clayton a few days later told me to return to arabia and feisal. this being much against my grain i urged my complete unfitness for the job: said i hated responsibility — obviously the position of a conscientious adviser would be responsible — and that in all my we objects had been gladder to me than persons, and ideas than objects. so the duty of succeeding with men, of disposing them to any purpose, would be doubly hard to me. they were not my medium: i was not practised in that technique. i was unlike a soldier: hated soldiering. of course, i had read the usual books (too many books), clausewitz and jomini, mahan and foch, had played at napoleon’s campaigns, worked at hannibal’s tactics, and the wars of belisarius, like any other man at oxford; but i had never thought myself into the mind of a real commander compelled to fight a campaign of his own.
last of all i reminded clayton, relevantly, that the sirdar had telegraphed to london for certain regular officers competent to direct the arab war. the reply was that they might be months arriving, and meanwhile feisal must be linked to us, and his needs promptly notified to egypt. so i had to go; leaving to others the arab bulletin i had founded, the maps i wished to draw, and the file of the war-changes of the turkish army, all fascinating activities in which my training helped me; to take up a role for which i felt no inclination. as our revolt succeeded, onlookers have praised its leadership: but behind the scenes lay all the vices of amateur control, experimental councils, divisions, whimsicality.
my journey was to yenbo, now the special base of feisal’s army, where garland single-handed was teaching the sherifians how to blow up railways with dynamite, and how to keep army stores in systematic order. the first activity was the better. garland was an enquirer in physics, and had years of practical knowledge of explosives. he had his own devices for mining trains and felling telegraphs and cutting metals; and his knowledge of arabic and freedom from the theories of the ordinary sapper-school enabled him to teach the art of demolition to unlettered beduin in a quick and ready way. his pupils admired a man who was never at a loss.
incidentally he taught me to be familiar with high explosive. sappers handled it like a sacrament, but garland would shovel a handful of detonators into his pocket, with a string of primers, fuse, and fusees, and jump gaily on his camel for a week’s ride to the hejaz railway. his health was poor and the climate made him regularly ill. a weak heart troubled him after any strenuous effort or crisis; but he treated these troubles as freely as he did detonators, and persisted till he had derailed the first train and broken the first culvert in arabia. shortly afterwards he died.
things in hejaz had changed a good deal in the elapsed month. pursuing his former plan, feisal had moved to wadi yenbo, and was trying to make safe his rear before going up to attack the railway in the grand manner. to relieve him of the burdensome harb tribes, his young half-brother zeid was on the way up from rabegh to wadi safra, as a nominal subordinate of sherif ali. the advanced harb clans were efficiently harrying the turkish communications between medina and bir abbas. they sent in to feisal nearly every day a little convoy of captured camels, or rifles picked up after an engagement, or prisoners, or deserters.
rabegh, shaken by the first appearance of turkish aeroplanes on november the seventh, had been reassured by the arrival of a flight of four british aeroplanes, b.e. machines, under major ross, who spoke arabic so adeptly and was so splendid a leader that there could be no two minds as to the wise direction of his help. more guns came in week by week, till there were twenty-three, mostly obsolete, and of fourteen patterns. ali had about three thousand arab infantry; of whom two thousand were regulars in khaki, under aziz el masri. with them were nine hundred camel corps, and three hundred egyptian troops. french gunners were promised.
sherif abdulla had at last left mecca, on november the twelfth. a fortnight later he was much where he had meant to be, south, east, and north-east of medina, able to cut off its supplies from kasim and kuweit. abdulla had about four thousand men with him, but only three machine-guns, and ten inefficient mountain guns captured at taif and mecca. consequently he was not strong enough to carry out his further plan of a concerted attack on medina with ali and feisal. he could only blockade it, and for this purpose posted himself at henakiyeh, a desert place, eighty miles north-east of medina, where he was too far away to be very useful.
the matter of the stores in the yenbo base was being well bandied. garland had left the checking and issuing of them to abd el kader, feisal’s governor, who was systematic and quick. his efficiency was a great comfort to us, since it enabled us to keep our attention on more active things. feisal was organizing his peasants, his slaves, and his paupers into formal battalions, an irregular imitation of the new model army of aziz at rabegh. garland held bombing classes, fired guns, repaired machine-guns, wheels, and harness, and was armourer for them all. the feeling was busy and confident.
feisal, who had not yet acted on our reminders of the importance of wejh, was imagining an expedition of the juheina to take it. meanwhile he was in touch with the billi, the numerous tribe with headquarters in wejh, and he hoped for support from them. their paramount sheikh, suleiman rifada, was temporizing, being really hostile; for the turks had made him pasha and decorated him; but his cousin hamid was in arms for the sherif, and had just captured a gratifying little caravan of seventy camels on the way from el ula, with stores for the turkish garrison of wejh. as i was starting for kheif hussein to press the wejh plan again on feisal, news came in of a turkish repulse near bir ibn hassani. a reconnaissance of their cavalry and camel corps had been pushed too far into the hills, and the arabs had caught it and scattered it. better and better yet.
