i had been many years going up and down the semitic east before the war, learning the manners of the villagers and tribesmen and citizens of syria and mesopotamia. my poverty had constrained me to mix with the humbler classes, those seldom met by european travellers, and thus my experiences gave me an unusual angle of view, which enabled me to understand and think for the ignorant many as well as for the more enlightened whose rare opinions mattered, not so much for the day, as for the morrow. in addition, i had seen something of the political forces working in the minds of the middle east, and especially had noted everywhere sure signs of the decay of imperial turkey.
turkey was dying of overstrain, of the attempt, with diminished resources, to hold, on traditional terms, the whole empire bequeathed to it. the sword had been the virtue of the children of othman, and swords had passed out of fashion nowadays, in favour of deadlier and more scientific weapons. life was growing too complicated for this child-like people, whose strength had lain in simplicity, and patience, and in their capacity for sacrifice. they were the slowest of the races of western asia, little fitted to adapt themselves to new sciences of government and life, still less to invent any new arts for themselves. their administration had become perforce an affair of files and telegrams, of high finance, eugenics, calculations. inevitably the old governors, who had governed by force of hand or force of character, illiterate, direct, personal, had to pass away. the rule was transferred to new men, with agility and suppleness to stoop to machinery. the shallow and half-polished committee of the young turks were descendants of greeks, albanians, circassians, bulgars, armenians, jews — anything but seljuks or ottomans. the commons ceased to feel in tune with their governors, whose culture was levantine, and whose political theory was french. turkey was decaying; and only the knife might keep health in her.
loving the old ways steadily, the anatolian remained a beast of burden in his village and an uncomplaining soldier abroad, while the subject races of the empire, who formed nearly seven-tenths of its total population, grew daily in strength and knowledge; for their lack of tradition and responsibility, as well as their lighter and quicker minds, disposed them to accept new ideas. the former natural awe and supremacy of the turkish name began to fade in the face of wider comparison. this changing balance of turkey and the subject provinces involved growing garrisons if the old ground was to be retained. tripoli, albania, thrace, yemen, hejaz, syria, mesopotamia, kurdistan, armenia, were all outgoing accounts, burdens on the peasants of anatolia, yearly devouring a larger draft. the burden fell heaviest on the poor villages, and each year made these poor villages yet more poor.
the conscripts took their fate unquestioning: resignedly, after the custom of turkish peasantry. they were like sheep, neutrals without vice or virtue. left alone, they did nothing, or perhaps sat dully on the ground. ordered to be kind, and without haste they were as good friends and as generous enemies as might be found. ordered to outrage their fathers or disembowel their mothers, they did it as calmly as they did nothing, or did well. there was about them a hopeless, fever-wasted lack of initiative, which made them the most biddable, most enduring, and least spirited soldiers in the world.
such men were natural victims of their showy-vicious levantine officers, to be driven to death or thrown away by neglect without reckoning. indeed, we found them just kept chopping-blocks of their commanders’ viler passions. so cheap did they rate them, that in connection with them they used none of the ordinary precautions. medical examination of some batches of turkish prisoners found nearly half of them with unnaturally acquired venereal disease. pox and its like were not understood in the country; and the infection ran from one to another through the battalion, where the conscripts served for six or seven years, till at the end of their period the survivors, if they came from decent homes, were ashamed to return, and drifted either into the gendarmerie service, or, as broken men, into casual labour about the towns; and so the birth-rate fell. the turkish peasantry in anatolia were dying of their military service.
we could see that a new factor was needed in the east, some power or race which would outweigh the turks in numbers, in output, and in mental activity. no encouragement was given us by history to think that these qualities could be supplied ready-made from europe. the efforts of european powers to keep a footing in the asiatic levant had been uniformly disastrous, and we disliked no western people enough to inveigle them into further attempts. our successor and solution must be local; and fortunately the standard of efficiency required was local also. the competition would be with turkey; and turkey was rotten.
some of us judged that there was latent power enough and to spare in the arabic peoples (the greatest component of the old turkish empire), a prolific semitic agglomeration, great in religious thought, reasonably industrious, mercantile, politic, yet solvent rather than dominant in character. they had served a term of five hundred years under the turkish harrow, and had begun to dream of liberty; so when at last england fell out with turkey, and war was let loose in the east and west at once, we who believed we held an indication of the future set out to bend england’s efforts towards fostering the new arabic world in hither asia.
we were not many; and nearly all of us rallied round clayton, the chief of intelligence, civil and military, in egypt. clayton made the perfect leader for such a band of wild men as we were. he was calm, detached, clear-sighted, of unconscious courage in assuming responsibility. he gave an open run to his subordinates. his own views were general, like his knowledge; and he worked by influence rather than by loud direction. it was not easy to descry his influence. he was like water, or permeating oil, creeping silently and insistently through everything. it was not possible to say where clayton was and was not, and how much really belonged to him. he never visibly led; but his ideas were abreast of those who did: he impressed men by his sobriety, and by a certain quiet and stately moderation of hope. in practical matters he was loose, irregular, untidy, a man with whom independent men could bear.
the first of us was ronald storrs, oriental secretary of the residency, the most brilliant englishman in the near east, and subtly efficient, despite his diversion of energy in love of music and letters, of sculpture, painting, of whatever was beautiful in the world’s fruit. none the less, storrs sowed what we reaped, and was always first, and the great man among us. his shadow would have covered our work and british policy in the east like a cloak, had he been able to deny himself the world, and to prepare his mind and body with the sternness of an athlete for a great fight.
george lloyd entered our number. he gave us confidence, and with his knowledge of money, proved a sure guide through the subways of trade and politics, and a prophet upon the future arteries of the middle east. we would not have done so much so soon without his partnership; but he was a restless soul, avid rather to taste than to exhaust. to him many things were needful; and so he would not stay very long with us. he did not see how much we liked him.
then there was the imaginative advocate of unconvincing world-movements, mark sykes: also a bundle of prejudices, intuitions, half-sciences. his ideas were of the outside; and he lacked patience to test his materials before choosing his style of building. he would take an aspect of the truth, detach it from its circumstances, inflate it, twist and model it, until its old likeness and its new unlikeness together drew a laugh; and laughs were his triumphs. his instincts lay in parody: by choice he was a caricaturist rather than an artist, even in statesmanship. he saw the odd in everything, and missed the even. he would sketch out in a few dashes a new world, all out of scale, but vivid as a vision of some sides of the thing we hoped. his help did us good and harm. for this his last week in paris tried to atone. he had returned from a period of political duty in syria, after his awful realization of the true shape of his dreams, to say gallantly, i was wrong: here is the truth’. his former friends would not see his new earnestness, and thought him fickle and in error; and very soon he died. it was a tragedy of tragedies, for the arab sake.
not a wild man, but mentor to all of us was hogarth, our father confessor and adviser, who brought us the parallels and lessons of history, and moderation, and courage. to the outsiders he was peacemaker (i was all claws and teeth, and had a devil), and made us favoured and listened to, for his weighty judgement. he had a delicate sense of value, and would present clearly to us the forces hidden behind the lousy rags and festering skins which we knew as arabs. hogarth was our referee, and our untiring historian, who gave us his great knowledge and careful wisdom even in the smallest things, because he believed in what we were making. behind him stood cornwallis, a man rude to look upon, but apparently forged from one of those incredible metals with a melting-point of thousands of degrees. so he could remain for months hotter than other men’s white-heat, and yet look cold and hard. behind him again were others, newcombe, parker, herbert, graves, all of the creed, and labouring stoutly after their fashion.
we called ourselves ‘intrusive’ as a band; for we meant to break into the accepted halls of english foreign policy, and build a new people in the east, despite the rails laid down for us by our ancestors. therefore from our hybrid intelligence office in cairo (a jangling place which for its incessant bells and bustle and running to and fro, was likened by aubrey herbert to an oriental railway station) we began to work upon all chiefs, far and near. sir henry mcmahon, high commissioner in egypt, was, of course, our first effort; and his shrewd insight and tried, experienced mind understood our design at once and judged it good. others, like wemyss, neil malcolm, wingate, supported us in their pleasure at seeing the war turned constructive. their advocacy confirmed in lord kitchener the favourable impression he had derived years before when sherif abdulla appealed to him in egypt; and so mcmahon at last achieved our foundation stone, the understanding with the sherif of mecca.
but before this we had had hopes of mesopotamia. the beginning of the arab independence movement had been there, under the vigorous but unscrupulous impulse of seyid taleb, and later of yasin el hashimi and the military league. aziz el masri, enver’s rival, who was living, much indebted to us, in egypt, was an idol of the arab officers. he was approached by lord kitchener in the first days of the war, with the hope of winning the turkish mesopotamian forces to our side. unfortunately britain was bursting then with confidence in an easy and early victory: the smashing of turkey was called a promenade. so the indian government was adverse to any pledges to the arab nationalists which might limit their ambitions to make the intended mesopotamian colony play the self-sacrificing role of a burma for the general good. it broke off negotiations, rejected aziz, and interned sayid taleb, who had placed himself in our hands.
by brute force it marched then into basra. the enemy troops in irak were nearly all arabs in the unenviable predicament of having to fight on behalf of their secular oppressors against a people long envisaged as liberators, but who obstinately refused to play the part. as may be imagined, they fought very badly. our forces won battle after battle till we came to think an indian army better than a turkish army. there followed our rash advance to ctesiphon, where we met native turkish troops whose full heart was in the game, and were abruptly checked. we fell back, dazed; and the long misery of kut began.
meanwhile, our government had repented, and, for reasons not unconnected with the fall of erzerum, sent me to mesopotamia to see what could be done by indirect means to relieve the beleaguered garrison. the local british had the strongest objection to my coming; and two generals of them were good enough to explain to me that my mission (which they did not really know) was dishonourable to a soldier (which i was not). as a matter of fact it was too late for action, with kut just dying; and in consequence i did nothing of what it was in my mind and power to do.
the conditions were ideal for an arab movement. the people of nejef and kerbela, far in the rear of halil pasha’s army, were in revolt against him. the surviving arabs in hali’s army were, on his own confession, openly disloyal to turkey. the tribes of the hai and euphrates would have turned our way had they seen signs of grace in the british. had we published the promises made to the sherif, or even the proclamation afterwards posted in captured bagdad, and followed it up, enough local fighting men would have joined us to harry the turkish line of communication between bagdad and kut. a few weeks of that, and the enemy would either have been forced to raise the siege and retire, or have themselves suffered investment, outside kut, nearly as stringent as the investment of townshend within it. time to develop such a scheme could easily have been gained. had the british headquarters in mesopotamia obtained from the war office eight more aeroplanes to increase the daily carriage of food to the garrison of kut, townshend’s resistance might have been indefinitely prolonged. his defence was turkishly impregnable; and only blunders within and without forced surrender upon him.
however, as this was not the way of the directing parties there, i returned at once to egypt; and till the end of the war the british in mesopotamia remained substantially an alien force invading enemy territory, with the local people passively neutral or sullenly against them, and in consequence had not the freedom of movement and elasticity of allenby in syria, who entered the country as a friend, with the local people actively on his side. the factors of numbers, climate and communications favoured us in mesopotamia more than in syria; and our higher command was, after the beginning, no less efficient and experienced. but their casualty lists compared with allenby’s, their wood-chopping tactics compared with his rapier-play, showed how formidably an adverse political situation was able to cramp a purely military operation.
