(a) we have shown that both the unjust man and the unjust act are unfair or unequal; now it is clear that there is also an intermediate between the two unequals involved in either case. and this is the equal; for in any kind of action in which there’s a more and a less there is also what is equal. if, then, the unjust is unequal, just is equal, as all men suppose it to be, even apart from argument. and since the equal is intermediate, the just will be an intermediate. now equality implies at least two things. the just, then, must be both intermediate and equal and relative (i.e. for certain persons). and since the equall intermediate it must be between certain things (which are respectively greater and less); equal, it involves two things; qua just, it is for certain people. the just, therefore, involves at least four terms; for the persons for whom it is in fact just are two, and the things in which it is manifested, the objects distributed, are two. and the same equality will exist between the persons and between the things concerned; for as the latter the things concerned-are related, so are the former; if they are not equal, they will not have what is equal, but this is the origin of quarrels and complaints-when either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. further, this is plain from the fact that awards should be ‘according to merit’; for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence.
the just, then, is a species of the proportionate (proportion being not a property only of the kind of number which consists of abstract units, but of number in general). for proportion is equality of ratios, and involves four terms at least (that discrete proportion involves four terms is plain, but so does continuous proportion, for it uses one term as two and mentions it twice; e.g. ‘as the line a is to the line b, so is the line b to the line c’; the line b, then, has been mentioned twice, so that if the line b be assumed twice, the proportional terms will be four); and the just, too, involves at least four terms, and the ratio between one pair is the same as that between the other pair; for there is a similar distinction between the persons and between the things. as the term a, then, is to b, so will c be to d, and therefore, alternando, as a is to c, b will be to d. therefore also the whole is in the same ratio to the whole; and this coupling the distribution effects, and, if the terms are so combined, effects justly. the conjunction, then, of the term a with c and of b with d is what is just in distribution, and this species of the just is intermediate, and the unjust is what violates the proportion; for the proportional is intermediate, and the just is proportional. (mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical; for it is in geometrical proportion that it follows that the whole is to the whole as either part is to the corresponding part.) this proportion is not continuous; for we cannot get a single term standing for a person and a thing.
this, then, is what the just is-the proportional; the unjust is what violates the proportion. hence one term becomes too great, the other too small, as indeed happens in practice; for the man who acts unjustly has too much, and the man who is unjustly treated too little, of what is good. in the case of evil the reverse is true; for the lesser evil is reckoned a good in comparison with the greater evil, since the lesser evil is rather to be chosen than the greater, and what is worthy of choice is good, and what is worthier of choice a greater good.
this, then, is one species of the just.
