cleanliness made me stop outside wejh and change my filthy clothes. feisal, when i reported, led me into the inner tent to talk. it seemed that everything was well. more cars had arrived from egypt: yenbo was emptied of its last soldiers and stores: and sharraf himself had come up, with an unexpected unit, a new machine-gun company of amusing origin. we had left thirty sick and wounded men in yenbo when we marched away; also heaps of broken weapons, with two british armourer-sergeants repairing them. the sergeants, who found time hang heavily, had taken mended maxims and patients and combined them into a machine-gun company so thoroughly trained by dumb show that they were as good as the best we had.
rabegh also was being abandoned. the aeroplanes from it had flown up here and were established. their egyptian troops had been shipped after them, with joyce and goslett and the rabegh staff, who were now in charge of things at wejh. newcombe and hornby were up country tearing at the railway day and night, almost with their own hands for lack of helpers. the tribal propaganda was marching forward: all was for the best, and i was about to take my leave when suleiman, the guest-master, hurried in and whispered to feisal, who turned to me with shining eyes, trying to be calm, and said, ‘auda is here’. i shouted, ‘auda abu tayi’, and at that moment the tent-flap was drawn back, before a deep voice which boomed salutations to our lord, the commander of the faithful. there entered a tall, strong figure, with a haggard face, passionate and tragic. this was auda, and after him followed mohammed, his son, a child in looks, and only eleven years old in truth.
feisal had sprung to his feet. auda caught his hand and kissed it, and they drew aside a pace or two and looked at each other — a splendidly unlike pair, typical of much that was best in arabia, feisal the prophet, and auda the warrior, each filling his part to perfection, and immediately understanding and liking the other. they sat down. feisal introduced us one by one, and auda with a measured word seemed to register each person.
we had heard much of auda, and were banking to open akaba with his help; and after a moment i knew, from the force and directness of the man, that we would attain our end. he had come down to us like a knight-errant, chafing at our delay in wejh, anxious only to be acquiring merit for arab freedom in his own lands. if his performance was one-half his desire, we should be prosperous and fortunate. the weight was off all minds before we went to supper.
we were a cheerful party; nasib, faiz, mohammed el dheilan auda’s politic cousin, zaal his nephew, and sherif nasir, resting in wejh for a few days between expeditions. i told feisal odd stories of abdulla’s camp, and the joy of breaking railways. suddenly auda scrambled to his feet with a loud ‘god forbid’, and flung from the tent. we stared at one another, and there came a noise of hammering outside. i went after to learn what it meant, and there was auda bent over a rock pounding his false teeth to fragments with a stone. ‘i had forgotten,’ he explained, ‘jemal pasha gave me these. i was eating my lord’s bread with turkish teeth!’ unfortunately he had few teeth of his own, so that henceforward eating the meat he loved was difficulty and after-pain, and he went about half-nourished till we had taken akaba, and sir reginald wingate sent him a dentist from egypt to make an allied set.
auda was very simply dressed, northern fashion, in white cotton with a red mosul head-cloth. he might be over fifty, and his black hair was streaked with white; but he was still strong and straight, loosely built, spare, and as active as a much younger man. his face was magnificent in its lines and hollows. on it was written how truly the death in battle of annad, his favourite son, cast sorrow over all his life when it ended his dream of handing on to future generations the greatness of the name of abu tayi. he had large eloquent eyes, like black velvet in richness. his forehead was low and broad, his nose very high and sharp, powerfully hooked: his mouth rather large and mobile: his beard and moustaches had been trimmed to a point in howeitat style, with the lower jaw shaven underneath.
centuries ago the howeitat came from hejaz, and their nomad clans prided themselves on being true bedu. auda was their master type. his hospitality was sweeping; except to very hungry souls, inconvenient. his generosity kept him always poor, despite the profits of a hundred raids. he had married twenty-eight times, had been wounded thirteen times; whilst the battles he provoked had seen all his tribesmen hurt and most of his relations killed. he himself had slain seventy-five men, arabs, with his own hand in battle: and never a man except in battle. of the number of dead turks he could give no account: they did not enter the register. his toweiha under him had become the first fighters of the desert, with a tradition of desperate courage, a sense of superiority which never left them while there was me and work to do: but which had reduced them from twelve hundred men to less than five hundred, in thirty years, as the standard of nomadic fighting rose.
auda raided as often as he had opportunity, and as widely as he could. he had seen aleppo, basra, wejh, and wadi dawasir on his expeditions: and was careful to be at enmity with nearly all tribes in the desert, that he might have proper scope for raids. after his robber-fashion, he was as hard-headed as he was hot-headed, and in his maddest exploits there would be a cold factor of possibility to lead him through. his patience in action was extreme: and he received and ignored advice, criticism, or abuse, with a smile as constant as it was very charming. if he got angry his face worked uncontrollably, and he burst into a fit of shaking passion, only to be assuaged after he had killed: at such times he was a wild beast, and men escaped his presence. nothing on earth would make him change his mind or obey an order to do the least thing he disapproved; and he took no heed of men’s feelings when his face was set.
he saw life as a saga. all the events in it were significant: all personages in contact with him heroic. his mind was stored with poems of old raids and epic tales of fights, and he overflowed with them on the nearest listener. if he lacked listeners he would very likely sing them to himself in his tremendous voice, deep and resonant and loud. he had no control over his lips, and was therefore terrible to his own interests and hurt his friends continually. he spoke of himself in the third person, and was so sure of his fame that he loved to shout out stories against himself. at times he seemed taken by a demon of mischief, and in public assembly would invent and utter on oath appalling tales of the private life of his hosts or guests: and yet with all this he was modest, as simple as a child, direct, honest, kind-hearted, and warmly loved even by those to whom he was most embarrassing — his friends.
joyce lived near the beach, beside the spread lines of the egyptian troops, in an imposing array of large tents and small tents, and we talked over things done or to do. every effort was still directed against the railway. newcombe and garland were near muadhdham with sherif sharraf and maulud. they had many billi, the mule-mounted infantry, and guns and machine-guns, and hoped to take the fort and railway station there. newcombe meant then to move ahl feisal’s men forward very close to medain salih, and, by taking and holding a part of the line, to cut off medina and compel its early surrender. wilson was coming up to help in this operation, and davenport would take as many of the egyptian army as he could transport, to reinforce the arab attack.
all this programme was what i had believed necessary for the further progress of the arab revolt when we took wejh. i had planned and arranged some of it myself. but now, since that happy fever and dysentery in abdulla’s camp had given me leisure to meditate upon the strategy and tactics of irregular war, it seemed that not merely the details but the essence of this plan were wrong. it therefore became my business to explain my changed ideas, and if possible to persuade my chiefs to follow me into the new theory.
so i began with three propositions. firstly, that irregulars would not attack places, and so remained incapable of forcing a decision. secondly, that they were as unable to defend a line or point as they were to attack it. thirdly, that their virtue lay in depth, not in face.
the arab war was geographical, and the turkish army an accident. our aim was to seek the enemy’s weakest material link and bear only on that till time made their whole length fail. our largest resources, the beduin on whom our war must be built, were unused to formal operations, but had assets of mobility, toughness, self-assurance, knowledge of the country, intelligent courage. with them dispersal was strength. consequently we must extend our front to its maximum, to impose on the turks the longest possible passive defence, since that was, materially, their most costly form of war.
our duty was to attain our end with the greatest economy of life, since life was more precious to us than money or time. if we were patient and superhuman-skilled, we could follow the direction of saxe and reach victory without battle, by pressing our advantages mathematical and psychological. fortunately our physical weakness was not such as to demand this. we were richer than the turks in transport, machine-guns, cars, high explosive. we could develop a highly mobile, highly equipped striking force of the smallest size, and use it successively at distributed points of the turkish line, to make them strengthen their posts beyond the defensive minimum of twenty men. this would be a short cut to success.
we must not take medina. the turk was harmless there. in prison in egypt he would cost us food and guards. we wanted him to stay at medina, and every other distant place, in the largest numbers. our ideal was to keep his railway just working, but only just, with the maximum of loss and discomfort. the factor of food would confine him to the railways, but he was welcome to the hejaz railway, and the trans-jordan railway, and the palestine and syrian railways for the duration of the war, so long as he gave us the other nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of the arab world. if he tended to evacuate too soon, as a step to concentrating in the small area which his numbers could dominate effectually, then we should have to restore his confidence by reducing our enterprises against him. his stupidity would be our ally, for he would like to hold, or to think he held, as much of his old provinces as possible. this pride in his imperial heritage would keep him in his present absurd position — all flanks and no front.
in detail i criticized the ruling scheme. to hold a middle point of the railway would be expensive for the holding force might be threatened from each side. the mixture of egyptian troops with tribesmen was a moral weakness. if there were professional soldiers present, the beduin would stand aside and watch them work, glad to be excused the leading part. jealousy, superadded to inefficiency, would be the outcome. further, the billi country was very dry, and the maintenance of a large force up by the line technically difficult.
neither my general reasoning, however, nor my particular objections had much weight. the plans were made, and the preparations advanced. everyone was too busy with his own work to give me specific authority to launch out on mine. all i gained was a hearing, and a qualified admission that my counter-offensive might be a useful diversion. i was working out with auda abu tayi a march to the howeitat in their spring pastures of the syrian desert. from them we might raise a mobile camel force, and rush akaba from the eastward without guns or machine-guns.
the eastern was the unguarded side, the line of least resistance, the easiest for us. our march would be an extreme example of a turning movement, since it involved a desert journey of six hundred miles to capture a trench within gunfire of our ships: but there was no practicable alternative, and it was so entirely in the spirit of my sick-bed ruminations that its issue might well be fortunate, and would surely be instructive. auda thought all things possible with dynamite and money, and that the smaller clans about akaba would join us. feisal, who was already in touch with them, also believed that they would help if we won a preliminary success up by maan and then moved in force against the port. the navy raided it while we were thinking, and their captured turks gave us such useful information that i became eager to go off at once.
the desert route to akaba was so long and so difficult that we could take neither guns nor machine-guns, nor stores nor regular soldiers. accordingly the element i would withdraw from the railway scheme was only my single self; and, in the circumstances, this amount was negligible, since i felt so strongly against it that my help there would have been half-hearted. so i decided to go my own way, with or without orders. i wrote a letter full of apologies to clayton, telling him that my intentions were of the best: and went.
