palmerston as foreign secretary, april, 1835, to august, 1841.

why lord grey abandoned the government in 1834, and why he refused to come back again either in 1834 or in 1835, is a question in english politics which it is difficult to answer. that it was occasioned, as lord palmerston says, by mr. o’connell and the irish coercion act may be true; but why it should have been occasioned thereby is another question. in the summer of 1834 the government went out with lord grey at its head, and came back with lord melbourne instead of lord grey. the world was astonished when it saw how good a prime minister it had in lord melbourne, and how sufficiently clever he was for all the purposes of his position; and the old-fashioned world has hardly yet got over its astonishment as it looks back on the strong and adequate conduct of william lamb in that position. in july, 1834, the king chose him for the office, and lord palmerston, of course, remained with him. but in november, 1834, the tories came in. “we are all out,” says lord palmerston to his brother. “turned out neck and crop. wellington is prime minister, and we give up the seals, etc., to-morrow at st. james’s at two. i am told ellenborough succeeds me. the speaker{61} takes the home office, ad interim, and till peel returns from italy.” then he adds, “this attempt to re-install the tories cannot possibly last. the country will not stand it. the house of commons will not bear it.”

this change had been brought about by the death of lord spencer, whose eldest son, lord althorp, became a peer, and could no longer lead the house of commons. there was a project to make lord palmerston leader, and it was a position for which he afterwards proved himself to be pre-eminently fitted. but king william took advantage of the accident of lord althorp’s peerage, and was carried by his royal instincts into the arms of the duke of wellington and sir robert peel. this king has always borne the character of being a true liberal. the reform bill was passed in his days, and a tory minister and tory principles were for a time impossible. but for a few months, when lord grey had gone, and lord althorp had been removed from the house of commons, he went back to toryism, as it was surely natural that a king should do. but here must be given an extract from a kindly letter which the king wrote to lord palmerston on his leaving office, which is inserted for the purpose of showing that though the foreign secretary had no doubt made himself disagreeable to the king of the french and to his servants, he had contrived to make himself pleasant to his own sovereign. “his majesty has, at all times, derived satisfaction from the free and unreserved character of viscount palmerston’s official intercourse with him, and from the anxiety which he has shown to afford to him upon every matter the most ample information, and all the explanation which he could possibly require, and{62} his majesty assures lord palmerston that he will always take a constant interest in his welfare and happiness.

“william r.”

but though the tories were strong in hope, and sir robert peel had hurried back from italy very fast,—but hardly fast enough to satisfy the longings of his party,—they were not destined to remain in power. on april 21, 1835, he once more writes to his brother from the foreign office, “here i am again at my old work.” but at the general election he had lost his seat for south hampshire, the county having a county’s dislike to a whig member. lord palmerston had, however, found a seat at tiverton, which he kept till he died. we are told that at this period he nearly slipped out of official life, having in truth but few strong ties by which he was bound to other men. some asked themselves the question, why was he there,—he who had so lately been a tory, and had done so little for his adopted party? for his work had been office work, diplomatic work, silent work, done by the pen rather than by the tongue, and had not recommended itself to the radicals. the foreign office was a place of great power, and very desirable. why should it not be given to some man who had made himself hot with the heat of the battle of reform? and when the time came that he was without a seat it might have been easy to pass him over. he did not belong to any great whig ducal house, nor had he put himself forward as a popular speaker. but he had his eyes wide open, and knew well how to say a word in season. and he selected his special friends with judgment. lord melbourne was his friend, and lord melbourne reinstated him at the foreign office.

on his reappointment, he expressed an opinion to his{63} brother, the truth of which every englishman will feel. “the truth is that english interests continue the same, let who will be in office, and that upon leading principles and great measures men of both sides, when they come to act dispassionately and with responsibility upon them, will be found acting very much alike.” the meaning of this is that an english statesman cannot dare to be other than honest. the right thing to do must be the right thing, whether lord aberdeen or lord palmerston be in power. when some vital question comes up as to the spreading or confining the british empire in india, and adding a new nation to our responsibilities, then there may be a difference in policy, and one set of ministers may fail to carry out the projects of their predecessors. but in the ordinary affairs of european politics, in which clear-seeing eyes may certainly discern what honesty demands, whigs and tories, liberals and conservatives, will be found “acting very much alike.”

it was now that lord palmerston obtained the sanction of the cabinet for the british legion in spain. it was intended to assist queen isabella in opposing the priests and the inquisition. it no doubt did have that effect, though it was not altogether a success, and sir de lacy evans, at the head of the legion, was so badly handled as to make the matter appear a fitting subject for a parliamentary attack on lord palmerston. this was done with great vigour and, through a debate which lasted for three nights, it was almost doubtful which way the majority might decide. towards the end of it lord palmerston spoke, and proved that the silence which was usual to him did not come from want of capacity to speak, or want of fire in speaking when the subject seemed to justify it. the speech is thus described{64} by mr. edward ellice; “it is, however, useless to say any more of it than that palmerston has made so admirable a speech in every respect as completely to have gained the house, and to have re-established himself entirely in their good opinion, if there was a question of his having lost it in some quarters. he spoke for three hours; and i never heard a more able, vigorous, or successful defence of the foreign policy of a government, or war better or more happily and fearlessly carried into the enemy’s quarters.” and we are told that the house was riotous with cheering throughout. when it divided, however, there was a majority of no more than thirty-six among five hundred and twenty members.

in reading the letters from lord palmerston to his brother and to lord granville, we cannot but feel sometimes that they were written with a view to the public. they contain sententious morsels of didactic wisdom, which would not have not been put there in the hurry of private correspondence unless they had been intended for other eyes. “when two of the most powerful maritime nations accept us as mediators upon a point of national honour, it is clear that they must think that we have not forfeited our own.” “england,” he says, “is to be as full of railways as a ploughed field is of furrows, but the crop they will bear is more doubtful.” “the nobles both in spain and portugal are the most incapable part of the nation, and therefore a remodelling of the upper chambers in both countries seems a reasonable thing.” “no empire is likely to fall to pieces if left to itself, and if no kind neighbours forcibly tear it to pieces.” “half the wrong conclusions at which mankind arrive are leached by the abuse of metaphors.” and we do not always feel that he is right. he gets a little out of his{65} element when he attempts to draw the conclusions at which he arrives. but when he tells of a fact, and of his conclusion from that, he is always correct. in reference to the king’s speech in january, 1837, he says: “on foreign affairs we shall say little, and especially not a word about france or french alliance. we can say nothing in their praise, and therefore silence is the most complimentary thing we can bestow upon them.” at this period we certainly could have said nothing complimentary respecting france, as the spanish marriages were coming on, and the preparations for the spanish marriages were being made.

in 1837 king william died, and the present sovereign came to the throne. she was then but eighteen years old, but immediately showed her fitness for her high office. “the queen went through her task to-day with great dignity and self-possession,” lord palmerston says, writing to lord granville. “one saw she felt much inward emotion; but it was fully controlled. her articulation was peculiarly good; her voice remarkably pleasing.” “they,” the foreign ministers, “were introduced one by one. nothing could be better than her manner of receiving them; it is easy, and dignified, and gracious.” “there will be lots of extra ambassadors, and shoals of princes, at our coronation. heaven knows what we shall do with them, or how and where they will find lodging. they will be disappointed, both as to the effect they will themselves produce, and as to the splendour of the ceremony they come to witness. state coaches, fine liveries, and gilt harness make no sensation in london, except among coachmakers and stablemen.” and then he adds: “i do not think that marriage has yet entered the queen’s head; perhaps some of her{66} visitors may inspire her with the idea; but after being used to agreeable and well-informed englishmen, i fear she will not find a foreign prince to her liking.” as to the foreign prince, however, palmerston proved himself to have been absolutely wrong.

in 1838 and 1839 mehemet ali was a great man. he had obtained for himself the pashalic of egypt and the dominion of syria. not content with that, he desired further influence in european turkey; and had probably conceived in his brain the idea of first upsetting, and then occupying the throne of the sultan. though in this he would not have succeeded, as the powers were too strong for him, he would probably have enabled the emperor of russia to have taken possession of constantinople, as the protector of the turk, but for the zeal and readiness of the english. it must not be told here how sir charles napier,—don carlos de ponza, as lord palmerston called him,—put an end to this dream by taking first sidon, and then acre, and created that enthusiasm in the mind of palmerston which afterwards led to the unfortunate dinner at the reform club, to the taking of bomarsund in lieu of cronstadt, and resulted at last in the bitterness of the admiral’s parliamentary attacks on his old friends when the crimean war was over. it is useless now to look back and to suggest what would have happened had things been allowed to take another course. but if russia had then been the protector of turkey instead of england, the latter campaign, if fought at all, would have taken place nearer to the more hospitable regions of middle europe than the crimea. as it was, mehemet ali was stopped, and turkey was defended, and russia for awhile kept in its place, i must not say by the zeal of lord palmerston,—because it would be{67} going too far to give to him the entire credit of doing what england did,—but with his co-operation and in conformity with his councils. it was at the time presumed that mehemet ali was struggling for supreme power, in conformity with french tactics; or, in other words, that france was seeking to obtain the upper hand in egypt. we were then awake to the necessity of maintaining for ourselves a way through egypt to india. this we were bound to do for the preservation of our indian empire, and should probably have done it under any circumstances; but lord palmerston took so prominent a part in the matter that it is necessary to follow him in his eagerness for a few pages.

there were three parties with whom he had to carry on the contest; and among the three the first was that which occasioned him the least trouble. they were mehemet ali himself, the king of the french, and the opposing members of our own cabinet. it was comparatively easy to dispose of mehemet ali, with the assistance of sir charles napier; but louis philippe was an antagonist with whom it was much more difficult to deal. palmerston put no trust in louis philippe, regarding him from first to last as an enemy to english practices and english aspirations; but neither was he afraid of louis philippe and his minister. he was afraid of some among his own colleagues, who could only with great difficulty be got to act with him in opposition to french counsels. he writes as follows to lord granville; “let the french say what they like, they cannot go to war with the four powers in support of mehemet ali. would they hazard a naval war for such an object? where are they to find ships to equal or to contend with the british navy alone, leaving out the russian navy,{68} which in such case would join us? what would become of algiers if they were at war with a power superior to france at sea? would they risk a continental war? and for what? could they help mehemet ali by marching to the rhine? and would they not be driven back as fast as they went? it is impossible. the french may talk big, but they cannot make war for such a cause. it would be very unwise to underrate the force of france and the evils of a war with her in a case in which she had national interest and a just cause; but it would be equally inexpedient to be daunted by big words and empty vapouring in a case in which a calm view of things ought to convince one that france alone would be the sufferer by a war hastily, capriciously, and unjustly undertaken by herself.” thiers and guizot were at this time the chief advisers of louis philippe, m. guizot having become the french ambassador in london. but lord palmerston believed not much in any of the three. “the truth is,” he says, “however reluctantly one may avow the conviction, that louis philippe is a man in whom no solid trust can be reposed. however, there he is, and we call him our ally; only we ought to be enlightened by experience and not to attach to his assertions or professions any greater value than really belongs to them; more especially when, as in the case of egypt, his words are not only at variance with his conduct, but even inconsistent with each other. the cabinet have determined that we must without delay bring the french to a clear and definite arrangement about their fleet.” austria, prussia, and russia were willing to act with us, but were not willing to take a part so active as that which palmerston desired on the part of england.{69}

but it was necessary to act in co-operation with these powers, and it was found very difficult to obtain the accord of the entire british cabinet. in consequence of this we find him writing to lord melbourne on the 5th of july, 1840, and offering to resign his post “the difference of opinion which seems to exist between myself and some members of the cabinet upon the turkish question, has led me, upon full consideration, to the conviction that it is a duty which i owe to myself and to my colleagues to relieve you and others from the necessity of deciding between my views and those of other members of the cabinet on these matters, by placing, as i now do, my office at your disposal. my opinion upon this question is distinct and unqualified. i think that the object to be attained is of the utmost importance for the interests of england, for the preservation of the balance of power, and for the maintenance of peace in europe. i find the three powers entirely prepared to concur in the views which i entertain on this matter if these views should be the views of the british government. i can feel no doubt that the four powers, acting in union with, and in support of the sultan, are perfectly able to carry those views into effect; and i think that the commercial and political interests of great britain, the honour and dignity of the country, good faith towards the sultan, and sound views of european policy, all require that we should adopt such a course. if we draw back, and shrink from a co-operation with austria, russia, and prussia in this matter, because france stands aloof and will not join, we shall place this country in the degraded position of being held in leading-strings by france, and shall virtually acknowledge that, even when supported by the other three powers of the continent, we dare embark in no{70} system of policy in opposition to the will of france, and consider her positive concurrence as a necessary condition for our action. the ultimate results of such a decision will be the practical division of the turkish empire into two separate and independent states, whereof one will be the dependency of france, and the other a satellite of russia; and in both of which our political influence will be annulled, and our commercial interests will be sacrificed; and this dismemberment will inevitably give rise to local struggles and conflicts which will involve the powers of europe in most serious disputes.” “twice my opinion on these affairs has been overruled by the cabinet, and twice the policy which i recommended has been set aside. first, in 1833, when the sultan sent to ask our aid before mehemet ali had made any material progress in syria, and when russia expressed her wish that we should assist the sultan,—saying, however, that if we did not, she would. secondly, in 1835, when france was ready to have united with us in a treaty with the sultan for the maintenance of the integrity of his empire.” “we have now arrived at a third crisis, when the resolution of the british cabinet will exercise a deciding influence upon future events; but this time the danger is more apparent and undisguised, and the remedy is more complete and within our reach. the matter to be dealt with belongs to my department, and i should be held in a peculiar degree personally responsible for the consequences of any course which i might undertake to conduct. i am sure, therefore, that you cannot wonder that i should decline to be the instrument for carrying out a policy which i disapprove, and that i should consequently take the step which i have stated in the beginning of this letter.”{71}

lord melbourne, however, induced him to withdraw his resignation, assuring him that it would involve the dissolution of the government. “and,” he added, “how another is to be formed in the present state of parties and opinions i see not.” the cabinet yielded, and lord palmerston had his way, as he usually did have, by a singular mixture of undaunted pluck and rectitude of purpose. i do not venture to assert that in this turkish question lord palmerston did that which the welfare of the east of europe certainly demanded. it is useless now to think whether the bulgarian horrors might have been avoided in 1876 had not lord palmerston supported the sultan in 1840, as it is also to argue that england could not have maintained her power in europe and her hold over egypt had she not then supported turkey. considerations of matters so intricate are too difficult for a little book such as this, however fitting they may be for deeper and longer volumes. my business is here to explain the nature of the conduct and character of lord palmerston. and when i speak of his rectitude of purpose i allude rather to his motives than to his actions. to do the best he could for english interests, and to do that best in an honest and manly manner, was his object; and the world may therefore give him credit for rectitude of purpose. the world must give him credit also for positive success.

just when palmerston was offering to resign his seat in the cabinet, meaning to show thereby that his power of carrying his own views in the government was not to be contested seriously, though questions concerning it might be raised, a whole series of pamphlets appeared against him, in which he was accused of selling his own country to russia. these charges came chiefly from one mr.{72} urquhart, who had been put into the civil service by lord palmerston himself, and had since filled himself with an idea that his former employer had become false to his country. mr. urquhart’s furor was so like madness that it would not be here mentioned, were it not worth our while to spend a page in showing the kind of things which were published at the time. there was a mr. doubleday, who, at a meeting at newcastle, spoke as follows;—“i hereby declare my conviction that lord palmerston is a traitor, and ought to be impeached; and, if found guilty before a tribunal of his country, his head ought to roll upon the scaffold!” “i happen to know that this man was, a few years ago, as poor as a person called a lord could well be conceived to be,—that he was hunted about, and had half a dozen executions in his house at once,—and now, without any visible cause, without any visible means of making a better livelihood, this man has suddenly become rich, has paid all his debts, and is living upon the fat of the land. what rational conclusion can one come to but that he is enabled to do this by means of russian gold?” for these calumnies there is not a tittle of excuse. there was not a word of truth in them. we are sometimes inclined to think that bitterness of speech against public men has now attained a worse acrimony than it ever did. but when we look back at some of these speeches against lord palmerston, we shall see that it is not so.

in 1839, an accusation had been made against lord palmerston, alleging that in dealing with foreign affairs he was too ready to sacrifice british interests, being the reverse of the medal as it was afterwards exhibited, in which he was shown as offending all foreigners by his arrogance in asserting every thing british. to this latter{73} accusation he was probably open;—but the other was brought against him also, and then he defended himself: “in the outset, i must deny the charge made personally against myself, and against the government to which i belong, of an identification with the interests of other nations. i venture to say that never was there an administration that paid more attention to the commercial interests of this country. and this i will add, that much as i feel the importance of the alliance of this country with other powers, and much as i wish to perpetuate such alliances, and to endeavour to render other nations as friendly as possible with this, i am satisfied that the interest of england is the polar star,—the guiding principle of the conduct of the government.” here, no doubt, he declared the purpose and the practice of his life;—the practice, by adhering to which he so nearly became shipwrecked, but succeeded in obtaining that special attachment which is felt for his name among englishmen generally.

on the 13th of july, 1840, he continued the correspondence with his brother william, the treaty with austria, prussia, and russia, for restraining mehemet ali, being dated on the subsequent 15th. he gives the particulars of the treaty which, had it been accepted by mehemet, would have left syria in his hands for life. but it was not accepted, and syria was consequently taken away by the victories of sidon and acre. but lord palmerston, in the same letter, goes on to other subjects. the queen had now been married, and a child is to be born. “prince albert is to be sole regent during the confinement of the queen, and if any misfortune were to happen during the minority of the heir to the throne, or rather of the infant sovereign, there is already a bill in{74} force to provide for the regency till the arrival of ernest, if, as a signal punishment for the sins of the nation, he were to come to the throne of england.” this was ernest, the duke of cumberland, as well as king of hanover. then, in the easy tone of fraternal conversation, he rushes on to another matter.

“my priam filly, three-year old, out of gallopade’s dam, has won the only two races she has started for; one at stockbridge, and the queen’s plate at guildford; and she may win a stake this week at southampton.”

we must here for awhile go back, before we finish the story of mehemet ali, to two circumstances, one of which had a considerable interest among the political quidnuncs of the day, and the other a more lasting influence on the life of lord palmerston himself. in the spring of 1839 the government was nearly beaten on the question of the jamaica constitution, having been supported by a majority of only five. they resigned in consequence, and sir robert peel, having been desired to form a government, broke down under the difficulties imposed upon him in reference to the ladies of the household. “they insisted on the removal of the ladies of the bedchamber. the queen declared she would not submit to it; that it would be too painful and affronting to her; that those ladies have no seats in parliament; that the object in view in dismissing them was to separate her from everybody in whom she could trust, and to surround her with political spies, if not with personal enemies.” “the queen, alone and unadvised, stood firm against all these assaults, showed a presence of mind, a firmness, a discrimination, far beyond her years.” “we shall, of course, stand by the queen, and support her against this offensive condition which the tories wanted to impose{75} upon her, and which her youth and isolated condition ought to have protected her from.”

in all this lord palmerston takes the part of his cabinet against sir robert peel’s, with all the eagerness of a partisan, and did, no doubt, feel as he wrote. but it was thought at the time that there was much to be said for sir robert’s view of the case, and that however well he might have been able to contest political questions with a whig cabinet, he could not have done so with any chance of success against the wives and sisters of whig ministers. the ladies, however, won the battle, and the whigs patched up their majority again, sufficiently to enable them to go on. the other event was the marriage of lord palmerston with the countess cowper, which took place on december 11, 1839. this lady, who had been left a widow in june, 1837, was sister to lord melbourne. she immediately took the name of her second husband, though in a rank inferior to that which she at the time enjoyed, and is still remembered as the most popular woman in london. she brought to her husband a considerable accession of fortune, and, among other things, brocket hall, in hertfordshire, which had been the seat of her brother, and in which he died, and in which lord palmerston, another prime minister, was fated to die also. lord palmerston, we may imagine, had but few things to regret in the world; but this marriage, which he did not achieve till he had reached the ripe age of fifty-five, certainly was not one of them.

now we must go back and finish the story of mehemet ali, as far as lord palmerston is concerned with it, and also the record of his doings as foreign secretary up to the year 1841. all through 1840 we find him carrying{76} on the battle. “guizot has looked as cross as the devil for the last few days,” he says in one of his letters; “and, indeed, on sunday, when he dined here, he could scarcely keep up the outward appearances of civility.” and then writing still to mr. bulwer, who was acting as ambassador in paris, “if thiers should again hold to you the language of menace, however indistinctly and vaguely shadowed out, pray retort upon him to the full extent of what he may say to you; and with that skill of language which i know you to be master of, convey to him, in the most friendly and inoffensive manner possible, that if france throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up; and that if she begins a war she will to a certainty lose her ships, colonies, and commerce, before she sees the end of it; that her army of algiers will cease to give her anxiety; and that mehemet ali will just be chucked into the nile.” “really thiers must think us wonderful simpletons to be thus bamboozled.”

the reader can tell, without any reference to lord palmerston’s private notes, those despatches of which he has intended that the very spirit, if not the language, shall be made known to his french antagonist. convey to him in the “most friendly and inoffensive manner possible that if france throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up!” what other minister ever wrote in language made so monstrously uncivil by its mock civility? but his anger is not only against france and frenchmen, but also against certain englishmen whom he does not name, but who, we are left to believe, sat in the same cabinet with himself, or formed part of the same administration. “i must say i never in my life was more disgusted with{77} anything than i have been by the conduct of certain parties,—useless now to name,—in all this affair.” he is supposed here to have alluded specially to lord holland, who had opposed him in the cabinet. lord holland died shortly afterwards, and then lord palmerston had nothing to say of him but what was good and affectionate. further on he writes to lord granville, who had returned to paris by october: “pray go to the king immediately, and say you are instructed to deprecate in the most friendly, but at the same time the most earnest, manner, steps which we hear are under consideration, and which, if taken, would either make war inevitable, or at least render the continuation or resumption (if they have ceased) of friendly relations a matter of the utmost difficulty.”

palmerston goes on doggedly with his projects, and does not cease to boast as to his progress. still writing to lord granville, he says, on 23rd october, 1840; “it is plain that we have as good as driven mehemet ali out of the whole of syria.” “indeed, i have good reason to believe, by information i have received from paris, that mehemet has sent to thiers to beg he would make the best terms he could for him.” “louis philippe seems to have held to you the same language which flahault and guizot held while here, namely, that it is necessary, in order to assist the king to maintain peace and keep down the war party, that we should make to the entreaties of the king those concessions which we have refused to the threats of thiers. but this is quite impossible, and you cannot too soon or too strongly explain it to all parties concerned.” “all frenchmen want to encroach and extend their territorial possessions at the expense of other nations; and they all feel, what the national has{78} often said, that an alliance with england is a bar to such projects.” “it is a misfortune to europe that the national character of a great and powerful people, placed in the centre of europe, should be such as it is.” and on the 15th of november he says; “rémusat has let the cat out of the bag, by declaring that france, in protecting mehemet ali, meant to establish a new second-rate maritime power in the mediterranean, whose fleet might unite with that of france, for the purpose of serving as a counterpoise to that of england.” and on the 26th: “mehemet is the subject of the sultan, and nothing more, and never can or will be anything more.” “i am very sorry to find that m. guizot is still hankering after mehemet ali, and clinging to the broken-down policy of thiers. pray communicate the substance of this letter to m. guizot.” and then comes the final blast of the trumpet. “my dear granville,—this day has brought us a flight of good news; mehemet’s submission”—together with other good news from foreign parts. “the general result”—and here i quote mr. ashley’s words—“of this long but successful contest over eastern affairs, was to produce the same respect for the names of palmerston and england in the east as had been already produced in europe. those names were whispered in the tents of the arabs with fear and reverence.”

but what was felt in england as to these matters is, we should say, of higher moment in regard to our minister’s reputation. the outspoken words of englishmen are of more avail than the whisperings of arabs. the writers of the quarterly and the edinburgh are supposed, at any rate, to write with their eyes open. but here we find that each party fights manfully, simply on its own side. writing in april, 1837, the quarterly{79} thus expresses itself; “the tinkering our constitution has undergone at the hands of whig-radical ministers has certainly not tended to elevate it in the estimation of foreigners, and lord palmerston’s foreign policy bids fair to bring the english flag into downright contempt from one end of europe to the other.” so much for the tory view of the years with which we have been dealing. when we turn to the july number of the edinburgh for 1840, we find the whig idea of our foreign politics thus given: “it was the moral influence of the policy of england at this period, which preserved europe in a state of tranquillity, and maintained that equipoise on which every hope of peace depended.” perhaps, after all, when party feelings ran so high at home—and still run so high—the greater dependence may be placed on the arab whisperings. no doubt a knowledge of the policy of the world at large is necessary to determine the respect or contempt for england which was felt when lord palmerston was at the foreign office. but i doubt whether any tory can hesitate on the matter; and my conviction is the stronger seeing that the charge now made against lord palmerston is, not that he showed a tendency to bully, but that he was so efficacious in bullying.