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CHAPTER XIII.

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palmerston as prime minister, from 1859 to his death.

the unification of italy was the first matter of importance to which lord palmerston’s new cabinet had to apply itself. lord john russell was foreign secretary, but we perceive that palmerston kept a hold of the reins himself. the things chiefly to be done were as follows. austria still held venetia, but had been made to abandon lombardy by marshal mac mahon at the battle of magenta. austria had to be put down and made to depart out of venetia if possible. france had been victorious; but the emperor claimed as his reward savoy and nice. it was too late for palmerston to save savoy and nice. that blot on poor cavour’s name must remain a stain for ever. he had told our minister at turin that they were not to be given up, and had known when he said so that their doom had been spoken. but the emperor must be stopped and not allowed to run headlong with the éclat of his victories. in this matter the emperor, too, had deceived him. and italy must be encouraged to take her place among the nations of europe.

these were the matters as to which, in regard to italy, the british cabinet was at the present moment anxious. palmerston’s dislike to austria,—{189}we might almost call it hatred,—still remained hot as ever. in a memorandum prepared for the cabinet, lord palmerston defended napoleon as against austria. “austria took our subsidies, bound herself by treaty not to make peace without our concurrence, sustained signal defeat in battle, and precipitately made peace without our concurrence. but on what occasion has the emperor napoleon so acted?—on none.” this was written in january, 1860; but a little later on, when the story of savoy and nice was known, he shows his jealousy of napoleon. in april of the same year, he writes to lord cowley at paris; “the emperor’s mind is as full of schemes as a warren is full of rabbits, and, like rabbits, his schemes go to ground for the moment to avoid notice or antagonism.” and there is a record of a conversation which he had with count flahault a few days previously. count flahault was just going to paris, and asked him what he should say to the emperor. the prime minister was, what we shall call, very outspoken. england desired peace, he said, but if the emperor was desirous of war, he would find that england was quite ready for him. and he says in a letter to the duke of somerset; “i have watched the emperor narrowly, and have studied his character and conduct. you may rely upon it, that at the bottom of his heart there rankles a deep and inextinguishable desire to humble and punish england.” he says to lord cowley; “the seizure of savoy and nice, and the breach of promise towards switzerland about the cession of the swiss of the neutralized district, are matters which cannot be got over easily.” from these quotations it will be seen how intent he was on keeping the emperor in his place, and saving this country, if it{190} might be saved, from some future battle of dorking. but in regard to the state of italy at the time, he had expressed himself very strongly in the memorandum above quoted; “there can be no reasonable doubt, therefore, that both france and sardinia would unite with england in maintaining the principle that the italians should be secured against foreign compulsion, and should be left free to determine, according to their own will, what shall be their future political condition.”

in all these matters lord palmerston and lord john russell were, between them, successful—at any rate in the accomplishment of their wishes. austria was altogether driven out of italy. the french emperor did not attempt to avenge waterloo. and italy has become a united nation, ruling herself in accordance with her own will.

but in order to make good the boasts which he had made to count flahault, it was necessary that the country should be on its guard. its security, by military means, was always present to lord palmerston’s mind. he had written a letter in december, 1859, to mr. gladstone on the subject, and he must, we should think, have startled mr. gladstone by the nonchalant audacity with which he proposed that ten or eleven millions should be at once voted for fortifications to defend portsmouth and plymouth. then he goes into the manner in which the money should be raised,—as to which we cannot but imagine that mr. gladstone had his own way. but the millions were voted, and the fortifications were erected; and the volunteer force was set on foot,—with what enormous results is now patent to the whole country. in consequence of what was then done, england has now got a{191} double army, one for service abroad, and the other at home. it is only now beginning to be seen and understood that the defence of our own shores may be trusted to men less expensively organized than in regiments of the line.

in 1861 lord palmerston was installed as warden of the cinque ports, by which he obtained the use of what was believed to be a comfortable residence near dover. as broadlands and brocket hall, as well as cambridge house, in piccadilly, to which he had long since removed, were all on his hands, this could not have been much to him. but the installation gave him at any rate the pleasure of going down once more to tiverton, and meeting his old friend mr. rowcliffe, the butcher. for the wardenship was an office, so called, of profit, and the new election was necessary. he was returned without a contest, but not without the usual preliminary discussion with mr. rowcliffe.

it is hardly possible to refer to all the measures, or even to all those of importance, with which lord palmerston was concerned at this period of his life. in 1860 the paper duties had been discussed; and now that this matter has been well-nigh forgotten among the things that have been quickly settled, we can hardly realize the disturbance to our feelings, and even the animosity, which they created. the house of lords took upon itself to throw the bill out; whereas a remission of taxation is an affair which the lower house conceives to belong exclusively to itself. but palmerston, whose own heart was hardly in the matter, but who was much concerned in keeping peace between the two houses, contrived to smooth matters down, so that the bill was passed in 1861, and nothing more has been since heard of the paper{192} duties. to us it seems that a penny is, and ever has been, the normal price of a daily newspaper,—unless when the times, or some other daily journal if there be another, chooses on behalf of old gentlemen and ladies to be absurdly luxurious at threepence.

in 1861 the american war of secession commenced, and in the same year, on the 14th of december, the prince consort died. it must have been pleasant to lord palmerston to remember that all feelings of animosity,—or rather of hard judgment against him,—had passed away. we can all remember the intense personal sorrow with which the death of the prince was received by us. a good man had gone from among us, leaving vacant a place which could never more be filled. a man so good at all points is a rare possession, and england has never ceased to want him and to mourn him.

almost exactly at the same time there sprang up an incident in the american war of secession which nearly carried us into the whirlpool in spite of the careful efforts we made to avoid the danger. the southern states had seceded because they had been unwilling to see the government of the country pass from them, the democratic party, into the hands of their opponents, the republicans. the democratic party had grown up and been in power almost since the days of the adamses, and now felt aware that all their most cherished political institutions were endangered by the appointment of mr. lincoln as president. mr. lincoln was a thorough republican. to show how the two parties had hitherto fought the battle, each by the creation of new states which should, or should not, foster slavery within their boundaries, is too long a task to be undertaken here. should texas, which was devoted to slavery, become{193} one state or should it be four? should kansas be slave or free? should nevada and nebraska, free-soil states as they would be, be admitted or excluded? each state must have two senators, and on the number of senators the manipulation of the powers of government depended. the growing wealth and population of the north at last won the day, and the south, seeing how it was with them, determined to secede. they did endeavour to secede, and a state of war was the consequence.

there can now be no doubt, i think, in any unprejudiced mind that the sole effort made by the english government during the war was to hold their own hands with absolute impartiality, and allow the americans to fight it out. in private life, opinions varied; and, following a broad line, we may say that the commercial classes were in favour of the north, and the agricultural and the aristocratic of the south. and these feelings, either on the one side or the other, were enhanced by the growing deficiency of cotton. we find even lord palmerston suggesting that the idea of a french ambassador should be entertained, for compelling the northern states to let cotton from the south make its way to europe. a more unjust, or indeed impossible, solution of the difficulty could not be found. but palmerston simply mentioned the matter to a colleague in the cabinet, and the question of interference or non-interference, of recognition or the reverse, was, as far as outsiders could perceive, left chiefly in the hands of lord russell, who was foreign secretary. lord john had been created a peer in july, 1861. by the entire cabinet the decision was come to that england would not interfere, and would not recognize the south. as far as the english government was concerned, of which lord palmerston was the head, such{194} was its line of policy from first to last; and the northern party in the war was certainly not justified in feeling animosity against england.

but such a feeling was very strong in the states. it was thought that england should at once have patted the north on the back, as having that side in the quarrel to which manifest justice belonged. then sprang up the trent affair, which, but for the united wisdom of two men in the states, of mr. lincoln and mr. seward his chief secretary, would certainly have brought us into war. and here, no doubt, lord palmerston did take an active part in preparing, under certain circumstances, for active measures.

as the north believed in england’s enmity, so did the south in her friendship. as the fighting became brisk and hard, could they not send two commissioners to england to arrange terms for their recognition? with this view messrs. slidell and mason were to be sent. but passenger ships did not run then from charleston to liverpool with more freedom than cotton ships. the gentlemen had to be smuggled to england, and made their way as far as cuba on their road. one would say that the difficulties of the journey were then overcome. and so they thought when they took their places on board the british mail steamer trent, which ran from the havanah to st. thomas. at st. thomas they would be as though they were in england.

but there is many a slip betwixt the cup and the lip. as the trent was running up to st. thomas, she was stopped by an american man-of-war, the san jacinto, under the command of the redoubtable captain wilkes, and the southerners were taken out of her and carried back to boston. a great fuss was made about the{195} achievement, as though captain wilkes had done something very heroic, and there was some talk of giving him a sword. thanks were voted to him by congress. he had done nothing but a policeman’s work, and had done it without orders. but it was conceived he had gone halfway to beating the south,—and not only the south, but england also.

it was then that the guards were sent to canada. it was the quickly expressed determination of england, in uttering which lord palmerston was the mouthpiece of the country, that unless these two men were sent over to england at once,—or were enabled to make the journey which they had promised themselves when they got on board the trent,—our minister should be withdrawn, and war should be declared. a man-of-war did come to the potomac, ready to take away lord lyons and his suite. in washington, we heard that on the next day war was to have been declared,—unless mr. lincoln and mr. seward yielded. mr. sumner, who as chairman of the committee of the senate on foreign politics was something akin to our foreign secretary, was hot against it. he was supposed to be the true patriotic american of the day. but before we went to bed that night in washington we had been told that messrs. slidell and mason were to be sent on to england. when they got there they could do nothing for the recognition of the south. england passed through that danger, and lord palmerston was enabled to think of other things.

we are drawing now to the end of lord palmerston’s career, and have only further to notice the schleswig-holstein affair, and the great debate which took place respecting it in july, 1864. there had previously been questions of the ill-treatment of the poles by russia, and{196} of the re-modelling of the treaty of vienna. in neither of these matters was anything effectual done by england; but in both of them palmerston showed the caution which had come to him, not from years, but from his thorough acquaintance with the state of europe. england had seen the third napoleon become, as it were, her natural ally. but against the craft of the emperor our prime minister was specially on his guard. france desired confirmation for what had lately passed, and a new treaty, so that europe should be re-arranged as she specially desired to arrange it; and france specially wanted some plea by which she could stretch her boundaries as far as the rhine. this matter is only interesting to us now as showing the care which lord palmerston, on the part of england, exercised in his latter days against his old friend the emperor.

then came the affair of schleswig-holstein, which it would be very difficult to explain in the penultimate chapter of such a book as this; and which would be very uninteresting if explained. denmark was undoubtedly denmark. holstein was undoubtedly german, though at present she was under the dominion of the king of denmark. schleswig may be said to have been half one and half the other. the encroachments of prussia, destined to envelop all adjacent german-speaking countries, had commenced; and austria, having then a part in the german diet, joined herself with prussia in attacking denmark. here, in england, the general opinion was undoubtedly in favour of denmark. it was so in the british interpretation of the law of europe on the subject; and also in the idea that a little country was undergoing ill-usage from two others that were much larger and more powerful. lord russell,{197} as foreign secretary, became indignant, and said words which enabled his eager friends and his active enemies to declare that he had promised assistance to denmark. lord palmerston, always since the days of savoy and nice on his guard against the emperor of the french, and having, as prime minister, reversed his character as the general tyrant of europe, wrote as follows to his colleague: “i share fully your indignation. the conduct of austria and prussia is discreditably bad, and one, or both of them, will suffer for it before these matters are settled. i rather doubt, however, the expediency of taking at the present moment the steps proposed. the french government would probably decline it, unless tempted by the suggestion that they should place an armed force on the rhenish frontier in the event of a refusal by austria and prussia,—which refusal we ought to reckon as nearly certain.” but he partially agreed with lord russell. he wrote to the duke of somerset; “i own i quite agree with russell, that our squadron ought to go to copenhagen as soon as the season will permit, and that it ought to have orders to prevent any invasion of, or attack upon, zealand and copenhagen.”

louis napoleon at last refused to join with us in any attempt to be made on behalf of the danes. he saw no reason for fighting with the germans unless he were to be allowed to stretch himself to the rhine. lord russell,—and with him the british cabinet,—found himself unable to undertake the task single-handed; and consequently denmark was abandoned, and the government had to bear the reproach of having deserted their friend. an attack was made upon it in both houses. in the house of lords, lord palmerston and his colleagues were beaten by a{198} majority of nine; and mr. disraeli brought the matter forward in the commons with many thunderclaps of furious speech. he asked the house to agree with him that the government “had lowered the just influence of their country in the councils of europe, and thereby destroyed the securities for peace.” the debate lasted for four nights, and mr. disraeli’s thunderclap of elocution was certainly loud and frightful. to tell the truth his speech on the occasion was very strong. lord palmerston spoke on the last day; and as he went down to the house, day after day, all the people cheered him. there was at the moment a feeling against lord russell, because it was thought that he had promised the danes much, and had performed little. but palmerston was still the people’s favourite, and they cheered him to the last. he altogether laid aside the matter at issue, and went into the general question of the merits of the government. let the people of the country see what had been done by the present government for the taxes of the country, and then he would be afraid of no vote which the house of commons could give against him. the government got a majority of eighteen, and were thus re-established in power, at any rate till the next session.

this had taken place in 1864, and the speech he had then delivered was the last of the great efforts he had made on that arena. during the next year he reached his eightieth birthday. in that same year parliament, having nearly run out its term of existence, was dissolved, and he was again elected for tiverton. he went from thence to brocket hall, having chosen that residence because of its vicinity to london, and there, with lady palmerston to watch over him, he breathed his last. it is a singular fact that in the room adjacent to that in{199} which he died another prime minister of england had left this troublesome world but a few years previously, and lady palmerston had been the sister of that other prime minister.

they laid him in westminster, among the statesmen and men of letters of whom his country was proud, and they put up a statue to his name in the close neighbourhood of the chamber in which he had sat almost continuously since it had been built thirty years before. what more could they do to perpetuate his memory? but all that would have been nothing had he not made for himself a lasting position in the minds of englishmen.

looking back through all the history of england and her worthies, i do not know the life of any man who has shown such a career of unchequered good fortune and jocund happiness,—or more unblemished honesty and truer courage.

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