women in the movement often wish that the word humanist had not been appropriated, because it would far more properly connote the women’s movement than the word feminist.
it is significant of much that there is in the english language no commonly used substantive corresponding to “homo.” there is need, of course, for the words man and woman, but there is also need for a word denoting the species, irrespective of sex, and i have been driven to make use of a locution not common in english, in writing “a human.” but the common pronoun is non-existent and i have not used the neuter, lest it should alarm nervous persons. perhaps when we have got over the panic fear of unsexing ourselves, we may find it safe to speak of a human, just as we do of a baby, as “it.”
there may seem to be a disappointing lack of prophesy in a book avowedly dealing with the future; but since i believe the women’s movement to be a seeking for knowledge and good, to show[viii] what is reasonable and good in the movement is to show what will persist and triumph. through all our faults and mistakes, we women are aiming at better understanding and co-operation with men, and a better adaptation to one another of conditions and persons. we are having to hammer out for ourselves the right principles of government. we can take them ready-made from no man. doubtless we shall flounder considerably, as men have done—and do. but there is little fear that in the long-run the best minds of men and women will not have a common principle.
meanwhile we have to resist the tendency to easy and cheap generalisations about woman, her sphere, her vocation, and her capacity, based upon a very small amount of very partial investigation and a huge amount of inherited prejudice and native conceit. men who ought to have some respect for scientific methods will, when some à priori theory of woman’s proper sphere has closed their minds, make the most palpably faulty deductions from imperfect data, and use their reputation in some other branch of science as cover for their bad reasoning. no statistics are more useful than vital statistics, and none have been more misused to prove some foregone conclusion. everyone experienced in investigation knows how helpful it is to[ix] have some general hypothesis in view, by which to co-ordinate all phenomena, but knows also how necessary it is to be constantly watchful lest the hypothesis should obscure new and unexpected phenomena. when the investigator is himself personally involved, and when the hypothesis is one which the majority of men have thought self-evident for ages, and when the strongest of all impulses, next to hunger, confuses the mind of the investigator, we are justified in being very sceptical about the positive nature of his conclusions, until he can satisfy us that they have been reached by strictly logical methods of agreement and difference.
if to some reasonable and civilised men it may seem that i have given undue importance to the foolishnesses and barbarisms of another kind of men, i would ask those men to remember that these are among our masters and we may not ignore them. we might like to treat them “with the contempt they deserve,” but we have at present to live under the laws that they help to make. doubtless, when we are free, we shall suffer fools more gladly than we do now, having less to fear from them.
