it is not possible, even in the most cursory account of life and manners in hungary, to escape all mention of the conflicting political interests which are making of austro-hungary one of the most curious ethnographical problems ever presented by history. taking even transylvania alone, we should find quite enough to fill a whole volume merely by describing the respective relations of the different races peopling the country. in addition to various minor nationalities, we find here no less than three principal races diametrically opposed to each other in origin, language, habits, and religion—to wit, the magyars, the saxons, and the roumanians, whose exact numbers i have given on a preceding page. the gypsies, whose numbers figure next in the list after the saxons, need not here be taken into consideration, being absolutely devoid of all political character; but of the other three races, each has its individual aspirations and interests, and each a political object in view which it pursues with dogged persistency.
the hungarians are at present the masters of the position, having wealth and nobility on their side, besides the reins of government. since the year 1867, when hungary, having regained her former independence with extended rights and privileges, re-established a purely hungarian ministry and an independent hungarian militia, the progress achieved in the country, both intellectually and commercially, has{12} been remarkable, affording brilliant proof of what can be done by a handful of energetic and intelligent men against a vast majority of other races.
the total population of hungary, rated at fifteen millions, counts four millions only of purely hungarian individuals; the rest of the population is made up of serbs, croatians, roumanians, slovacks, and germans, all of which (if we except the germans, whose numbers are insignificant) are far inferior to the magyars in point of civilization; and here, as elsewhere, when intelligence and wealth are supported by energy, the right of might belonged to the hungarians, who have always been able to produce skilful and efficient statesmen, knowing their own minds, and clear-sighted as to the country’s requirements.
those now at the helm have had the discernment from the very outset to foresee the danger likely to arise from the ever-increasing spirit of nationality gaining ground among the non-hungarian inhabitants of the soil. two courses were here open to them: either seeking to conciliate the various nationalities by concessions to their pretensions; or else, by pursuance of an inflexible policy, to sacrifice all alien considerations to purely hungarian interests, and impose their own nationality on all without exception.
this latter course was the one adopted by hungary, who for the last ten years, introducing measures as practical as they are far-sighted, has pursued this object with undeviating consistency.
first of all, the hungarian tongue was everywhere established as the official language. in all schools, whether of serbs, roumanians, or germans, it became compulsory to teach hungarian; without a thorough knowledge of the language no one was competent to aspire to any official position; the courts of justice, even in completely non-hungarian districts, are held in hungarian, and hungarian likewise is the word of command throughout the honved army. such are the means by which the government hopes to effect the magyarization of all its subjects.
but within the last few years we have beheld two new kingdoms spring up at hungary’s very door, roumania and serbia—incentive enough to induce all roumanians and serbs living in hungary strenuously to resist this magyarizing influence, and inspire them with the hope of being one day amalgamated with their more independent countrymen. in croatia the case is more or less the same, for, being united by similarities of language, custom, and religion to their serbian{13} neighbors, the croats far rather incline to assimilate with these than with the tyrannical magyars; while the slovacks, continually stirred up by russian, ruthenian, and bohemian agitators, have likewise their reasons for resistance. add to this that the german colonies, which, far more isolated than the races aforenamed, can never have a serious chance of independent existence, are yet infatuated enough to harbor impossible visions of a union with their father-land, and have consequently ranged themselves among the most vehement opposers of hungarian rule, and it will be seen that the task which the magyars have set themselves, of bending all these conflicting interests to their own ends, is indeed a stupendous one. but hungary, in self-preservation, could not have acted otherwise: it was for her a question of life or death; and having the choice of becoming the hammer or the anvil, who can blame her for choosing the former?
whether this portentous struggle will outlast our generation, or find its issue within the next few years, will depend upon outward political constellations. so much, however, is certain, that should the magyars be able to carry through their system during a sufficient space of time, they will have created a state which, by virtue of the richness of its soil, the extent of its domains, and the vigor of its race, will have acquired incontestable right to independent existence.
should, however, the oriental question, and with it the panslavonian one, bring about the inevitable collision of nationalities so long foreseen; should the balkan races begin to agitate ere hungary have accomplished her herculean task—then her downfall is certain. the magyars may, indeed, continue to exist as a nation, but not as a state, and their fate will be that of poland.
while in the one half of the austro-hungarian empire this system of centralizing the power and assimilating all minor interests to the hungarian idea is being pursued with inflexible ardor, the cis-latin provinces—that is to say, austria proper—are being governed in diametrically opposed fashion.
till within a few years ago, the german language was the official one in all cis-latin provinces, and germans had there everywhere the upperhand, as to-day the magyars in the trans-latin countries; but since the advent of count taafe’s ministry, now seven years ago, the situation has completely changed. the present government, wishing to conciliate the different nationalities, such as bohemians, poles, ruthenians,{14} etc., granted to each of these the free use of its own tongue in school and office—a concession which may be said to mark the beginning of austria’s decomposition. the results of this deplorable system as yet have been that the germans, who in austria form the wealthiest and most intelligent part of the population, imbittered at finding themselves degraded from their former position of leaders of the state, have become the most formidable opponents of the government; while the minor races, only stimulated by the concessions received, are ever clamoring for more. the taafe ministry has marvellously succeeded, during the incredibly short space of seven years, in establishing chaos in the administration of the cis-latin provinces, contenting no one, and fostering racial contentions which can have but the most melancholy results for the stability of the empire.
whether a state, not only composed of such heterogeneous racial elements, but, moreover, governed by two such diametrically opposed systems, will have strength to resist attacks from without, who can say?—for it still remains to be practically proved which of the two governments has chosen the right road to success. so much, however, is certain—the hungarians know what they want, and pursue their preconceived line of political action with consistent energy; while the austrian government, never knowing its own mind, is swayed at hazard by whichever of the minor nationalities happens to have the momentary ascendancy, and behindhand, as ever, of “an idea and of an army,” may almost be said to deserve the definition of one of its own statesmen,[2] of being the “land of improbabilities.”
