a very frequent question, also quite a justifiable one and one which cavalry soldiers must not shirk, but must on the other hand thoroughly understand and thresh out in their own minds, both by practical experiment and theoretical discussion,24 is the following:—
since cavalry are armed with an excellent magazine rifle, may they not more easily and effectually inflict loss and defeat on the enemy’s cavalry by that means rather than by employing shock action, with its gambling uncertainty, its losses in men and horses, its need of intense resolution or complete absence of arrière pensée on the part of the leader?
those cavalry soldiers who have had experience in such affairs, who have thought the matter out and51 thus obtained certain guiding principles, will reply: “there are certainly many occasions when the conditions of terrain or the nature of the combat favour such action. we have only to mention a rearguard or a running fight and many instances come to mind at once in the case of those pursued.”
intricate ground always favours fire action, and in small affairs, as a sequel to a dash at the flank of an enemy holding a position on a rough and unrideable kopje, it is obviously the right course.
of all these occasions it is our intention to take full advantage; never to miss an opportunity. at the same time, practical experience has convinced us that we must guard against such action being adopted to the prejudice of shock action in cases where the latter is of supreme value, and we must also recognize the “inherent weakness of mounted troops who attempt to force a decision with fire action without combining it with shock action.”
in the report on the cavalry division training, 1909, by general sir d. haig, we find the following:—
the principles which should determine the choice between mounted and dismounted action require to be more thoroughly considered. small units have been seen on several occasions to dismount on open ground when mounted action was the only sound course to adopt. on the other hand, squadrons have been seen to remain mounted in enclosed country when under fire at close range of dismounted men.
further, we feel that the very fact that there are many more occasions suitable for fire action than for52 shock action must not make us lose sight of this, namely, that though we may use fire action when we meet the enemy nine times out of ten, it is on the tenth occasion, and then because shock action takes place, that something definite, something which affects the result of the campaign, is seen to happen. therefore we must not let our future leaders be brought up with distorted views. we have to recognize that whilst recourse to shock action demands great resolution, fire action on each successive occasion at an increased distance is always the easy course; whilst the former decides battles and increases our moral, the latter is a sign in many cases of the leader weakening, temporizing, or waiting for orders which will never—and he knows it—come.25
we desire to face this question squarely, and with a just appreciation of human nature and its many weaknesses and failings. nor do we forget the arab proverb that victory is gained not so much by the numbers killed as by the numbers frightened. it is in view of this that we adopt certain lines in our cavalry training.
it appears desirable to give an instance of a case where shock action is decisive. imagine two brigades of cavalry each with their h.a. battery meeting on an open plain. each wishes to get forward. one, red, determining to use rifle action only, adopts53 the best formation he can think of, a double echelon formation with his guns either on the flanks well drawn back or in the centre. dismounting, he prepares to attack. blue, leaving a fraction of his force in guns and rifles to hold red to his ground (and cavalry will credit how difficult it is for red to break off from such an attack), moves round red’s flank, out of easy range and at speed, and with the remainder of his brigade attacks red’s flank, choosing the angle at which he will “go in.”
red has of his own accord rendered his mobile force to a great extent immobile; he suffers accordingly. blue, using gun fire just in advance of his shock action, rolls red up.
it is the fact, that the leaders of both sides instinctively feel that they should not immobilize their commands, which will lead to “mounted combats of cavalry forces.” scores of actual happenings have convinced those who have been present at them that there is nothing harder to hit than a galloping man and horse; further, that if the mark is men and horses approaching, the fire will be still less effectual. whether the men firing are under shell fire and their own horses are near them, whether the enemy are armed with a personal weapon, especially a lance or long rapier, each of these factors reduces the number of hits in a way which can only have been seen to be believed.
in the case of red, their own and the enemy’s movements are disconcerting and inimical to accuracy of fire. in the case of blue, movement every54 moment is conferring increased advantages on him, and not the least of these liberty of action.
red, since he must send his horses to some distance back, takes a long time to mount and move; and would give opportunities to blue during his movement.26
as regards the difficulty of hitting a galloping horseman, the following incident in south africa may be of interest. an officer and four good shots, with their horses close at hand, remained to observe after the squadron had been withdrawn from a debatable kopje. occasionally they took long shots at the boers, who in twos and threes rode strung out across the front, almost out of range. without any warning, suddenly about seventy boers turned and galloped straight at the kopje. “fire steadily till i tell you to mount,” was the order given by the officer, who then fired at a man in the centre on a white horse and well in advance. no boers were55 seen to fall, and with 100 yards start the five raced back to their squadron. when they came to compare notes, it was found that all had fired at the same man on a white horse, at whom some forty rounds had been discharged. the conclusion arrived at was that rifle fire is not effective against galloping individual horsemen, a conclusion which was duly acted upon.
cavalry must have space to man?uvre and fight. without these, cavalry lose the advantages conferred on them by mobility, and become at a disadvantage compared with infantry.
that there are very diverse opinions on the power of rifle fire against cavalry must be evident from the fact that instructions so very different in their import as the following were issued in mounted troops’ manuals shortly after the war in south africa:—
“this memorandum is not meant for cavalry who turn their backs, but for those who, when they see the enemy preparing to charge with sabre and lance, will coolly dismount, form up, and when he gets within reach, pour in such a withering fire as will in five minutes kill as many of the enemy as the same enemy with sword and lance would kill in five hours on active service.”—preface to lord dundonald’s cavalry training, canada, 1904.
“if an attack of cavalry is imminent, mounted troops should, if time admits, gallop to cover or enclosed or broken ground and there repel and retaliate.”—general hutton’s mounted service manual, australian commonwealth.
the method is illustrated on an opposite page and shows the formation of square, horses inside. this56 formation offers a splendid target to h.a. or machine-gun fire for preparation of the attack which would undoubtedly be made by cavalry from a direction at right angles to that fire.
colonel henderson, in science of war, page 160, sums up the situation as follows:—
it is beyond question that dealing with a dismounted force, whatever may be the amount of fire with which it is endowed, shock tactics may play an important part.
the opportunities of effective outflanking and surprise may possibly be few; but the very fact that the enemy has both the power and the will to seek out such opportunities and to charge home is bound to hamper the movements and to affect the moral of any force of horsemen which depends on fire alone.
such a force, even if it could hold on to its position, would be unable, except under favourable conditions of ground, to make any forward progress, for directly it mounted it would be at the mercy of its antagonist,27 and it would thus be absolutely prevented from bursting through the hostile cavalry and from acquiring the information which it is its main object to obtain.
in the valley of the shenandoah in 1864 the confederate squadrons were armed only with rifles, while the federals under sheridan were trained both to fire and charge. the result is significant. the southerners, though admirable horsemen, were worsted at every turn, and their commander had at last to report that his mounted infantry were absolutely useless against the union cavalry.
57
dismounted action of cavalry
objection is often raised to cavalry practising the r?le of the infantry attack, and generally with reason, for, where there is any other better plan for cavalry, it is obviously wrong for them to dismount, leave their horses far behind, and immobilize themselves in order to carry out this form of attack. but on the other hand, and especially in rearguard affairs, it is quite possible that a weak rearguard or detached force well posted in a gorge or other unturnable position will hold out till such an attack is made. then take plenty of cartridges, carry your swords with you,28 and “go in.” but do not imagine that this costly mode of attack should be adopted on all occasions.
it may be taken as a general rule that full value is not obtained from cavalry who are far distant or long separated from their horses. in the latest german cavalry regulations there is an important modification. it is laid down that the decisive dismounted action should only be attempted when the leader is convinced of possessing numerical superiority, and very rarely over ground giving the enemy a prepared field of fire. it is fatal, they say, to commit your forces with numbers insufficient for success. they further say (para. 452): “half-hearted dismounted action contains the germs of failure”; and evidently disapprove of the view that58 the extent of the r?le of cavalry dismounted should be delimitated, as there is a tendency to do in our army by those who expect the cavalryman to protest if they ask him to dismount, and to argue how far he should go in attack—whereas he must be, and will be, ready to accept any r?le which aids victory.
prince kraft’s contribution to the discussion which followed the war of 1870–71 should be regarded, by the british army at any rate, as out of date. he wrote: “a blow is given to the true spirit of cavalry if a trooper once believes that he can fight without his horse.” this blow, duly received by the british cavalry, has proved innocuous; they have learnt to reculer pour mieux sauter, with an additional power, in the form of the rifle, of the greatest value to them, whilst at the same time they will retain the tradition that their
ideal is shock action.
