the first inquiry which runs through sir joshua reynolds’s discourses is whether the student ought to look at nature with his own eyes or with the eyes of others, and on the whole, he apparently inclines to the latter. the second question is what is to be understood by nature; whether it is a general and abstract idea, or an aggregate of particulars; and he strenuously maintains the former of these positions. yet it is not easy always to determine how far or with what precise limitations he does so.

the first germ of his speculations on this subject is to be found in two papers in the idler. in the last paragraph of the second of these, he says:

‘if it has been proved that the painter, by attending to the invariable and general ideas of nature, produces beauty, he must, by regarding minute particularities and accidental discrimination, deviate from the universal rule, and pollute his canvas with deformity.’

in answer to this, i would say that deformity is not the being varied in the particulars, in which all things differ (for on this principle all nature, which is made up of individuals, would be a heap of deformity), but in violating general rules, in which they all or almost all agree. thus there are no two noses in the world exactly alike, or without a great variety of subordinate parts, which may still be handsome, but a face without any nose at all, or a nose (like that of a mask) without any particularity in the details, would be a great deformity in art or nature. sir joshua seems to have been led into his notions on this subject either by an ambiguity of terms, or by taking only one view of nature. he supposes grandeur, or the general effect of the whole, to consist in leaving out the particular details, because these details are sometimes found without any grandeur of effect, and he therefore conceives the two things to be irreconcilable and the alternatives of each other. this is very imperfect reasoning. if the mere leaving out the detail constituted grandeur, any one could do this: the greatest dauber would at that rate be the greatest artist. a house or sign painter might instantly enter the lists with michael angelo, and might look down on the little, dry, hard manner of raphael. but grandeur depends on a distinct principle of its own, not on a negation of the parts; and as it does not arise from their omission, so neither is it incompatible with their insertion or the highest finishing. in fact, an artist may give the minute particulars of any object one by one and with the utmost care, and totally neglect the proportions, arrangement, and general masses, on which the effect of the whole more immediately depends; or he may give the latter, viz. the proportions and arrangement of the larger parts and the general masses of light and shade, and leave all the minuter parts of which those parts are composed a mere blotch, one general smear, like the first crude and hasty getting in of the groundwork of a picture: he may do either of these, or he may combine both, that is, finish the parts, but put them in their right places, and keep them in due subordination to the general effect and massing of the whole. if the exclusion of the parts were necessary to the grandeur of the whole composition, if the more entire this exclusion, if the more like a tabula rasa, a vague, undefined, shadowy and abstracted representation the picture was, the greater the grandeur, there could be no danger of pushing this principle too far, and going the full length of sir joshua’s theory without any restrictions or mental reservations. but neither of these suppositions is true. the greatest grandeur may coexist with the most perfect, nay with a microscopic accuracy of detail, as we see it does often in nature: the greatest looseness and slovenliness of execution may be displayed without any grandeur at all either in the outline or distribution of the masses of colour. to explain more particularly what i mean. i have seen and copied portraits by titian, in which the eyebrows were marked with a number of small strokes, like hairlines (indeed, the hairs of which they were composed were in a great measure given)— but did this destroy the grandeur of expression, the truth of outline, arising from the arrangement of these hair-lines in a given form? the grandeur, the character, the expression remained, for the general form or arched and expanded outline remained, just as much as if it had been daubed in with a blacking-brush: the introduction of the internal parts and texture only added delicacy and truth to the general and striking effect of the whole. surely a number of small dots or lines may be arranged into the form of a square or a circle indiscriminately; the square or circle, that is, the larger figure, remains the same, whether the line of which it consists is broken or continuous; as we may see in prints where the outlines, features, and masses remain the same in all the varieties of mezzotinto, dotted and lined engraving. if titian in marking the appearance of the hairs had deranged the general shape and contour of the eyebrows, he would have destroyed the look of nature; but as he did not, but kept both in view, he proportionably improved his copy of it. so, in what regards the masses of light and shade, the variety, the delicate transparency and broken transitions of the tints is not inconsistent with the greatest breadth or boldest contrasts. if the light, for instance, is thrown strongly on one side of a face, and the other is cast into deep shade, let the individual and various parts of the surface be finished with the most scrupulous exactness both in the drawing and in the colours, provided nature is not exceeded, this will not nor cannot destroy the force and harmony of the composition. one side of the face will still have that great and leading distinction of being seen in shadow, and the other of being seen in the light, let the subordinate differences be as many and as precise as they will. suppose a panther is painted in the sun: will it be necessary to leave out the spots to produce breadth and the great style, or will not this be done more effectually by painting the spots of one side of his shaggy coat as they are seen in the light, and those of the other as they really appear in natural shadow? the two masses are thus preserved completely, and no offence is done to truth and nature. otherwise we resolve the distribution of light and shade into local colouring. the masses, the grandeur exist equally in external nature with the local differences of different colours. yet sir joshua seems to argue that the grandeur, the effect of the whole object, is confined to the general idea in the mind, and that all the littleness and individuality is in nature. this is an essentially false view of the subject. this grandeur, this general effect, is indeed always combined with the details, or what our theoretical reasoner would designate as littleness in nature: and so it ought to be in art, as far as art can follow nature with prudence and profit. what is the fault of denner’s style? — it is, that he does not give this combination of properties: that he gives only one view of nature; that he abstracts the details, the finishing, the curiosities of natural appearances from the general result, truth, and character of the whole, and in finishing every part with elaborate care, totally loses sight of the more important and striking appearance of the object as it presents itself to us in nature. he gives every part of a face; but the shape, the expression, the light and shade of the whole is wrong, and as far as can be from what is natural. he gives an infinite variety of tints of the human face, nor are they subjected to any principle of light and shade. he is different from rembrandt or titian. the english schools, formed on sir joshua’s theory, give neither the finishing of the parts nor the effect of the whole, but an inexplicable dumb mass without distinction or meaning. they do not do as denner did, and think that not to do as he did is to do as titian and rembrandt did; i do not know whether they would take it as a compliment to be supposed to imitate nature. some few artists, it must be said, have ‘of late reformed this indifferently among us! oh! let them reform it altogether!’ i have no doubt they would if they could; but i have some doubts whether they can or not. — before i proceed to consider the question of beauty and grandeur as it relates to the selection of form, i will quote a few passages from sir joshua with reference to what has been said on the imitation of particular objects. in the third discourse he observes: ‘i will now add that nature herself is not to be too closely copied. . . . a mere copier of nature can never produce anything great; can never raise and enlarge the conceptions, or warm the heart of the spectator. the wish of the genuine painter must be more extensive: instead of endeavouring to amuse mankind with the minute neatness of his imitations, he must endeavour to improve them by the grandeur of his ideas; instead of seeking praise by deceiving the superficial sense of the spectator, he must strive for fame by captivating the imagination.’

from this passage it would surely seem that there was nothing in nature but minute neatness and superficial effect: nothing great in her style, for an imitator of it can produce nothing great; nothing ‘to enlarge the conceptions or warm the heart of the spectator.’

what word hath passed thy lips, adam severe!

all that is truly grand or excellent is a figment of the imagination, a vapid creation out of nothing, a pure effect of overlooking and scorning the minute neatness of natural objects. this will not do. again, sir joshua lays it down without any qualification that —

‘the whole beauty and grandeur of the art consists in being able to get above all singular forms, local customs, peculiarities, and details of every kind.’

yet we find him acknowledging a different opinion.

‘i am very ready to allow’ (he says, in speaking of history-painting) ‘that some circumstances of minuteness and particularity frequently tend to give an air of truth to a piece, and to interest the spectator in an extraordinary manner. such circumstances therefore cannot wholly be rejected; but if there be anything in the art which requires peculiar nicety of discernment, it is the disposition of these minute, circumstantial parts, which, according to the judgment employed in the choice, become so useful to truth or so injurious to grandeur.’

that’s true; but the sweeping clause against ‘all particularities and details of every kind’ is clearly got rid of. the undecided state of sir joshua’s feelings on this subject of the incompatibility between the whole and the details is strikingly manifested in two short passages which follow each other in the space of two pages. speaking of some pictures of paul veronese and rubens as distinguished by the dexterity and the unity of style displayed in them, he adds:

‘it is by this, and this alone, that the mechanical power is ennobled, and raised much above its natural rank. and it appears to me that with propriety it acquires this character, as an instance of that superiority with which mind predominates over matter, by contracting into one whole what nature has made multifarious.’

this would imply that the principle of unity and integrity is only in the mind, and that nature is a heap of disjointed, disconnected particulars, a chaos of points and atoms. in the very next page the following sentence occurs:

‘as painting is an art, they’ (the ignorant) ‘think they ought to be pleased in proportion as they see that art ostentatiously displayed; they will from this supposition prefer neatness, high finishing, and gaudy corlouring, to the truth, simplicity, and unity of nature.’

before, neatness and high finishing were supposed to belong exclusively to the littleness of nature, but here truth, simplicity, and unity are her characteristics. soon after, sir joshua says: ‘i should be sorry if what has been said should be understood to have any tendency to encourage that carelessness which leaves work in an unfinished state. i commend nothing for the want of exactness; i mean to point out that kind of exactness which is the best, and which is alone truly to be so esteemed.’ this sir joshua has already told us consists in getting above ‘all particularities and details of every kind.’ once more we find it stated that —

‘it is in vain to attend to the variation of tints, if in that attention the general hue of flesh is lost; or to finish ever so minutely the parts, if the masses are not observed, or the whole not well put together.’

nothing can be truer; but why always suppose the two things at variance with each other?

‘titian’s manner was then new to the world, but that unshaken truth on which it is founded has fixed it as a model to all succeeding painters; and those who will examine into the artifice will find it to consist in the power of generalising, and in the shortness and simplicity of the means employed.’

titian’s real excellence consisted in the power of generalising and of individualising at the same time: if it wore merely the former, it would be difficult to account for the error immediately after pointed out by sir joshua. he says in the very next paragraph:

‘many artists, as vasari likewise observes, have ignorantly imagined they are imitating the manner of titian when they leave their colours rough and neglect the detail; but not possessing the principles on which he wrought, they have produced what he calls goffe pitture— absurd, foolish pictures.’

many artists have also imagined they were following the directions of sir joshua when they did the same thing, that is, neglected the detail, and produced the same results — vapid generalities, absurd, foolish pictures.

i will only give two short passages more, and have done with this part of the subject. i am anxious to confront sir joshua with his own authority:

‘the advantage of this method of considering objects (as a whole) is what i wish now more particularly to enforce. at the same time i do not forget that a painter must have the power of contracting as well as dilating his sight; because he that does not at all express particulars expresses nothing; yet it is certain that a nice discrimination of minute circumstances and a punctilious delineation of them, whatever excellence it may have (and i do not mean to detract from it), never did confer on the artist the character of genius.’

at page 53 we find the following words:

‘whether it is the human figure, an animal, or even inanimate objects, there is nothing, however unpromising in appearance, but may be raised into dignity, convey sentiment, and produce emotion, in the hands of a painter of genius. what was said of virgil, that he threw even the dung about the ground with an air of dignity, may be applied to titian; whatever he touched, however naturally mean, and habitually familiar, by a kind of magic he invested with grandeur and importance.’— no, not by magic, but by seeking and finding in individual nature, and combined with details of every kind, that grace and grandeur and unity of effect which sir joshua supposes to be a mere creation of the artist’s brain! titian’s practice was, i conceive, to give general appearances with individual forms and circumstances: sir joshua’s theory goes too often, and in its prevailing bias, to separate the two things as inconsistent with each other, and thereby to destroy or bring into question that union of striking effect with accuracy of resemblance in which the essence of sound art (as far as relates to imitation) consists.

farther, as sir joshua is inclined to merge the details of individual objects in general effect, so he is resolved to reduce all beauty or grandeur in natural objects to a central form or abstract idea of a certain class, so as to exclude all peculiarities or deviations from this ideal standard as unfit subjects for the artist’s pencil, and as polluting his canvas with deformity. as the former principle went to destroy all exactness and solidity in particular things, this goes to confound all variety, distinctness, and characteristic force in the broader scale of nature. there is a principle of conformity in nature or of something in common between a number of individuals of the same class, but there is also a principle of contrast, of discrimination and identity, which is equally essential in the system of the universe and in the structure of our ideas both of art and nature. sir joshua would hardly neutralise the tints of the rainbow to produce a dingy grey, as a medium or central colour; why, then, should he neutralise all features, forms, etc., to produce an insipid monotony? he does not indeed consider his theory of beauty as applicable to colour, which he well understood, but insists upon and literally enforces it as to form and ideal conceptions, of which he knew comparatively little, and where his authority is more questionable. i will not in this place undertake to show that his theory of a middle form (as the standard of taste and beauty) is not true of the outline of the human face and figure or other organic bodies, though i think that even there it is only one principle or condition of beauty; but i do say that it has little or nothing to do with those other capital parts of painting, colour, character, expression, and grandeur of conception. sir joshua himself contends that ‘beauty in creatures of the same species is the medium or centre of all its various forms’; and he maintains that grandeur is the same abstraction of the species in the individual. therefore beauty and grandeur must be the same thing, which they are not; so that this definition must be faulty. grandeur i should suppose to imply something that elevates and expands the mind, which is chiefly power or magnitude. beauty is that which soothes and melts it; and its source, i apprehend, is a certain harmony, softness, and gradation of form, within the limits of our customary associations, no doubt, or of what we expect of certain species, but not independent of every other consideration. our critic himself confesses of michael angelo, whom he regards as the pattern of the great or sublime style, that ‘his people are a superior order of beings: there is nothing about them, nothing in the air of their actions or their attitudes, or the style or cast of their limbs or features, that reminds us of their belonging to our own species. raffaelle’s imagination is not so elevated; his figures are not so much disjoined from our own diminutive race of beings, though his ideas are chaste, noble, and of great conformity to their subjects. michael angelo’s works have a strong, peculiar, and marked character: they seem to proceed from his own mind entirely, and that mind so rich and abundant that he never needed, or seemed to disdain to look abroad for foreign help. raffaelle’s materials are generally borrowed, though the noble structure is his own.44 how does all this accord with the same writer’s favourite theory that all beauty, all grandeur, and all excellence consist in an approximation to that central form or habitual idea of mediocrity, from which every deviation is so much deformity and littleness? michael angelo’s figures are raised above our diminutive race of beings, yet they are confessedly the standard of sublimity in what regards the human form. grandeur, then, admits of an exaggeration of our habitual impressions; and ‘the strong, marked, and peculiar character which michael angelo has at the same time given to his works’ does not take away from it. this is fact against argument. i would take sir joshua’s word for the goodness of a picture, and for its distinguishing properties, sooner than i would for an abstract metaphysical theory. our artist also speaks continually of high and low subjects. there can be no distinction of this kind upon his principle, that the standard of taste is the adhering to the central form of each species, and that every species is in itself equally beautiful. the painter of flowers, of shells, or of anything else, is equally elevated with raphael or michael, if he adheres to the generic or established form of what he paints: the rest, according to this definition, is a matter of indifference. there must therefore be something besides the central or customary form to account for the difference of dignity, for the high and low style in nature or in art. michael angelo’s figures, we are told, are more than ordinarily grand; why, by the same rule, may not raphael’s be more than ordinarily beautiful, have more than ordinary softness, symmetry, and grace? — character and expression are still less included in the present theory. all character is a departure from the common-place form; and sir joshua makes no scruple to declare that expression destroys beauty. thus he says:

‘if you mean to preserve the most perfect beauty in its most perfect state, you cannot express the passions, all of which produce distortion and deformity, more or less, in the most beautiful faces.’

he goes on: ‘guido, from want of choice in adapting his subject to his ideas and his powers, or from attempting to preserve beauty where it could not be preserved, has in this respect succeeded very ill. his figures are often engaged in subjects that required great expression; yet his judith and holofernes, the daughter of herodias with the baptist’s head, the andromeda, and some even of the mothers of the innocents, have little more expression than his venus attired by the graces.’

what a censure is this passed upon guido, and what a condemnation of his own theory, which would reduce and level all that is truly great and praiseworthy in art to this insipid, tasteless standard, by setting aside as illegitimate all that does riot come within the middle, central form! yet sir joshua judges of hogarth as he deviates from this standard, not as he excels in individual character, which he says is only good or tolerable as it partakes of general nature; and he might accuse michael angelo and raphael, the one for his grandeur of style, the other for his expression; for neither are what he sets up as the goal of perfection — i will just stop to remark here that sir joshua has committed himself very strangely in speaking of the character and expression to be found in the greek statues. he says in one place:

‘i cannot quit the apollo without making one observation on the character of this figure. he is supposed to have just discharged his arrow at the python; and by the head retreating a little towards the right shoulder, he appears attentive to its effect. what i would remark is the difference of this attention from that of the discobolus, who is engaged in the same purpose, watching the effect of his discus. the graceful, negligent, though animated air of the one, and the vulgar eagerness of the other, furnish an instance of the judgment of the ancient sculptors in their nice discrimination of character. they are both equally true to nature, and equally admirable.’ after a few observations on the limited means of the art of sculpture, and the inattention of the ancients to almost everything but form, we meet with the following passage:—

‘those who think sculpture can express more than we have allowed may ask, by what means we discover, at the first glance, the character that is represented in a bust, a cameo, or intaglio? i suspect it will be found, on close examination, by him who is resolved not to see more than he really does see, that the figures are distinguished by their insignia more than by any variety of form or beauty. take from apollo his lyre, from bacchus his thyrsus and vine-leaves, and meleager the boar’s head, and there will remain little or no difference in their characters. in a juno, minerva, or flora, the idea of the artist seems to have gone no further than representing perfect beauty, and afterwards adding the proper attributes, with a total indifference to which they gave them.’

(what, then, becomes of that ‘nice discrimination of character’ for which our author has just before celebrated them?)

‘thus john de bologna, after he had finished a group of a young man holding up a young woman in his arms, with an old man at his feet, called his friends together, to tell him what name he should give it, and it was agreed to call it the rape of the sabines; and this is the celebrated group which now stands before the old palace at florence. the figures have the same general expression which is to be found in most of the antique sculpture; and yet it would be no wonder if future critics should find out delicacy of expression which was never intended, and go so far as to see, in the old man’s countenance, the exact relation which he bore to the woman who appears to be taken from him.’

so it is that sir joshua’s theory seems to rest on an inclined plane, and is always glad of an excuse to slide, from the severity of truth and nature, into the milder and more equable regions of insipidity and inanity; i am sorry to say so, but so it appears to me.

i confess, it strikes me as a self-evident truth that variety or contrast is as essential a principle in art and nature as uniformity, and as necessary to make up the harmony of the universe and the contentment of the mind. who would destroy the shifting effects of light and shade, the sharp, lively opposition of colours in the same or in different objects, the streaks in a flower, the stains in a piece of marble, to reduce all to the same neutral, dead colouring, the same middle tint? yet it is on this principle that sir joshua would get rid of all variety, character, expression, and picturesque effect in forms, or at least measure the worth or the spuriousness of all these according to their reference to or departure from a given or average standard. surely, nature is more liberal, art is wider than sir joshua’s theory. allow (for the sake of argument) that all forms are in themselves indifferent, and that beauty or the sense of pleasure in forms can therefore only arise from customary association, or from that middle impression to which they all tend: yet this cannot by the same rule apply to other things. suppose there is no capacity in form to affect the mind except from its corresponding to previous expectation, the same thing cannot be said of the idea of power or grandeur. no one can say that the idea of power does not affect the mind with the sense of awe and sublimity. that is, power and weakness, grandeur and littleness, are not indifferent things, the perfection of which consists in a medium between both. again, expression is not a thing indifferent in itself, which derives its value or its interest solely from its conformity to a neutral standard. who would neutralise the expression of pleasure and pain? or say that the passions of the human mind — pity, love, joy, sorrow, etc. — are only interesting to the imagination and worth the attention of the artist, as he can reduce them to an equivocal state which is neither pleasant nor painful, neither one thing nor the other? or who would stop short of the utmost refinement, precision, and force in the delineation of each? ideal expression is not neutral expression, but extreme expression. again, character is a thing of peculiarity, of striking contrast, of distinction, and not of uniformity. it is necessarily opposed to sir joshua’s exclusive theory, and yet it is surely a curious and interesting field of speculation for the human mind. lively, spirited discrimination of character is one source of gratification to the lover of nature and art, which it could not be if all truth and excellence consisted in rejecting individual traits. ideal character is not common-place, but consistent character marked throughout, which may take place in history or portrait. historical truth in a picture is the putting the different features of the face or muscles of the body into consistent action. the picturesque altogether depends on particular points or qualities of an object, projecting as it were beyond the middle line of beauty, and catching the eye of the spectator. it was less, however, my intention to hazard any speculations of my own than to confirm the common-sense feelings on the subject by sir joshua’s own admissions in different places. in the tenth discourse, speaking of some objections to the apollo, he has these remarkable words:—

‘in regard to the last objection (viz. that the lower half of the figure is longer than just proportion allows) it must be remembered that apollo is here in the exertion of one of his peculiar powers, which is swiftness; he has therefore that proportion which is best adapted to that character. this is no more incorrectness than when there is given to a hercules an extraordinary swelling and strength of muscles.’

strength and activity then do not depend on the middle form; and the middle form is to be sacrificed to the representation of these positive qualities. character is thus allowed not only to be an integrant part of the antique and classical style of art, but even to take precedence of and set aside the abstract idea of beauty. little more would be required to justify hogarth in his gothic resolution, that if he were to make a figure of charon, he would give him bandy legs, because watermen are generally bandy-legged. it is very well to talk of the abstract idea of a man or of a god, but if you come to anything like an intelligible proposition, you must either individualise and define, or destroy the very idea you contemplate. sir joshua goes into this question at considerable length in the third discourse:

‘to the principle i have laid down, that the idea of beauty in each species of beings is an invariable one, it may be objected,’ he says, ‘that in every particular species there are various central forms, which are separate and distinct from each other, and yet are undeniably beautiful; that in the human figure, for instance the beauty of hercules is one, of the gladiator another, of the apollo another, which makes so many different ideas of beauty. it is true, indeed, that these figures are each perfect in their kind, though of different characters and proportions; but still none of them is the representation of an individual, but of a class. and as there is one general form, which, as i have said, belongs to the human kind at large, so in each of these classes there is one common idea which is the abstract of the various individual forms belonging to that class. thus, though the forms of childhood and age differ exceedingly, there is a common form in childhood, and a common form in age, which is the more perfect as it is remote from all peculiarities. but i must add further, that though the most perfect forms of each of the general divisions of the human figure are ideal, and superior to any individual form of that class, yet the highest perfection of the human figure is not to be found in any of them. it is not in the hercules, nor in the gladiator, nor in the apollo; but in that form which is taken from all, and which partakes equally of the activity of the gladiator, of the delicacy of the apollo, and of the muscular strength of the hercules. for perfect beauty in any species must combine all the characters which are beautiful in that species. it cannot consist in any one to the exclusion of the rest: no one, therefore, must be predominant, that no one may be deficient.’

sir joshua here supposes the distinctions of classes and character to be necessarily combined with the general leading idea of a middle form. this middle form is not to confound age, sex, circumstance, under one sweeping abstraction; but we must limit the general ideas by certain specific differences and characteristic marks, belonging to the several subordinate divisions and ramifications of each class. this is enough to show that there is a principle of individuality as well as of abstraction inseparable from works of art as well as nature. we are to keep the human form distinct from that of other living beings, that of men from that of women; we are to distinguish between age and infancy, between thoughtfulness and gaiety, between strength and softness. where is this to stop? but sir joshua turns round upon himself in this very passage, and says: ‘no: we are to unite the strength of the hercules with the delicacy of the apollo; for perfect beauty in any species must combine all the characters which are beautiful in that species.’ now if these different characters are beautiful in themselves, why not give them for their own sakes and in their most striking appearances, instead of qualifying and softening them down in a neutral form; which must produce a compromise, not a union of different excellences. if all excess of beauty, if all character is deformity, then we must try to lose it as fast as possible in other qualities. but if strength is an excellence, if activity is an excellence, if delicacy is an excellence, then the perfection, i.e. the highest degree of each of these qualities, cannot be attained but by remaining satisfied with a less degree of the rest. but let us hear what sir joshua himself advances on this subject in another part of the discourses:

‘some excellences bear to be united, and are improved by union: others are of a discordant nature, and the attempt to unite them only produces a harsh jarring of incongruent principles. the attempt to unite contrary excellences (of form, for instance45) in a single figure can never escape degenerating into the monstrous but by sinking into the insipid; by taking away its marked character, and weakening its expression.

‘obvious as these remarks appear, there are many writers on our art who, not being of the profession and consequently not knowing what can or cannot be done, have been very liberal of absurd praises in their description of favourite works. they always find in them what they are resolved to find. they praise excellences that can hardly exist together; and, above all things, are fond of describing with great exactness the expression of a mixed passion, which more particularly appears to me out of the reach of our art.46

‘such are many disquisitions which i have read on some of the cartoons and other pictures of raffaelle, where the critics have described their own imaginations; or indeed where the excellent master himself may have attempted this expression of passions above the powers of the art, and has, therefore, by an indistinct and imperfect marking, left room for every imagination with equal probability to find a passion of his own. what has been, and what can be done in the art, is sufficiently difficult: we need not be mortified or discouraged at not being able to execute the conceptions of a romantic imagination. art has its boundaries, though imagination has none. we can easily, like the ancients, suppose a jupiter to be possessed of all those powers and perfections which the subordinate deities were endowed with separately. yet when they employed their art to represent him, they confined his character to majesty alone. pliny, therefore, though we are under great obligations to him for the information he has given us in relation to the works of the ancient artists, is very frequently wrong when he speaks of them, which he does very often, in the style of many of our modern connoisseurs. he observes that in a statue of paris, by euphranor, you might discover at the same time three different characters: the dignity of a judge of the goddesses, the lover of helen, and the conqueror of achilles. a statue in which you endeavour to unite stately dignity, youthful elegance, and stern valour, must surely possess none of these to any eminent degree.

‘from hence it appears that there is much difficulty as well as danger in an endeavour to concentrate in a single subject those various powers which, rising from various points, naturally move in different directions.’

what real clue to the art or sound principles of judging the student can derive from these contradictory statements, or in what manner it is possible to reconcile them one to the other, i confess i am at a loss to discover. as it appears to me, all the varieties of nature in the infinite number of its qualities, combinations, characters, expressions, incidents, etc., rise from distinct points or centres and must move in distinct directions, as the forms of different species are to be referred to a separate standard. it is the object of art to bring them out in all their force, clearness, and precision, and not to blend them into a vague, vapid, nondescript ideal conception, which pretends to unite, but in reality destroys. sir joshua’s theory limits nature and paralyses art. according to him, the middle form or the average of our various impressions is the source from which all beauty, pleasure, interest, imagination springs. i contend, on the contrary, that this very variety is good in itself, nor do i agree with him that the whole of nature as it exists in fact is stark naught, and that there is nothing worthy of the contemplation of a wise man but that ideal perfection which never existed in the world nor even on canvas. there is something fastidious and sickly in sir joshua’s system. his code of taste consists too much of negations, and not enough of positive, prominent qualities. it accounts for nothing but the beauty of the common antique, and hardly for that. the merit of hogarth, i grant, is different from that of the greek statues; but i deny that hogarth is to be measured by this standard or by sir joshua’s middle forms: he has powers of instruction and amusement that, ‘rising from a different point, naturally move in a different direction,’ and completely attain their end. it would be just as reasonable to condemn a comedy for not having the pathos of a tragedy or the stateliness of an epic poem. if sir joshua reynolds’s theory were true, dr. johnson’s irene would be a better tragedy than any of shakespear’s.

the reasoning of the discourses is, i think, then, deficient in the following particulars:

1. it seems to imply that general effect in a picture is produced by leaving out the details, whereas the largest masses and the grandest outline are consistent with the utmost delicacy of finishing in the parts.

2. it makes no distinction between beauty and grandeur, but refers both to an ideal or middle form, as the centre of the various forms of the species, and yet inconsistently attributes the grandeur of michael angelo’s style to the superhuman appearance of his prophets and apostles.

3. it does not at any time make mention of power or magnitude in an object as a distinct source of the sublime (though this is acknowledged unintentionally in the case of michael angelo, etc.), nor of softness or symmetry of form as a distinct source of beauty, independently of, though still in connection with another source arising from what we are accustomed to expect from each individual species.

4. sir joshua’s theory does not leave room for character, but rejects it as an anomaly.

5. it does not point out the source of expression, but considers it as hostile to beauty; and yet, lastly, he allows that the middle form, carried to the utmost theoretical extent, neither defined by character, nor impregnated by passion, would produce nothing but vague, insipid, unmeaning generality.

in a word, i cannot think that the theory here laid down is clear and satisfactory, that it is consistent with itself, that it accounts for the various excellences of art from a few simple principles, or that the method which sir joshua has pursued in treating the subject is, as he himself expresses it, ‘a plain and honest method.’ it is, i fear, more calculated to baffle and perplex the student in his progress than to give him clear lights as to the object he should have in view, or to furnish him with strong motives of emulation to attain it.