so much, then, for apparent refutations. as for showing that the answerer is committing some fallacy, and drawing his argument into paradox-for this was the second item of the sophist’s programme-in the first place, then, this is best brought about by a certain manner of questioning and through the question. for to put the question without framing it with reference to any definite subject is a good bait for these purposes: for people are more inclined to make mistakes when they talk at large, and they talk at large when they have no definite subject before them. also the putting of several questions, even though the position against which one is arguing be quite definite, and the claim that he shall say only what he thinks, create abundant opportunity for drawing him into paradox or fallacy, and also, whether to any of these questions he replies ‘yes’ or replies ‘no’, of leading him on to statements against which one is well off for a line of attack. nowadays, however, men are less able to play foul by these means than they were formerly: for people rejoin with the question, ‘what has that to do with the original subject?’ it is, too, an elementary rule for eliciting some fallacy or paradox that one should never put a controversial question straight away, but say that one puts it from the wish for information: for the process of inquiry thus invited gives room for an attack.
a rule specially appropriate for showing up a fallacy is the sophistic rule, that one should draw the answerer on to the kind of statements against which one is well supplied with arguments: this can be done both properly and improperly, as was said before.’ again, to draw a paradoxical statement, look and see to what school of philosophers the person arguing with you belongs, and then question him as to some point wherein their doctrine is paradoxical to most people: for with every school there is some point of that kind. it is an elementary rule in these matters to have a collection of the special ‘theses’ of the various schools among your propositions. the solution recommended as appropriate here, too, is to point out that the paradox does not come about because of the argument: whereas this is what his opponent always really wants.
moreover, argue from men’s wishes and their professed opinions. for people do not wish the same things as they say they wish: they say what will look best, whereas they wish what appears to be to their interest: e.g. they say that a man ought to die nobly rather than to live in pleasure, and to live in honest poverty rather than in dishonourable riches; but they wish the opposite. accordingly, a man who speaks according to his wishes must be led into stating the professed opinions of people, while he who speaks according to these must be led into admitting those that people keep hidden away: for in either case they are bound to introduce a paradox; for they will speak contrary either to men’s professed or to their hidden opinions.
the widest range of common-place argument for leading men into paradoxical statement is that which depends on the standards of nature and of the law: it is so that both callicles is drawn as arguing in the gorgias, and that all the men of old supposed the result to come about: for nature (they said) and law are opposites, and justice is a fine thing by a legal standard, but not by that of nature. accordingly, they said, the man whose statement agrees with the standard of nature you should meet by the standard of the law, but the man who agrees with the law by leading him to the facts of nature: for in both ways paradoxical statements may be committed. in their view the standard of nature was the truth, while that of the law was the opinion held by the majority. so that it is clear that they, too, used to try either to refute the answerer or to make him make paradoxical statements, just as the men of to-day do as well.
some questions are such that in both forms the answer is paradoxical; e.g. ‘ought one to obey the wise or one’s father?’ and ‘ought one to do what is expedient or what is just?’ and ‘is it preferable to suffer injustice or to do an injury?’ you should lead people, then, into views opposite to the majority and to the philosophers; if any one speaks as do the expert reasoners, lead him into opposition to the majority, while if he speaks as do the majority, then into opposition to the reasoners. for some say that of necessity the happy man is just, whereas it is paradoxical to the many that a king should be happy. to lead a man into paradoxes of this sort is the same as to lead him into the opposition of the standards of nature and law: for the law represents the opinion of the majority, whereas philosophers speak according to the standard of nature and the truth.
