“cavalry has more need of artillery than infantry, because it cannot reply to fire, but can fight only with the steel.”—napoleon.
of close co-operation by the horse artillery in the charges of cavalry against infantry there is practically little or no trace in the battles of 1870. the training of cavalry and horse artillery and the organization of the cavalry division had not proceeded on these lines, as is evident from the fact that there is no mention of it in books such as von schmidt before that war, or in prince kraft’s letters on cavalry after it. the latter writer shows that the tendency was to deprive the cavalry division of its horse artillery when a battle took place, and put it with the corps artillery. it was claimed that by so doing the horse artillery were practically of double use.
the batteries remain as a rule with the corps artillery. if the cavalry division is sent forward, they are attached to it. if a battle takes place during which the cavalry division is held in reserve, then the horse artillery becomes again a part of the corps artillery and considerably augments its fire. the horse artillery of the guards corps was thus employed in 1870.
109 for a cavalry division which takes part in a great battle does not require any horse artillery. it is held at first in reserve.
if it is called upon to attack it is obliged to make use of an opportunity of charging broken troops of the enemy. there is thus no need to break up its enemy with artillery fire, and there is, besides, no time to do so.
compare with the above the 1907 amendments to the german exerzier reglement für die kavallerie 1895, no. 375:
in a general engagement the batteries and machine guns told off to the cavalry will remain with them, because they are indispensable to the cavalry in the fulfilment of their special duties during, and particularly after, the battle.
the cavalry leader must, however, judge whether the general position does not rather demand the employment of his batteries in co-operation with the rest of the artillery. the horse artillery and machine guns will be of the greatest use in a general engagement when the cavalry are operating against the enemy’s flanks and rear. their sudden appearance from a flank or from the rear is certain to produce a strong moral effect on the enemy.
there could scarcely be a greater volte face than is indicated by these two extracts.
further, what we read of the use of masses of cavalry at the present date, in both the german and french man?uvres, leads us to the conclusion that their cavalry and horse artillery will be kept together in a general engagement and used for the sledge-hammer blow on both shaken and unshaken infantry.
110 the reader should study some of the instances given in colonel maude’s book, cavalry: its past and future, chaps. xi. and xii., of the charges by cavalry on infantry in the 1870 war, and picture to himself what would have been the results if these charges had been preluded by even five minutes’ gun fire of one battery of modern horse artillery, say 350 accurately placed shells, containing in all 83,600 projectiles.
a conclusion early arrived at in the consideration of the r?le of the three arms on the modern battlefield is that no artillery and infantry force, however strong, can afford to enter upon a battle unless their flanks are protected by natural obstacles or by masses of cavalry. but battles, except where we adopt the defensive, are not fought where natural obstacles cover our flank. therefore, we must have sufficient cavalry if only to neutralize the enemy’s cavalry, otherwise they will work round our flank and attack our reserves, and, if they are accompanied by horse artillery, whilst our horse and field artillery is already engaged in the great battle, they possess a marked advantage over us.
the latest instance of the need of cavalry and horse artillery is furnished by captain spaits, who himself went through the retreat with the russians after mukden, in his book, with cossacks through manchuria.
he “and many others who realized the panic-stricken frame of mind of the masses of men who were pouring back without arms and without111 discipline” are of opinion that a “couple of good cavalry divisions, energetically led and provided with artillery and machine guns, could have turned the retreat into a complete annihilation of the army.”
the above inference is obvious when one considers the impression made on the flying troops by a few hundred indifferent horsemen.55
having, it is hoped, to the reader’s satisfaction, demonstrated that cavalry with horse artillery have a great r?le on the battlefield against infantry, if (i.) the conditions are favourable, (ii.) the attack is à propos, and (iii.) properly supported by horse artillery and machine-gun fire, we turn to the form which the attack against infantry should take. cavalry training indicates that it should be made in a succession of lines; and it may be added that it is of the highest importance that these attacks should not be made without sufficient preliminary reconnaissance on the part of the cavalry leader accompanied by the commander of his artillery, and that subsequently the action of the infantry should be decided upon in conjunction with the infantry commander in that portion of the field.
that the infantry should not stand open-mouthed, but should press in at the right moment, is of the highest importance. as far as the troops are concerned, the formation is a simple one; but there are two points which demand forethought and arrangement. the first is the best position for112 the supporting fire; the second is the rallying-point. in these circumstances it appears best to have in one’s mind an ideal, as a guide, and endeavour in the actual fight to approximate to it—and we may turn to the memoirs of napoleon for the solution. he says: “a flanking battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely is capable of deciding victory in itself.”
the ideal then appears to be: “a,” when the fire effect is delivered at right angles to the direction of the successive lines of cavalry; and “b,” when the rallying-point is fixed on the flank away from the general engagement and under cover from the enemy’s fire; “c,” when we utilize surprise. it is usually in the return from such enterprises after rallying that nine-tenths of the loss takes place. a good instance is that of michel’s brigade at the battle of woerth; see page 203, maude’s cavalry: its past and future.
suddenly the wreck of the ten squadrons of michel’s brigade, now making the best of their way back at full speed, but still preserving some attempt at formation, appeared right in rear of the prussians. the latter at once wheeled troops about and charged at full gallop from the halt. owing to the suddenness of the attack there was no time to deploy, though the outer troops attempted to gallop up into line; but the shock was sufficient to discomfort the french. there was a short mêlée, and then the prussians, promptly rallying, swept up the debris of the french, and brought in some sixty prisoners and many riderless horses. the prompt resolution to attack and the rapid rally both deserve very high commendation.
113 many writers of recent date, and especially those who are impressed with an exaggerated idea of the accuracy of rifle fire, those, in fact, of the de bloch school, are under the impression that cavalry will not charge infantry. it is probable that, never having ridden in a force of cavalry passing through a fire-swept zone, they are unaware how much simpler it is than the attack on cavalry or artillery, and how much less resolution is needed.
in the case of cavalry there is the apparently inevitable concussion which is seen to be nearing; in the former a few men or horses drop almost unnoticed by their comrades, but most of them “carry on” for a long way after being hit. as the enemy are reached, the desire for slaughter overrides all other thoughts; cavalry should then be taught to go straight on, taking with the point what comes to them and riding their horses at speed in the direction of the rallying-point.
an example of the “counter-attack by a cavalry division on hostile infantry in order to gain time for reserves to come up” is given in general sir d. haig’s 2nd cavalry staff ride, p. 40:
the problem here presented is one of considerably more danger and difficulty than that of completing the rout of beaten troops and reaping the fruits of victory. the enemy’s infantry, far from having lost their moral, are pressing victoriously to the attack, and, though the leading echelons may have sustained heavy losses from the fire of the defence, there are troops in reserve and support which retain their cohesion and steadiness. the responsibility for114 ordering an attack of this nature ... rests with the commander-in-chief. against such an objective it is useless to send regiments at the gallop. it is necessary to (1) prepare the attack, concentrate the means for it, and bring a converging fire of guns, machine guns, and infantry upon the objective; (2) make a definite plan. this must be based on what can be seen of the enemy and his position, the use of ground, the most opportune moment; (3) dispose the troops methodically by the execution of the plan, and assign to them, if possible, their objectives; (4) give the signal for the attack at the right moment.
in the manual of infantry training, 1905, under “formations applicable to savage warfare,” is found s. no. 118, which contains an instruction for “meeting an attack by cavalry or swordsmen.”
when a battalion in line is threatened by cavalry or swordsmen in force, it may sometimes be desirable to dress back the threatened flank and to dress up the unmenaced flank, the battalion commander giving the command, “back, no. ——, up, no. ——.”
such a formation if adopted in ordinary warfare against cavalry would favour the fire of artillery and machine guns, if the latter are placed at right angles to the attack as indicated above.
may, writing in 1896, guns and cavalry, says:
true, there may be opportunities when cavalry and horse artillery moving rapidly, even during the progress of a great battle, may anticipate the foe at some decisive point, and may make or prevent a telling flank movement. but for such occasions special arrangements could no doubt be115 made as the exigencies of the moment might dictate, and we need not legislate for them beforehand.
it is evident from the german regulations quoted above that they have no intention of trusting to the “special arrangements” for “exigencies.”
their reasons no doubt are somewhat as follows:
1st. horse artillery is an integral part of the cavalry.
2nd. attacks on unshaken infantry depend upon horse artillery for such a preparation as will speedily reduce infantry to shaken infantry.
3rd. in order to get freedom of man?uvre for our squadrons to a flank, cavalry are bound to meet an enemy’s cavalry force, possibly belonging to an enemy whose cavalry does not leave its horse artillery behind with the corps artillery in a great general engagement.
on which side wins will depend the subsequent course of events on that flank.
4th. a cavalry force of three regiments and one battery of horse artillery is quite equal, or more than equal, to one of four regiments without horse artillery.
having in view the above consideration, cavalry should not be prepared to forgo their horse artillery in a great general engagement, since it foredooms them to the inaction of the french and german cavalry divisions of the war of 1870, or perhaps to their comparative failure and losses, when, unsupported by horse artillery fire, they attacked infantry columns to cover the retreat of their own infantry.
116 special arrangements of this kind are not made, and we know also, too well, that “no man can serve two masters.”
the latest german regulations appear, therefore, to have been formulated on sound reasoning.
