next morning i was up early and out among feisal’s troops towards the side of kheif, by myself, trying to feel the pulse of their opinions in a moment, by such tricks as those played upon their chiefs the night before. time was of the essence of my effort, for it was necessary to gain in ten days the impressions which would ordinarily have been the fruit of weeks of observing in my crab-fashion, that sideways-slipping affair of the senses. normally i would go along all day, with the sounds immediate, but blind to every detail, only generally aware that there were things red, or things grey, or clear things about me. to-day my eyes had to be switched straight to my brain, that i might note a thing or two the more clearly by contrast with the former mistiness. such things were nearly always shapes: rocks and trees, or men’s bodies in repose or movement: not small things like flowers, nor qualities like colour.
yet here was strong need of a lively reporter. in this drab war the least irregularity was a joy to all, and mcmahon’s strongest course was to exploit the latent imagination of the general staff. i believed in the arab movement, and was confident, before ever i came, that in it was the idea to tear turkey into pieces; but others in egypt lacked faith, and had been taught nothing intelligent of the arabs in the field. by noting down something of the spirit of these romantics in the hills about the holy cities i might gain the sympathy of cairo for the further measures necessary to help them.
the men received me cheerfully. beneath every great rock or hush they sprawled like lazy scorpions, resting from the heat, and refreshing their brown limbs with the early coolness of the shaded stone. because of my khaki they took me for a turk-trained officer who had deserted to them, and were profuse in good-humoured but ghastly suggestions of how they should treat me. most of them were young, though the term ‘fighting man’ in the hejaz meant anyone between twelve and sixty sane enough to shoot. they were a tough-looking crowd, dark-coloured, some negroid. they were physically thin, but exquisitely made, moving with an oiled activity altogether delightful to watch. it did not seem possible that men could be hardier or harder. they would ride immense distances day after day, run through sand and over rocks bare-foot in the heat for hours without pain, and climb their hills like goats. their clothing was mainly a loose shirt, with sometimes short cotton drawers, and a head-shawl usually of red cloth, which acted towel or handkerchief or sack as required. they were corrugated with bandoliers, and fired joy-shots when they could.
they were in wild spirits, shouting that the war might last ten years. it was the fattest time the hills had ever known. the sherif was feeding not only the fighting men, but their families, and paying two pounds a month for a man, four for a camel. nothing else would have performed the miracle of keeping a tribal army in the field for five months on end. it was our habit to sneer at oriental soldiers’ love of pay; but the hejaz campaign was a good example of the limitations of that argument. the turks were offering great bribes, and obtaining little service — no active service. the arabs took their money, and gave gratifying assurances in exchange; yet these very tribes would be meanwhile in touch with feisal, who obtained service for his payment. the turks cut the throats of their prisoners with knives, as though they were butchering sheep. feisal offered a reward of a pound a head for prisoners, and had many carried in to him unhurt. he also paid for captured mules or rifles.
the actual contingents were continually shifting, in obedience to the rule of flesh. a family would own a rifle, and the sons serve in turn for a few days each. married men alternated between camp and wife, and sometimes a whole clan would become bored and take a rest. consequently the paid men were more than those mobilized; and policy often gave to great sheikhs, as wages, money that was a polite bribe for friendly countenance. feisal’s eight thousand men were one in ten camel-corps and the rest hill-men. they served only under their tribal sheikhs, and near home, arranging their own food and transport. nominally each sheikh had a hundred followers. sherifs acted as group leaders, in virtue of their privileged position, which raised them above the jealousies which shackled the tribesmen.
blood feuds were nominally healed, and really suspended in the sherifian area: billi and juheina, ateiba and ageyl living and fighting side by side in feisal’s army. all the same, the members of one tribe were shy of those of another, and within the tribe no man would quite trust his neighbour. each might be, usually was, wholehearted against the turk, but perhaps not quite to the point of failing to work off a family grudge upon a family enemy in the field. consequently they could not attack. one company of turks firmly entrenched in open country could have defied the entire army of them; and a pitched defeat, with its casualties, would have ended the war by sheer horror.
i concluded that the tribesmen were good for defence only. their acquisitive recklessness made them keen on booty, and whetted them to tear up railways, plunder caravans, and steal camels; but they were too free-minded to endure command, or to fight in team. a man who could fight well by himself made generally a bad soldier, and these champions seemed to me no material for our drilling; but if we strengthened them by light automatic guns of the lewis type, to be handled by themselves, they might be capable of holding their hills and serving as an efficient screen behind which we could build up, perhaps at rabegh, an arab regular mobile column, capable of meeting a turkish force (distracted by guerilla warfare) on terms, and of defeating it piecemeal. for such a body of real soldiers no recruits would be forthcoming from hejaz. it would have to be formed of the heavy unwarlike syrian and mesopotamian towns-folk already in our hands, and officered by arabic-speaking officers trained in the turkish army, men of the type and history of aziz el masri or maulud. they would eventually finish the war by striking, while the tribesmen skirmished about, and hindered and distracted the turks by their pin-prick raids.
the hejaz war, meanwhile, would be one of dervishes against regular troops. it was the fight of a rocky, mountainous, barren country (reinforced by a wild horde of mountaineers) against an enemy so enriched in equipment by the germans as almost to have lost virtue for rough-and-tumble war. the hill-belt was a paradise for snipers; and arabs were artists in sniping. two or three hundred determined men knowing the ranges should hold any section of them; because the slopes were too steep for escalade. the valleys, which were the only practicable roads, for miles and miles were not so much valleys as chasms or gorges, sometimes two hundred yards across, but sometimes only twenty, full of twists and turns, one thousand or four thousand feet deep, barren of cover, and flanked each side by pitiless granite, basalt and porphyry, not in polished slopes, but serrated and split and piled up in thousands of jagged heaps of fragments as hard as metal and nearly as sharp.
it seemed to my unaccustomed eyes impossible that, without treachery on the part of the mountain tribes, the turks could dare to break their way through. even with treachery as an ally, to pass the hills would be dangerous. the enemy would never be sure that the fickle population might not turn again; and to have such a labyrinth of defiles in the rear, across the communications, would be worse than having it in front. without the friendship of the tribes, the turks would own only the ground on which their soldiers stood; and lines so long and complex would soak up thousands of men in a fortnight, and leave none in the battle-front.
the sole disquieting feature was the very real success of the turks in frightening the arabs by artillery. aziz el masri in the turk-italian war in tripoli had found the same terror, but had found also that it wore off. we might hope that the same would happen here; but for the moment the sound of a fired cannon sent every man within earshot behind cover. they thought weapons destructive in proportion to their noise. they were not afraid of bullets, not indeed overmuch of dying: just the manner of death by shell-fire was unendurable. it seemed to me that their moral confidence was to be restored only by having guns, useful or useless, but noisy, on their side. from the magnificent feisal down to the most naked stripling in the army the theme was artillery, artillery, artillery.
when i told them of the landing of the five-inch howitzers at rabegh they rejoiced. such news nearly balanced in their minds the check of their last retreat down wadi safra. the guns would be of no real use to them: indeed, it seemed to me that they would do the arabs positive harm; for their virtues lay in mobility and intelligence, and by giving them guns we hampered their movements and efficiency. only if we did not give them guns they would quit.
at these close quarters the bigness of the revolt impressed me. this well-peopled province, from una lejj to kunfida, more than a fortnight’s camel march, had suddenly changed its character from a rout of casual nomad pilferers to an eruption against turkey, fighting her, not certainly in our manner, but fiercely enough, in spite of the religion which was to raise the east against us in a holy war. beyond anything calculable in figures, we had let loose a passion of anti-turkish feeling which, embittered as it had been by generations of subjection, might die very hard. there was among the tribes in the fighting zone a nervous enthusiasm common, i suppose, to all national risings, but strangely disquieting to one from a land so long delivered that national freedom had become like the water in our mouths, tasteless.
later i saw feisal again, and promised to do my best for him. my chiefs would arrange a base at yenbo, where the stores and supplies he needed would be put ashore for his exclusive use. we would try to get him officer-volunteers from among the prisoners of war captured in mesopotamia or on the canal. we would form gun crews and machine-gun crews from the rank and file in the internment camps, and provide them with such mountain guns and light machine-guns as were obtainable in egypt. lastly, i would advise that british army officers, professionals, be sent down to act as advisers and liaison officers with him in the field.
this time our talk was of the pleasantest, and ended in warm thanks from him, and an invitation to return as soon as might be. i explained that my duties in cairo excluded field work, but perhaps my chiefs would let me pay a second visit later on, when his present wants were filled and his movement was going forward prosperously. meanwhile i would ask for facilities to go down to yenbo, for egypt, that i might get things on foot promptly. he at once appointed me an escort of fourteen juheina sherifs, all kinsmen of mohamed ali ibn beidawi, the emir of the juheina. they were to deliver me intact in yenbo to sheikh abd el kadir el abdo, its governor.
