the british forces—the sikh army cross the sutlej—the battle of moodkee—position and operations considered.
under the circumstances thus briefly detailed, it would appear to have been expedient to bring matters at once to a crisis; for this annual threatening posture assumed by the gigantic incubus which runjeet singh had created on our threshold, could not be suffered permanently to draw the strength of the british forces in the presidency to guard their frontier. but it was generally understood that the wishes of leadenhall street were strongly in favour of a pacific line of conduct, and[pg 66] thus the governor-general had little choice as to the line of operations to be pursued.
no actual increase of numbers over the preceding year took place on the frontier, but nearly every british regiment in bengal had been marched to the north-western provinces.
umbala was the cantonment for the main body of the army, to which ferozepore and loodiana were the outposts on the sutlej, distant respectively one hundred and ten, and seventy miles, whilst the base line connecting the latter places measured about seventy-five miles.
the reserve force remained at merut, which, being one hundred and fifty miles from umbala, and more than two hundred and sixty from ferozepore, might appear the most defective part of the arrangement.
the whole of the bengal presidency had been so drained of british troops to supply the north-western provinces, that from merut to calcutta (nearly nine hundred miles,) there remained but one british infantry regiment[16] to overawe the[pg 67] numerous independent principalities of india, to garrison fort william, and to show the people of hindostan that the british had not altogether forsaken them in their ardour to form new acquaintances on the frontier. no one will assert that the gallant 39th had not a handful of responsibility assigned them, and none were more capable of undertaking whatever britons could effect, than the victors of maharajpore.
the forces at ferozepore, loodiana, and umbala, including the regiments at the hill stations of kussowlie and subathoo, amounted to about twenty thousand men, with seventy pieces of cannon, (six and nine-pounders, and twelve and twenty-four-pound howitzers.) this force having been warned some weeks previously to complete their marching establishment, were available for field service at a few hours' notice.
the regiments composing the above-named force were as follow:—h.m.'s 3rd light dragoons, and seven regiments of native cavalry; h.m.'s 9th, 29th, 31st, 50th, 62nd, and 80th regiments; the company's european regiment, and fourteen regiments of native infantry, ex[pg 68]clusive of the sirmoor and nusseeree battalions, which were destined to garrison loodiana in case of emergency.
the reserve force, at merut, amounted to more than four thousand men, including h.m. 9th and 16th lancers, 3rd native cavalry, h.m. 10th regiment, two corps of native infantry, and two troops of horse artillery. an elephant battery of twelve-pounders also moved with the reserve force. other corps in the neighbourhood or on the line of march might complete the whole reserve force to a numerical strength of about eight thousand men.
thus, within a month, the whole army might, when concentrated on the frontier, amount, in round numbers, to nearly thirty thousand men, with one hundred pieces of artillery. nearly one-third of which force would consist of british troops, including the artillery, of which not more than one-third were natives.
with such an army at his disposal, sir henry hardinge cannot be deemed guilty of having despised his enemies.
[pg 69]
on the 20th of november, major broadfoot[17] communicated to the governor-general that the information which he had received from lahore led him to suppose that the sikhs had resolved on an advance towards the sutlej, for the purpose of invading the british territories, and the next day's accounts tended to corroborate this statement.
on the 24th and 25th of november, a great portion of the sikh army were on their march towards the sutlej, openly proclaiming their intentions of crossing the river. on this news reaching the governor-general's camp, the sikh vakeel (ambassador) was called upon for an explanation of this hostile attitude, and being unable to give any satisfactory answer, was ordered, on the 4th of december, to quit the governor-general's camp at umbala, and return to the punjaub.
after the vakeel's departure, sir henry hardinge continued to advance peaceably towards the frontier, visiting the protected sikh states; nor were orders issued for the movement of any por[pg 70]tion of the army until the 8th of december, which order did not reach army head-quarters before the 10th of that month.
sir henry, in common with the primates in office, had unhappily so far misjudged the sikh character, as to suppose it was the intention both of their government and soldiery to provoke, but not to commit, hostilities.[18] the attitude and operations of the enemy, when once the war broke out, evidently displayed the aggressive policy which guided their efforts. one cause of ill-feeling engendered in the punjaub against the british government, may be traced to a journal published in the north-western provinces of india, whose inflammatory articles had long-pointed out the punjaub as a worthy object of cupidity, and such sentiments, when circulated amongst the proud and suspicious sikhs, were doubtless mistaken for an exposition of the views of government, and must have gone far to stir the national jealousy.
[pg 71]
when the sikh forces had actually quitted lahore in progress to the sutlej, there could remain no doubt of the object of their march, however sceptical many might be of the continuation of their humour; and had it then been decided to move the merut force[19] towards the frontier, the features of the subsequent operations must have undergone a material change by such an accession of strength, and especially of cavalry, of which there was a sad deficiency. in lieu of being moved on the 26th of november, the main column of that force did not quit cantonments until the 16th of december, only two days before the action fought at moodkee. in the governor-general's dispatch, it is stated that all troops destined for service on the frontier had marched by the 12th of december. sir john grey's division of the army were not all on the line of march before the 16th, as before stated.
[pg 72]
when the sikhs had moved six brigades towards the sutlej, on the 25th of november, the most prudent and fastidious of the peace party could not have reasonably objected to the advance of the reserve to kurnal, which would have brought them eighty miles nearer the scene of action, and within three or four days reach of umbala.
the force at army head-quarters having moved, pursuant to orders, under the personal command of his excellency sir hugh gough, on the 11th and 12th of december, all doubt of the requisition of their services was cleared up on the 13th, by receipt of intelligence at the governor-general's camp, that the sikhs, who had been assembled in great force, for some days, at hureeka ford, about twenty miles above ferozepore, had at length commenced the passage of the sutlej. for two or three days previously to their crossing, their hostile spirit was fully evinced, by firing upon our reconnoitring parties from ferozepore.
sir john littler, who was in command at ferozepore, immediately occupied a defensive position, but was not in sufficient force to oppose the pas[pg 73]sage of so numerous an army as the sikhs displayed, and amply provided with heavy artillery to cover their landing.
it was fortunate that this important news reached head-quarters so safely and expeditiously; for thenceforth a long farewell was taken of all communication between the provinces and the interesting field of operations on the north-west frontier.
on hearing that the enemy had actually invaded our territories, sir henry hardinge hastened with the small force at loodiana[20] to form a junction with sir hugh gough, near bussean, and issued a proclamation, calling on the chiefs in the protected sikh states to be quiet and faithful, whilst the british army hastened to encounter and chastise their treacherous invaders.
the junction between the umbala and loodiana forces was effected without interruption; and all heavy baggage with the force having been deposited at bussean, where a large dep?t for com[pg 74]missariat supplies had been established, in case of the army being called into the field, the forces hastily advanced towards ferozepore to encounter the enemy.
worn and harassed by forced marches,[21] and a constant scarcity of water, the united forces, under the command of sir hugh gough, advanced, on the morning of the 18th of december, towards the fortified village of moodkee, pressing forward "with hot haste," lest the heart of the sikhs should fail them, and no fight take place. at least, such appears to have been the object of these forced marches, for it is distinctly asserted that ferozepore was not considered in any danger, as the fort could hold out for an indefinite time, and the town and cantonment could not have been entitled to more consideration than was bestowed on poor forsaken loodiana.
on the memorable 18th of december, the cavalry and horse artillery reached the village of moodkee, about one p.m., after a severe march of[pg 75] twenty-one miles, the greater portion of the infantry being still a considerable distance in the rear, and, of course, much fatigued.
the cavalry pickets were moving to their posts soon after arrival, as usual, when clouds of dust were discerned through the jungle, which announced the approach of the enemy. previously to arrival at moodkee, a small reconnoitring party of horse had been descried, who fell back forthwith; but the enemy had scoured the whole country in the morning, with their cavalry, and taken an officer prisoner,[22] and the probable time of arrival had been well calculated. major broadfoot, whose experience of native warfare had been gleaned amongst the rugged defiles of afghanistan, where his gallantry and intelligence had earned him an undying fame, was firmly convinced of the enemy's vicinity, and had some hours before intimated his belief: but doubts were still entertained.
moodkee is a small compact fort, situated on a[pg 76] mound commanding the country, which is open and sandy for a circle of about three quarters of a mile radius, taking the fort as a centre; thence, the country becomes close, with stunted trees and bushes at a few yards interval from each other, affording excellent shelter for irregular troops, but mainly obstructing operations of regular cavalry, or bodies moving in compact order from man?uvring with precision.
when the alarm of the sikhs' approach reached camp, the cavalry and horse artillery moved forward towards the jungle, and the infantry, as each brigade arrived within reach of the scene of operation, hastened to take part in the fray.
the enemy, whose numbers and intentions were effectually masked by the nature of the ground which he occupied, opened a heavy fire of artillery, which crashed through the jungle with serious effect upon the advancing column, who received the deadly blows without perceiving whence the missives proceeded.
our light guns were brought rapidly into play; but the advantage of position was with the sikhs, added to which, they came fresh into the field.[pg 77] the struggle under these disadvantages threatened to be severe.
as each of the brigades of infantry endeavoured to fall into its place in advancing, they found themselves so much impeded by the number of stunted trees, that it was difficult to ascertain their relative positions or to form with their accustomed regularity, whilst the sikh cavalry, hovering in the vicinity, threatened momentarily to charge.
the infantry, being ordered to deploy, effected that movement with as much regularity as the ground permitted, whilst the cavalry were directed to attack and turn the sikh flanks, and to disperse the hordes of goorcheras[23] who infested the jungle. the gallant 3rd dragoons, sweeping the goorcheras from before them, penetrated the heavy covert, and, riding through the sikh artillery, silenced their fire for a time; but the enemy's matchlock men, from behind the hillocks and bushes, and many of them perched amongst the branches of the low trees, whence they could act with impunity, inflicted a severe loss on the dra[pg 78]goons. when this fact was ascertained, the pistol and carbine were brought into play with some effect on these jungle fowl, but many a gallant fellow was stretched on the ground in this unequal contest.
the sikh artillery, having again opened fire, continued to tell with murderous effect, and did material damage to our light artillery, whose horses, wearied with a long march, were not in the best condition for hard work.
meanwhile, our infantry, having approached the sikh position, poured in a steady rolling fire, which was, however, as steadily met, whilst the grape-shot from their battery in the centre caused fearful gaps amongst the british ranks.
the enemy, under cover of the hillocks and thick patches of jungle, maintained his post with the utmost resolution, whilst the declining light favoured this mode of warfare on the part of the sikhs. our troops continued gradually to advance, whilst the enemy, falling back, and having abandoned his heaviest battery, was not disposed to await the issue of the bayonet, when the choice rested on his side.
[pg 79]
a bright december's evening enabled the contending parties faintly to distinguish each other's outline, but the sikhs had now suffered severely; and, having failed in their main object of surprise, lal singh conveyed the orders to his troops to retire. the enemy therefore abandoned the field to the british, having been compelled to suffer a loss of fifteen guns and to cast others into the wells in the village in rear of his position.
when it was ascertained that the sikhs had finally retired, the men rested themselves for the first time during that toilsome and eventful day; but bodily fatigue was a trifling evil when compared with the parching thirst from which all had long suffered, and from which there was yet no relief. but if those who escaped unharmed had undergone incredible hardships, the agonies of the wounded can scarcely be conjectured, as only partial relief could be afforded amongst the crowds of sufferers.
the enemy having made no demonstrations of renewing the attack, the troops were withdrawn, about midnight, to their encampments at moodkee.
the forces engaged on the british side, during[pg 80] this action, amounted to something less than ten thousand men and forty-five guns. the return of losses gives two hundred and fifteen killed and six hundred and fifty seven wounded.
the enemy's force encountered at moodkee was estimated, in the despatches, at fifteen thousand infantry, as many cavalry, and forty guns.[24] of course it is necessary to form some estimate of the enemy's force on such occasions; but though always a difficult operation with regard to native armies, in this instance it could be no more than mere conjecture, for the jungle prevented the chance of giving anything resembling an accurate judgment.
the enemy's loss was never ascertained; but, judging from the bodies scattered over the country, the number of killed may be set down at about three hundred. their wounded were carried to ferozeshuhur and the villages in the neighbouring country, so that the sikhs themselves were, doubtless, never aware of the actual amount.
[pg 81]
amongst the officers who fell in this action was the gallant sir robert sale, whose leg was shattered by a grape shot. the shock proved fatal to him in the course of the night of the 18th.
ever foremost in the numerous actions in which he was engaged, it is only a matter of wonder that so fearless a soldier should so long have been spared. the battle-field was his element; and had the fates permitted him to select his last resting-place, he would have asked no other than the path of victory, beneath which he sleeps. the combined roar of eighty pieces of cannon saluted the parting spirit of the hero of jellalabad on the field of strife; and though his remains rest on the far-distant eastern plains which have witnessed his warlike achievements, yet will his name descend to posterity bright in the ranks of england's departed heroes.
sir hugh gough heartily congratulated the troops on their gallantry. such an eulogium is valuable, coming from a veteran, whose undaunted bearing and personal example (on every occasion in the front, or "where death came thick[pg 82]est,") was the universal theme of applause in the army.
when we consider the position and the circumstances under which the action was fought, the principal difficulty that presents itself for explanation is the extreme alacrity manifested to commence the engagement before the whole army was prepared. it has long been the practice in india to hasten forward under all disadvantages, and attack an enemy when once within reach; but, although this system has often been successfully practised, under the impression that such active and bold measures inspire confidence and daring amongst our native army, it becomes a critical experiment when brought into play with a more enterprising foe.
after crossing the sutlej, the sikhs, leaving a small force to watch ferozepore, advanced more than twelve miles into our territories, and occupied a position, which they speedily entrenched, at ferozeshuhur. from the latter place a division of their army was detached to moodkee, with the evident intention of surprising the governor-general's camp, after a long march.
[pg 83]
on the arrival of the governor-general at bussean, it is probable that the enemy's spies gave intelligence of the loodiana force being at bussean with the governor-general; and the enemy, unaware of the junction which had been arranged with sir hugh gough, conceived that when the force advanced to moodkee a master-stroke might be effected, at the outset of the war, by surprising and capturing sir henry hardinge, and destroying the force which accompanied his excellency as an escort. had they imagined that the main body of the army were advancing on moodkee, the enemy would surely have attached a larger force of artillery, on which arm, as before stated, they place their main confidence.
at two p.m. on the day of the battle—viz., at the time our troops turned out to attack, the cavalry and artillery had just arrived, much jaded after their long march, and the infantry brigades had not all arrived, but received their orders whilst on the line of march, to hasten forward with all possible speed, and take up their posts on the field of action. on riding over the ground, some time after the action was fought, it appeared to[pg 84] me that the fortified village of moodkee would have afforded an admirable position to be occupied by such portion of the wearied infantry and artillery, as had arrived on the ground; and their numbers would have been concealed from the enemy. this would have afforded them rest, and water, of which there was an abundance around the village; and our cavalry pickets, falling back, would have drawn the enemy most probably upon the open ground, which he had then nearly reached; and, being emboldened by perceiving few of the british forces, and those not advancing, is it not reasonable to conclude that he would have become the assailant? had the sikhs attacked us while so posted, the force in moodkee might have engaged the attention of the enemy, whilst our cavalry and rear brigades of infantry, by making a trifling detour in the jungle, would have taken the sikh forces in reverse, and probably given them more cause to regret their advance from ferozeshuhur than as matters actually befel.
had the sikhs not attacked when our cavalry pickets retired upon moodkee, our forces would have been fresh, and better prepared for action[pg 85] the following morning; and the 19th of december ought to have yielded more favourable results, under such circumstances, than the 18th.
taking, as a third supposition, that the sikh force would have fallen back during the night on their main column at ferozeshuhur, the conclusion is, that there would have been no battle of moodkee, and that ferozeshuhur might have been fought on the 20th, in lieu of the 21st and 22nd of december, in neither of which cases can i see any ground for supposing that our interests would have suffered.
i have heard it suggested, that if the enemy had not been engaged at moodkee, there was a probability of his turning our flank, and threatening the provinces; if such had been his intention, it is probable that he would have taken another line of country, and not the road by which our forces were advancing, for the country affords anywhere a ready passage for troops, and they are not confined to any particular track, as in inclosed countries.
[pg 86]
return of killed and wounded in the action of moodkee, dec. 18, 1845.
killed. wounded.
officers. native & non-
commissioned. privates. officers. native & non-
commissioned. privates, fifers,
& drummers.
personal staff 2 2
general staff 1 1
artillery division.
(col. brooke, com.)
horse 2 3 11 4 3 19
foot 1 1 2 8
cavalry division.
(brig. white.)
staff 2
h.m.'s 3rd light dragoons 2 5 53 3 3 29
body-guard (natives) 1 6 2 2 15
4th native cavalry 2 4
5th ditto 8 2 1 16
9th ditto irregulars 1 3 1 7
1st infantry division.
(sir harry smith.)
staff 1 4
1st brigade, h.m. 31st rgt. 1 2 22 7 4 121
" 47th native infantry 6 1 8
2nd ditto h.m. 50th rgt. 1 11 5 5 87
" 42nd native infantry 1 1 25 1 6 55
" 48th ditto 2 5 7 28
2nd infantry division.
(gen. gilbert.)
staff 1
45th native infantry 1 1
2nd ditto 14 3 6 48
16th ditto 1 2 9 32
3rd infantry division.
(sir j. m'caskill.)
staff 1
h.m.'s 9th regiment 2 1 2 47
26th native infantry 1 3
73rd ditto 1 1 5
h.m.'s 80th regiment 1 3 1 19
11th native infantry
41st ditto
[pg 87]
killed.
european officers 13
native ditto 2
non-commissioned officers, privates, &c. 192
syces, followers, &c. 3
——
total 210
wounded.
european officers 39
native ditto 9
non-commissioned officers, privates, &c. 588
syces, drivers, &c. 21
——
total 657
list of officers killed and wounded.
killed.
head 2nd staff major-general sir r. sale.
" major herries, a.d.c.
" capt. munro, a.d.c.
artillery captain trower.
" lieut. pollock.
3rd light dragoons capt. newton.
" cornet worley.
body-guard lieut. fisher.
staff capt. van homrigh, 48th n.i.
[pg 88] h.m.'s 31st lieut. hart.
h.m.'s 50th assistant-surgeon graydon.
42nd n.i. lieut. spence.
3rd division major-general sir j. m'caskill.
wounded.
head 2nd staff major grant, d.a.g., dangerously.
" capt. hillier, a.d.c., severely.
" capt. edwards, a.d.c.
" capt. dashwood, since dead.
" lieut. cox.
artillery lieut. wheelright.
" lieut. bowie.
" brigadier mactier, severely.
" brigade-major capt. harrington, do.
3rd light dragoons lieut. fisher, ditto.
" lieut. swinton, ditto.
" lieut. cureton, ditto.
body-guard capt. dawkins, ditto.
" lieut. taylor, ditto.
5th cavalry major alexander.
" lieut. christie.
1st division brigadier bolton, since dead.
" brigadier wheeler, severely.
engineers lieut. nicolls, ditto.
h.m.'s 31st captain lugard.
" lieut.-col. byrne, since dead.
" capt. willis, dangerously.
" capt. bulkeley, ditto.
[pg 89] " capt. young, ditto.
" lieut. pollard.
" lieut. brenchley, since dead.
47th n.i. lieut. pogson, dangerously.
h.m.'s 50th capt. needham, severely.
" lieut. bishop, ditto.
" lieut. young, ditto.
" lieut. montmorency, ditto.
" lieut. carter.
42nd n.i. lieut. holt.
h.m.'s 9th assist.-surgeon gahan, dangerously.
" lieut. hanham, slightly.
staff major codrington, severely.
2nd n.i. captain bolton, ditto.
" captain gifford, ditto.
h.m.'s 80th ensign walden, ditto.
" colonel bunbury, ditto.
return of ordnance captured at moodkee.
number. ordnance. metal. calibre. weight of shot.
in. tenths.
6 guns brass 4 6 12 pr.
1 howitzer ditto 6 5 6?
4 guns ditto 4 2 9 pr.
3 ditto ditto 3 6 6 pr.
1 ditto ditto 2 9 3 pr.
—
15
it was impossible to compute the metal in these guns; but it was evident they were heavier than those of similar calibre in the bengal artillery.
the carriages all in good repair, except one or two, struck by our shot. the whole were destroyed, and the guns left at moodkee.
four guns, reported to have been dismounted, and left on the ground by the men of the horse artillery, for want of means to bring them away.
(signed) g. brooke,
brigadier, artillery.
