natures of wars—

limited and

unlimited

the second classification to which we are led by the political theory of war, is one which clausewitz was the first to formulate and one to which he came to attach the highest importance. it becomes necessary therefore to examine his views in some detail—not because there is any need to regard a continental soldier, however distinguished, as an indispensable authority for a maritime nation. the reason is quite the reverse. it is because a careful examination of his doctrine on this point will lay open what are the radical and essential differences between the german or continental school of strategy and the british or maritime school—that is, our own traditional school, which too many writers both at home and abroad quietly assume to have no existence. the evil tendency of that assumption cannot be too strongly emphasised, and the main purpose of this and the following chapters will be to show how and why even the greatest of the continental strategists fell short of realising fully the characteristic conception of the british tradition.

by the classification in question clausewitz distinguished wars into those with a "limited" object and those whose object was "unlimited." such a classification was entirely characteristic of him, for it rested not alone upon the material nature of the object, but on certain moral considerations to which he was the first to attach their real value in war. other [pg 42] writers such as jomini had attempted to classify wars by the special purpose for which they were fought, but clausewitz's long course of study convinced him that such a distinction was unphilosophical and bore no just relation to any tenable theory of war. whether, that is, a war was positive or negative mattered much, but its special purpose, whether, for instance, according to jomini's system, it was a war "to assert rights" or "to assist an ally" or "to acquire territory," mattered not at all.

whatever the object, the vital and paramount question was the intensity with which the spirit of the nation was absorbed in its attainment. the real point to determine in approaching any war plan was what did the object mean to the two belligerents, what sacrifices would they make for it, what risks were they prepared to run? it was thus he stated his view. "the smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller presumably will be the means of resistance he will employ, and the smaller his means, the smaller will ours be required to be. similarly the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it and the more easily we shall be induced to abandon it." thus the political object of the war, its original motive, will not only determine for both belligerents reciprocally the aim of the force they use, but it will also be the standard of the intensity of the efforts they will make. so he concludes there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy from a war of extermination down to the use of an army of observation. so also in the naval sphere there may be a life and death struggle for maritime supremacy or hostilities which never rise beyond a blockade.

such a view of the subject was of course a wide departure from the theory of "absolute war" on which clausewitz had started working. under that theory "absolute war" was the [pg 43] ideal form to which all war ought to attain, and those which fell short of it were imperfect wars cramped by a lack of true military spirit. but so soon as he had seized the fact that in actual life the moral factor always must override the purely military factor, he saw that he had been working on too narrow a basis—a basis that was purely theoretical in that it ignored the human factor. he began to perceive that it was logically unsound to assume as the foundation of a strategical system that there was one pattern to which all wars ought to conform. in the light of his full and final apprehension of the value of the human factor he saw wars falling into two well-marked categories, each of which would legitimately be approached in a radically different manner, and not necessarily on the lines of "absolute war."

he saw that there was one class of war where the political object was of so vital an importance to both belligerents that they would tend to fight to the utmost limit of their endurance to secure it. but there was another class where the object was of less importance, that is to say, where its value to one or both the belligerents was not so great as to be worth unlimited sacrifices of blood and treasure. it was these two kinds of war he designated provisionally "unlimited" and "limited," by which he meant not that you were not to exert the force employed with all the vigour you could develop, but that there might be a limit beyond which it would be bad policy to spend that vigour, a point at which, long before your force was exhausted or even fully developed, it would be wiser to abandon your object rather than to spend more upon it.

this distinction it is very necessary to grasp quite clearly, for it is often superficially confused with the distinction already referred to, which clausewitz drew in the earlier part of his work—that is, the distinction between what he called the character of modern war and the character of the wars which preceded the napoleonic era. it will be remembered he [pg 44] insisted that the wars of his own time had been wars between armed nations with a tendency to throw the whole weight of the nation into the fighting line, whereas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries wars were waged by standing armies and not by the whole nation in arms. the distinction of course is real and of far-reaching consequences, but it has no relation to the distinction between "limited" and "unlimited" war. war may be waged on the napoleonic system either for a limited or an unlimited object.

a modern instance will serve to clear the field. the recent russo-japanese war was fought for a limited object—the assertion of certain claims over territory which formed no part of the possessions of either belligerent. hostilities were conducted on entirely modern lines by two armed nations and not by standing armies alone. but in the case of one belligerent her interest in the object was so limited as to cause her to abandon it long before her whole force as an armed nation was exhausted or even put forth. the expense of life and treasure which the struggle was involving was beyond what the object was worth.

this second distinction—that is, between limited and unlimited wars—clausewitz regarded as of greater importance than his previous one founded on the negative or positive nature of the object. he was long in reaching it. his great work on war as he left it proceeds almost entirely on the conception of offensive or defensive as applied to the napoleonic ideal of absolute war. the new idea came to him towards the end in the full maturity of his prolonged study, and it came to him in endeavouring to apply his strategical speculations to the practical process of framing a war plan in anticipation of a threatened breach with france. it was only in his final section on war plans that he began to deal with it. by that time he had grasped the first practical result to [pg 45] which his theory led. he saw that the distinction between limited and unlimited war connoted a cardinal distinction in the methods of waging it. when the object was unlimited, and would consequently call forth your enemy's whole war power, it was evident that no firm decision of the struggle could be reached till his war power was entirely crushed. unless you had a reasonable hope of being able to do this it was bad policy to seek your end by force—that is, you ought not to go to war. in the case of a limited object, however, the complete destruction of the enemy's armed force was beyond what was necessary. clearly you could achieve your end if you could seize the object, and by availing yourself of the elements of strength inherent in the defensive could set up such a situation that it would cost the enemy more to turn you out than the object was worth to him.

here then was a wide difference in the fundamental postulate of your war plan. in the case of an unlimited war your main strategical offensive must be directed against the armed forces of the enemy; in the case of a limited war, even where its object was positive, it need not be. if conditions were favourable, it would suffice to make the object itself the objective of your main strategical offensive. clearly, then, he had reached a theoretical distinction which modified his whole conception of strategy. no longer is there logically but one kind of war, the absolute, and no longer is there but one legitimate objective, the enemy's armed forces. being sound theory, it of course had an immediate practical value, for obviously it was a distinction from which the actual work of framing a war plan must take its departure.

a curious corroboration of the soundness of these views is that jomini reached an almost identical standpoint independently and by an entirely different road. his method was severely concrete, based on the comparison of observed facts, but it brought him as surely as the abstract method of his rival to the conclusion that there were two distinct classes of [pg 46] object. "they are of two different kinds," he says, "one which may be called territorial or geographical ... the other on the contrary consists exclusively in the destruction or disorganisation of the enemy's forces without concerning yourself with geographical points of any kind." it is under the first category of his first main classification "of offensive wars to assert rights," that he deals with what clausewitz would call "limited wars." citing as an example frederick the great's war for the conquest of silesia, he says, "in such a war ... the offensive operations ought to be proportional to the end in view. the first move is naturally to occupy the provinces claimed" (not, be it noted, to direct your blow at the enemy's main force). "afterwards," he proceeds, "you can push the offensive according to circumstances and your relative strength in order to obtain the desired cession by menacing the enemy at home." here we have clausewitz's whole doctrine of "limited war"; firstly, the primary or territorial stage, in which you endeavour to occupy the geographical object, and then the secondary or coercive stage, in which you seek by exerting general pressure upon your enemy to force him to accept the adverse situation you have set up.

such a method of making war obviously differs in a fundamental manner from that which napoleon habitually adopted, and yet we have it presented by jomini and clausewitz, [pg 47] the two apostles of the napoleonic method. the explanation is, of course, that both of them had seen too much not to know that napoleon's method was only applicable when you could command a real physical or moral preponderance. given such a preponderance, both were staunch for the use of extreme means in napoleon's manner. it is not as something better than the higher road that they commend the lower one, but being veteran staff-officers and not mere theorists, they knew well that a belligerent must sometimes find the higher road beyond his strength, or beyond the effort which the spirit of the nation is prepared to make for the end in view, and like the practical men they were, they set themselves to study the potentialities of the lower road should hard necessity force them to travel it. they found that these potentialities in certain circumstances were great. as an example of a case where the lower form was more appropriate jomini cites napoleon's campaign against russia in 1812. in his opinion it would have been better if napoleon had been satisfied to begin on the lower method with a limited territorial object, and he attributes his failure to the abuse of a method which, however well suited to his wars in germany, was incapable of achieving success in the conditions presented by a war with russia.

seeing how high was napoleon's opinion of jomini as a master of the science of war, it is curious how his views on the two natures of wars have been ignored in the present day. it is even more curious in the case of clausewitz, since we know that in the plenitude of his powers he came to regard this classification as the master-key of the subject. the explanation is that the distinction is not very clearly formulated in his first seven books, which alone he left in anything like a finished condition. it was not till he came to write his eighth book on war plans that he saw the vital importance of the distinction round which he had been hovering. in that book the distinction is clearly laid down, but the book unhappily [pg 48] was never completed. with his manuscript, however, he left a "note" warning us against regarding his earlier books as a full presentation of his developed ideas. from the note it is also evident that he thought the classification on which he had lighted was of the utmost importance, that he believed it would clear up all the difficulties which he had encountered in his earlier books—difficulties which he had come to see arose from a too exclusive consideration of the napoleonic method of conducting war. "i look upon the first six books," he wrote in 1827, "as only a mass of material which is still in a manner without form and which has still to be revised again. in this revision the two kinds of wars will be kept more distinctly in view all through, and thereby all ideas will gain in clearness, in precision, and in exactness of application." evidently he had grown dissatisfied with the theory of absolute war on which he had started. his new discovery had convinced him that that theory would not serve as a standard for all natures of wars. "shall we," he asks in his final book, "shall we now rest satisfied with this idea and by it judge of all wars, however much they may differ?"2 he answers his question in the negative. "you cannot determine the requirements of all wars from the napoleonic type. keep that type and its absolute method before you to use when you can or when you must, but keep equally before you that there are two main natures of war."

in his note written at this time, when the distinction first came to him, he defines these two natures of war as follows: "first, those in which the object is the overthrow of the enemy, whether it be we aim at his political destruction or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace [pg 49] on our terms; and secondly, those in which our object is merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently or of turning them to account as a matter of exchange in settling terms of peace."3 it was in his eighth book that he intended, had he lived, to have worked out the comprehensive idea he had conceived. of that book he says, "the chief object will be to make good the two points of view above mentioned, by which everything will be simplified and at the same time be given the breath of life. i hope in this book to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen, and at least to show the object of action and the real point to be considered in war."4

that hope was never realised, and that perhaps is why his penetrating analysis has been so much ignored. the eighth book as we have it is only a fragment. in the spring of 1830—an anxious moment, when it seemed that prussia would require all her best for another struggle single-handed with france—he was called away to an active command. what [pg 50] he left of the book on "war plans" he describes as "merely a track roughly cleared, as it were, through the mass, in order to ascertain the points of greatest moment." it was his intention, he says, to "carry the spirit of these ideas into his first six books"—to put the crown on his work, in fact, by elaborating and insisting upon his two great propositions, viz. that war was a form of policy, and that being so it might be limited or unlimited.

the extent to which he would have infused his new idea into the whole every one is at liberty to judge for himself; but this indisputable fact remains. in the winter in view of the threatening attitude of france in regard to belgium he drew up a war plan, and it was designed not on the napoleonic method of making the enemy's armed force the main strategical objective, but on seizing a limited territorial object and forcing a disadvantageous counter-offensive upon the french. the revolutionary movement throughout europe had broken the holy alliance to pieces. not only did prussia find herself almost single-handed against france, but she herself was sapped by revolution. to adopt the higher form [pg 51] of war and seek to destroy the armed force of the enemy was beyond her power. but she could still use the lower form, and by seizing belgium she could herself force so exhausting a task on france that success was well within her strength. it was exactly so we endeavoured to begin the seven years' war; and it was exactly so the japanese successfully conducted their war with russia; and what is more striking, it was on similar lines that in 1859 moltke in similar circumstances drew up his first war plan against france. his idea at that time was on the lines which jomini held should have been napoleon's in 1812. it was not to strike directly at paris or the french main army, but to occupy alsace-lorraine and hold that territory till altered conditions should give him the necessary preponderance for proceeding to the higher form or forcing a favourable peace.

in conclusion, then, we have to note that the matured fruit of the napoleonic period was a theory of war based not on the single absolute idea, but on the dual distinction of limited and unlimited. whatever practical importance we may attach to the distinction, so much must be admitted on the clear and emphatic pronouncements of clausewitz and jomini. the practical importance is another matter. it may fairly be argued that in continental warfare—in spite of the instances quoted by both the classical writers—it is not very great, for reasons that will appear directly. but it must be remembered that continental warfare is not the only form in which great international issues are decided. standing at the final point which clausewitz and jomini reached, we are indeed only on the threshold of the subject. we have to begin where they left off and inquire what their ideas have to tell for the modern conditions of worldwide imperial states, where the sea becomes a direct and vital factor.