arrests of alleged spies were reported from manchester and other large towns. most of the prisoners were, however, able to prove themselves naturalised british subjects; but several were detained pending investigation and examination of correspondence found at their homes. in manchester, where there are always a number of germans, it is known that many slipped away on sunday night after the publication of the news of the invasion.
in most of the larger midland towns notices had been issued by the mayors deprecating hostility towards residents of foreign origin, and stating that all suspicious cases were already receiving the attention of the police.
in stafford the boot factories were idle. in the potteries all work was at a standstill. at stoke-on-trent, at hanley, at burslem, tunstall, and congleton all was chaos, and thousands upon thousands were already wanting bread. the silk-thread industry at leek was ruined, so was the silk industry at macclesfield; the great breweries at burton were idle, while the hosiery factories of leicester and the boot factories of northampton were all shut.[100]
with the german troops threatening sheffield, nottingham was in a state of intense alarm. the lace and hosiery factories had with one accord closed on tuesday, and the great market place was now filled day and night by thousands upon thousands of unemployed mill-hands of both sexes. on friday, however, came the news of how sheffield had built barricades against the enemy, and there ensued a frantic attempt at defence on the part of thousands of terrified and hungry men and women. in their frenzy they sacked houses in order to obtain material to construct the barricades, which were, however, built just where the fancy took the crowd.
the white, interminable north road, that runs so straight from london through york and berwick to edinburgh, was, with its by-roads in the midlands, now being patrolled by british cavalry, and here and there telegraphists around a telegraph post showed that those many wires at the roadside were being used for military communication.
at several points along the road between wansford bridge and retford the wires had been cut and tangled by the enemy's agents, but by friday all had been restored again. in one spot, between weston and sutton-on-trent, eight miles south of newark, a trench had actually been dug during the night, the tube containing the subterranean telegraph lines discovered, and the whole system to the north disorganised. similar damage had been done by german spies to the line between london and birmingham, two miles south of shipston-on-stour; and again the line between loughborough and nottingham had been similarly destroyed.
the post office linesmen had, however, quickly made good the damage everywhere in the country not already occupied by the enemy, and telegraph and telephone communication north and south was now practically again in its normal state.
through lincolnshire the enemy's advance patrols had spread south over every road between the humber and the wash, and in the city of lincoln itself a tremendous sensation was caused when on wednesday, market-day, several bodies of german motor-cyclists swept into the stonebow and dismounted at the saracen's head, amid the crowd of farmers and dealers who had assembled there, not, alas! to do business, but to discuss the[101] situation. in a moment the city was panic-stricken. from mouth to mouth the dread truth spread, that the germans were upon them, and people ran indoors and barricaded themselves within their houses.
a body of uhlans came galloping proudly through the stonebow a quarter of an hour later, and halted in high street as though awaiting orders. then in rapid succession troops seemed to arrive from all quarters, many halting in the cathedral close and by exchequer gate, and others riding through the streets in order to terrify the inhabitants.
von kronhelm's famous proclamation was posted by german soldiers upon the police station, upon the stonebow, and upon the door of the grand old cathedral itself, and before noon a german officer accompanied by his staff called upon the mayor, and warned him that lincoln was occupied by the german troops, and that any armed resistance would be punished by death, as the generalissimo's proclamation stated. an indemnity was demanded, and then the powerless people saw upon the cathedral and upon several of the public buildings the german flag rise and float out upon the summer wind.
boston was full of german infantry, and officers had taken up temporary quarters in the peacock and other hotels in the market-place, while upon the "stump" the enemy's colours were flying.
no news came from london. people in norwich, ipswich, yarmouth, and other places heard vaguely of the invasion in the north, and of fighting in which the germans were careful to report that they were always successful. they saw the magnificently equipped army of the kaiser, and, comparing it with our mere apology for military force, regarded the issue as hopeless from the very first. in every town the german colours were displayed, and all kinds of placards in german and in english made their appearance.
the "daily chronicle," on september 10, published the following despatch from one of its war correspondents:
"royston, september 9.
"victory at last. a victory due not only to the bravery and exertion of our troops, regular and auxiliary, but also to the genius of field-marshal lord byfield, our commander-in-chief, ably seconded by the energy and[102] resource with which sir william packington, in command of the ivth army corps at baldock, carried out that part of the programme entrusted to him.
"but though in this success we may hope that we are seeing the first glimmerings of dawn—of deliverance from the nightmare of german invasion that is now oppressing our dear old england—we must not be led into foolishly sanguine hopes. the snake has been scotched, and pretty badly into the bargain, but he is far from being killed. the german ivth army corps, under the famous general von kleppen, their magnificent garde corps commanded by the duke of mannheim, and fr?lich's fine cavalry division, have been repulsed in their attack on our positions near royston and saffron walden, and driven back with great loss and confusion. but we are too weak to follow up our victory as it should be followed up.
"the menace of the ixth and xth corps on our right flank ties us to our selected position, and the bulk of our forces being composed of indifferently trained volunteers and militia, is much more formidable behind entrenchments than when attempting to man?uvre in a difficult and intricate country such as it is about here. but, on the other hand, we have given pause to the invaders, and have certainly gained a few days' time, which will be invaluable to us.
"we shall be able to get on with the line of fortifications that are being constructed to bar the approaches to london, and behind which it will be necessary for us to make our final stand. i do not conceive that it is possible for such an agglomeration of amateur troops as ours are in the main to defeat in the open field such formidable and well-trained forces as the germans have succeeded in throwing into this country. but when our navy has regained command of the sea, we hope that we may, before very long, place our unwelcome visitors 'between the devil and the deep sea'—the part of the devil being played by our brave troops finally concentrated behind the strong defences of the metropolis. in short, that the germans may run out of ammunition and provisions. for if communication with the fatherland is effectively cut, they must starve, unless they have previously compelled our submission; for it is impossible for an army of the size that has invaded us to live on the country.[103]
"no doubt hundreds, nay thousands, of our non-militant countrymen—and, alas! women and children—will starve before the german troops are conquered by famine, that most terrible of enemies; but this issue seems to be the only possible one that will save the country.
"but enough of these considerations of the future. it is time that i should relate what i can of the glorious victory which our gallant defenders have torn from the enemy. i do not think that i am giving any information away if i state that the british position lay mainly between saffron walden and royston, the headquarters respectively of the iind and iiird army corps. the ivth corps was at baldock, thrown back to cover the left flank and protect our communications by the great northern railway. a detached force, from what command supplied it is not necessary or advisable to say, was strongly entrenched on the high ground north-west of helions bumpstead, serving to strengthen our right. our main line of defence—very thinly held in some parts—began a little to the south-east of saffron walden, and ran westwards along a range of high ground through elmdon and chrishall to heydon. here it turned south through great chrishall to little chrishall, where it again turned west, and occupied the high range south of royston on which stands the village of therfield.
"the night before the battle we knew that the greater portion of the german ivth and garde corps were concentrated, the former at newmarket, the 1st division of the latter at cambridge, the 2nd on this side of st. ives, while fr?lich's cavalry division had been in constant contact with our outposts the greater part of the day previous. the garde cavalry brigade was reported to be well away to the westward towards kettering, as we suppose, on account of the reports which have been going about of a concentration of yeomanry and militia in the hilly country near northampton. our intelligence department, which appears to have been very well served by its spies, obtained early knowledge of the intention of the germans to make an attack on our position. in fact, they talked openly of it, and stated at cambridge and newmarket that they would not man?uvre at all, and only hoped that we should hold on long enough to our position to enable them to smash up our iind and iiird corps by a frontal attack, and[104] so clear the road to london. the main roads lent themselves admirably to such strategy, which rendered the reports of their intentions the more probable, for they all converged on our position from their main points of concentration.
"the letter 'w' will exactly serve to show the positions of the contending forces. st. ives is at the top of the first stroke, cambridge at the junction of the two shorter centre ones, newmarket at the top of the last stroke, while the british positions at royston and saffron walden are at the junctions of all four strokes at the bottom of the letter. the strokes also represent the roads, except that from cambridge three good roads lead towards each of the british positions. the prisoners taken from the germans in the various preliminary skirmishes also made no bones of boasting that a direct attack was imminent, and our commander-in-chief eventually, and rightly as it proved, determined to take the risk of all this information having been specially promulgated by the german staff to cover totally different intentions, as was indeed quite probable, and to accept it as true. having made up his mind, he lost no time in taking action. he ordered the ivth corps under sir william packington to move on potton, twelve miles to the north-west, as soon as it was dark. as many cavalry and mounted infantry as could possibly be spared from royston were placed at his disposal.
"it ought to be stated that while the auxiliary troops had been busily employed ever since their arrival in entrenching the british position, the greater part of the regular troops had been occupying an advanced line two or three miles to the northward on the lower spurs of the hills, and every possible indication of a determination to hold this as long as possible was afforded to the german reconnoitrers. during the night these troops fell back to the position which had been prepared, the outposts following just before daylight. about 6 a.m. the enemy were reported to be advancing in force along the icknield way from newmarket, and also by the roads running on either bank of the river cam. twenty minutes later considerable bodies of german troops were reported at fowlmere and melbourn on the two parallel royston-cambridge roads. they must have followed very close on the heels of our retiring outposts. it was a very misty morning—down in the low ground over which[105] the enemy were advancing especially so—but about seven a gust of wind from the westward dispelled the white fog-wreaths that hung about our left front, and enabled our lookouts to get a glimpse along the famous ermine street, which runs straight as an arrow from royston for twenty or thirty miles to the n.n.w.
"along this ancient roman way, far as the eye could reach, poured a steady stream of marching men, horse, foot, and artillery. the wind dropped, the mists gathered again, and once more enveloped the invaders in an impenetrable screen. but by this time the whole british line was on the qui vive. regulars, militia, and volunteers were marching down to their chin-deep trenches, while those who were already there busied themselves in improving their loopholes and strengthening their head cover. behind the ridges of the hills the gunners stood grouped about their 'long toms' and heavy howitzers, while the field batteries waited, ready horsed, for orders to gallop under cover of the ridge to whichever set of emplacements should first require to be manned and armed. we had not enough to distribute before the movements of the enemy should, to a certain extent, show his hand.
"about seven o'clock a series of crackling reports from the outskirts of royston announced that the detachment of mounted infantry, who now alone held it, was exchanging shots with the advancing enemy, and in a few minutes, as the morning mistiness cleared off, the general and his staff, who were established at the northern edge of the village of therfield, three or four hundred feet higher up than the german skirmishers, were able to see the opening of the battle spread like a panorama before them. a thick firing line of drab-costumed germans extended right across from holland hall to the coach and horses on the fowlmere road. on their left moved two or three compact masses of cavalry, while the infantry reserves were easily apparent in front of the village of melbourn. our mounted infantry in the village were indistinguishable, but away on the spur to the north-east of royston a couple of batteries of horse artillery were unlimbered and were pushing their guns up to the brow of the hill by hand. in two minutes they were in action, and hard at work.
"through the glasses the shrapnel could be seen bursting, half a dozen together, in front of the advancing[106] germans, who began to fall fast. but almost at once came an overwhelming reply from somewhere out of sight behind melbourn. the whole hilltop around our guns was like a spouting volcano. evidently big high-explosive shells were being fired from the german field-howitzers. in accordance with previous orders, our horse-gunners at once ran down their guns, limbered up, and started to gallop back towards our main position. simultaneously a mass of german cavalry deployed into attack formation near the coach and horses, and swept down in their direction with the evident intention of cutting off and capturing them. but they reckoned without their escort of mounted infantry, who had been lying low behind the long, narrow line of copse north of lowerfield farm. safely ensconced behind this—to cavalry—impassable barrier, the company, all good shots, opened a terrible magazine fire on the charging squadrons as they passed at close range. a maxim they had with them also swept horses and men away in swathes. the charge was checked, and the guns saved, but we had not finished with the german reiters. away to the north-east a battery of our 4·7 guns opened on the disorganised cavalry, firing at a range of four thousand yards. their big shells turned the momentary check into a rout, both the attacking cavalry and their supports galloping towards fowlmere to get out of range. we had scored the first trick!
"the attacking lines of german infantry still pressed on, however, and after a final discharge the mounted infantry in royston sprang on their horses and galloped back over whitely hill, leaving the town to be occupied by the enemy. to the eastward the thunder of heavy cannon, gradually growing in intensity, proclaimed that the iind corps was heavily attacked. covered by a long strip of plantation, the german ivth corps contrived to mass an enormous number of guns on a hill about two miles north of the village of elmdon, and a terrific artillery duel began between them and our artillery entrenched along the elmdon-heydon ridge. under cover of this the enemy began to work his infantry up towards elmdon, obtaining a certain amount of shelter from the spurs which ran out towards the north-east of our line. other german troops with guns put in an appearance on the high ground to the north-east of saffron walden, near chesterton park.[107]
"to describe the fortunes of this fiercely contested battle, which spread along a front of nearly twenty miles, counting from the detached garrison of the hill at helions bumpstead—which, by the way, succeeded in holding its ground all day, despite two or three most determined assaults by the enemy—to kelshall on the left of the british position, would be an impossibility in the space at my disposal. the whole morning it raged all along the northern slopes of the upland held by our gallant troops. the fiercest fighting was, perhaps, in the neighbourhood of elmdon, where our trenches were more than once captured by the magdeburg battalions, only to be themselves hurled out again by the rush of the 1st coldstream guards, who had been held in reserve near the threatened point. by noon the magnificent old palace at audley end was in flames. art treasures which were of inestimable value and absolutely unreplaceable perished in this shocking conflagration. desperate fighting was going on in the streets of the little town of saffron walden, where a mingled mass of volunteers and militia strove hard to arrest the advance of a portion of the german army which was endeavouring to work round the right of our position.
"on our left the foot guards and fusiliers of the 1st german guard division, after receiving a terrible pounding from our guns when they poured into royston at the heels of our mounted infantry, had fought their way up the heights to within fifteen hundred yards of our trenches on the upper slopes of the ridge. farther than that they had been unable to advance. their close formations offered an excellent target to the rifles of the volunteers and militia lining our entrenchments. the attackers had lost men in thousands, and were now endeavouring to dig themselves in as best they could under the hail of projectiles that continually swept the hillside. about noon, too, the 2nd division of the garde corps, after some skirmishing with the mounted infantry away on our left front, got into attack formation along the line of the hitchin and cambridge railway, and after pouring a deluge of projectiles from field guns and howitzers upon our position, advanced upon therfield with the greatest bravery and determination. they had succeeded by 2 p.m. in driving our men from the end of the spur running northward near therfield heath, and managed to get a number of their howitzers[108] up there, and at once opened fire from the cover afforded by several copses out of which our men had been driven.
"in short, things were beginning to look very bad for old england, and the watchers on the therfield heights turned their glasses anxiously northward in search of general sir william packington's force from potton. they had not long to wait. at 2.15 the winking flash of a heliograph away near wendy place, about eight miles up ermine street, announced that the advance guard, consisting of the 1st royal welsh fusiliers, was already at bassingbourn, and that the main body was close behind, having escaped detection by all the enemy's patrols and flank guards. they were now directly in the rear of the right of the german reserves, who had been pushed forward into the neighbourhood of royston to support the attack of their main body on the british position. a few minutes later it was evident that the enemy had also become aware of their advent. two or three regiments hurriedly issued from royston and deployed to the north-west. but the guns of the baldock corps turned such a 'rafale' fire upon them that they hesitated and were lost.
"every long-range gun in the british entrenchments that would bear was also turned upon them, leaving the infantry and field guns to deal with the troops assaulting their position. the three battalions, as well as a fourth that was sent to their assistance, were simply swept out of existence by this terrible cross-fire. their remnants streamed away, a disorganised crowd of scattered stragglers, towards melbourn; while, still holding on to bassingbourn, the baldock force moved down on royston, driving everything before it.
"the most advanced german troops made a final effort to capture our position when they saw what was going on behind them, but it was half-hearted; they were brought to a standstill, and our men, fixing bayonets, sprang from their trenches and charged down upon them with cheers, which were taken up all along the line for miles. the germans here and there made a partial stand, but in half an hour they were down on the low ground, falling back towards the north-east in the greatest confusion, losing men in thousands from the converging fire of our guns. their cavalry made a gallant attempt to save the day by charging our troops to the north of royston. it was[109] a magnificent sight to see their enormous masses sweeping over the ground with an impetus which looked capable of carrying everything before it, but our men, clustering behind the hedges of ermine street, mowed them down squadrons at a time. not one of them reached the roadway. the magnificent garde corps was routed.
battle of royston sunday sept. 9th. battle of royston
sunday sept. 9th.
"the combined iiird and ivth corps now advanced on the exposed right flank of the german ivth corps, which, fighting gallantly, fell back, doing its best to cover the retreat of its comrades, who, on their part, very much hampered its movements. by nightfall there was no unwounded german south of whittlesford, except as a prisoner. by this time, too, we were falling back on our original position."
