methods of

disputing command

i. defensive fleet operations—"a fleet in

being"

in dealing with the theory of sea command, attention was called to the error of assuming that if we are unable to win the command we therefore lose it. it was pointed out that this proposition, which is too often implied in strategical discussion, denies in effect that there can be such a thing as strategical defensive at sea, and ignores the fact that the normal condition in war is for the command to be in dispute. theory and history are at one on the point. together they affirm that a power too weak to win command by offensive operations may yet succeed in holding the command in dispute by assuming a general defensive attitude.

that such an attitude in itself cannot lead to any positive result at sea goes without saying, but nevertheless even over prolonged periods it can prevent an enemy securing positive results, and so give time for the other belligerent to dominate the situation by securing his ends ashore.

it is seldom that we have been forced even for a time to adopt such an attitude, but our enemies have done so frequently to our serious annoyance and loss. in the seven years' war, for instance, the french by avoiding offensive operations likely to lead to a decision, and confining themselves [pg 210] to active defence, were able for five campaigns to prevent our reducing canada, which was the object of the war. had they staked the issue on a great fleet action in the first campaign, and had the result been against them, we could certainly have achieved our object in half the time. in the end, of course, they failed to prevent the conquest, but during all the time the catastrophe was postponed france had abundant opportunity of gaining offensively elsewhere territory which, as she at all events believed, would have compelled us to give up our conquest at the peace.

again, in our last great naval war napoleon by avoiding general actions was able to keep the command in dispute till by alliances and otherwise he had gathered force which he deemed sufficient to warrant a return to the offensive. eventually that force proved unequal to the task, yet when it failed and the command passed to his enemy, he had had time to consolidate his power so far that the loss of his fleet seemed scarcely to affect it, and for nine years more he was able to continue the struggle.

such examples—and there are many of them—serve to show how serious a matter is naval defence in the hands of a great military power with other means of offence. they tell us how difficult it is to deal with, and how serious therefore for even the strongest naval power is the need to give it careful study.

and not for this reason only, but also because the strongest naval power, if faced with a coalition, may find it impossible to exert a drastic offensive anywhere without temporarily reducing its force in certain areas to a point relatively so low as to permit of nothing higher than the defensive. the leading case of such a state of affairs, which we must further consider presently, was our own position in the war of american independence, when, as we have seen, in order to secure an adequate concentration for offence in the west indies we were forced to reduce our home fleet to defensive level.

[pg 211]

what, then, do we mean by naval defence? to arrive at a right answer we must first clear our mind of all confusing shadows cast by the accidents of land defence. both on land and at sea defence means of course taking certain measures to defer a decision until military or political developments so far redress the balance of strength that we are able to pass to the offensive. in the operations of armies the most usual means employed are the holding of positions and forcing our superior enemy to exhaust his strength in attacking them. consequently the idea of military defence is dominated by the conception of entrenched positions and fortresses.

in naval warfare this is not so. at sea the main conception is avoiding decisive action by strategical or tactical activity, so as to keep our fleet in being till the situation develops in our favour. in the golden age of our navy the keynote of naval defence was mobility, not rest. the idea was to dispute the control by harassing operations, to exercise control at any place or at any moment as we saw a chance, and to prevent the enemy exercising control in spite of his superiority by continually occupying his attention. the idea of mere resistance was hardly present at all. everything was counterattack, whether upon the enemy's force or his maritime communications. on land, of course, such methods of defence are also well known, but they belong much more to guerilla warfare than to regular operations. in regular warfare with standing armies, however brilliantly harassing operations and counter-attack are used, the fundamental conception is the defended or defensible position.

similarly at sea, although the essence of defence is mobility and an untiring aggressive spirit rather than rest and resistance, yet there also defended and defensible positions are not excluded. but they are only used in the last resort. a fleet may retire temporarily into waters difficult of access, where it can only be attacked at great risk, or into a fortified base, where it is practically removed from the board and cannot be [pg 212] attacked at all by a fleet alone. but the occasions on which such expedients can be used at sea are far rarer than on land. indeed except for the most temporary purposes they can scarcely be regarded as admissible at sea, however great their value on land. the reason is simple. a fleet withdrawing to such a position leaves open to the enemy the ulterior object, which is the control of sea communications, whereas on land an army in a good position may even for a prolonged period cover the ulterior object, which is usually territory. an army in position, moreover, is always doing something to exhaust its opponent and redress the unfavourable balance, but a fleet in inactivity is too often permitting the enemy to carry on operations which tend to exhaust the resources of its own country.

for a maritime power, then, a naval defensive means nothing but keeping the fleet actively in being-not merely in existence, but in active and vigorous life. no phrase can better express the full significance of the idea than "a fleet in being," if it be rightly understood. unfortunately it has come to be restricted, by a misunderstanding of the circumstances in which it was first invented, to one special class of defence. we speak of it as though it were essentially a method of defence against invasion, and so miss its fuller meaning. if, however, it be extended to express defence against any kind of maritime attack, whether against territory or sea communications, its broad truth will become apparent, and it will give us the true conception of the idea as held in the british service.

the occasion on which it was first used was one that well exhibits the special possibilities of a naval defensive. it was in the year 1690, when, in alliance with the dutch, we were at war with france, and though really superior, had been caught in a situation which placed us temporarily at a great disadvantage in home waters. the french by a surprising rapidity of mobilisation and concentration had stolen a [pg 213] march on us before either our mobilisation or our concentration was complete. king william, with the best of the army, was in ireland dealing with a french invasion in support of james, and a squadron of seven sail under sir cloudesley shovel had been detached into the irish sea to guard his communications. another squadron, consisting of sixteen of the line, british and dutch, had been sent to gibraltar under admiral killigrew to take down the trade and to keep an eye on chateaurenault, who with a slightly inferior squadron was at toulon. it was assumed he would probably make a push for brest, where the french main fleet was mobilising under the comte de tourville, and killigrew had orders to follow him if he got through the straits. chateaurenault did get through; killigrew failed to bring him to action, and instead of following him immediately, he went into cadiz to complete his arrangements for forwarding his outward-bound convoy and escorting the one he was to bring home. what of course he should have done, according to the practice of more experienced times, was to have left this work to a [pg 214] cruiser detachment, and failing contact with chateaurenault, should have closed at once to the strategical centre with his battle-squadron.

meanwhile the home fleet, which lord torrington was to command, was still unformed. it lay in three divisions, at the downs, portsmouth, and plymouth, while a considerable part of the promised dutch contingent had not made its appearance. it was a splendid chance for the french to seize the command of the channel before the concentration could take place and to crush the british in detail. accordingly, on june 13th, as soon as chateaurenault had arrived, tourville put to sea with some seventy of the line. the day before, however, torrington, having hoisted his flag in the downs, had massed his two main divisions at portsmouth, and by the time tourville appeared off the isle of wight he had with later arrivals, both dutch and british, about fifty-six of the line in st. helen's road. not knowing that the toulon contingent had joined, he put to sea intending to fight, but on discovering the great superiority of the french, he decided in concert with his council of war to act on the defensive, and before offering battle to endeavour to secure a concentration with killigrew and shovel and the plymouth division by getting to the westward. if he found this course impossible without fighting an action, his plan was to retire before tourville "even to the gunfleet," where amidst the shoals of the thames estuary he felt he would have a good chance of repelling an attack with success. there, too, he counted on being reinforced not only [pg 215] by the ships still at chatham, but also possibly by ships from the westward which might steal along the coast and join him "over the flats" by channels unknown to the french. to fight as he was he considered to be only playing the enemy's game. "if we are beaten," he said in communicating his plan to the government, "they being absolute masters of the sea will be at great liberty of doing many things which they dare not do whilst we observe them and are in a possibility of joining admiral killigrew and our ships to the westward."

it was a plan conceived on the best principles of defence—waiting till the acquisition of fresh force justified a return to the offensive. it is further interesting as a pure case of naval defence, with no ulterior object other than control of home waters. in the minds of the government there was no apprehension of any definite attempt to invade across the channel, but the invasion of ireland was in full progress, and all nourishment of it must be stopped and our own communications kept free. there was, moreover, serious anxiety lest the french should extend their operations to scotland, and there was killigrew's homeward-bound convoy approaching. the situation was one that obviously could not be solved effectually except by winning a general command of the sea, but in torrington's judgment it could be rendered innocuous by holding the command in dispute. his design, therefore, was to act upon the defensive and prevent the enemy achieving any positive result until he was in a position to fight them with a fair chance of victory. a temporary defensive he considered was the only way to win the command, while to hazard a decision in inferior strength was the best way to lose it.

nothing could be in closer harmony with the principles of good strategy as we understand them now. it was undoubtedly [pg 216] in advance of anything that had been done up to that time, and it was little wonder if the government, as is usually said, failed to appreciate the design. their rejection of it has come in for very severe criticism. but it would seem that they misunderstood rather than failed to appreciate. the earl of nottingham, who was at the head of the government, believed, as his reply to the admiral clearly shows, that torrington meant to retire to the gunfleet at once; whereas it is equally clear to us that the gunfleet was to be his extreme point, and that he did not mean to retire so far unless the french forced him. the minister failed, as others have done since, to grasp what the admiral meant by "a fleet in being." he thought that in torrington's view a fleet safe in port and not in contact with the enemy was "in being," whereas torrington had no such idea. as nottingham conceived the admiral's intention he saw that although it might preserve the fleet, it would expose everything else to destruction; that is, he was oppressed with the special characteristic of naval warfare which always permits action against the ulterior object when the enemy denies you any chance of acting against his armed force.

under this misapprehension, which indeed was not justified by the words of torrington's despatch, he procured from the queen an order in these terms: "we apprehend," it ran, "the consequences of your retiring to the gunfleet to be so fatal, that we choose rather you should upon any advantage of the wind give battle to the enemy than retreat farther than is necessary to get an advantage upon the enemy." it was, however, left to his discretion to proceed to the westward to complete his concentration that way, provided, it said, "you by no means ever lose sight of the french fleet whereby they [pg 217] may have opportunity of making attempts upon the shore or in the rivers of medway or thames, or get away without fighting."

this order has been very hardly dealt with by modern critics, although it clearly contemplates true preventive observation, and even, as the last words suggest, the idea contained in nelson's well-known saying, "that by the time the enemy had beat our fleet soundly they would do us no more harm this year." it is true that nelson could rely on the proved superiority of the british at that time unit for unit, but it is also true that nottingham and his colleagues in the government had information which led them greatly to underestimate tourville's strength. this was evident on the face of nottingham's despatch which covered the order, so evident indeed that torrington might well perhaps have suspended the execution of an order so obviously based on incorrect information. but knowing probably what intrigues were going on against him at court, he chose to regard it as a peremptory command to engage whenever he found himself to windward.

much as a more scientific view of naval strategy may admire torrington's conception, there seems no reason for losing temper over the government's plan. it was certainly one way of solving the problem, and seeing how large were our reserves, a defeat need not have meant disaster. still, it was doubtless dictated by an inability to grasp, the strategical strength of torrington's novel plan, a plan which was not [pg 218] only safer, but was calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end. the real fallacy of the government's plan was that although it had a specious appearance of a bold offensive, it could have achieved nothing but a negative result. the most a battle could have given in the circumstances could only have left the command in dispute, and the worst would have given the enemy a positive result, which must have gravely compromised william's campaign in ireland.

on these lines torrington replied to the government. dealing with their anxiety for the ships to the westward and the mediterranean convoy, whose danger was their expressed reason for forbidding him the gunfleet, he pointed out that they could not run much hazard if they took care of themselves. for, as he repeated, "while we observe the french, they cannot make any attempt on ships or shore without running great hazard, and if we are beaten, all is exposed to their mercy." thus without specially noticing the minister's misinterpretation of his despatch, he intimated that his intention was observation, and not simple retreat.

by the time torrington sent this reply he had been pressed back as far as beachy head; it was no longer possible to get to the westward; and the following day, finding himself to windward, he attacked. but still confirmed in his idea of defence, and carrying it on to his tactics, he refused to give the french the chance of a real decision, and disengaged as soon as a drop in the wind permitted. so far he felt justified in [pg 219] interpreting orders which he knew were founded on false information. he was sure, as he said in justification of the way he fought the action, "that the queen could not have been prevailed with to sign an order for it, had not both our weakness and the strength of the enemy been disguised to her."

so severely was his fleet crippled that he believed his plan could no longer act. "what the consequences of this unfortunate battle may be," he wrote in his journal, "god almighty only knows, but this i dare be positive in, had i been left to my liberty i had prevented any attempt upon the land, and secured the western ships, killigrew, and the merchantmen." actually in all this he was successful. slowly retiring eastward he drew the french after him as far as dover before he ran to the nore; and tourville was unable to get back to [pg 220] the westward, till all the endangered ships were safe in plymouth. in spite of torrington's being forced to fight an action at the wrong time and place, his design had so far succeeded. not only had he prevented the french doing anything that could affect the issue of the war, but he had completely foiled tourville's plan of destroying the british fleet in detail. that he had done, but retribution by passing to the offensive was no longer in his power.

that tourville or his government was impressed with the efficacy of the method was demonstrated the following year, when he in his turn found himself in an inferiority that denied him hope of a successful battle decision. during the summer he kept his fleet hovering off the mouth of the channel without giving the british admiral a chance of contact. his method, however, differed from that of torrington, and he only achieved his negative object by keeping out of sight of his enemy altogether. in his opinion, if a fleet remained at sea in close observation of an active enemy an action could not be avoided. "if (the admiral)," he wrote in his memorandum on the subject, "be ordered to keep the sea to try to amuse the enemy and to let them know we are in a position to attack in case they attempt a descent, i think it my duty to say that in that case we must make up our mind to have to fight them in the end; for if they have really sought an action, they will have been able to fight, seeing that it is impossible to pirouette so long near a fleet without coming to grips."20 this is as much as to say that a sure point of temporary retreat is necessary to "a fleet in being," and this was an essential part of torrington's idea.

in torrington's and tourville's time, when ships were unhandy and fleet tactics in their infancy, the difficulty of avoiding [pg 221] action, when a determined enemy had once got contact, were undoubtedly great, unless a port of retreat was kept open. but as the art of naval warfare developed, the possibilities of "a fleet in being" were regarded as much wider, at least in the british service. it was nearly a hundred years before we were again forced to use the same device on a large scale, and then it was believed that superior speed and tactical precision were factors that could be counted on to an almost unlimited extent. in the darkest days of the war of american independence we have a memorandum of the subject by kempenfelt, which not only gives the developed idea of "a fleet in being" and the high aggressive spirit that is its essence, but also explains its value, not merely as a defensive expedient, but as a means of permitting a drastic offensive even when you are as a whole inferior. "when you know the enemy's designs," he says, "in order to do something effectual you must endeavour to be superior to them in some part where they have designs to execute, and where, if they succeed, they would most injure you. if your fleet is divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will have a fair chance of succeeding everywhere in their attempts. if a squadron cannot be formed sufficient to face the enemy's at home, it would be more advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to gain the superiority elsewhere."

"when inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of observation to watch and attend upon their motions, such a squadron should be composed of two-decked ships only [that is, ships of the highest mobility] as to assure it purpose. it must have the advantage of the enemy in sailing, else under certain circumstances it will be liable to be forced to battle or to give up some of its heavy sailers. it is highly necessary to have such a flying squadron to hang on the enemy's large fleet, as it will prevent their dividing into separate squadrons for intercepting your trade or spreading their [pg 222] ships for a more extensive view. you will be at hand to profit from any accidental separation or dispersion of their fleet from hard gales, fogs, or other causes. you may intercept supplies, intelligence, &c, sent to them. in fine, such a squadron will be a check and restraint upon their motions, and prevent a good deal of the mischief they might otherwise do."

three years before, when first called to be chief of the staff in the channel, he had emphasised the same points. "much," he wrote in july 1779, "i may say all, depends upon this fleet. 'tis an inferior against a superior fleet. therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at some or other feeble part of the enemy's line; or if such opportunities don't offer, to hover near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his attempting anything but at risk and hazard; to command their attention, and oblige them to think of nothing but being on their guard against your attack."21

it was on these lines the war was conducted. the west indian area, in which lay the enemy's principal object, was treated as the offensive theatre and the home waters as the defensive. inferior as was the channel fleet to the home fleet of the allies, its defensive operations proved adequate to prevent their achieving any success. nor was this all, for kempenfelt was able to demonstrate the positive side of his theory in the most brilliant and convincing manner. in dealing with [pg 223] concentration we have seen how, in command of such a flying squadron as he postulated, he was able off ushant to seize a favourable opportunity for action, which resulted in his capturing a convoy of military stores essential to the french operations in the west indies under the nose of de guichen with an escort of nearly twice his force.

nelson certainly shared kempenfelt's views as to the possibilities of an inferior fleet kept actively in being. "as to our fleet," he wrote from the mediterranean in 1796, "under such a commander-in-chief as sir john jervis nobody has any fear ... we are now twenty-two sail of the line. the combined fleet will not be above thirty-five.... i will venture my life sir john jervis defeats them. i do not mean by a regular battle, but by the skill of our admiral and the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen. this country is the most favourable possible for that skill with an inferior fleet; for the winds are so variable, that some one time in twenty-four hours you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and the other will be becalmed or have a contrary wind. therefore i hope the government will not be alarmed for our safety."

such a conception of the defensive may indeed be said to have become current in the british service. it was part of the reasoning which in 1805, after villeneuve's escape from the mediterranean, decided sir john orde to fall back on [pg 224] ushant instead of entering the straits. "i dare believe," he wrote, "lord nelson will be found in condition with his twelve of the line and numerous frigates to act on the defensive without loss and even to hang on to the skirts of the enemy's fleet should it attempt any material service, especially when encumbered with troops."

in all this consideration of the potentialities of "a fleet in being" operating defensively it must never be forgotten that we are dealing with its possibilities in relation to a general command of the sea—to its general power of holding such command in dispute, as torrington used it. its power of preventing a particular operation, such as oversea invasion, is another matter, which will always depend upon the local conditions. if the "fleet in being" can be contained in such a way that it is impossible for it to reach the invading line of passage, it will be no bar to invasion. in 1690, so far as torrington's fleet was concerned, the french, had they been so minded, might have made a descent, say, at portsmouth while torrington was at the nore. but torrington's fleet was not the only factor. his retreat forced tourville to leave behind him unfought the squadrons of shovel and killigrew, and so far as commanding a line of invasion passage was concerned tourville was himself as well contained as torrington. the conditions of naval defence against invasion are in fact so complex compared with those of general naval defence that they must be treated later as a special branch of the subject.

the doctrine of the "fleet in being" as formulated and practised by torrington and developed by kempenfelt goes no further than this, that where the enemy regards the general command of a sea area as necessary to his offensive purposes, you may be able to prevent his gaining such command by using your fleet defensively, refusing what nelson [pg 225] called a regular battle, and seizing every opportunity for a counterstroke. to use it as it was used by the french in the case of tourville's famous deterrent cruise, where the whole object of the french was offensive and could not be obtained except by offence, is quite another thing.

it is indeed difficult to understand the admiration with which his campagne au large has been treated in france. he kept the sea off the mouth of the channel for fifty days in the summer of 1691, and for forty of those days our channel fleet was making no systematic effort to seek him out. he had been sent to sea in hope of intercepting our great "smyrna convoy," which was then the backbone of our oversea trade. russell with the british main fleet simply took positions to cover its approach until it was safe, knowing presumably that tourville must come to him if he wished to accomplish his purpose. when the convoy was safe russell proceeded off ushant, that is, between the enemy and his base. tourville's communications were thus cut, his line of retreat threatened, and he seized the first opportunity to elude russell and to return into port. beyond taking a few ships from one of the west india convoys, he accomplished nothing. the central french offensive in ireland was broken at the battle of the boyne, and the prestige of england at sea was restored. it is true our trade suffered in the north sea, but this was not directly due to the concentration which tourville's cruise forced upon us, but rather to the failure of the dutch—apparently by a misunderstanding-to provide for an effective blockade of dunkirk.

[pg 226]

to british eyes it will seem that the heresy which was latent in tourville's instructions was a seed that choked all the finer aspirations of the french navy. in 1691 the plan of his cruise may possibly be defended as sufficiently aggressive, since, seeing how unstable was william's new throne, a resounding blow at british trade, combined with an expected victory in ireland, might have been enough to upset it. but afterwards the idea was stretched to occasions it would not fit. it seems to have bred a belief that where the object of the war plainly depended on winning a real command of the sea, that object could yet be attained by naval defensive operations. many times it is true a policy which had starved the navy of france left no other course open to her seamen, and had they in their inferiority attempted the offensive, the end must have been swifter if not more certain. in criticising the maritime history of france we must be careful to distinguish policy from strategy. it was not always the defensive strategy that was bad, but the policy that condemned her admirals to negative operations. seeing that she was a continental power with continental aspirations, it was often a policy from which her military exigencies permitted no escape. nevertheless the policy was twice accursed: it cursed her when she was weak, and cursed her when she was strong. the prolonged use of the defensive bred a habit of mind which seems to have rendered her incapable of striking hard when she had the strength. in no other way at least can we account for the behaviour of so high-spirited a nation when her chance of revenge came in the war of american independence.

it is here in its moral reactions lies the danger of the defensive, a danger so insidious in its working as to tempt us never to utter the word. yet with the voice of torrington, kempenfelt, and nelson in our ears, it would be folly to ignore it for ourselves, and still more to ignore the exhausting strain its use by our enemy may impose upon us. it must be studied, if for no other reasons than to learn how to break it down. nor [pg 227] will the study have danger, if only we keep well in view the spirit of restless and vigilant counter-attack which kempenfelt and nelson regarded as its essence. true, some of the conditions which in the days of sails made for opportunity have passed away, but many still remain. shifts of wind and calms will no longer bring them, but weather thick or violent can yet make seamanship, nimbleness, and cohesion tell as it always did; and there is no reason to doubt that it is still possible for hard sea-training to make "the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen" give the results which nelson so confidently expected.

ii. minor counter-attacks

for the weaker of two belligerents minor-attack has always exercised a certain fascination. where a power was so inferior in naval force that it could scarcely count even on disputing command by fleet operations, there remained a hope of reducing the relative inferiority by putting part of the enemy's force out of action. such hopes were rarely realised. in 1587 drake succeeded in stopping the spanish invasion by such a counter-attack on the cadiz division of the armada while it was still unmobilised. in 1667 the dutch achieved a similar success against our chatham division when it was demobilised and undefended, and thereby probably secured rather more favourable terms of peace. but it cannot be said that the old wars present any case where the ultimate question of command was seriously affected by a minor counterattack.

the advent of the torpedo, however, has given the idea a new importance that cannot be overlooked. the degree of that importance is at present beyond calculation. there is at least no evidence that it would be very high in normal conditions and between ordinarily efficient fleets. the comparative success of the opening japanese attack on the port arthur [pg 228] squadron is the only case in point, and where only one case exists, it is necessary to use extreme caution in estimating its significance. before we can deduce anything of permanent value we must consider very carefully both its conditions and results.

to begin with, it was a new experience of a new class of weapon, and it by no means follows that the success of a new expedient will be repeated with anything like equal result. it will not be irrelevant again to recall the case of fireships. at the outset of the sailing era in 1588, this device prepared the way for a decisive success against a fleet in the open. in the succeeding wars the new weapon found a prominent place in the organisation of sea-going fleets, but its success was never repeated. against ships in ill-defended harbours it did occasionally produce good results, and during the infancy of tactics its moral and even material effects in fleet actions were frequently demonstrated. but as naval science developed and the limitations of the weapon were more accurately measured, it was able to achieve less and less, till in the eighteenth century it was regarded as almost negligible. even its moral effect was lost, and it ceased to be considered as a battle unit.

now, if we examine closely the port arthur case, we shall find it pointing to the existence of certain inherent conditions not dissimilar from those which discredited fireships as a decisive factor in war. in spite of the apparently formidable nature of a surprise attack by torpedo the indications from the one case in point are that these conditions make for greater power in the defence than in the attack. the first [pg 229] condition relates to the difficulty of locating the objective accurately. it is obvious that for this kind of operation the most precise intelligence is essential, and of all intelligence the most difficult to obtain in war is the distribution of an enemy's fleet from day to day. the japanese had fairly certain information that the bulk of the port arthur squadron was lying in the outer anchorage, but it had been constantly moving, and there was a report that three battleships had just been detached from it. the report was false, but the result was that of the five divisions of destroyers which the japanese had available, two were diverted against dalny, where no enemy was found. such uncertainty must always exist, and in no circumstances is it likely to be less than where, as in the japanese case, the attack is made before declaration, and while the ordinary channels of intelligence are still open.

further, it is to be noted that in spite of the fact that relations for some weeks had been highly strained, and a surprise torpedo attack was regarded as probable, the russians had taken no precautions to confuse their enemy. it is obvious that measures to prevent accurate locating can, and should, be taken in such cases. we may go further. from confusing the enemy by such means it is but a step to lead him to a wrong conclusion, and to lay for him a trap which may swallow up the bulk of his destroyer force in the first hours of the war. it is to be feared, however, that the risks of such an eventuality are so great in minor counter-attacks of this nature, that it will probably be very difficult to tempt an inferior enemy to expose his flotilla in this way.

this view receives emphasis from the second point which the port arthur case serves to demonstrate, and that is the great power of even the flimsiest defence against such attacks; in other words, the chances of success can scarcely ever [pg 230] be great enough to justify the risk. everything was in favour of the japanese. orders had been issued in the russian squadron for two or three nights previously to prepare for a torpedo attack, but so low had discipline fallen, that the orders were obeyed in a very perfunctory manner. guns were not loaded, their crews were not at quarters, nor were the nets got out. the only real precaution taken was that two destroyers and no more had been sent out as guard patrol, but even they were forbidden to fire on anything they met until they had reported to the admiral or had themselves been fired on. defence against a surprise attack could scarcely have been more feeble, and yet so high was the nervous tension in the attacking force, that it proved stronger than could reasonably have been expected. the mere existence of the patrol and the necessity of evading it threw the japanese approach into a confusion from which it was unable to recover entirely, and the attack lost its essential momentum and cohesion. again, defective as were the arrangements in the squadron itself, and lax as were its training and discipline, no torpedo hits were made, so far as we can judge, after the russian guns and searchlights got into play.

such development of strength in the defence seems inherent in the conditions of minor attack, and there appears to be no reason for expecting better results for such attacks in normal cases. but in deducing principles from the port arthur case, it must always be remembered that it was far from normal. it was a blow before declaration, when the menace of strained relations, though realised, had been almost entirely ignored by the russians. in such exceptional and almost incredible circumstances a minor attack might always be counted on for a certain measure of success. to this we have to add the fact that the russian squadron was not ordinarily efficient, but appears to have fallen into a lax condition such as could scarcely recur in the case of any other naval power.

[pg 231]

finally, we must ask what, with every condition abnormally in favour of the attack, was the actual material result? did it have any real influence on the ultimate question of command? it is true that it so far swung the balance in favour of the japanese that they were able to exercise the local control long enough to land their troops and isolate port arthur. but the japanese plan for securing ultimate command rested on their power of taking port arthur by military operation and sustaining the siege from the sea. yet in spite of every condition of success the physical effect of the blow was so small, that even without the help of an adequate dockyard the squadron recovered from it and became potent again before the siege could even be formed. the minor attacks which followed the first blow were all failures, and whether delivered at the port or upon the squadron in the open had no appreciable effect whatever.

at the same time it must be remembered that since that war the art of torpedo warfare has developed very rapidly. its range and offensive power have increased in a higher ratio than the means of resisting it. still those means have advanced, and it is probable that a squadron in a naval port or in a properly defended anchorage is not more easy to injure than it ever was; while a squadron at sea, so long as it constantly shifts its position, still remains very difficult to locate with sufficient precision for successful minor attack.

the unproved value of submarines only deepens the mist which overhangs the next naval war. from a strategical point of view we can say no more than that we have to count with a new factor, which gives a new possibility to minor counterattack. it is a possibility which on the whole tells in favour of naval defence, a new card which, skilfully played in combination with defensive fleet operations, may lend fresh importance to the "fleet in being." it may further be expected that whatever the effective possibilities of minor operations may ultimately prove to be in regard to securing command, the [pg 232] moral influence will be considerable, and at least at the beginning of a future war will tend to deflect and hamper the major operations and rob of their precision the lines which formerly led so frankly to the issue by battle.

in the absence of a sufficient volume of experience it would be idle to go further, particularly as torpedo attack, like fireship attack, depends for success more than any other on the spirit and skill of officers and men. with regard to the torpedo as the typical arm of mobile coastal defence, it is a different matter. what has been said applies only to its power towards securing command of the sea, and not to the exercise or to disputing the exercise of command. this is a question which is concerned with defence against invasion, and to that we must now turn.