let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed. to judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. for there are, we may say, three prominent types of life — that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of sardanapallus. a consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. but it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better. and perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honour, the end of the political life. but even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. but enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions. third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later.
the life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. and so one might rather take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. but it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. let us leave this subject, then.
