commonly called the passions. and the speeches by which they are expressed.
motion vitall and animal
there be in animals, two sorts of motions peculiar to them: one called vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the bloud, the pulse, the breathing, the concoctions, nutrition, excretion, &c; to which motions there needs no help of imagination: the other in animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion; as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. that sense, is motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we see, heare, &c.; and that fancy is but the reliques of the same motion, remaining after sense, has been already sayd in the first and second chapters. and because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the imagination is the first internall beginning of all voluntary motion. and although unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. for let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. these small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called endeavour.
endeavour; appetite; desire; hunger; thirst; aversion
this endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called appetite, or desire; the later, being the generall name; and the other, oftentimes restrayned to signifie the desire of food, namely hunger and thirst. and when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called aversion. these words appetite, and aversion we have from the latines; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. so also do the greek words for the same, which are orme and aphorme. for nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. for the schooles find in meere appetite to go, or move, no actuall motion at all: but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it metaphoricall motion; which is but an absurd speech; for though words may be called metaphoricall; bodies, and motions cannot.
that which men desire, they are also sayd to love; and to hate those things, for which they have aversion. so that desire, and love, are the same thing; save that by desire, we alwayes signifie the absence of the object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. so also by aversion, we signifie the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object.
of appetites, and aversions, some are born with men; as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more properly be called aversions, from somewhat they feele in their bodies;) and some other appetites, not many. the rest, which are appetites of particular things, proceed from experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. for of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further desire, than to tast and try. but aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.
contempt
those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we are said to contemne: contempt being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.
and because the constitution of a mans body, is in continuall mutation; it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object.
good evill
but whatsoever is the object of any mans appetite or desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate, and aversion, evill; and of his contempt, vile, and inconsiderable. for these words of good, evill, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man (where there is no common-wealth;) or, (in a common-wealth,) from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.
pulchrum turpe; delightfull profitable; unpleasant unprofitable
the latine tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evill; but are not precisely the same; and those are pulchrum and turpe. whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signes promiseth good; and the later, that, which promiseth evill. but in our tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by. but for pulchrum, we say in some things, fayre; in other beautifull, or handsome, or gallant, or honourable, or comely, or amiable; and for turpe, foule, deformed, ugly, base, nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els, but the mine, or countenance, that promiseth good and evill. so that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, delightfull; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evill: for evill, in promise, is that they call turpe; evill in effect, and end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and evill in the means, inutile, unprofitable, hurtfull.
delight displeasure
as, in sense, that which is really within us, is (as i have sayd before) onely motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light and colour; to the eare, sound; to the nostrill, odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, eares, and other organs to the heart; the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or aversion, to, or from the object moving. but the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call delight, or trouble of mind.
pleasure offence
this motion, which is called appetite, and for the apparence of it delight, and pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of vitall motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused delight, were not improperly called jucunda, (a juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, molesta, offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vitall.
pleasure therefore, (or delight,) is the apparence, or sense of good; and molestation or displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill. and consequently all appetite, desire, and love, is accompanied with some delight more or lesse; and all hatred, and aversion, with more or lesse displeasure and offence.
pleasures of sense; pleasures of the mind; joy paine griefe
of pleasures, or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present; and those may be called pleasures of sense, (the word sensuall, as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be lawes.) of this kind are all onerations and exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the sight, hearing, smell, tast, or touch; others arise from the expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequence of things; whether those things in the sense please or displease: and these are pleasures of the mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called joy. in the like manner, displeasures, are some in the sense, and called payne; others, in the expectation of consequences, and are called griefe.
these simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified. as first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. secondly, from the object loved or hated. thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. fourthly, from the alteration or succession it selfe.
hope— for appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called hope.
despaire— the same, without such opinion, despaire.
feare— aversion, with opinion of hurt from the object, feare.
courage— the same, with hope of avoyding that hurt by resistance, courage.
anger— sudden courage, anger.
confidence— constant hope, confidence of our selves.
diffidence— constant despayre, diffidence of our selves.
indignation— anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by injury, indignation.
benevolence— desire of good to another, benevolence, good will, charity. if to man generally, good nature.
covetousnesse— desire of riches, covetousnesse: a name used alwayes in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those riches are sought.
ambition— desire of office, or precedence, ambition: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.
pusillanimity— desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; and fear of things that are but of little hindrance, pusillanimity.
magnanimity— contempt of little helps, and hindrances, magnanimity.
valour— magnanimity, in danger of death, or wounds, valour, fortitude.
liberality— magnanimity in the use of riches, liberality
miserablenesse— pusillanimity, in the same wretchednesse, miserablenesse; or parsimony; as it is liked or disliked.
kindnesse— love of persons for society, kindnesse.
naturall lust— love of persons for pleasing the sense onely, natural lust.
luxury— love of the same, acquired from rumination, that is imagination of pleasure past, luxury.
the passion of love; jealousie— love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, the passion of love. the same, with fear that the love is not mutuall, jealousie.
revengefulnesse— desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own, revengefulnesse.
curiosity— desire, to know why, and how, curiosity; such as is in no living creature but man; so that man is distinguished, not onely by his reason; but also by this singular passion from other animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by praedominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall pleasure.
religion superstition; true religion— feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition. and when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, true religion.
panique terrour— feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, panique terror; called so from the fables that make pan the author of them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. and therefore this passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.
admiration— joy, from apprehension of novelty, admiration; proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.
glory vaine-glory— joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called glorying: which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it, is called vaine-glory: which name is properly given; because a well-grounded confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called vaine.
dejection— griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection of mind.
the vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the histories or fictions of gallant persons; and is corrected often times by age, and employment.
sudden glory laughter— sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those grimaces called laughter; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. and it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. and therefore much laughter at the defects of others is a signe of pusillanimity. for of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able.
sudden dejection weeping— on the contrary, sudden dejection is the passion that causeth weeping; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are women, and children. therefore, some weep for the loss of friends; others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by reconciliation. but in all cases, both laughter and weeping, are sudden motions; custome taking them both away. for no man laughs at old jests; or weeps for an old calamity.
shame blushing— griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability is shame, or the passion that discovereth itself in blushing; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: in old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.
impudence— the contempt of good reputation is called impudence.
pitty— griefe, for the calamity of another is pitty; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also compassion, and in the phrase of this present time a fellow-feeling: and therefore for calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least pitty; and for the same calamity, those have least pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.
cruelty— contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call cruelty; proceeding from security of their own fortune. for, that any man should take pleasure in other mens' great harmes, without other end of his own, i do not conceive it possible.
emulation envy— griefe, for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joyned with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called emulation: but joyned with endeavour to supplant or hinder a competitor, envie.
deliberation— when in the mind of man, appetites and aversions, hopes and feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope to be able to do it; sometimes despaire, or feare to attempt it; the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and feares, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call deliberation.
therefore of things past, there is no deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such deliberation vaine. but of things impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. and it is called deliberation; because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own appetite, or aversion.
this alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and feares is no less in other living creatures than in man; and therefore beasts also deliberate.
every deliberation is then sayd to end when that whereof they deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our appetite, or aversion.
the will
in deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the will; the act, (not the faculty,) of willing. and beasts that have deliberation must necessarily also have will. the definition of the will, given commonly by the schooles, that it is a rationall appetite, is not good. for if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. for a voluntary act is that, which proceedeth from the will, and no other. but if in stead of a rationall appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same that i have given here. will, therefore, is the last appetite in deliberating. and though we say in common discourse, a man had a will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an inclination, which makes no action voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last inclination, or appetite. for if the intervenient appetites make any action voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient aversions should make the same action involuntary; and so one and the same action should be both voluntary & involuntary.
by this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from aversion, or feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions.
formes of speech, in passion
the formes of speech by which the passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our thoughts. and first generally all passions may be expressed indicatively; as, i love, i feare, i joy, i deliberate, i will, i command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the passion they proceed from. deliberation is expressed subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, if this be done, then this will follow; and differs not from the language of reasoning, save that reasoning is in generall words, but deliberation for the most part is of particulars. the language of desire, and aversion, is imperative; as, do this, forbear that; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is command; otherwise prayer; or els counsell. the language of vaine-glory, of indignation, pitty and revengefulness, optative: but of the desire to know, there is a peculiar expression called interrogative; as, what is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why so? other language of the passions i find none: for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like, do not signifie as speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.
these forms of speech, i say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our passions: but certain signes they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such passions or not. the best signes of passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.
good and evill apparent
and because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end. but for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent or seeming good. and contrarily, when the evill exceedeth the good, the whole is apparent or seeming evill: so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.
felicity
continual successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call felicity; i mean the felicity of this life. for there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without feare, no more than without sense. what kind of felicity god hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of school-men, beatifical vision, is unintelligible.
praise magnification
the form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the goodnesse of anything is praise. that whereby they signifie the power and greatness of anything is magnifying. and that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the greeks called makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue. and thus much is sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions.
