as soon as the enemy had established themselves on 203 metre hill, they began to build an observation station, and connected it to their siege batteries by telephone. december 6 passed in comparative quiet, but towards evening the enemy began to shell our ships. these were lying helplessly under quail hill, hoping to get some protection there from the 11-inch shells; but in vain, for from the summit of 203 metre hill could be seen the harbour, every ship, and every bursting shell. the huge projectiles could be seen falling one after another, either in the water near the ships, raising great pillars of water, or else striking them. the punishment began. the enemy's siege batteries set to work to destroy the squadron, which perished under the eyes of the whole fortress, and the sailors now holding the land positions watched, helpless and with sad hearts, as their ships were struck, and one after another our great giants went to the bottom. a column of smoke was seen to shoot up from the pallada, an explosion was heard, and a fire broke out on her. she struggled for life, admiral wiren himself superintending the extinguishing of the fire, but efforts were in vain, and she slowly perished. the bayan was sunk under golden hill; close to quail hill lay the retvisan on her side, and beyond, again, were the pobieda and poltava, turrets half a-wash, guns pointing dumbly to the sky. along-[pg 260]side stuck out the masts of the zabiyak; the inner harbour was, in fact, a cemetery.
with the loss of 203 metre hill, st?ssel's determination to surrender the fortress ripened; in this he was much influenced by ——. the latter, for some incomprehensible reason, did not like the navy; his dislike reached such proportions that, when the sad news of the destruction of the last ship came in, he crossed himself, and, as if greatly relieved, said, 'thank god—that's the end.' this was said in st?ssel's intimate circle, but it soon became known in the garrison. and so st?ssel, when the destruction of the ships began on december 7, wrote a letter to admiral wiren, in which he categorically insisted on the sunken ships being destroyed, and on those that were able putting out to sea, giving as his reason that with the loss of 203 metre hill the defence of arthur was nearing its end. (the fall of this hill had an enormous significance for the fleet, but was only of secondary importance with regard to the defence of the fortress.)
to general st?ssel's letter admiral wiren replied as follows:
'from the officer commanding the squadron of battleships and cruisers in port arthur to the officer commanding the kwantun fortified district.
'i have the honour to reply to your letter, no. 2,241 of 7th instant, as follows:
'the sortie of the fleet on august 10 of this year, in order to force its way through to vladivostock, was made in accordance with an order from the tsar, communicated in a telegram from the viceroy, though the opinion of the majority of admirals and captains was against such an operation, for—taking into consideration the superiority of the enemy, both in ships, guns, independent cruisers, divisions of destroyers, and speed, as well as the distance to vladivostock without ports en route, and the necessity of passing the enemy's straits near the island of tsu-shima—they deemed it impossible.
[pg 261]
'if everything went well, our ships, having expended their ammunition in fighting the enemy's battleships and repelling torpedo attacks at night, or being disabled like the cesarevitch, would have had to seek the sanctuary of a neutral port, and would have become useless for the rest of the campaign. it was doubtful if any ship would ever have reached vladivostock; the novik, which was the quickest of them, even though she had great luck, was unable to do so.
'all our ships would have been lost in the middle of august, at a time when the enemy's fleet would have been able (thanks to its above-mentioned superiority and to the fact that, while steaming parallel with us, it was making towards its own ports) to operate so that none of its ships were rendered hors de combat. as the enemy's ships would not have been seriously injured in these fights, they could have renewed, refitted, and repaired at ease before the earliest possible arrival of admiral rojdestvensky's squadron in the beginning of january, and could have met it in as good condition as now.
'with the return of our fleet to port arthur, after the battle of august 10, with less than half its ammunition, with battered ships, and many disabled guns, this operation of breaking through to vladivostock became still more impossible. a few days after the squadron's return began the august assaults, in which our naval detachments played an important part, and in which several officers and men were killed. at a conference of flag-officers and captains on august 19 a minute was drawn up, a copy of which i have the honour to attach. in accordance with this it was decided to assist the fortress in every possible way, and we have most conscientiously endeavoured so to do. all the guns asked for for the positions have been taken off the ships and mounted, shells of all calibres have been expended on the land batteries, all ratings have worked according to their special calling for the defence of the fortress, and have taken the most active part in repulsing the attacks in september, in october and, finally, in november on tumulus hill, b battery, and 203 metre hill, where many of all ranks were killed.
'till the capture of the latter the ships were, as far as possible, kept in repair, but they could only have been of assistance to rojdestvensky's fleet after the relief of port arthur by land, which would have enabled us to[pg 262] get ammunition and guns and to refit. rojdestvensky well knows this.
'the ships of the fleet are now sunk. save for a small quantity of 47-millimetre and 12-inch ammunition, all the rest has been put on shore. the officers and crews have been sent ashore. the torpedo officers and men are employed making hand grenades and small shells, and many of the engineers are making ammunition; the remainder of the crews, numbering about 500, form the last reserve, and so the squadron to the very end of all its matériel and personnel is helping the fortress to defend itself. with regard to the sinking of the ships, steps have been taken that uninjured guns should not fall as trophies into the enemy's hands if the fortress falls. the sevastopol, which is the only uninjured battleship, i will try to anchor near white wolf's hill, where, however, she will, of course, be subject to torpedo attacks and risk being sunk. it is naturally sad to have to lose the fleet thus, but if god enables us to hold out in the fortress till relieved from the land side, i am sure that impartial men in port arthur will say that without the assistance rendered by the fleet it would long ago have fallen into the enemy's hands.'
to show clearly the state the fleet was in in the middle of the strict blockade, when the viceroy ordered it to break through to vladivostock after the unlucky attempt on august 10, i will quote an extract from a report of admiral wiren's, which fully illustrates its pitiful condition, and clearly shows that it had not a chance of getting through. the report was written after the fight of august 10:
'i have the honour to report that at present the ships of the squadron under my command are in the following state:
'(a) hulls.
'the repairs to the peresvet, pobieda, retvisan, and pallada are finished, and to the poltava and bayan are being finished. the sevastopol is being repaired with the aid of caissons, and will be ready in six to seven weeks. external damage to the sides has been covered with sheets, and her interior has, as far as possible, been repaired.
[pg 263]
'(b) guns.
'since the commencement of the operations two guns have been absolutely disabled.
'after the conference on august 19, the following were put ashore for the land defences: one 6-inch, ten 75-millimetre, nineteen 47-millimetre, eight 37-millimetre, and three searchlights.
'(c) personnel.
'captain boysman of the peresvet is recovering from wounds, and is on the mongolia. in the fight of august 10 two officers were killed; in the assaults two more were killed; eleven are wounded and sick.
'in reporting the above-mentioned state of the fleet, and in stating that all my thoughts and desires are aimed towards carrying out the tsar's orders and your wishes, i consider it my duty to represent the following facts:
'our fleet, and particularly my squadron, not being able to steam faster than thirteen knots (sevastopol and poltava), cannot possibly get through to vladivostock without a fight, and the result of a fight is not hard to foresee, even if the ships were better than the enemy's in point of fighting—i.e., straight shooting. even supposing that the fleet steams out of port arthur without accident through the mine-fields, which have become more dangerous during the last month, as the enemy have constantly been laying mines (our dredging flotilla, though it has daily trawled, is very weak, has few pinnaces, and what with the destruction of a dredger, a port barge, and two destroyers, has not been able to do much), it is impossible for it to escape notice. our greatest speed is only thirteen knots.
'the enemy would meet us in three or four divisions:
1. division of battleships and armoured cruisers 6 ships
2. division of fast second-class cruisers and one first-class cruiser (yakuma) 5 ships
3. coast-defence battleships and one armoured cruiser (tokiwa) 7 ships
4. several divisions of destroyers and small torpedo craft.
'we cannot take the initiative in action, as the enemy, having superior speed, can steam away if they do not wish[pg 264] to fight, and can accompany us until it suits them to engage in battle—i. e:
'(a) when our fleet is some seventy miles from arthur.
'(b) when they can concentrate all their force.
'(c) when they are occupying a favourable position with regard to the sun and the sea.
'as on august 10, the real fighting would again probably commence in the afternoon; and each of the enemy's ships which were seriously injured would be able to fall out for repairs or to make the land without risk, at a time when each of our ships falling out of action, though only temporarily damaged, might become a prize to two, three, or four of their vessels, or at best might run on to a neutral coast, or steam into a neutral port, and be interned for the rest of the campaign.
'thus they can easily beat us without losing a single big ship, and all damage to ships or guns could be quickly made good in port, after replacing the disabled guns and supplementing the crew. at sunset the big ships would cease fighting, to rest, while two, three, or four destroyer divisions would attack or menace us all night, so that the crews would get no sleep, and we should be forced to waste ammunition till morning. the speed of our fleet would in all probability diminish, as the battered funnels (one of the principal destructions on august 10) increase the expenditure of coal and prevent proper pressure being maintained. if steaming thirteen knots, the voyage to vladivostock takes four days: it will take longer at less speed—i.e., at eight knots the passage would take six days. on the morning of the second day the enemy's battleships, having repaired and rested, would again, whenever it suited them, fall on our tired fleet, and so on repeat their tactics till the island of tsu-shima, where a fresh division of four armoured cruisers and destroyers would be waiting for us; and there, close to their shores, their fortresses and ports, the enemy would try and bring on a decisive action. we could not ram, as this operation requires superior speed. indeed, it would be a miracle if we got to vladivostock, and, having lost the remainder of our pacific ocean fleet, we would be giving the enemy a fresh victory, and, what is more important, depriving the baltic fleet of the possibility of destroying them, since it is weaker than the enemy, both in numbers of ships and of guns, in its many types of vessels, in speed, and in the fact that it will have to force its way through to a base—vladivostock—without which no fleet can operate.'
