refutations that depend on the definition of a refutation must, according to the plan sketched above, be met by comparing together the conclusion with its contradictory, and seeing that it shall involve the same attribute in the same respect and relation and manner and time. if this additional question be put at the start, you should not admit that it is impossible for the same thing to be both double and not double, but grant that it is possible, only not in such a way as was agreed to constitute a refutation of your case. all the following arguments depend upon a point of that kind. ‘does a man who knows a to be a, know the thing called a?’ and in the same way, ‘is one who is ignorant that a is a ignorant of the thing called a?’ ‘yes.’ ‘but one who knows that coriscus is coriscus might be ignorant of the fact that he is musical, so that he both knows and is ignorant of the same thing.’ is a thing four cubits long greater than a thing three cubits long?’ ‘yes.’ ‘but a thing might grow from three to four cubits in length; ‘now what is ‘greater’ is greater than a ‘less’: accordingly the thing in question will be both greater and less than itself in the same respect.