for the purposes of making this subject plain, the squadron, the tactical unit, will be first considered.
let us picture, then, a squadron led at a trot with absolute cohesion (that is, every man’s knees close against those of the next man,18 but not so as to prevent the pace being increased to such a gallop as is compatible with that of the slower horses in the squadron). this squadron being led till they are within 50 to 100 yards of their opponents, and then at a command breaking into the full pace of the charge with a crashing, ear-splitting yell rather than a cheer, will, it is universally allowed, go through, break up, and cause to turn an opposing squadron which has any intervals in its ranks.19 in the latter, men and horses can, since there is room, turn or pull round; and they will do so. your men and horses cannot turn; there is no room. weapons in this case may be ignored, the30 horses’ weight and momentum is the weapon. horse and man total upwards of a thousand pounds in weight, they represent 9 feet in height by 3 feet in width. the front extends for, say, 70 or 80 yards. the pace is 10 yards per second. it is a rushing wall, there is nowhere any gap.
the opposing squadron has started out with equally gallant intentions, but before they reached the charging point, or even later, something has occurred to prevent them appearing like a wall; more often than not their direction has been changed, and, whilst shouldering, these on the hand turned to may be closed up well enough, but those on the outer flank have not had time to gain the direction; pace may not have been uniform; a direction may not have been given by the leader; or his order may have been mistaken. no matter what it is: fifty things may happen. it is just enough to prevent that squadron being the more compact, well-built wall of the two. and what follows? they are defeated and disgraced. they will not, as a squadron, again face the cavalry of the enemy whose squadron defeated them. better, far better draft the squadron and send the leader to another arm or work if, unfortunately, he has survived. why be so severe? why treat them thus? because the heart, the moral of the defeated squadron has lost two-thirds, whilst the winning squadron is elated, believes in itself and its leader, and despises the enemy. it will charge three squadrons next time and will not turn. still keeping before us the idea31 of a wall moving at speed, let us consider what better fortune it may have; it may catch the enemy on a half flank, or full in flank.
place a row of books standing quite an inch or two apart from each other, hurl a spare book at the end book, and see what happens. at least four or five will fall down. “ten men on the flanks and rear (of the enemy) do more than one hundred riding in front.”
trusting that this idea of a knee-to-knee charge, the cardinal point, has been made clear, let us consider the other matters which a squadron leader should keep before him when opposed to cavalry. he must utilize surprise, what galliffet refers to as “the horrible and unexpected”; he should always be “the first to attack, always take the initiative, and charge resolutely.” again, our leader must utilize the ground: first, its hollows and ridges must be accommodated to his tactics; secondly, he should try to give the enemy bad ground, ground which will tire or disintegrate them whilst he himself uses the best, since a ditch, narrow drain, or small nullah diagonal to his front, a fallen tree, a patch of boggy land, a few rabbit holes, some thorns or rocks may mean two or three men and horses down or out of place.
it is certain that an enemy who sees your squadron disappear in a hollow, as you advance towards him, will, nine times out of ten, expect it to continue its direction towards him; here, then, a wheel to the flank, a gallop of a hundred yards or so, followed by a change of direction, and later a32 wheel into line, may give the opportunity of a lifetime.
these may appear small things, but they must be second nature to a cavalry leader as they are to some, and those the most dangerous, wild animals; for in the skilled utilization of these small things lies his honour and hopes of success.
watch the cat tribe: deliberate preparations, every advantage taken of cover in the stealthy advance, then the gathering of the limbs under—for the rush. from a fighting point of view we want every instinct of this kind; with the cavalry there is no place for “gentlemen of the guard, fire first”—cunning, nerve, unflinching resolution, reckless, bloody-minded intrepidity, and with all this the power to inspire your command, even those of doubtful courage, with the certainty of success; though they must know some cannot come back, still they like to be deceived, to die, or to be maimed, fierce, high-hearted, happy, and elated. the sight of the enemy’s backs makes them all brave.
and then we re-formed and went at them once more, and ere they had rightly closed up the old track, we broke through the lane we had opened before, and as we went forward e’en so we came back.
lindsay gordon.
the rally
an endeavour has been made, then, to show that the success of the charge lies: first, in the ordered momentum of the unit; second, in the suitable application33 of this by the leader. disciplined experience turns the scale. first, the impact, lessened in degree as one side turns sooner or later. then the mêlée. these beaten back, the others victorious; these looking for safety, the others for victims. now, at this moment the wild man’s first instinct is to pursue “all out,” without a reserve, to kill, perhaps, a weaker instinct, to capture, or to plunder. a new element of disorder follows on this mad desire to cast prudence to the winds and pursue, l’épée dans les reins.
once more the governing mind of the leader must assert itself, his foresight and knowledge must reign supreme and repress the natural instinct of the many; he by voice and example must rally his squadron. failing this, or a portion of his squadron held in reserve, his horsemen are a prey to the first formed body which attacks them, though of inferior strength.20 “that side which is able to throw in the last-formed body will win.” so excited is his command and so irregular their course of action, that he will have great difficulty in getting them to obey him. cavalry training, p. 128, realizes this:
as the pursuers will be in disorder and consequently at the mercy of any fresh body of the enemy’s cavalry,34 the necessity of organizing a support without delay is imperative.
here let us remember that we have glorious traditions. the name of cromwell inspires very diverse thoughts in the british isles. to the irish, battered walls; to the scots, ruthless discipline; to the english, a constitution upheld or a monarchy overturned. suitable memories of our great cavalry leader.21 to the cavalryman what does this man, who can still inspire such diverse thoughts in nations, represent?
the highest attribute in a general is that he should be able to order the elements of disorder. war is the acme of disorder. the instant conversion of the available remnants out of disorder, chaos, a hundred wishes, shouts and orders, broken legs, loose horses, dead or wounded, men fierce and reckless, constitutes the triumph of discipline and the guiding foreseeing mind.
in minutes, perhaps seconds, the enemy’s support or reserve, taking advantage in turn of our disorder, will be upon us; we who have ceased to be a wall, and are now scattered masonry, must be built up, so as at any rate to look formidable and to make those of the enemy, who as individuals still bravely dispute the ground, turn and fly, and perhaps throw into disorder35 the ranks of those who are coming to their support. more than this, we must move in the direction of the enemy, as though we still wished to fight. as wind is caught, stunned men regain their senses, disabled horses exchanged for sound ones captured at hazard, broken weapons replaced, the ranks refill, order at last prevails.
we have laid stress on the rally of the squadron,22 but hardly less important is the maxim that the victory rests with those who can last throw a formed body into the combat. this may be the support of which de brack says:23
almost all the failures of charges are due to the slowness or ignorance of the supports. a charge badly supported, no matter how bravely begun, becomes only a bloody affray, whilst one well supported is always victorious and decisive.
let us, then, for our guidance, and before considering larger forces, formed of many squadrons and supplied with another element of offence in their horse artillery, consider what conclusions are arrived at from the fight of squadron v. squadron. they appear to be:—
36
1. provided that there is space to man?uvre and fight, that cavalry which can man?uvre with cohesion at the greatest pace will win.
2. the element of surprise affects the result.
3. the utilization of terrain is a sine qua non.
4. a flank attack is the object to be aimed at.
5. on the quickness with which the rally is carried out much depends.
6. a skilled direction of the support influences the action.
