i
drift toward southern nationalization (1850–1860)
seventy-two years after the adoption of the constitution, called into being to form “a more perfect union,” and eighty-five years after the declaration of independence (a space completely covered by the lives of men still living), a new confederacy of seven southern states was formed, and the great political fabric, the exemplar and hope of every lover of freedom throughout the world, was apparently hopelessly rent. of these seven states but two were of the original thirteen—louisiana and florida had been purchased by the government of the union; a war had been fought in behalf of texas; two states, alabama and mississippi, lay within original claims of georgia, but had been ceded to the union and organized as federal territories.
april 11, 1861, found a fully organized separate government established for these seven states, with a determination to form a separate nation, most forcibly expressed by the presence of an army at charleston, south carolina, which next day was to open fire upon a feebly manned fort, and thus to begin a terrible civil war. the eight other slave states were in a turmoil of anxiety, leaning toward their sisters of the farther south through the common sympathy which came of slavery, but drawn also to the union through tradition and233 appreciation of benefits, and through a realization by a great number of persons that their interests in slavery were much less than those of the states which had already seceded.
the north, in the middle of april, was only emerging from a condition of stupefied amazement at a condition which scarcely any of its statesmen, and practically none of the men of every-day life, had thought possible. it was to this crisis that the country had been brought by the conflicting views of the two great and strongly divided sections of the union respecting slavery, and by the national aspirations which, however little recognized, were working surely in each section, but upon divergent lines.
* * * * *
the outward manifestations in the history of the separation of the north and the south stand out in strong relief: the missouri question; the protective tariff and south carolina nullification; the abolition attacks which wrought the south into a frenzy suicidal in character through its impossible demands upon the north for protection; the action of the southern statesmen in the question of petitions; the passage of a fugitive-slave law which drove the north itself to nullification; the kansas-nebraska act and its outcome of civil war in the former territory; the recognition, in the dicta of the supreme court in the dred scott case, of the south’s contention of its constitutional right to carry slavery into the territories, and the stand taken by the north against any further slavery extension. to these visible conflicts were added the unconscious workings of the disruptive forces of a totally distinct social organization. the outward strifes were but the symptoms of a malady in the body politic of the union which could have but one end, unless the deep, abiding cause, slavery, should be removed.135
234 the president and vice-president of the southern confederacy, in their elaborate defences written after the war, have endeavored to rest the cause of the struggle wholly on constitutional questions. stephens, whose book, not even excepting calhoun’s utterances, is the ablest exposition of the southern reading of the constitution, says: “the struggle or conflict, ... from its rise to its culmination, was between those who, in whatever state they lived, were for maintaining our federal system as it was established, and those who were for a consolidation of power in the central head.”136 jefferson davis is even more explicit. “the truth remains,” he says, “intact and incontrovertible, that the existence of african servitude was in no wise the cause of the conflict, but only an incident. in the later controversies ... its effect in operating as a lever upon the passions, prejudices, or sympathies of mankind was so potent that it has been spread like a thick cloud over the whole horizon of historic truth.”137
this is but begging the question. the constitutional view had its weight for the south in 1860 as it had for new england in the jefferson-madison period. jefferson’s iron domination of the national government during his presidency, a policy hateful to new england, combined with the fear of being overweighted in sectional influence by the western extension through the louisiana purchase, led to pronounced threats of secession by men of new england, ardently desirous of escaping from what pickering, one of its most prominent men, termed the virginian supremacy.138 exactly the same arguments were used, mutatis mutandis, later by the south.
as we all know, the movement, which never had any real popular support and which had its last spasm of life in the hartford convention at the close of the war of235 1812, came to naught. freed by the fall of napoleon and the peace with england from the pressure of the upper and nether mill-stones which had so ground to pieces our commerce, a prosperity set in which drowned the sporadic discontent of the previous twenty years. the fears of the eastern states no longer loomed so high and were as imaginary in fact, and had as slight a basis, as were, in the beginning of the era of discord, those of the south. could slavery have been otherwise preserved, the extreme decentralizing ideas of the south would have disappeared with equal ease, and stephens’ causa causans—“the different and directly opposite views as to the nature of the government of the united states, and where, under our system, ultimate sovereign power or paramount authority properly resides,” would have had no more intensity of meaning in 1860 than to-day.
divergence of constitutional views, like most questions of government, follow the lines of self-interest; jefferson’s qualms gave way before the great prize of louisiana; one part of the south was ready in 1832 to go to war on account of a protective tariff; another, louisiana, was at the same time demanding protection for her special industry. the south thus simply shared in our general human nature, and fought, not for a pure abstraction, as davis and stephens, led by calhoun, would have it, but for the supposed self-interest which its view of the constitution protected. its section, its society, could not continue to develop in the union under the northern reading of the document, and the irrepressible and certain nationalization, so different from its own tendencies, to which the north as a whole was steadily moving.
slavery drove the south into opposition to the broad, liberal movement of the age. the french revolution; the destruction of feudalism by napoleon; the later popular movements throughout europe and south america; the liberalizing of great britain; the nationalistic ideas of which we have the results in the236 german empire and the kingdom of italy, and the strong nationalistic feeling developing in the northern part of the union itself had but little reflex action in the south because of slavery and the south’s consequent segregation and tendency to a feudalistic nationalization.
ii
status of the forts (oct. 29, 1860–dec. 20, 1860)
general scott, with his memories of 1832, was one of those who appreciated the danger hanging over the country, and, october 29, 1860, he wrote from new york, where he had his headquarters, a letter of great length to the president, which in pompous phrases, conceding the right of secession, and embodying some absurd ideas, such as allowing “the fragments of the great republic to form themselves into new confederacies, probably four,” as a smaller evil than war, gave it as his “solemn conviction” that there was, from his knowledge of the southern population, “some danger of an early act of rashness preliminary to secession, viz.: the seizure of some or all of the following posts: forts jackson and st. philip on the mississippi; morgan below mobile, all without garrisons; pickens, mckee at pensacola, with an insufficient garrison for one; pulaski, below savannah, without a garrison; moultrie and sumter, charleston harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison, the latter without any; and fort monroe, hampton roads, with an insufficient garrison.”
he gave it as his opinion that “all these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup de main ridiculous.” he did not state the number of men needed, but in a supplementary paper the next day (october 30th) said, “there is one (regular) company in boston, one here (at the narrows), one at pittsburg, one at baton237 rouge—in all, five companies only within reach.”139 these five companies, about two hundred and fifty men, were of course absurdly inadequate to garrison nine such posts, but, had there been a determination in the president’s mind to prevent seizures, enough men could have been brought together to hold the more important points.
for scott’s statement as to the number available was grossly inaccurate, and but serves to show the parlous state of a war department in which the general-in-chief can either be so misinformed or allow himself to remain in ignorance of vital facts. there were but five points in the farther south of primal importance: the mississippi, mobile, pensacola, savannah, and charleston; two hundred men at each would have been ample to hold the positions for the time being, and, being held, reinforcement in any degree would later have been easy. there was a total of 1048 officers and men at the northern posts,140 including leavenworth, mackinac, plattsburg, boston, new york, and fort monroe, who could have been drawn upon. there were already 250 men at charleston, key west, pensacola, and baton rouge. it is safe to say that a thousand men were available. there were also some eight hundred marines at the navy-yards and barracks141 who could have been used in such an emergency. the aggregate of the army, june 30, 1860, was 16,006, of which 14,926 were enlisted men; and it was in the power of the president to increase this total aggregate to 18,626.142 recruiting was, in fact, actively going on; almost every man at the posts mentioned could, even much after the date of scott’s paper, have been safely withdrawn for the object mentioned and quickly replaced.
238 scott’s inaccurate report gave buchanan additional reason for the inaction which was his basic thought. he says, in his apologia, that “to have attempted to distribute these five companies in the eight forts of the cotton states and fortress monroe in virginia, would have been a confession of weakness.... it could have had no effect in preventing secession, but must have done much to provoke it.”143 the first part of this statement would have been true had these five companies been the only force available; the second, on the supposition that the president meant that any attempt with a force reasonably large would have provoked secession, was a short-sighted view. to garrison the forts could not have been more obnoxious than to put them in a state of defence. at any time before the secession of a state they could have been garrisoned without bringing on actual conflict. the statesmen of the south were well aware that an attack upon an armed force of the united states, before secession, must place them irretrievably in the wrong. south carolina did not secede until december 20th. to resist the sending of troops before this date to any of these forts would have been unqualified treason, and for this no one in the south was prepared. the safety of the secession movement, the extension of sympathy throughout the south, rested very greatly upon strict compliance with the forms of law and with the theories of the constitution held by that section. at least one ardent secessionist, judge longstreet, recognized this when he appealed to south-carolinians to refrain from any act of war; “let the first shot,” he said, “come from the enemy. burn that precept into your hearts.”144 it was impossible that the southern leaders should place themselves, or allow their people to place them, in the attitude of waging war against the union while even in their own view their states still239 remained within it. there was, too, still a very large union sentiment in the south, though finally swept into the vortex by the principle of going with the state, which would not have been averse to a determined action on the part of the president and might have upheld it, as in 1833. such vigor would have given this sentiment a working basis, through the evidence that the federal authority was to be upheld; and it would have caused a pause even in the least thoughtful of the secessionists had they felt that their coast strongholds were to be held and all their ports to be in the hands of the enemy. in the dearth of manufactures in the south, the holding of their ports was an essential to southern military success. their closure by blockade was equally an essential to the success of the north. the strategy of the situation was of the clearest and most palpable, and with their coast forts in union hands warlike action on the part of the south is not conceivable. one can thus understand the importance of spreading the reiterated statements of “intense excitement” and “danger of attack” in the event of reinforcement; statements which, in the circumstances, must be regarded, if the phrase may be used, in the nature of a gigantic and successful “bluff.”
* * * * *
the military property of the united states at charleston consisted of the armory, covering a few acres, where were stored twenty-two thousand muskets and a considerable number of old, heavy guns, and of three forts named for south-carolinians of union-wide fame. the smallest of these, castle pinckney, was a round, brick structure, in excellent condition, on a small island directly east of the town and distant from the wharves but half a mile. it completely commanded the town, and had a formidable armament of four forty-two-pounders, fourteen twenty-four-pounders, and four eight-inch sea-coast howitzers. the powder of the arsenal was here stored. the only garrison was an ordnance sergeant,240 who, with his family, looked after the harbor light which was in the fort.
almost due east again, and three miles distant, was fort moultrie, on the south end of sullivan’s island, a low sand-spit forming the north side of the harbor entrance. the work had an area of one and a half acres, and mounted fifty-five guns in barbette. the drifting sands had piled themselves even with the parapet, and the work was in such condition as to be indefensible against a land attack. the whole was but of a piece with the long-continued neglect arising from many years of peace and the optimistic temperament of a people who never believe that war can occur until it is upon them; it was the natural outcome of the almost entire absence of governmental system and forethought of the time. the fort was garrisoned by two companies, comprising sixty-four enlisted men and eight officers, of the first regiment of artillery; the surgeon, band, a hospital steward, and an ordnance sergeant brought the total up to eighty-four.
almost south of moultrie was cummings point, on morris island, forming the southern side of the harbor entrance. nearly midway between this point and moultrie, but a half-mile within the line joining them, and distant three and a half miles from the nearest part of the city, was fort sumter, begun in 1829, and after thirty-one years not yet finished. built on a shoal covered at most stages of the tide, it rose directly out of the water, with two tiers of casemates, and surmounted by a third tier of guns in barbette. in plan it was very like the transverse section of the ordinary american house, the apex of the two sides representing the lines of the roof, looking toward moultrie. it was intended for a garrison of six hundred and fifty men and an armament of one hundred and forty-six guns, of which seventy-eight were on hand.
on a report made in july by captain j. g. foster, repairs241 on moultrie were begun september 14th, and next day upon sumter, some two hundred and fifty men being employed. the sand about the walls of moultrie was removed, a wet ditch dug, a glacis formed, the guardhouse pierced with loop-holes, and the four field-guns placed in position for flank attack.
at the end of october, captain foster, foreseeing events, requested the issue of arms to the workmen to protect property, and the secretary of war approved the issue of forty muskets, if it should meet the concurrence of the commanding officer. colonel gardner, in reply, november 5th, doubted the expediency, as most of the laborers were foreigners, indifferent to which side they took, and wisely advised, instead, filling up “at once” the two companies at moultrie with recruits and sending two companies from fort monroe to the two other forts.145 the requisition was thus held in abeyance, and the muskets remained at the arsenal. when, only two days later, gardner, urged by the repeated solicitations of his officers, directed the transfer of musket ammunition to moultrie, the loading of the schooner was objected to by the owner of the wharf, and the military store-keeper, under apparently very inadequate pressure, returned the stores to the arsenal. a permit, given by the mayor of charleston next day, for the removal was very properly declined by gardner, on the ground that the city authorities could not control his actions.146
the affair, however, cost gardner his command, by a process described by the assistant secretary of state, trescot: “i received a telegram from charleston, saying that intense excitement prevailed, ... and that, if the removal was by orders of the department of war, it ought to be revoked, otherwise collision was inevitable. knowing the cabinet were then in session, i went over to the white house.... i took governor floyd aside, and he was242 joined, i think, by messrs. cobb and toucey, and showed them the telegram. governor floyd replied, ‘telegraph back at once; say that you have seen me, that no such orders have been issued, and none such will be issued, under any circumstances.’” floyd, a day or so later, gave trescot “his impressions of the folly of colonel gardner’s conduct, and his final determination to remove him and supply his place with major robert anderson, in whose discretion, coolness, and judgment he put great confidence. he also determined to send colonel ben. huger to take charge of the arsenal, believing that his high reputation, his close association with many of the most influential people in charleston, and the fact of his being a carolinian, would satisfy the state of the intention of the government.”147
that floyd himself was in an uncertain state of mind is shown by his willingness to begin and continue the work upon the forts; that his mental state did not permit logical action is clear from his temper and attitude regarding the transfer of musket ammunition november 7th, though but the week before (october 31st) he had authorized the transfer of the muskets themselves.
major fitz-john porter, of the adjutant-general’s office, later the able and ill-treated general, was sent to charleston to inspect the conditions. his report, made november 11th, revealed the military inefficiency almost inseparable from a post so neglected and ill-manned, and subject to the lazy peace conditions of the period. he said: “the unguarded state of the fort invites attack, if such design exists, and much discretion and prudence are required on the part of the commander to restore the proper security without exciting a community prompt to misconstrue actions of authority. i think this can be effected by a proper commander without checking in the slightest the progress of the engineer in completing the243 works of defence.” major porter continues with a most significant phrase, “all could have been easily arranged a few weeks since, when the danger was foreseen by the present commander.”148
november 15th, anderson was ordered to the command. a kentuckian by birth, his wife a georgian, his views in sympathy with those of general scott, he appeared to be and, as results proved, was in many respects particularly fitted for the post; by november 23d he was able to report that in two weeks the outer defences of moultrie would be finished and the guns mounted, and that sumter was ready for the comfortable accommodation of one company, and, indeed, for the temporary reception of its proper garrison. “this,” he said, “is the key to the entrance to this harbor; its guns command this work [moultrie] and could drive out its occupants. it should be garrisoned at once.... so important do i consider the holding of castle pinckney by the government that i recommend, if the troops asked for cannot be sent at once, that i be authorized to place an engineer detachment [of an officer and thirty workmen] ... to make the repairs needed there.... if my force was not so very small, i would not hesitate to send a detachment at once to garrison that work. fort sumter and castle pinckney must be garrisoned immediately if the government determines to keep command of this harbor.”
anderson proceeded to give advice which sane judgment and every sentiment of national honor demanded. after mentioning his anxiety to avoid collision with the citizens of south carolina, he said: “nothing, however, will be better calculated to prevent bloodshed than our being found in such an attitude that it would be madness and folly to attack us. there is not so much feverish excitement as there was last week, but that there is a settled determination to leave the union, and obtain244 possession of this work, is apparent to all.... the clouds are threatening, and the storm may break upon us at any moment. i do, then, most earnestly entreat that a reinforcement be immediately sent to this garrison, and that at least two companies be sent at the same time to fort sumter and castle pinckney.” anderson also stated his belief that as soon as the people of south carolina learned that he had demanded reinforcements they would occupy pinckney and attack moultrie; and therefore it was vitally important to embark the troops in war steamers and designate them for other duty as a blind.149 captain foster, november 24th, reported the whole of the barbette tier of sumter ready for its armament and as presenting an excellent appearance of preparation and strength equal to seventy per cent. of its efficiency when finished.150 he said, november 30th, “i think more troops should have been sent here to guard the forts, and i believe that no serious demonstration on the part of the populace would have met such a course.”151
the work on the forts was, of course, well known to the people of charleston, and that at moultrie, at least, subject to daily inspection by many visitors. there was still no restriction “upon any intercourse with charleston, many of whose citizens were temporary residents of sullivan’s island. the activity about the fort drew to it a large number of visitors daily, and the position of the garrison and the probable action of the state in regard to the forts were constant subjects of discussion. there was as yet no unfriendly feeling manifested, and the social intercourse between the garrison and their friends in charleston was uninterrupted. but as the days went on the feeling assumed a more definite shape, and found expression in many ways.... it was openly announced, both to the commanding officer and to his officers, that as soon as the state seceded a demand for245 the delivery of the forts would be made, and, if resisted, they would be taken.... meantime, all of the able-bodied men in charleston were enrolled, military companies were formed everywhere, and drilling went on by night and day, and with the impression among them that they were to attack fort moultrie.”152 november 28th and december 1st, anderson again pressed for troops or for ships of war in the harbor;153 but his last request was anticipated in a letter of the same date, when he was informed by the war department, “from information thought to be reliable, that an attack will not be made on your command, and the secretary has only to refer to his conversation with you and to caution you that, should his convictions unhappily prove untrue, your actions must be such as to be free from the charge of initiating a collision. if attacked, you are of course expected to defend the trust committed to you to the best of your ability.”154
a demand being made by the adjutant of a south carolina regiment on the engineer officer at moultrie for a list of his workmen, “as it was desired to enroll the men upon them for military duty,”155 anderson asked for instructions. the war department replied, december 14th, “if the state authorities demand any of captain foster’s workmen on the ground of their being enrolled into the service of the state, ... you will, after fully satisfying yourself that the men are subject to enrolment, and have been properly enrolled, ... cause them to be delivered up or suffer them to depart.” banality could go no further, and anderson, december 18th, informed the department that, as he understood it, “the south carolina authorities sought to enroll as a part of their army intended to act against the forces of the united states men who are employed by and in the pay of that government, and246 could not, as i conceived, be enrolled by south carolina ‘under the laws of the united states and of the state of south carolina.’” no answer was vouchsafed to this, and the request was not complied with.
anderson’s repeated statements of the necessity of the occupancy of sumter, without which his own position was untenable, led to the despatch of major buell, a kentuckian, and later a major-general of united states volunteers, with verbal instructions, which, however, on buell’s own motion, and with the thought that anderson should have written evidence, were reduced, december 11th, to writing. this memorandum is of such importance that it must be given in full.
“you are aware of the great anxiety of the secretary of war that a collision of the troops with the people of this state shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against such a collision. he has therefore carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that south carolina will not attempt, by violence, to obtain possession of the public works or interfere with their occupancy. but as the counsels and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint those expectations of the government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. he has therefore directed me verbally to give you such instructions. you are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are not without evident and imminent necessity to take up any position which could be construed in the assumption of a hostile attitude. but you are to hold possession of the forts in the harbor, and if attacked you are to defend yourself to the last247 extremity. the smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of, any one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. you are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.”156
these instructions did not come to the president’s knowledge until december 21st, though a despatch from washington, december 13th, published in the charleston courier, announced major buell’s visit; when made known to the president, he directed them to be modified, ordering that if “attacked by a force so superior that resistance would, in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be your duty to yield to necessity and make the best terms in your power.”157
december 3d, anderson placed lieutenant jefferson c. davis with thirty men in castle pinckney, and began work there. action upon a request for arms for the workmen at sumter and pinckney was deferred by the war department “for the present,” but captain foster going to the arsenal, december 17th, for two gins for hoisting, “to the transmission of which there was no objection,” arranged with the store-keeper that the old order of the ordnance department of november 1st, for forty muskets, should be complied with, which was done. “intense excitement” as usual was reported the next day to have occurred; there was the reiteration of great danger of “violent demonstration” from a military official of the state who called upon foster, and who stated that colonel huger had informed the governor that no arms should be removed. foster declined to return the arms, stating that he knew nothing of huger’s pledge, but was248 willing to refer the matter to washington. trescot was informed by telegraph that “not a moment’s time should be lost.” the secretary of war was aroused in the depths of the night, and the result was a telegraphic order from floyd himself to “return [the arms] instantly.”158 the go-between assistant secretary of state, so busily engaged with affairs not his own, received from the aide-de-camp of governor pickens the telegram: “the governor says he is glad of your despatch, for otherwise there would have been imminent danger. earnestly urge that there be no transfer of troops from fort moultrie to fort sumter and inform secretary of war.”159 captain foster, explaining to the war department, december 20, 1860, says, “when in town to see general schnierle and allay any excitement relative to the muskets, i found to my surprise that there was no excitement except with a very few who had been active in the matter, and the majority of the gentlemen whom i met had not even heard of it.”160
pickens, the new governor of south carolina, december 17th, the day after his inauguration, and before the state had passed the ordinance of secession, made a demand on the president for the delivery of fort sumter. the letter, drawn in the most offensive terms, and marked “strictly confidential,” urged that all work be stopped and that no more troops be ordered. it continued: “it is not improbable that, under orders from the commandant, or, perhaps, from the commander-in-chief of the army, the alteration and defences of the posts are progressing without the knowledge of yourself or the secretary of war. the arsenal in the city of charleston, with the public arms, i am informed, was turned over very properly to the keeping and defence of the state force at249 the urgent request of the governor of south carolina. i would most respectfully, and from a sincere devotion to the public peace, request that you would allow me to send a small force, not exceeding twenty-five men and an officer, to take possession of fort sumter immediately, in order to give a feeling of safety to the community.”161
the ever-ready trescot arranged an interview december 20th with the president for the delivery of the letter. the president stated that he would give an answer the next day. in the mean time trescot, seeing the difficulties to which it led, consulted both senators davis and slidell, who thought the demand “could do nothing but mischief”; and on consultation with two of the south carolina delegation in washington, governor pickens was advised by telegraph to withdraw the letter, which was done. trescot’s letter to governor pickens, returning that of the latter, after mentioning all that had been done by the executive to refrain from injuring the sensibilities of south carolina, said: the president’s “course had been violently denounced by the northern press, and an effort was being made to institute a congressional investigation. at that moment he could not have gone to the extent of action you desired, and i felt confident that, if forced to answer your letter then, he would have taken such ground as would have prevented his even approaching it hereafter; ... you had all the advantage of knowing the truth, without the disadvantage of having it put on record.... i was also perfectly satisfied that the status of the garrison would not be disturbed.... i have had this morning an interview with governor floyd, the secretary of war; ... while i cannot even here venture into details, which are too confidential to be risked in any way, i am prepared to say ... that nothing will be done which will either do you injury or properly create alarm.”162
250 the president’s painful weakness is but too clear in the fact that he had not only given his confidence so largely to such a man, whose position and attitude he knew, but saw nothing derogatory in such a letter as that of governor pickens, and could draft a reply (december 20th) in which, while stating that no authority had been given to governor gist to guard the charleston arsenal, he said: “i deeply regret to observe that you seem entirely to have misapprehended my position, which i supposed had been clearly stated in my message. i have incurred, and shall incur, any reasonable risk ... to prevent a collision.... hence i have declined for the present to reinforce these forts, relying upon the honor of the south-carolinians that they will not be assaulted whilst they remain in their present condition; but that commissioners will be sent by the convention to treat with congress on the subject.”163
december 18th the president sent caleb cushing with a letter to governor pickens, with the idea of inducing the authorities and people of south carolina to await the action of congress and the development of opinion in the north as to the recommendation of his message. governor pickens told cushing, december 20th, the day of the passage of the ordinance of secession, that he would make no reply to the letter, and stated “very candidly that there was no hope for the union, and that, as far as he was concerned, he intended to maintain the separate independence of south carolina.”164
iii
the fort sumter crisis (dec. 2, 1860–jan. 8, 1861)
the question of the united states forts was now uppermost, and upon the action regarding them hung war or251 peace. three commissioners—robert w. barnwell, james h. adams, and james l. orr—were appointed by south carolina to lay the ordinance of secession before the president and congress, and were empowered as agents of the state to treat for the delivery of the forts and other real estate, for the apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all the property of the united states.165
in apprehension of the occupation of sumter by anderson, a patrol by two small steamers, the nina and general clinch, was established, with orders to prevent such action at all hazards and seize fort sumter if it should be attempted. a lieutenant-colonel green was sent to fort monroe to observe any movements; and one norris, at norfolk, was employed to give information of any action at the norfolk navy-yard. a committee of prominent men was sent to fort sumter, who thoroughly inspected the works and reported upon them.
meantime, major anderson had been preparing, with great caution and foresight, to move his command. for some ten days the officers had been apprised that it was advisable to send the families of the men to the unoccupied barracks on james’ island, known as fort johnson, a mile and a quarter west of sumter. the work of mounting guns at sumter had been discontinued for three days, and the elevating-screws and pintle-bolts sent to moultrie so that the guns should not be used if the south-carolinians should anticipate his action, and also to give the impression that occupancy of the fort was not designed. all stores and provisions at fort moultrie which could be carried, and personal belongings, except what the men could carry in their knapsacks, were loaded as for fort johnson in the two small sailing-vessels which were to carry the women and children.
christmas day had been fixed for the transfer, but252 heavy rains prevented. the delay might have had other consequences, for, curiously enough, on the morning of december 26th, colonel r. b. rhett, jr., waited upon the governor, with a private warning letter from washington to the effect that anderson was about to seize sumter, and urged the governor to secure it.166
all was made ready on december 26th, and the quartermaster who was to have charge of the little flotilla, loaded with “everything in the household line from boxes and barrels of provisions to cages of canary-birds,” was directed to go to fort johnson, but not to land anything. upon a signal of two guns from moultrie he was to go to sumter on the plea that he had to report to anderson that he could not find accommodations. five pulling-boats in customary use were available for the transportation of the men. only one officer had been thus far informed, and the men had no suspicion where they were to go when they fell in at retreat roll-call with packed knapsacks and filled cartridge-boxes, carried at parade under a general standing order. so little was the movement suspected that captain doubleday, second in command, came at sunset to anderson in the midst of the officers to invite the major to tea. he was then informed of anderson’s intentions, and was directed to have his company in readiness in twenty minutes, an order met by an “eager obedience.” part of this time was taken in arranging for the safety of mrs. doubleday in the village outside of the fort, whither the families of the other officers were also sent. the men were ready promptly, and the first detachment of twenty, led by anderson himself, marched over the quarter of a mile of sand to the landing-place with the good-fortune of encountering, no one.
anderson went in the leading boat. lieutenant meade, the engineer in charge of the works at castle253 pinckney, had charge of the second, and captain doubleday of the third. when half-way across, doubleday’s boat came unexpectedly in the path of one of the patrol boats, the general clinch, which was towing a schooner to sea. the men were ordered to take off their coats and cover their muskets. the steamer stopped, but in the twilight, and with the resemblance of the boat and its load of men to the usual parties of workmen, suspicion was not aroused, and the steamer resumed her way without questioning. she had been anxiously watched from moultrie, and had she interfered would have been fired upon by a thirty-two-pounder, two of which had been loaded with that intent. captain foster, with assistant surgeon crawford, a mr. moall, four non-commissioned officers, and seven privates, had been left at moultrie to spike the guns, burn the gun-carriages, and hew down the flag-staff.167
on reaching sumter, the workmen, some hundred and fifty, swarmed to the wharf, some feebly cheering, many angrily demanding the reason for the presence of the soldiers; many of the workmen wore the secession cockade; the malecontents (a number of whom shortly returned to charleston) quickly gave way before the bayonets of doubleday’s men, who at once occupied the main entrance and guard-room; sentries were posted and the fort was under military control. boats were now sent back for captain seymour’s company, which arrived without interference, and the whole force, except the few detailed to remain at moultrie, was in sumter before eight o’clock, at which hour anderson wrote the adjutant-general, reporting that he had “just completed, by the blessing of god, the removal to this fort of all my garrison.... the step which i have taken was, in my opinion, necessary to prevent the effusion of blood.”168 on the firing of the signal-guns at moultrie, lieutenant254 hall left the west side of the bay with the two lighters carrying the men’s families and stores, and reached sumter under sail.
with the help of the engineer’s workmen at moultrie, the boats were loaded during the night with part of the impedimenta of every sort which had to be left in the first crossing, and reached sumter in the early dawn. the following day, december 27th, was passed like the preceding night, in transferring ammunition and other stores to sumter; but a month and a half’s supply of provisions, some fuel, and personal effects had to be left. all the guns at moultrie were spiked, and the carriages of those bearing on sumter burned, the smoke from these bearing to charleston the first indication of what had happened. at fifteen minutes before noon the command and one hundred and fifty workmen were formed in a square near the flag-staff of sumter; the chaplain offered a prayer expressing gratitude for their safe arrival, and prayed that the flag might never be dishonored, but soon float again over the whole country, a peaceful and prosperous nation. “when the prayer was finished, major anderson, who had been kneeling, arose, the battalion presented arms, the band played the national air, and the flag went to the head of the flag-staff, amid the loud and earnest huzzas of the command.”169
sergeant hart nailing the colors to the flag-staff, fort sumter
intense excitement in charleston was the natural outcome of anderson’s action, and the morning of the 27th the governor sent his aide-de-camp, colonel pettigrew, accompanied by major capers, with a peremptory demand that anderson should return with his garrison to moultrie, to which anderson replied, “make my compliments to the governor and say to him that i decline to accede to his request; i cannot and will not go back.” the governor’s messenger mentioned that when governor pickens came into office he found an understanding255 between his predecessor (gist) and the president, by which the status in the harbor was to remain unchanged. anderson stated “that he knew nothing of it; that he could get no information or positive orders from washington; ... that he had reason to believe that [the state troops] meant to land and attack him from the north; that the desire of the governor to have the matter settled peaceably and without bloodshed was precisely his own object in transferring his command; ... that he did it upon his own responsibility alone,” as safety required it, “and as he had the right to do.” he added that, “in this controversy between the north and the south, my sympathies are entirely with the south,” but that a sense of duty to his trust was first.170 the immediate result was the occupancy by the state forces, december 27th, of pinckney and moultrie; the seizure, december 30th, of the unoccupied barracks known as fort johnson, and of the arsenal, with its ordnance and ordnance stores, valued at four hundred thousand dollars.
the news of anderson’s dramatic, bold, and self-reliant act, one for which the country owes a debt to the memory of this upright and excellent commander, brought consternation to the president and secretary of war, who learned it through the indefatigable trescot, who had, on the 26th, arranged for the three commissioners of south carolina an interview with the president for december 27th, at one o’clock. the news of the morning brought a complete change of circumstances. a telegram to wigfall was brought by him to the commissioners and to the secretary of war, who at once went to the commissioners. trescot was present, and could not believe in an “act not only without orders but in the face of orders.” floyd at once telegraphed, asking an explanation of the report. “it is not believed, because there is no order for any such movement.” a telegram256 in reply from anderson assured him of the truth, and a written report gave as reasons that “many things convinced me that the authorities of the state designed to proceed to a hostile act. under this impression i could not hesitate that it was my solemn duty to move my command from a fort which we could not have held probably longer than forty-eight or sixty hours to this one where my power of resistance is increased to a very great degree.”171
[in january a futile attempt to relieve fort sumter was made by sending from new york two hundred troops in an unarmed steamer, the star of the west, which was fired upon by the secessionists in fort moultrie, and, receiving no support from fort sumter, returned to new york.]
iv
the fall of fort sumter (april, 1861)
lamon’s172 officiousness resulted in giving both to anderson and to the confederate authorities an impression that sumter would surely be evacuated; hence beauregard, march 26th, wrote to anderson offering facilities for removal, but asking his word of honor that the fort would be left without any preparation for its destruction or injury. this demand deeply wounded anderson, and he resented it in a letter of the same date, saying, “if i can only be permitted to leave on the pledge you mention, i shall never, so help me god, leave this fort alive.”173 beauregard hastened to state that he had only alluded to the “pledge” on account of the “high source” from which the rumors appeared to come, and257 made a full amend, which re-established their usual relations.
anderson had informed fox that, by placing the command on a short allowance, he could make the provisions last until after april 10th; but not receiving instructions from the war department that it was desirable to do so, it had not been done.174 he had already reported, march 31st, that his last barrel of flour had been issued two days before.175
anderson’s little command, as he explained to washington april 1st, would now face starvation should the daily supply of fresh meat and vegetables, still allowed from charleston, be cut off. being in daily expectation, since the return of colonel lamon to washington, of receiving orders to vacate the post, he had, to the great disadvantage of the food supply, kept the engineer laborers as long as he could. he now asked permission to send them from sumter; but the request, referred to montgomery april 2d by beauregard, was refused, unless all the garrison should go.176
april 1st an ice-laden schooner bound for savannah entered charleston harbor by mistake, and was fired upon by a morris island battery. again the sumter batteries were manned and a consultation held, at which five of the eight officers declared in favor of opening fire, but no action was taken by anderson beyond sending an officer to the offending battery, from which word was returned by its commanding officer that he was simply carrying out his orders to fire upon any vessel carrying the united states colors which attempted to enter.
on april 4th anderson assembled his officers, and for the first time made known to them the orders of january 10th and february 23d, directing him to act strictly on the defensive. as lieutenant talbot had just been promoted captain and ordered to washington, anderson258 determined to send by him his despatches. in order to arrange for his departure, talbot, april 4th, accompanied lieutenant snyder, under a white flag, to call the attention of the governor to the fact that the schooner fired upon had not been warned by one of their own vessels, as had been arranged. it developed that the guard-vessel on duty had come in on account of heavy weather, and the commanding officer was consequently dismissed. the request to allow talbot to proceed brought out the fact that orders had been received from montgomery not to allow any portion of the garrison to leave the fort unless all should go177—which, however, beauregard construed, for the benefit of talbot, to apply more particularly to laborers and enlisted men178—and also that the following telegram from commissioner crawford had reached charleston april 1st: “i am authorized to say that this government will not undertake to supply sumter without notice to you. my opinion is that the president has not the courage to execute the order agreed upon in cabinet for the evacuation of the fort, but that he intends to shift the responsibility upon major anderson by suffering him to be starved out. would it not be well to aid in this by cutting off all supplies?”179 beauregard had, the same day, sent the message to the confederate secretary of war, with the remark, “batteries here ready to open wednesday or thursday. what instructions?”
charleston harbor
april, 1861
the knowledge of these telegrams called from anderson, april 5th, a pathetic despatch to the war department: “i cannot but think mr. crawford has misunderstood what he has heard in washington, as i cannot think the government could abandon, without instructions and without advice, a command which has tried to do all its duty to our country.” he ended a fervent appeal for this act of justice with, “unless we receive supplies259 i shall be compelled to stay here without food or to abandon this post very early next week.”180 “at this time,” says doubleday, “the seeming indifference of the politicians to our fate made us feel like orphan children of the republic, deserted by both the state and federal administration.”181
two days later anderson received a letter of april 4th from the secretary of war, informing him of the government’s purpose to send the fox expedition, and hoping that he would be able to sustain himself until the 11th or 12th.182 the same day he was informed by the confederate authorities that the supply of provisions had been stopped, and late that evening that no mails coming or going would be allowed to pass. the fort was to be “completely isolated.” this action was undoubtedly taken at this moment in consequence of a telegram from washington sent magrath april 6th, as follows: “positively determined not to withdraw anderson. supplies go immediately, supported by naval force under stringham if their landing be resisted.” this telegram, signed “a friend,” was, as later became known, from james e. harvey, who was about to go as united states minister to portugal. it was sent to montgomery, and had its full effect.183
just before the reception of the information regarding the stoppage of mails, anderson had posted his acknowledgment of the war department’s letter of the 4th and a report by foster to the chief-engineer of the army; both letters were opened by the confederate authorities, and gave full confirmation of the accuracy of the telegram from “a friend.” anderson said that “the resumption of work yesterday (sunday) at various points on morris island, and the vigorous prosecution of it this261 morning, ... shows that they have either received some news from washington which has put them on the qui vive, or that they have received orders from montgomery to commence operations here. i fear” that fox’s attempt “cannot fail to be disastrous to all concerned.... we have not oil enough to keep a light in lanterns for one night. the boats will have therefore to rely at night entirely upon other marks. i ought to have been informed that this expedition was to come. colonel lamon’s remark convinced me that the idea merely hinted at to me by captain fox would not be carried out. we shall strive to do our duty, though i frankly say that my heart is not in the war which i see is to be thus commenced.”184
as shown by despatches which anderson had no means of sending, and carried north, eight guard-boats and signal-vessels were on duty out far beyond the bar; a fourth gun had been added to the new battery on sullivan’s island, which had until the 8th been masked by a house now torn down, and which bore directly upon any boat attempting to land stores on the left bank. there was bread enough to last, using half-rations, until dinner-time friday (12th). anderson reported the command in fine spirits. it was evident that a hostile force was expected. the iron-clad floating battery appeared the morning of the 11th at the west end of sullivan’s island. anderson, in ignorance that his own intercepted letter and harvey’s telegram had given them all they needed to know, said: “had they been in possession of the information contained in your letter of the 4th instant they could not have made better arrangements than these they have made and are making to thwart the contemplated scheme.”185
chew, who, as mentioned, had been selected as the messenger to carry to charleston the notice of the president’s262 intention to attempt to provision sumter, left washington saturday, april 6th, at 6 p.m., in company with captain talbot, and reached charleston forty-eight hours later; finding no action taken against sumter, he delivered a copy of his memorandum to the governor, who called general beauregard into the consultation. captain talbot’s request to join the garrison at sumter was referred to beauregard, and peremptorily refused, beauregard remarking that the instructions from montgomery required that no communication whatever should be permitted with anderson except to convey an order for the evacuation of the fort.186 the return of the envoys to washington was much delayed by disarrangement of trains by order of beauregard, who also held all telegrams from chew to lincoln.187
sumter now mounted fifty-nine guns, twenty-seven of the heaviest of which were in barbette (the upper and open tier). in the lowest tier there were also twenty-seven, four of which were forty-two-pounders and the remainder thirty-two’s. the ports of the second (or middle tier), eight feet square, were closed by a three-foot brick wall, laid in cement and backed in twenty-seven of the more exposed by two feet of sand kept in place by planks or barrels. on the parade were one 10-inch and four 8-inch guns, mounted as howitzers, the former to throw shells into charleston, the latter into the batteries on cummings point. the guns bearing upon the three batteries on the west end of sullivan’s island were ten thirty-two-pounders; on fort moultrie, two forty-three-pounders. five guns bore upon the mortar battery at fort johnson. seven hundred cartridges had been made up, material of every kind, even the woollen shirts of the men, being used.188
bearing upon fort sumter there were on sullivan’s island three 8-inch, two thirty-two-pounders, and six twenty-four-pounders263 in fort moultrie; two thirty-two-pounders and two twenty-four-pounders in the new enfilade battery; one 9-inch, two forty-two-pounders, and two thirty-two-pounders at the point and aboard the floating battery, and six 10-inch mortars; on morris island, two forty-two-pounders, one twelve-pounder blakely rifle, three 8-inch guns, and seven 10-inch mortars; at fort johnson, one twenty-four-pounder and four 10-inch mortars; at mount pleasant, one 10-inch mortar: a total of twenty-seven guns and eighteen mortars.189 the latter were particularly to be feared, as mortar fire under the conditions of a fixed target and perfectly established distances is extremely accurate. the interior of the fort was thus as vulnerable as the exterior.
governor pickens at once sent to montgomery a telegram reporting the visit of the president’s messenger. a lengthy discussion ensued in the confederate cabinet. toombs, the secretary of state, said: “the firing upon that fort will inaugurate a civil war greater than any the world has yet seen; and i do not feel competent to advise you.”190 in the state of southern feeling, however, the only thing possible was for secretary walker to order beauregard, april 10th, “if you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent who communicated to you the intention of the washington government to supply sumter by force, you will at once demand its evacuation, and if this is refused proceed, in such manner as you may determine, to reduce it.”191 beauregard answered the same day, “the demand will be made to-morrow at twelve o’clock.” to this came reply from montgomery, “unless there are special reasons connected with your own condition, it is considered proper that you should make the demand at an earlier date.” beauregard replied (all these of the same date, the 10th), “the264 reasons are special for twelve o’clock.”192 these imperative “reasons” proved to be shortness of powder, then on its way, and which arrived from augusta, georgia, that evening,193 and the placing of a new rifled twelve-pounder.
shortly after noon, april 11th, a boat bearing a white flag and three officers, the senior being colonel james chesnut, recently a united states senator, pushed off from a charleston wharf and arrived at sumter at half-past three. the officers being conducted to anderson, a demand for the evacuation of the work was delivered. the officers of the fort were summoned, and after an hour’s discussion it was determined, without dissent, to refuse the demand, and a written refusal was sent, in which anderson regretted that his sense of honor and his obligations to his government prevented his compliance.194 anderson accompanied the messengers as far as the main gate, where he asked, “will general beauregard open his batteries without further notice to me?” colonel chesnut replied, “i think not,” adding, “no, i can say to you that he will not, without giving you further notice.” on this anderson unwisely remarked that he would be starved out anyway in a few days if beauregard did not batter him to pieces with his guns. chesnut asked if he might report this to beauregard. anderson declined to give it such character, but said it was the fact.195
this information, telegraphed to montgomery, elicited the reply: “do not desire needlessly to bombard fort sumter. if major anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree that in the mean time he will not use his guns against us unless ours should be employed against sumter, you are authorized thus to avoid the effusion of blood. if this or265 its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment decides to be most practicable.”196
a second note from beauregard was presented that night, and after a conference with his officers of three hours, in which the question of food was the main consideration, anderson replied, “i will, if provided with proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate fort sumter by noon on the 15th instant ... should i not receive prior to that time controlling instructions from my government or additional supplies.” the terms of the reply were considered by the messengers “manifestly futile,” and at 3.20 a.m. of the 12th the following note was handed by beauregard’s aides, chesnut and lee, to anderson: “by authority of brigadier-general beauregard, commanding the provisional forces of the confederate states, we have the honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his batteries on fort sumter in one hour from this time.”197
meantime fox, intrusted with the general charge of the relief expedition, was sent by the president, march 30th, to new york, with verbal instructions to prepare for the voyage but to make no binding engagements. not having received the written authority expected, he returned to washington april 2d, and on the 4th the final decision was reached, and fox was informed that a messenger would be sent to the authorities at charleston to notify them of the president’s action. fox mentioned to the president that he would have but nine days to charter vessels and reach charleston, six hundred and thirty-two miles distant. he arrived at new york april 5th, bearing an order from general scott to lieutenant-colonel h. l. scott (son-in-law and aide-de-camp to the general-in-chief), embracing all his wants and directing colonel scott to give in his name all necessary instructions. colonel scott ridiculed the idea of relief,266 and his indifference caused the loss of half a day of precious time, besides furnishing recruits who, fox complained, were “totally unfit” for the service they were sent on.198
fox at once engaged the large steamer baltic for troops and stores, and, after great difficulty, obtained three tugs, the uncle ben, freeborn, and yankee, the last fitted to throw hot water. the pocahontas, pawnee, and the revenue-cutter harriet lane, as already mentioned, were to be a part of the force, which thus, with the powhatan, included four armed vessels, the last being of considerable power. the pawnee, commander rowan, sailed from washington the 9th; the pocahontas, captain gillis, from norfolk the 10th; the harriet lane, captain faunce, from new york the 8th; the baltic, captain fletcher, the 9th. the powhatan was already far on her way to pensacola.
the baltic arrived at the rendezvous, ten miles east of charleston bar, at 3 a.m. of the 12th, and found there the harriet lane; at six the pawnee arrived; the powhatan was not visible. the baltic, followed by the harriet lane, stood in toward the land, where heavy guns were heard and the smoke and shells from the batteries which had opened that morning on sumter were distinctly visible. fox stood out to inform rowan, of the pawnee. rowan asked for a pilot, declaring his intention of going in and sharing the fate of his brethren of the army. fox went aboard the pawnee and informed him that he would answer for it that the government did not expect such a sacrifice, having settled maturely upon the policy in instructions to captain mercer and himself. the nashville, from new york, and a number of merchant vessels off the bar, gave the appearance of the presence of a large naval fleet.
the weather continued very bad, with a heavy sea.267 no tugboats had arrived; the tug freeborn did not leave new york; the uncle ben was driven into wilmington by the gale; the yankee did not arrive off charleston bar until april 15th, too late for any service; neither the pawnee nor the harriet lane had boats or men to carry supplies; the baltic stood out to the rendezvous and signalled all night for the expected powhatan. the next morning, the 13th, was thick and foggy, with a heavy ground-swell, and the baltic, feeling her way in, touched on rattlesnake shoal, but without damage; a great volume of black smoke was seen from sumter. no tugboats had yet arrived, and a schooner near by, loaded with ice, was seized and preparations made to load her for entering the following night. going aboard the pawnee, fox now learned that a note from captain mercer of the powhatan mentioned that he had been detached by superior authority and that the ship had gone elsewhere; though fox had left new york two days later than the powhatan, he had no intimation of the change. at 2 p.m., april 13th, the pocahontas arrived, and the squadron, powerless for relief, through the absence of the powhatan and the tugs, was obliged to witness the progress of the bombardment.199
“about 4 a.m. on the twelfth,” says doubleday, “i was awakened by some one groping about my room in the dark and calling out my name.” this was anderson, who had come to inform his second in command of the information just received of the intention of the confederates to open fire an hour later.200 at 4.30, the confederates being able to make out the outline of the fort, a gun at fort johnson was fired as the signal to open; the first shotted gun was then fired from morris island by edmund ruffin, an aged secessionist from virginia, who had long, in pamphlet and speech, advocated268 separation from the union. the fire from the batteries at once became general.
the fort began its return at seven o’clock. all the officers and men, including the engineers, had been divided into three reliefs of two hours each, and the forty-three workmen yet remaining all volunteered for duty. it was, however, an absurdly meagre force to work such a number of guns and to be pitted against the surrounding batteries, manned by more than six thousand men. the number of cartridges was so reduced by the middle of the day, though the six needles available were kept steadily at work in making cartridge-bags, that the firing had to slacken and be confined to the six guns bearing toward moultrie and the batteries on the west end of sullivan’s island. the mortar fire had become very accurate, so that, when the 13-inch shells “came down in a vertical direction and buried themselves in the parade-ground, their explosion shook the fort like an earthquake.”201 the horizontal fire also grew in accuracy, and anderson, to save his men, withdrew them from the barbette guns and used those of the lower tiers only. unfortunately, these were of too light a caliber to be effective against the morris island batteries, the shot rebounding without effect from the face of the iron-clad battery there, as well as from the floating iron-clad battery moored behind the sea-wall at sullivan’s island. the withdrawal of the men from the heavier battery could only be justified by the already foregone result, and no doubt this was in anderson’s mind. the garrison was reduced to pork and water, and, however willing, it could not with such meagre food withstand the strain of the heavy labor of working the guns; to add to the difficulties, the guns, strange to say, were not provided with breech-sights, and these had to be improvised with notched sticks.202
the shells from the batteries set fire to the barracks269 three times during the day, and the precision of the vertical fire was such that the four 8-inch and one 10-inch columbiad, planted in the parade, could not be used. half the shells fired from the seventeen mortars engaged came within, or exploded above, the parapet of the fort, and only about ten buried themselves in the soft earth of the parade without exploding. two of the barbette guns were struck by the fire from moultrie, which also damaged greatly the roof of the barracks and the stair towers. none of the shot came through. the day closed stormy and with a high tide, without any material damage to the strength of the fort. throughout the night the confederate batteries threw shell every ten or fifteen minutes. the garrison was occupied until midnight in making cartridge-bags, for which all the extra clothing was cut up and all the coarse paper and extra hospital sheets used.203
at daylight, april 13th, all the batteries again opened, and the new twelve-pounder blakely rifle, which had arrived but four days before from abroad,204 caused the wounding of a sergeant and three men by the fragments thrown off from the interior of the wall by its deep penetration. an engineer employed was severely wounded by a fragment of shell. hot shot now became frequent, and at nine o’clock the officers’ quarters were set afire. as it was evident the fire would soon surround the magazine, every one not at the guns was employed to get out powder; but only fifty barrels could be removed to the casements, when it became necessary from the spread of the flames to close the magazine. the whole range of the officers’ quarters was soon in flames, and the clouds of smoke and cinders sent into the casements set on fire many of the men’s beds and boxes, making the retention of the powder so dangerous that all but five barrels were thrown into the sea.205
270 by eleven o’clock the fire and smoke were driven by the wind in such masses into the point where the men had taken refuge that suffocation appeared imminent. “the roaring and crackling of the flames, the dense masses of whirling smoke, the bursting of the enemy’s shells, and our own, which were exploding in the burning rooms, the crashing of the shot and the sound of masonry falling in every direction made the fort a pandemonium.... there was a tower at each angle of the fort. one of these, containing great quantities of shells, ... was almost completely shattered by successive explosions. the massive wooden gates, studded with iron nails, were burned, and the wall built behind them was now a heap of débris, so that the main entrance was wide open for an assaulting party.”206
but however great the apparent damage and the discomfort and danger while the fire lasted, the firing could have been resumed “as soon as the walls cooled sufficiently to open the magazines, and then, having blown down the wall projecting above the parapet, so as to get rid of the flying bricks, and built up the main gates with stones and rubbish, the fort would actually have been in a more defensible condition than when the action commenced.”207
but want of men, want of food, and want of powder together made a force majeure against which further strife was useless; and when, about 1 p.m., the flag-staff was shot away, though the flag was at once flown from an improvised staff, a boat was sent from the commanding officer at morris island, bringing colonel (ex-senator) wigfall and a companion bearing a white flag, to inquire if the fort had surrendered.
being allowed entrance, major anderson was sought for, and wigfall, using beauregard’s name, offered anderson his own terms. wigfall exhibited a white handkerchief271 from the parapet, and this being noticed brought from beauregard himself colonel chesnut, colonel roger a. pryor, colonel william porcher miles, and captain lee, followed soon by beauregard’s adjutant-general, jones, ex-governor manning, and colonel alston. it transpired that wigfall had not seen beauregard for two days, and that his visit was wholly unauthorized. the proper authorities, however, being now at hand, arrangements were concluded at 7 p.m., anderson surrendering (after some correspondence), with permission to salute the flag as it was hauled down, to march out with colors flying and drums beating and with arms and private baggage.208
noticing the disappearance of the colors, a flag of truce was sent in from the squadron outside, and arrangements made for carrying the garrison north. next morning, sunday, april 14th, with a salute of fifty guns, the flag was finally hauled down. it had been anderson’s intention to fire a hundred guns, but a lamentable accident occurred in the premature discharge of one, by which one man was killed, another mortally wounded, and four others seriously injured. this accident delayed the departure until 4 p.m., when the little company of some eighty men, accompanied by the forty laborers,209 marched out of the gate with their flags flying and drums beating. the steamer isabel carried anderson and his men to the baltic, and at nightfall they were on their way north.
april 15th, the day after the surrender, the president issued his proclamation calling “forth the militia of the several states of the union” to the number of seventy-five thousand men, in order to suppress “combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the marshals by law,” and “to cause the laws to be duly272 executed.” congress was called to convene july 4th. an immediate effect of the proclamation was the secession of virginia, april 17th, the conservative elements of the state convention, although in the majority, being overwhelmed by the enthusiasm and impetus of the secession attack. another prompt result was the formation of the northwestern counties into what is now west virginia.
fox’s expedition, however abortive in a physical sense, did much more than attempt to succor sumter; it was the instrument through which the fort was held to the accomplishment of the fateful mistake of the confederacy in striking the first blow. it prevented the voluntary yielding of the fort, and was an exhibition of the intention of the government to hold its own. it was thus elemental in its effects. had anderson withdrawn and hauled down his flag without a shot from the south, it would have been for the federal government to strike the first blow of war; and its call for men would have met with a different response to that which came from the electric impulse which the firing upon the flag caused to vibrate through the north. this expectation was the basis of lincoln’s determination. almost alone, unmovable by cabinet or war department, he saw with the certainty of the seer what holding sumter meant, and continued on the unchangeable way which from the first he had taken. in his letter of sympathy to fox, may 1st, he said: “you and i both anticipated that the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision fort sumter, even if it should fail, and it is no small consolation now to feel that our anticipation is justified by the result.”210
the enthusiastic response of the north to the proclamation was witness to the truth of lincoln’s view, as well as to the north’s determination that the offended273 dignity of the union should be avenged, its strongholds regained, its boundaries made intact, and that the united states be proved to be a nation. it was for this the union fought; the freeing of the blacks was but a natural and necessary incident. the assault upon sumter was the knife driven by the hand of the south itself into the vitals of slavery.
synopsis of the principal events, chiefly
military, between the bombardment
of fort sumter, 1861, and the battle
of the monitor and the
merrimac, 1862
1861. president lincoln calls for seventy-five thousand militia to suppress the rebellion of the southern states. secession of virginia, tennessee, arkansas, and north carolina. formal division of western virginia from virginia. the massachusetts militia attacked in baltimore. the congress of the confederate states assembles at montgomery and is later transferred to richmond. the first battle of bull run results in a federal repulse. battle of wilson’s creek. repulse of the federals at ball’s bluff. mcclellan succeeds scott as commander-in-chief of the federal armies. the federals gain possession of port royal. the confederate commissioners, mason and slidell, are intercepted on the british steamer trent.
1862. surrender of the confederate commissioners, mason and slidell, to the british government. the federals capture roanoke island. fort henry and fort donelson surrender to general grant. federal victory at pea ridge. engagement between the monitor and the merrimac. the french declare war against mexico.
