been preferred by those who have been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in other ages. which is the better is a question of no small moment; for the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his life according to the best end. there are some who think that while a despotic rule over others is the greatest injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule over them, even though not unjust, is a great impediment to a man’s individual wellbeing. others take an opposite view; they maintain that the true life of man is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits of being practiced, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as by private individuals. others, again, are of opinion that arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone consists with happiness; indeed, in some states the entire aim both of the laws and of the constitution is to give men despotic power over their neighbors. and, therefore, although in most cities the laws may be said generally to be in a chaotic state, still, if they aim at anything, they aim at the maintenance of power: thus in lacedaemon and crete the system of education and the greater part of the of the laws are framed with a view to war. and in all nations which are able to gratify their ambition military power is held in esteem, for example among the scythians and persians and thracians and celts.

in some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate the warlike virtues, as at carthage, where we are told that men obtain the honor of wearing as many armlets as they have served campaigns. there was once a law in macedonia that he who had not killed an enemy should wear a halter, and among the scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was handed round at a certain feast. among the iberians, a warlike nation, the number of enemies whom a man has slain is indicated by the number of obelisks which are fixed in the earth round his tomb; and there are numerous practices among other nations of a like kind, some of them established by law and others by custom. yet to a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that the statesman should be always considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over others, whether they will or not. how can that which is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the legislator? unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there may be might where there is no right. the other arts and sciences offer no parallel a physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. yet most men appear to think that the art of despotic government is statesmanship, and what men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are not ashamed of practicing towards others; they demand just rule for themselves, but where other men are concerned they care nothing about it. such behavior is irrational; unless the one party is, and the other is not, born to serve, in which case men have a right to command, not indeed all their fellows, but only those who are intended to be subjects; just as we ought not to hunt mankind, whether for food or sacrifice, but only the animals which may be hunted for food or sacrifice, this is to say, such wild animals as are eatable. and surely there may be a city happy in isolation, which we will assume to be well-governed (for it is quite possible that a city thus isolated might be well-administered and have good laws); but such a city would not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest of enemies — all that sort of thing must be excluded. hence we see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally to be deemed honorable, are not the supreme end of all things, but only means. and the good lawgiver should inquire how states and races of men and communities may participate in a good life, and in the happiness which is attainable by them. his enactments will not be always the same; and where there are neighbors he will have to see what sort of studies should be practiced in relation to their several characters, or how the measures appropriate in relation to each are to be adopted. the end at which the best form of government should aim may be properly made a matter of future consideration.

iii

let us now address those who, while they agree that the life of virtue is the most eligible, differ about the manner of practicing it. for some renounce political power, and think that the life of the freeman is different from the life of the statesman and the best of all; but others think the life of the statesman best. the argument of the latter is that he who does nothing cannot do well, and that virtuous activity is identical with happiness. to both we say: ‘you are partly right and partly wrong.’ first class are right in affirming that the life of the freeman is better than the life of the despot; for there is nothing grand or noble in having the use of a slave, in so far as he is a slave; or in issuing commands about necessary things. but it is an error to suppose that every sort of rule is despotic like that of a master over slaves, for there is as great a difference between the rule over freemen and the rule over slaves as there is between slavery by nature and freedom by nature, about which i have said enough at the commencement of this treatise. and it is equally a mistake to place inactivity above action, for happiness is activity, and the actions of the just and wise are the realization of much that is noble.

but perhaps some one, accepting these premises, may still maintain that supreme power is the best of all things, because the possessors of it are able to perform the greatest number of noble actions. if so, the man who is able to rule, instead of giving up anything to his neighbor, ought rather to take away his power; and the father should make no account of his son, nor the son of his father, nor friend of friend; they should not bestow a thought on one another in comparison with this higher object, for the best is the most eligible and ‘doing eligible’ and ‘doing well’ is the best. there might be some truth in such a view if we assume that robbers and plunderers attain the chief good. but this can never be; their hypothesis is false. for the actions of a ruler cannot really be honorable, unless he is as much superior to other men as a husband is to a wife, or a father to his children, or a master to his slaves. and therefore he who violates the law can never recover by any success, however great, what he has already lost in departing from virtue. for equals the honorable and the just consist in sharing alike, as is just and equal. but that the unequal should be given to equals, and the unlike to those who are like, is contrary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to nature is good. if, therefore, there is any one superior in virtue and in the power of performing the best actions, him we ought to follow and obey, but he must have the capacity for action as well as virtue.

if we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best, both for every city collectively, and for individuals. not that a life of action must necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor are those ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts and contemplations which are independent and complete in themselves; since virtuous activity, and therefore a certain kind of action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions the directing mind is most truly said to act. neither, again, is it necessary that states which are cut off from others and choose to live alone should be inactive; for activity, as well as other things, may take place by sections; there are many ways in which the sections of a state act upon one another. the same thing is equally true of every individual. if this were otherwise, god and the universe, who have no external actions over and above their own energies, would be far enough from perfection. hence it is evident that the same life is best for each individual, and for states and for mankind collectively

iv

thus far by way of introduction. in what has preceded i have discussed other forms of government; in what remains the first point to be considered is what should be the conditions of the ideal or perfect state; for the perfect state cannot exist without a due supply of the means of life. and therefore we must presuppose many purely imaginary conditions, but nothing impossible. there will be a certain number of citizens, a country in which to place them, and the like. as the weaver or shipbuilder or any other artisan must have the material proper for his work (and in proportion as this is better prepared, so will the result of his art be nobler), so the statesman or legislator must also have the materials suited to him.

first among the materials required by the statesman is population: he will consider what should be the number and character of the citizens, and then what should be the size and character of the country. most persons think that a state in order to be happy ought to be large; but even if they are right, they have no idea what is a large and what a small state. for they judge of the size of the city by the number of the inhabitants; whereas they ought to regard, not their number, but their power. a city too, like an individual, has a work to do; and that city which is best adapted to the fulfillment of its work is to be deemed greatest, in the same sense of the word great in which hippocrates might be called greater, not as a man, but as a physician, than some one else who was taller and even if we reckon greatness by numbers, we ought not to include everybody, for there must always be in cities a multitude of slaves and sojourners and foreigners; but we should include those only who are members of the state, and who form an essential part of it. the number of the latter is a proof of the greatness of a city; but a city which produces numerous artisans and comparatively few soldiers cannot be great, for a great city is not to be confounded with a populous one. moreover, experience shows that a very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed; since all cities which have a reputation for good government have a limit of population. we may argue on grounds of reason, and the same result will follow. for law is order, and good law is good order; but a very great multitude cannot be orderly: to introduce order into the unlimited is the work of a divine power — of such a power as holds together the universe. beauty is realized in number and magnitude, and the state which combines magnitude with good order must necessarily be the most beautiful. to the size of states there is a limit, as there is to other things, plants, animals, implements; for none of these retain their natural power when they are too large or too small, but they either wholly lose their nature, or are spoiled. for example, a ship which is only a span long will not be a ship at all, nor a ship a quarter of a mile long; yet there may be a ship of a certain size, either too large or too small, which will still be a ship, but bad for sailing. in like manner a state when composed of too few is not, as a state ought to be, self-sufficing; when of too many, though self-sufficing in all mere necessaries, as a nation may be, it is not a state, being almost incapable of constitutional government. for who can be the general of such a vast multitude, or who the herald, unless he have the voice of a stentor?

a state, then, only begins to exist when it has attained a population sufficient for a good life in the political community: it may indeed, if it somewhat exceed this number, be a greater state. but, as i was saying, there must be a limit. what should be the limit will be easily ascertained by experience. for both governors and governed have duties to perform; the special functions of a governor to command and to judge. but if the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other’s characters; where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong. when the population is very large they are manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought not to be. besides, in an over-populous state foreigners and metics will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for who will find them out? clearly then the best limit of the population of a state is the largest number which suffices for the purposes of life, and can be taken in at a single view. enough concerning the size of a state.

v

much the same principle will apply to the territory of the state: every one would agree in praising the territory which is most entirely self-sufficing; and that must be the territory which is all-producing, for to have all things and to want nothing is sufficiency. in size and extent it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at once temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of leisure. whether we are right or wrong in laying down this limit we will inquire more precisely hereafter, when we have occasion to consider what is the right use of property and wealth: a matter which is much disputed, because men are inclined to rush into one of two extremes, some into meanness, others into luxury.

it is not difficult to determine the general character of the territory which is required (there are, however, some points on which military authorities should be heard); it should be difficult of access to the enemy, and easy of egress to the inhabitants. further, we require that the land as well as the inhabitants of whom we were just now speaking should be taken in at a single view, for a country which is easily seen can be easily protected. as to the position of the city, if we could have what we wish, it should be well situated in regard both to sea and land. this then is one principle, that it should be a convenient center for the protection of the whole country: the other is, that it should be suitable for receiving the fruits of the soil, and also for the bringing in of timber and any other products that are easily transported.

vi

whether a communication with the sea is beneficial to a well-ordered state or not is a question which has often been asked. it is argued that the introduction of strangers brought up under other laws, and the increase of population, will be adverse to good order; the increase arises from their using the sea and having a crowd of merchants coming and going, and is inimical to good government. apart from these considerations, it would be undoubtedly better, both with a view to safety and to the provision of necessaries, that the city and territory should be connected with the sea; the defenders of a country, if they are to maintain themselves against an enemy, should be easily relieved both by land and by sea; and even if they are not able to attack by sea and land at once, they will have less difficulty in doing mischief to their assailants on one element, if they themselves can use both. moreover, it is necessary that they should import from abroad what is not found in their own country, and that they should export what they have in excess; for a city ought to be a market, not indeed for others, but for herself.

those who make themselves a market for the world only do so for the sake of revenue, and if a state ought not to desire profit of this kind it ought not to have such an emporium. nowadays we often see in countries and cities dockyards and harbors very conveniently placed outside the city, but not too far off; and they are kept in dependence by walls and similar fortifications. cities thus situated manifestly reap the benefit of intercourse with their ports; and any harm which is likely to accrue may be easily guarded against by the laws, which will pronounce and determine who may hold communication with one another, and who may not.

there can be no doubt that the possession of a moderate naval force is advantageous to a city; the city should be formidable not only to its own citizens but to some of its neighbors, or, if necessary, able to assist them by sea as well as by land. the proper number or magnitude of this naval force is relative to the character of the state; for if her function is to take a leading part in politics, her naval power should be commensurate with the scale of her enterprises. the population of the state need not be much increased, since there is no necessity that the sailors should be citizens: the marines who have the control and command will be freemen, and belong also to the infantry; and wherever there is a dense population of perioeci and husbandmen, there will always be sailors more than enough. of this we see instances at the present day. the city of heraclea, for example, although small in comparison with many others, can man a considerable fleet. such are our conclusions respecting the territory of the state, its harbors, its towns, its relations to the sea, and its maritime power.

vii

having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will proceed to speak of what should be their character. this is a subject which can be easily understood by any one who casts his eye on the more celebrated states of hellas, and generally on the distribution of races in the habitable world. those who live in a cold climate and in europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they retain comparative freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. whereas the natives of asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. but the hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. hence it continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world. there are also similar differences in the different tribes of hellas; for some of them are of a one-sided nature, and are intelligent or courageous only, while in others there is a happy combination of both qualities. and clearly those whom the legislator will most easily lead to virtue may be expected to be both intelligent and courageous. some say that the guardians should be friendly towards those whom they know, fierce towards those whom they do not know. now, passion is the quality of the soul which begets friendship and enables us to love; notably the spirit within us is more stirred against our friends and acquaintances than against those who are unknown to us, when we think that we are despised by them; for which reason archilochus, complaining of his friends, very naturally addresses his soul in these words:

for surely thou art plagued on account of friends.

the power of command and the love of freedom are in all men based upon this quality, for passion is commanding and invincible. nor is it right to say that the guardians should be fierce towards those whom they do not know, for we ought not to be out of temper with any one; and a lofty spirit is not fierce by nature, but only when excited against evil-doers. and this, as i was saying before, is a feeling which men show most strongly towards their friends if they think they have received a wrong at their hands: as indeed is reasonable; for, besides the actual injury, they seem to be deprived of a benefit by those who owe them one. hence the saying:

cruel is the strife of brethren,

and again:

they who love in excess also hate in excess.

thus we have nearly determined the number and character of the citizens of our state, and also the size and nature of their territory. i say ‘nearly,’ for we ought not to require the same minuteness in theory as in the facts given by perception.

viii

as in other natural compounds the conditions of a composite whole are not necessarily organic parts of it, so in a state or in any other combination forming a unity not everything is a part, which is a necessary condition. the members of an association have necessarily some one thing the same and common to all, in which they share equally or unequally for example, food or land or any other thing. but where there are two things of which one is a means and the other an end, they have nothing in common except that the one receives what the other produces. such, for example, is the relation which workmen and tools stand to their work; the house and the builder have nothing in common, but the art of the builder is for the sake of the house. and so states require property, but property, even though living beings are included in it, is no part of a state; for a state is not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible. now, whereas happiness is the highest good, being a realization and perfect practice of virtue, which some can attain, while others have little or none of it, the various qualities of men are clearly the reason why there are various kinds of states and many forms of government; for different men seek after happiness in different ways and by different means, and so make for themselves different modes of life and forms of government. we must see also how many things are indispensable to the existence of a state, for what we call the parts of a state will be found among the indispensables. let us then enumerate the functions of a state, and we shall easily elicit what we want:

first, there must be food; secondly, arts, for life requires many instruments; thirdly, there must be arms, for the members of a community have need of them, and in their own hands, too, in order to maintain authority both against disobedient subjects and against external assailants; fourthly, there must be a certain amount of revenue, both for internal needs, and for the purposes of war; fifthly, or rather first, there must be a care of religion which is commonly called worship; sixthly, and most necessary of all there must be a power of deciding what is for the public interest, and what is just in men’s dealings with one another.

these are the services which every state may be said to need. for a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life; and if any of these things be wanting, it is as we maintain impossible that the community can be absolutely self-sufficing. a state then should be framed with a view to the fulfillment of these functions. there must be husbandmen to procure food, and artisans, and a warlike and a wealthy class, and priests, and judges to decide what is necessary and expedient.

ix

having determined these points, we have in the next place to consider whether all ought to share in every sort of occupation. shall every man be at once husbandman, artisan, councillor, judge, or shall we suppose the several occupations just mentioned assigned to different persons? or, thirdly, shall some employments be assigned to individuals and others common to all? the same arrangement, however, does not occur in every constitution; as we were saying, all may be shared by all, or not all by all, but only by some; and hence arise the differences of constitutions, for in democracies all share in all, in oligarchies the opposite practice prevails. now, since we are here speaking of the best form of government, i.e., that under which the state will be most happy (and happiness, as has been already said, cannot exist without virtue), it clearly follows that in the state which is best governed and possesses men who are just absolutely, and not merely relatively to the principle of the constitution, the citizens must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble, and inimical to virtue. neither must they be husbandmen, since leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties.

again, there is in a state a class of warriors, and another of councillors, who advise about the expedient and determine matters of law, and these seem in an especial manner parts of a state. now, should these two classes be distinguished, or are both functions to be assigned to the same persons? here again there is no difficulty in seeing that both functions will in one way belong to the same, in another, to different persons. to different persons in so far as these i.e., the physical and the employments are suited to different primes of life, for the one requires mental wisdom and the other strength. but on the other hand, since it is an impossible thing that those who are able to use or to resist force should be willing to remain always in subjection, from this point of view the persons are the same; for those who carry arms can always determine the fate of the constitution. it remains therefore that both functions should be entrusted by the ideal constitution to the same persons, not, however, at the same time, but in the order prescribed by nature, who has given to young men strength and to older men wisdom. such a distribution of duties will be expedient and also just, and is founded upon a principle of conformity to merit. besides, the ruling class should be the owners of property, for they are citizens, and the citizens of a state should be in good circumstances; whereas mechanics or any other class which is not a producer of virtue have no share in the state. this follows from our first principle, for happiness cannot exist without virtue, and a city is not to be termed happy in regard to a portion of the citizens, but in regard to them all. and clearly property should be in their hands, since the husbandmen will of necessity be slaves or barbarian perioeci.

of the classes enumerated there remain only the priests, and the manner in which their office is to be regulated is obvious. no husbandman or mechanic should be appointed to it; for the gods should receive honor from the citizens only. now since the body of the citizen is divided into two classes, the warriors and the councillors and it is beseeming that the worship of the gods should be duly performed, and also a rest provided in their service for those who from age have given up active life, to the old men of these two classes should be assigned the duties of the priesthood.

we have shown what are the necessary conditions, and what the parts of a state: husbandmen, craftsmen, and laborers of an kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and councillors. and these are distinguished severally from one another, the distinction being in some cases permanent, in others not.

x

it is not a new or recent discovery of political philosophers that the state ought to be divided into classes, and that the warriors should be separated from the husbandmen. the system has continued in egypt and in crete to this day, and was established, as tradition says, by a law of sesostris in egypt and of minos in crete. the institution of common tables also appears to be of ancient date, being in crete as old as the reign of minos, and in italy far older. the italian historians say that there was a certain italus, king of oenotria, from whom the oenotrians were called italians, and who gave the name of italy to the promontory of europe lying within the scylletic and lametic gulfs, which are distant from one another only half a day’s journey. they say that this italus converted the oenotrians from shepherds into husbandmen, and besides other laws which he gave them, was the founder of their common meals; even in our day some who are derived from him retain this institution and certain other laws of his. on the side of italy towards tyrrhenia dwelt the opici, who are now, as of old, called ausones; and on the side towards iapygia and the ionian gulf, in the district called siritis, the chones, who are likewise of oenotrian race. from this part of the world originally came the institution of common tables; the separation into castes from egypt, for the reign of sesostris is of far greater antiquity than that of minos. it is true indeed that these and many other things have been invented several times over in the course of ages, or rather times without number; for necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions which were absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees. and we may infer that in political institutions the same rule holds. egypt witnesses to the antiquity of all these things, for the egyptians appear to be of all people the most ancient; and they have laws and a regular constitution existing from time immemorial. we should therefore make the best use of what has been already discovered, and try to supply defects.

i have already remarked that the land ought to belong to those who possess arms and have a share in the government, and that the husbandmen ought to be a class distinct from them; and i have determined what should be the extent and nature of the territory. let me proceed to discuss the distribution of the land, and the character of the agricultural class; for i do not think that property ought to be common, as some maintain, but only that by friendly consent there should be a common use of it; and that no citizen should be in want of subsistence.

as to common meals, there is a general agreement that a well ordered city should have them; and we will hereafter explain what are our own reasons for taking this view. they ought, however, to be open to all the citizens. and yet it is not easy for the poor to contribute the requisite sum out of their private means, and to provide also for their household. the expense of religious worship should likewise be a public charge. the land must therefore be divided into two parts, one public and the other private, and each part should be subdivided, part of the public land being appropriated to the service of the gods, and the other part used to defray the cost of the common meals; while of the private land, part should be near the border, and the other near the city, so that, each citizen having two lots, they may all of them have land in both places; there is justice and fairness in such a division, and it tends to inspire unanimity among the people in their border wars. where there is not this arrangement some of them are too ready to come to blows with their neighbors, while others are so cautious that they quite lose the sense of honor. wherefore there is a law in some places which forbids those who dwell near the border to take part in public deliberations about wars with neighbors, on the ground that their interests will pervert their judgment. for the reasons already mentioned, then, the land should be divided in the manner described. the very best thing of all would be that the husbandmen should be slaves taken from among men who are not all of the same race and not spirited, for if they have no spirit they will be better suited for their work, and there will be no danger of their making a revolution. the next best thing would be that they should be perioeci of foreign race, and of a like inferior nature; some of them should be the slaves of individuals, and employed in the private estates of men of property, the remainder should be the property of the state and employed on the common land. i will hereafter explain what is the proper treatment of slaves, and why it is expedient that liberty should be always held out to them as the reward of their services.

xi

we have already said that the city should be open to the land and to the sea, and to the whole country as far as possible. in respect of the place itself our wish would be that its situation should be fortunate in four things. the first, health — this is a necessity: cities which lie towards the east, and are blown upon by winds coming from the east, are the healthiest; next in healthfulness are those which are sheltered from the north wind, for they have a milder winter. the site of the city should likewise be convenient both for political administration and for war. with a view to the latter it should afford easy egress to the citizens, and at the same time be inaccessible and difficult of capture to enemies. there should be a natural abundance of springs and fountains in the town, or, if there is a deficiency of them, great reservoirs may be established for the collection of rainwater, such as will not fail when the inhabitants are cut off from the country by by war. special care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, which will depend chiefly on the healthiness of the locality and of the quarter to which they are exposed, and secondly, on the use of pure water; this latter point is by no means a secondary consideration. for the elements which we use most and oftenest for the support of the body contribute most to health, and among these are water and air. wherefore, in all wise states, if there is a want of pure water, and the supply is not all equally good, the drinking water ought to be separated from that which is used for other purposes.

as to strongholds, what is suitable to different forms of government varies: thus an acropolis is suited to an oligarchy or a monarchy, but a plain to a democracy; neither to an aristocracy, but rather a number of strong places. the arrangement of private houses is considered to be more agreeable and generally more convenient, if the streets are regularly laid out after the modern fashion which hippodamus introduced, but for security in war the antiquated mode of building, which made it difficult for strangers to get out of a town and for assailants to find their way in, is preferable. a city should therefore adopt both plans of building: it is possible to arrange the houses irregularly, as husbandmen plant their vines in what are called ‘clumps.’ the whole town should not be laid out in straight lines, but only certain quarters and regions; thus security and beauty will be combined.

as to walls, those who say that cities making any pretension to military virtue should not have them, are quite out of date in their notions; and they may see the cities which prided themselves on this fancy confuted by facts. true, there is little courage shown in seeking for safety behind a rampart when an enemy is similar in character and not much superior in number; but the superiority of the besiegers may be and often is too much both for ordinary human valor and for that which is found only in a few; and if they are to be saved and to escape defeat and outrage, the strongest wall will be the truest soldierly precaution, more especially now that missiles and siege engines have been brought to such perfection. to have no walls would be as foolish as to choose a site for a town in an exposed country, and to level the heights; or as if an individual were to leave his house unwalled, lest the inmates should become cowards. nor must we forget that those who have their cities surrounded by walls may either take advantage of them or not, but cities which are unwalled have no choice.

if our conclusions are just, not only should cities have walls, but care should be taken to make them ornamental, as well as useful for warlike purposes, and adapted to resist modern inventions. for as the assailants of a city do all they can to gain an advantage, so the defenders should make use of any means of defense which have been already discovered, and should devise and invent others, for when men are well prepared no enemy even thinks of attacking them.

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as the walls are to be divided by guardhouses and towers built at suitable intervals, and the body of citizens must be distributed at common tables, the idea will naturally occur that we should establish some of the common tables in the guardhouses. these might be arranged as has been suggested; while the principal common tables of the magistrates will occupy a suitable place, and there also will be the buildings appropriated to religious worship except in the case of those rites which the law or the pythian oracle has restricted to a special locality. the site should be a spot seen far and wide, which gives due elevation to virtue and towers over the neighborhood. below this spot should be established an agora, such as that which the thessalians call the ‘freemen’s agora’; from this all trade should be excluded, and no mechanic, husbandman, or any such person allowed to enter, unless he be summoned by the magistrates. it would be a charming use of the place, if the gymnastic exercises of the elder men were performed there. for in this noble practice different ages should be separated, and some of the magistrates should stay with the boys, while the grown-up men remain with the magistrates; for the presence of the magistrates is the best mode of inspiring true modesty and ingenuous fear. there should also be a traders’ agora, distinct and apart from the other, in a situation which is convenient for the reception of goods both by sea and land.

but in speaking of the magistrates we must not forget another section of the citizens, viz., the priests, for whom public tables should likewise be provided in their proper place near the temples. the magistrates who deal with contracts, indictments, summonses, and the like, and those who have the care of the agora and of the city, respectively, ought to be established near an agora and some public place of meeting; the neighborhood of the traders’ agora will be a suitable spot; the upper agora we devote to the life of leisure, the other is intended for the necessities of trade.

the same order should prevail in the country, for there too the magistrates, called by some ‘inspectors of forests’ and by others ‘wardens of the country,’ must have guardhouses and common tables while they are on duty; temples should also be scattered throughout the country, dedicated, some to gods, and some to heroes.

but it would be a waste of time for us to linger over details like these. the difficulty is not in imagining but in carrying them out. we may talk about them as much as we like, but the execution of them will depend upon fortune. wherefore let us say no more about these matters for the present.

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returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to determine out of what and what sort of elements the state which is to be happy and well-governed should be composed. there are two things in which all which all well-being consists: one of them is the choice of a right end and aim of action, and the other the discovery of the actions which are means towards it; for the means and the end may agree or disagree. sometimes the right end is set before men, but in practice they fail to attain it; in other cases they are successful in all the means, but they propose to themselves a bad end; and sometimes they fail in both. take, for example, the art of medicine; physicians do not always understand the nature of health, and also the means which they use may not effect the desired end. in all arts and sciences both the end and the means should be equally within our control.

the happiness and well-being which all men manifestly desire, some have the power of attaining, but to others, from some accident or defect of nature, the attainment of them is not granted; for a good life requires a supply of external goods, in a less degree when men are in a good state, in a greater degree when they are in a lower state. others again, who possess the conditions of happiness, go utterly wrong from the first in the pursuit of it. but since our object is to discover the best form of government, that, namely, under which a city will be best governed, and since the city is best governed which has the greatest opportunity of obtaining happiness, it is evident that we must clearly ascertain the nature of happiness.

we maintain, and have said in the ethics, if the arguments there adduced are of any value, that happiness is the realization and perfect exercise of virtue, and this not conditional, but absolute. and i used the term ‘conditional’ to express that which is indispensable, and ‘absolute’ to express that which is good in itself. take the case of just actions; just punishments and chastisements do indeed spring from a good principle, but they are good only because we cannot do without them — it would be better that neither individuals nor states should need anything of the sort — but actions which aim at honor and advantage are absolutely the best. the conditional action is only the choice of a lesser evil; whereas these are the foundation and creation of good. a good man may make the best even of poverty and disease, and the other ills of life; but he can only attain happiness under the opposite conditions (for this also has been determined in accordance with ethical arguments, that the good man is he for whom, because he is virtuous, the things that are absolutely good are good; it is also plain that his use of these goods must be virtuous and in the absolute sense good). this makes men fancy that external goods are the cause of happiness, yet we might as well say that a brilliant performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instrument and not to the skill of the performer.

it follows then from what has been said that some things the legislator must find ready to his hand in a state, others he must provide. and therefore we can only say: may our state be constituted in such a manner as to be blessed with the goods of which fortune disposes (for we acknowledge her power): whereas virtue and goodness in the state are not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge and purpose. a city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens share in the government; let us then inquire how a man becomes virtuous. for even if we could suppose the citizen body to be virtuous, without each of them being so, yet the latter would be better, for in the virtue of each the virtue of all is involved.

there are three things which make men good and virtuous; these are nature, habit, rational principle. in the first place, every one must be born a man and not some other animal; so, too, he must have a certain character, both of body and soul. but some qualities there is no use in having at birth, for they are altered by habit, and there are some gifts which by nature are made to be turned by habit to good or bad. animals lead for the most part a life of nature, although in lesser particulars some are influenced by habit as well. man has rational principle, in addition, and man only. wherefore nature, habit, rational principle must be in harmony with one another; for they do not always agree; men do many things against habit and nature, if rational principle persuades them that they ought. we have already determined what natures are likely to be most easily molded by the hands of the legislator. an else is the work of education; we learn some things by habit and some by instruction.

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since every political society is composed of rulers and subjects let us consider whether the relations of one to the other should interchange or be permanent. for the education of the citizens will necessarily vary with the answer given to this question. now, if some men excelled others in the same degree in which gods and heroes are supposed to excel mankind in general (having in the first place a great advantage even in their bodies, and secondly in their minds), so that the superiority of the governors was undisputed and patent to their subjects, it would clearly be better that once for an the one class should rule and the other serve. but since this is unattainable, and kings have no marked superiority over their subjects, such as scylax affirms to be found among the indians, it is obviously necessary on many grounds that all the citizens alike should take their turn of governing and being governed. equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons, and no government can stand which is not founded upon justice. for if the government be unjust every one in the country unites with the governed in the desire to have a revolution, and it is an impossibility that the members of the government can be so numerous as to be stronger than all their enemies put together. yet that governors should excel their subjects is undeniable. how all this is to be effected, and in what way they will respectively share in the government, the legislator has to consider. the subject has been already mentioned. nature herself has provided the distinction when she made a difference between old and young within the same species, of whom she fitted the one to govern and the other to be governed. no one takes offense at being governed when he is young, nor does he think himself better than his governors, especially if he will enjoy the same privilege when he reaches the required age.

we conclude that from one point of view governors and governed are identical, and from another different. and therefore their education must be the same and also different. for he who would learn to command well must, as men say, first of all learn to obey. as i observed in the first part of this treatise, there is one rule which is for the sake of the rulers and another rule which is for the sake of the ruled; the former is a despotic, the latter a free government. some commands differ not in the thing commanded, but in the intention with which they are imposed. wherefore, many apparently menial offices are an honor to the free youth by whom they are performed; for actions do not differ as honorable or dishonorable in themselves so much as in the end and intention of them. but since we say that the virtue of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good man, and that the same person must first be a subject and then a ruler, the legislator has to see that they become good men, and by what means this may be accomplished, and what is the end of the perfect life.

now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one of which has a rational principle in itself, and the other, not having a rational principle in itself, is able to obey such a principle. and we call a man in any way good because he has the virtues of these two parts. in which of them the end is more likely to be found is no matter of doubt to those who adopt our division; for in the world both of nature and of art the inferior always exists for the sake of the better or superior, and the better or superior is that which has a rational principle. this principle, too, in our ordinary way of speaking, is divided into two kinds, for there is a practical and a speculative principle. this part, then, must evidently be similarly divided. and there must be a corresponding division of actions; the actions of the naturally better part are to be preferred by those who have it in their power to attain to two out of the three or to all, for that is always to every one the most eligible which is the highest attainable by him. the whole of life is further divided into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace, and of actions some aim at what is necessary and useful, and some at what is honorable. and the preference given to one or the other class of actions must necessarily be like the preference given to one or other part of the soul and its actions over the other; there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honorable. all these points the statesman should keep in view when he frames his laws; he should consider the parts of the soul and their functions, and above all the better and the end; he should also remember the diversities of human lives and actions. for men must be able to engage in business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is necessary and indeed what is useful, but what is honorable is better. on such principles children and persons of every age which requires education should be trained. whereas even the hellenes of the present day who are reputed to be best governed, and the legislators who gave them their constitutions, do not appear to have framed their governments with a regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and education with a view to all the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those which promised to be more useful and profitable. many modern writers have taken a similar view: they commend the lacedaemonian constitution, and praise the legislator for making conquest and war his sole aim, a doctrine which may be refuted by argument and has long ago been refuted by facts. for most men desire empire in the hope of accumulating the goods of fortune; and on this ground thibron and all those who have written about the lacedaemonian constitution have praised their legislator, because the lacedaemonians, by being trained to meet dangers, gained great power. but surely they are not a happy people now that their empire has passed away, nor was their legislator right. how ridiculous is the result, if, when they are continuing in the observance of his laws and no one interferes with them, they have lost the better part of life! these writers further err about the sort of government which the legislator should approve, for the government of freemen is nobler and implies more virtue than despotic government. neither is a city to be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised because he trains his citizens to conquer and obtain dominion over their neighbors, for there is great evil in this. on a similar principle any citizen who could, should obviously try to obtain the power in his own state — the crime which the lacedaemonians accuse king pausanias of attempting, although he had so great honor already. no such principle and no law having this object is either statesmanlike or useful or right. for the same things are best both for individuals and for states, and these are the things which the legislator ought to implant in the minds of his citizens.

neither should men study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved; but first of all they should provide against their own enslavement, and in the second place obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not for the sake of exercising a general despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be masters only over those who deserve to be slaves. facts, as well as arguments, prove that the legislator should direct all his military and other measures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. for most of these military states are safe only while they are at war, but fall when they have acquired their empire; like unused iron they lose their temper in time of peace. and for this the legislator is to blame, he never having taught them how to lead the life of peace.

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since the end of individuals and of states is the same, the end of the best man and of the best constitution must also be the same; it is therefore evident that there ought to exist in both of them the virtues of leisure; for peace, as has been often repeated, is the end of war, and leisure of toil. but leisure and cultivation may be promoted, not only by those virtues which are practiced in leisure, but also by some of those which are useful to business. for many necessaries of life have to be supplied before we can have leisure. therefore a city must be temperate and brave, and able to endure: for truly, as the proverb says, ‘there is no leisure for slaves,’ and those who cannot face danger like men are the slaves of any invader. courage and endurance are required for business and philosophy for leisure, temperance and justice for both, and more especially in times of peace and leisure, for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure which comes with peace tend to make them insolent. those then who seem to be the best-off and to be in the possession of every good, have special need of justice and temperance — for example, those (if such there be, as the poets say) who dwell in the islands of the blest; they above all will need philosophy and temperance and justice, and all the more the more leisure they have, living in the midst of abundance. there is no difficulty in seeing why the state that would be happy and good ought to have these virtues. if it be disgraceful in men not to be able to use the goods of life, it is peculiarly disgraceful not to be able to use them in time of leisure — to show excellent qualities in action and war, and when they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves. wherefore we should not practice virtue after the manner of the lacedaemonians. for they, while agreeing with other men in their conception of the highest goods, differ from the rest of mankind in thinking that they are to be obtained by the practice of a single virtue. and since they think these goods and the enjoyment of them greater than the enjoyment derived from the virtues . . . and that it should be practiced for its own sake, is evident from what has been said; we must now consider how and by what means it is to be attained.

we have already determined that nature and habit and rational principle are required, and, of these, the proper nature of the citizens has also been defined by us. but we have still to consider whether the training of early life is to be that of rational principle or habit, for these two must accord, and when in accord they will then form the best of harmonies. the rational principle may be mistaken and fail in attaining the highest ideal of life, and there may be a like evil influence of habit. thus much is clear in the first place, that, as in all other things, birth implies an antecedent beginning, and that there are beginnings whose end is relative to a further end. now, in men rational principle and mind are the end towards which nature strives, so that the birth and moral discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered with a view to them. in the second place, as the soul and body are two, we see also that there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational, and two corresponding states — reason and appetite. and as the body is prior in order of generation to the soul, so the irrational is prior to the rational. the proof is that anger and wishing and desire are implanted in children from their very birth, but reason and understanding are developed as they grow older. wherefore, the care of the body ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should follow: none the less our care of it must be for the sake of the reason, and our care of the body for the sake of the soul.

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since the legislator should begin by considering how the frames of the children whom he is rearing may be as good as possible, his first care will be about marriage — at what age should his citizens marry, and who are fit to marry? in legislating on this subject he ought to consider the persons and the length of their life, that their procreative life may terminate at the same period, and that they may not differ in their bodily powers, as will be the case if the man is still able to beget children while the woman is unable to bear them, or the woman able to bear while the man is unable to beget, for from these causes arise quarrels and differences between married persons. secondly, he must consider the time at which the children will succeed to their parents; there ought not to be too great an interval of age, for then the parents will be too old to derive any pleasure from their affection, or to be of any use to them. nor ought they to be too nearly of an age; to youthful marriages there are many objections — the children will be wanting in respect to the parents, who will seem to be their contemporaries, and disputes will arise in the management of the household. thirdly, and this is the point from which we digressed, the legislator must mold to his will the frames of newly-born children. almost all these objects may be secured by attention to one point. since the time of generation is commonly limited within the age of seventy years in the case of a man, and of fifty in the case of a woman, the commencement of the union should conform to these periods. the union of male and female when too young is bad for the procreation of children; in all other animals the offspring of the young are small and in-developed, and with a tendency to produce female children, and therefore also in man, as is proved by the fact that in those cities in which men and women are accustomed to marry young, the people are small and weak; in childbirth also younger women suffer more, and more of them die; some persons say that this was the meaning of the response once given to the troezenians — the oracle really meant that many died because they married too young; it had nothing to do with the ingathering of the harvest. it also conduces to temperance not to marry too soon; for women who marry early are apt to be wanton; and in men too the bodily frame is stunted if they marry while the seed is growing (for there is a time when the growth of the seed, also, ceases, or continues to but a slight extent). women should marry when they are about eighteen years of age, and men at seven and thirty; then they are in the prime of life, and the decline in the powers of both will coincide. further, the children, if their birth takes place soon, as may reasonably be expected, will succeed in the beginning of their prime, when the fathers are already in the decline of life, and have nearly reached their term of three-score years and ten.

thus much of the age proper for marriage: the season of the year should also be considered; according to our present custom, people generally limit marriage to the season of winter, and they are right. the precepts of physicians and natural philosophers about generation should also be studied by the parents themselves; the physicians give good advice about the favorable conditions of the body, and the natural philosophers about the winds; of which they prefer the north to the south.

what constitution in the parent is most advantageous to the offspring is a subject which we will consider more carefully when we speak of the education of children, and we will only make a few general remarks at present. the constitution of an athlete is not suited to the life of a citizen, or to health, or to the procreation of children, any more than the valetudinarian or exhausted constitution, but one which is in a mean between them. a man’s constitution should be inured to labor, but not to labor which is excessive or of one sort only, such as is practiced by athletes; he should be capable of all the actions of a freeman. these remarks apply equally to both parents.

women who are with child should be careful of themselves; they should take exercise and have a nourishing diet. the first of these prescriptions the legislator will easily carry into effect by requiring that they shall take a walk daily to some temple, where they can worship the gods who preside over birth. their minds, however, unlike their bodies, they ought to keep quiet, for the offspring derive their natures from their mothers as plants do from the earth.

as to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live, but that on the ground of an excess in the number of children, if the established customs of the state forbid this (for in our state population has a limit), no child is to be exposed, but when couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation.

and now, having determined at what ages men and women are to begin their union, let us also determine how long they shall continue to beget and bear offspring for the state; men who are too old, like men who are too young, produce children who are defective in body and mind; the children of very old men are weakly. the limit then, should be the age which is the prime of their intelligence, and this in most persons, according to the notion of some poets who measure life by periods of seven years, is about fifty; at four or five years or later, they should cease from having families; and from that time forward only cohabit with one another for the sake of health; or for some similar reason.

as to adultery, let it be held disgraceful, in general, for any man or woman to be found in any way unfaithful when they are married, and called husband and wife. if during the time of bearing children anything of the sort occur, let the guilty person be punished with a loss of privileges in proportion to the offense.

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after the children have been born, the manner of rearing them may be supposed to have a great effect on their bodily strength. it would appear from the example of animals, and of those nations who desire to create the military habit, that the food which has most milk in it is best suited to human beings; but the less wine the better, if they would escape diseases. also all the motions to which children can be subjected at their early age are very useful. but in order to preserve their tender limbs from distortion, some nations have had recourse to mechanical appliances which straighten their bodies. to accustom children to the cold from their earliest years is also an excellent practice, which greatly conduces to health, and hardens them for military service. hence many barbarians have a custom of plunging their children at birth into a cold stream; others, like the celts, clothe them in a light wrapper only. for human nature should be early habituated to endure all which by habit it can be made to endure; but the process must be gradual. and children, from their natural warmth, may be easily trained to bear cold. such care should attend them in the first stage of life.

the next period lasts to the age of five; during this no demand should be made upon the child for study or labor, lest its growth be impeded; and there should be sufficient motion to prevent the limbs from being inactive. this can be secured, among other ways, by amusement, but the amusement should not be vulgar or tiring or effeminate. the directors of education, as they are termed, should be careful what tales or stories the children hear, for all such things are designed to prepare the way for the business of later life, and should be for the most part imitations of the occupations which they will hereafter pursue in earnest. those are wrong who in their laws attempt to check the loud crying and screaming of children, for these contribute towards their growth, and, in a manner, exercise their bodies. straining the voice has a strengthening effect similar to that produced by the retention of the breath in violent exertions. the directors of education should have an eye to their bringing up, and in particular should take care that they are left as little as possible with slaves. for until they are seven years old they must five at home; and therefore, even at this early age, it is to be expected that they should acquire a taint of meanness from what they hear and see. indeed, there is nothing which the legislator should be more careful to drive away than indecency of speech; for the light utterance of shameful words leads soon to shameful actions. the young especially should never be allowed to repeat or hear anything of the sort. a freeman who is found saying or doing what is forbidden, if he be too young as yet to have the privilege of reclining at the public tables, should be disgraced and beaten, and an elder person degraded as his slavish conduct deserves. and since we do not allow improper language, clearly we should also banish pictures or speeches from the stage which are indecent. let the rulers take care that there be no image or picture representing unseemly actions, except in the temples of those gods at whose festivals the law permits even ribaldry, and whom the law also permits to be worshipped by persons of mature age on behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives. but the legislator should not allow youth to be spectators of iambi or of comedy until they are of an age to sit at the public tables and to drink strong wine; by that time education will have armed them against the evil influences of such representations.

we have made these remarks in a cursory manner — they are enough for the present occasion; but hereafter we will return to the subject and after a fuller discussion determine whether such liberty should or should not be granted, and in what way granted, if at all. theodorus, the tragic actor, was quite right in saying that he would not allow any other actor, not even if he were quite second-rate, to enter before himself, because the spectators grew fond of the voices which they first heard. and the same principle applies universally to association with things as well as with persons, for we always like best whatever comes first. and therefore youth should be kept strangers to all that is bad, and especially to things which suggest vice or hate. when the five years have passed away, during the two following years they must look on at the pursuits which they are hereafter to learn. there are two periods of life with reference to which education has to be divided, from seven to the age of puberty, and onwards to the age of one and twenty. the poets who divide ages by sevens are in the main right: but we should observe the divisions actually made by nature; for the deficiencies of nature are what art and education seek to fill up.

let us then first inquire if any regulations are to be laid down about children, and secondly, whether the care of them should be the concern of the state or of private individuals, which latter is in our own day the common custom, and in the third place, what these regulations should be.