none of the dwellers in the territories described in the last chapter gave us any trouble during the first few years which followed upon the taking over of the frontier by the british. in 1853, however, it became necessary to punish the hindustani fanatics, who had afforded some assistance to the hassanzais during the expedition which the british government undertook against them in the previous year, and who had seized the fort at kotla on the right bank of the indus, belonging to the nawab of amb. early in january 1853, lieutenant-colonel mackeson, c.b., moved the following force down to the indus opposite kotla:
two guns, mountain train battery.
1st sikh infantry.
3rd sikh infantry.
two dogra regiments of the kashmir army.
six wallpieces.
six zamburaks.
on the 6th the force was ferried across from kirpilian in two large boats, and the sikh regiments and mountain guns advanced, when the hindustanis 72evacuated the fort and fled, being pursued and having considerable loss inflicted upon them by the nawab of amb’s men. there was no more trouble in the peshawar district until the year of the mutiny, and it was then almost entirely due to the presence on the yusafzai frontier of the hindustani fanatics, who were supported by contributions of men and money from traitorous princes and private individuals in india.
the mutineers of the 55th
the yusafzai country was then controlled by the fort at mardan, usually garrisoned by the corps of guides; in the middle of may, however, this regiment had started upon its famous march to delhi, and its place at mardan had been taken by part of the 55th native infantry. on the night of the 21st may news reached general cotton at peshawar that some companies of the 55th, stationed at nowshera, had mutinied, and that some of these had joined their comrades at mardan. on the night of the 23rd a small force, accompanied by john nicholson as political officer, quitted peshawar for the purpose of disarming the 55th native infantry at mardan. at sunrise on the 25th the disaffected regiment saw the column approaching mardan; “and then all but a hundred and twenty, who were restrained by the threats and persuasions of the officers, broke tumultuously from the fort, and fled. the column pressed on in pursuit; but the mutineers were far ahead; the ground was so heavy that the artillery could not get within range; and the chase was all in vain until nicholson, taking with him a few of the police sowars, 73dashed to the front and rode into the fugitive masses. breaking before his charge, they scattered themselves over the country in sections and companies; but all day long he pursued them, hunted them out of the villages in which they sought for refuge, drove them over ridges, cut down their stragglers in ravines, and never rested till, having ridden over seventy miles, slain a hundred and twenty, and wounded between three and four hundred of the traitors, taken a hundred and fifty prisoners, and recovered two hundred and fifty stand of arms and the regimental colours, he was forced by the approach of night to draw rein, while those who had escaped him fled across the border into the hills of swat.”[26]
the virtual ruler of swat at that time was one whom oliver has called “a border pope”—an aged priest, known as the akhund, and he decided that these fugitives should not be accorded an asylum. they were accordingly guided to the indus and put across the stream, whence they intended to endeavour to make their way to kashmir. the majority of them succumbed, however, to the perils of the journey by way of hazara or kohistan, but a few took refuge in the country of the khudu khels, whose khan was hostile to us, and in whose territory a settlement of hindustanis had been established at a place called mangal thana, as a branch of the parent colony at sitana. the presence of the hindustanis was the cause of some trouble in july 1857 at shekh jana, and a fortnight later the fanatics, under the 74leadership of one maulvi inayat ali khan, crossed the border and raised the standard of religious war at a border village called narinji, where some 650 desperadoes had collected. a small force was moved out from mardan and nowshera, and, marching at first in another direction so as to conceal the object of the expedition, arrived unexpectedly before narinji. the position of the village was very strong, and in the days of sikh rule it had more than once been unsuccessfully attacked, but under cover of the fire of the mountain guns, it was now speedily taken and destroyed. the enemy had lost very severely, and the retirement, which now took place, was quite unopposed. our casualties had been five killed and twenty-one wounded.
the chief object of the operations—the capture of the maulvi—had not, however, been attained; cattle were raided from british territory; and the enemy were being daily reinforced by men from buner, chamla and swat. major j. l. vaughan, who had charge of the operations, now received additional troops from peshawar, and early on the 1st august he left his camp at shewa with the following force:
2
24–pounder howitzers.
4
guns, peshawar mountain train battery.
50
bayonets, 27th foot.
50
bayonets, 70th foot.
50
bayonets, 87th foot.
150
sabres, 2nd punjab cavalry.[27]
50
bayonets, 21st native infantry.[28]
75
400
bayonets, 5th punjab infantry.[29]
200
bayonets, 6th punjab infantry.[30]
150
bayonets, 16th punjab infantry.[31]
225
mounted levies and police.
100
foot levies and police.
expedition of 1857
three hundred and fifty rifles were detached to take narinji in flank and rear, and reached their position about half an hour after the main body had appeared in front of the village. the flanking party was vigorously opposed, but the frontal attack had a comparatively easy task, many of the defenders withdrawing early—among them being the maulvi. the retreat was to some extent cut off, and many were killed, among the slain being several of the mutineers of the 55th native infantry. our losses were only one killed and eight wounded.
the village was then completely destroyed and the troops retired.
the spirit of the people was not, however, by any means broken, for less than three months later the assistant-commissioner of yusafzai, while encamped at shekh jana with a small escort, was attacked by the hindustanis and khudu khels, assisted by the men of shekh jana and narinji. the assistant-commissioner escaped with his life, but five of his party were killed, and the whole of his baggage was looted.
expedition against the hindustanis and khudu khels, 1858.—on the 22nd april, 1858, a force was 76assembled, for the punishment of this outrage, on the left bank of the kabul river opposite nowshera. it numbered 4877 of all ranks, was commanded by major-general sir sydney cotton, k.c.b., and was divided into two brigades, respectively under lieutenant-colonel renny and major alban, both of the 81st foot, but before crossing the frontier, was divided into three columns as under:
first column.
4
guns, peshawar light field battery.[32]
2
guns, peshawar mountain train battery.[33]
260
bayonets, 98th foot.
100
sabres, 7th irregular cavalry.[34]
200
sabres, guides cavalry.
30
sabres, peshawar light horse.[35]
100
bayonets, sappers and miners.
300
bayonets, 21st native infantry.[36]
300
bayonets, guides infantry.
400
bayonets, 9th punjab infantry.[37]
400
bayonets, 18th punjab infantry.[38]
77second column.
200
bayonets, 81st foot.
100
sabres, 18th irregular cavalry.[39]
47
bayonets, sappers and miners.
200
bayonets, kelat-i-ghilzie regiment.
450
bayonets, 8th punjab infantry.[40]
third column.
105
bayonets, 81st foot.
10
bayonets, 98th foot.
25
sabres, 7th irregular cavalry.
25
sabres, 18th irregular cavalry.[39]
60
sabres, guides cavalry.
254
bayonets, kelat-i-ghilzie regiment.
155
bayonets, 21st native infantry.
76
bayonets, guides infantry.
54
bayonets, 8th punjab infantry.[40]
137
bayonets, 9th punjab infantry.
185
bayonets, 18th punjab infantry.
expedition of 1858
the force assembled at the frontier village of salim khan, which was made the base of operations, and on the 25th april the people of totalai, who had long been oppressed by the chief of the khudu khels, now, encouraged by the proximity of the troops, made a rush upon panjtar, intending to seize the chief, mukarrab khan, but he escaped to chinglai, when his village was burnt before the troops arrived upon the scene. the first object of the expedition was thus unexpectedly and easily attained.
78the following arrangements were now made: the first column, under the major-general commanding, marching by chinglai, was to enter khudu khel territory by the darhan pass; the second column was to move directly on panjtar; while the third remained in charge of the camp at salim khan. the darhan pass was found to be a very narrow defile, about two miles in length, the passage of which might easily have been disputed; no opposition was, however, encountered, and the troops reached chinglai, which was destroyed under a slight and ineffectual fire from the enemy holding the heights. the column returned on the 27th to salim khan via panjtar and the jehangirra darra. this route was found to form a very much more difficult approach to chinglai than the darhan pass route, the track being chiefly through broken country, at one point passing through a rocky defile called taralai—a very formidable obstacle if disputed. although some of mukarrab khan’s men, mounted and on foot, were seen, no attack was made upon the column. the second column had meanwhile thoroughly destroyed panjtar and returned to salim khan.
the general now determined to attack a stronghold of the khan’s, called mangal thana, situated on one of the main spurs of the mahaban mountain. this place had also been the resort of maulvi inayat ali khan, who had so perseveringly endeavoured, at narinji and other places, to raise yusafzai in rebellion in 1857.
the force was again divided into three columns, 79which were now, however, somewhat differently constituted—the first to act against mangal thana, the second to proceed as a support to panjtar, the third remaining in reserve at salim khan. on the 28th april the first column left camp while it was moonlight; the ascent of the hills was found to be very difficult, and it was necessary to leave half the column at dukarai. no opposition was, however, met with, and mangal thana was found to be abandoned.
mangal thana consisted of two villages, one above the other, the upper containing the citadel of the leader of the fanatics with enclosures for his followers, and the whole surrounded by strong fortifications of stones and timber. the position was about 5000 feet above sea-level, and the neighbourhood was densely wooded. the troops bivouacked here for the night, blew up the fort next day, and returned on the 30th to camp at salim khan.
operations against the fanatics
the colony of fanatics at sitana had now to be dealt with, and accordingly, on the 2nd may, the force marched to khabal, about four miles from sitana. between amb, on the right bank of the indus, and our frontier village of topi, is a narrow strip of land forming part of the utmanzai territory. it contains, in addition to the two or three small hamlets of topi, the villages of upper and lower khabal (exactly opposite torbela), upper and lower kai, and lower sitana, mandi and upper sitana. the utmanzais of this strip had, previous to this date, had feuds with the saiyids and hindustanis of sitana, and consequently 80welcomed our troops as allies against a common foe.
early on the 4th may a force of five guns and 1050 rifles was sent to the left bank of the indus, and advanced against the villages from the east; the main column moved against them from the south; while the men of our ally, the nawab of amb, occupied the hills to the north. on approaching lower sitana, two regiments were detached to move up the mountain in rear, the position was attacked in front, and the enemy were driven with considerable loss to their second position. here they were met by one of the regiments coming up in their rear, and driven back on the bayonets of the troops in front. hand-to-hand fighting now ensued until every hindustani in the position was either killed or captured. some gadun allies of the fanatics made no stand, retiring precipitately. the enemy’s position having been carried at all points and their villages destroyed, the force retired, being closely followed up. this was the first time the enfield rifle had been used against the tribesmen, and the effectiveness of its fire made a great impression. our losses had been six killed and twenty-nine wounded.
that night the force encamped on the sitana plain by the indus bank, whence it proceeded next day to khabal.
the hindustanis, expelled from sitana by the utmanzais, had taken refuge with the upper gaduns, and to prevent the utmanzais being compelled, on our retirement, to readmit them, the gadun villages 81immediately on the yusafzai border were surrounded by our troops, and coercive measures were threatened. this had an immediate effect, the upper and lower gaduns sending in their representatives and binding themselves, equally with the utmanzais, to expel and keep out the saiyids and hindustanis, and to resist any other tribe which should try to readmit them.
the force then marched back to nowshera, where it was broken up.
the gaduns troublesome
the hindustani fanatics, now ejected from sitana, settled at malka, on the north side of the mahaban mountain, but in 1861 they came down to a place called siri, close to their old haunts, and began abducting hindu traders from across the hazara border. the only way whereby it seemed possible to check these crimes was to punish the tribes which allowed these robbers passage through their territories. the utmanzais and gaduns were accordingly placed under blockade, and towards the end of 1861 these came in, made submission, and again agreed to exclude the hindustanis. for a brief period the kidnapping ceased; then in the spring of 1863 came reports of two murders, followed in the summer by the news that the hindustanis had suddenly reoccupied sitana. not only had the tribes above mentioned done nothing to prevent this, according to agreement, but some of the tribesmen had actually invited this occupation. a blockade of the gaduns and utmanzais was therefore reimposed, and a large number of troops and levies were disposed on either 82bank of the indus, while the 101st fusiliers were ordered up to hazara.
the hindustanis were now showing a very bitter spirit against the british government, their leaders were preaching something of a jehad, and attacks on our posts and villages were now projected or undertaken. on the night of the 3rd september a party of hindustanis attempted to attack the camp of the guides engaged on blockade duty at topi, but were driven off in panic; the hassanzais, instigated by the maulvi of sitana, made an unprovoked attack upon and destroyed several outlying villages in amb territory; later the same clan threatened chamberi, and attacked and killed several of the amb levies on the black mountain. by this time it seemed clear that most of the hazara tribes had now thrown in their lot against the british, and an expedition against them appeared inevitable; it was therefore decided that the force employed should be a large one, and that brigadier-general sir neville chamberlain should command it.
two columns were to be employed, the one operating from the peshawar valley, the other from hazara, and the movements proposed for each were as under: the peshawar column was to assemble at nawa kala and swabi, with the apparent intention of moving on mangal thana, but when ready to move was to march through the ambela pass, occupy koga in the chamla valley, and thence march on sitana by chirori; the hazara column remaining stationary at darband to overawe the riverain tribes and protect the hazara 83border. additional troops were detailed to hold the line of the indus, hazara and yusafzai at darband, torbela, topi, abbottabad, rustam bazar and mardan. hostilities were not anticipated from the bunerwals, with whom we had no quarrel, and who were known to have no sympathy with the hindustanis; but it was unfortunate that the absolute necessity for keeping the line of operations secret prevented the bunerwals being informed that their frontier would be approached by our troops. consequently they not unnaturally believed that an invasion of their country was intended, and eventually joined the coalition against us.
ambela expedition
ambela expedition, 1863.—the preliminary arrangements for the expedition appear to have suffered to no inconsiderable extent from the fact that, in order not to alarm the frontier tribes, general chamberlain had been asked not to join his command until the last moment. on the 19th october he wrote to his brother: “i never before had such trouble or things in so unsatisfactory a state. carriage, supplies, grain-bags, all deficient. some of our guns and the five and a half inch mortars have to be sent back as useless, after having taken the pick of men and animals to equip a half-inch battery of r.a. our 1st l.f. batteries have to be stripped to make the half battery r.a. efficient.”[41]
general chamberlain reached swabi on the 13th october, and marched on the 18th to the mouth of the darhan pass with the following troops:
84peshawar mountain train battery.
hazara mountain train battery.[42]
1st punjab infantry.[43]
5th gurkhas.
the other troops of the expeditionary force closed up at the same time to nawa kala from their camps in rear, and a proclamation was now issued to all the tribes concerned, stating the object of the operations and the reason for following this particular route. then on the night of the 19th the following troops marched from nawa kala and joined at parmalao the advanced column:
100
sabres, guides cavalry.
100
sabres, 11th bengal cavalry.[44]
guides infantry.
5th punjab infantry.
27th punjab native infantry.[45]
the junction effected, the whole moved on, under colonel wilde, to the mouth of the ambela pass, which was reached at sunrise on the 20th.
on the 20th the pass was entered and traversed, the head of the pass being held by some 250 bunerwals, who were, however, dislodged without any great difficulty, and colonel wilde’s column encamped on and beyond the pass on tolerably open and level ground; he posted picquets to hold the most important points, but was not strong enough to do more. the main column had left nawa kala 85at 1 a.m. on the 20th october, and, after a short halt at rustam, closed up to the rear of the advanced troops late in the afternoon. both parties had found the road extraordinarily difficult; the track was tolerably good up to the village of surkhabi, in our own territory, but thereafter deteriorated, in the pass often lying in the bed of a stream, and in other places being overgrown with jungle. in most parts it was possible to move only in single file; the rear guard did not get beyond surkhabi; and though the ammunition mules managed, with difficulty, to keep up with their units, not a single baggage animal reached camp during the night of the 20th–21st, and only few had arrived there twenty-four hours later. it had been intended that colonel wilde should push forward the few cavalry with him, supported by the other arms, to reconnoitre the road down the further side of the pass and the head of the chamla valley, but in view of the difficulties of the road, it was deemed best to postpone any forward movement.
the advance commences
while halted on the pass, representatives came in from the people of chamla and buner expressing feelings of friendship, and no opposition seems therefore to have been anticipated from these tribes when the force again moved forward on the morning of the 22nd. to prevent any misunderstanding, a full explanation of our intentions was sent to the buner maliks, and careful instructions were given to our reconnoitring party of cavalry and infantry, now sent on, to follow a road avoiding buner territory as far as possible. the descent from the top of the 86kotal was found to be tolerably good going, and the rest of the pass was unoccupied by any of the tribesmen.
from the foot of the range on the northern side, two roads passed through the chamla valley; one skirted the village of ambela and lay under the hills dividing chamla from buner on the north side of the valley, while the other went by koga on the south; and as ambela, though actually in chamla, was regarded by the bunerwals as one of their own villages, the advance guard was ordered to proceed by the koga road so as to avoid all possibility of offence or misunderstanding.
passing the kotal leading into buner it was seen to be crowded by bunerwals, but they did not come down into the valley, which appeared to be quite unoccupied. the reconnoitring party pushed on through koga to kuria and then returned towards the ambela; by this time it was seen that numbers of bunerwals had come down from the hills with the evident intention of cutting off the retreat of the party. the tribesmen were charged by the cavalry and driven back, and the infantry—the 20th punjab infantry[46] under major brownlow—then formed the rearguard. daylight had now gone, the enemy came on again and pressed the 20th very closely, rushing in among them sword in hand. as the retiring troops drew near camp, the picquets became engaged, and there was a general attack upon them in the front and on the flanks of the camp, which was kept up until midnight.
hostility of the bunerwals
87that the bunerwals should thus have taken a decidedly hostile part against us was very serious, and our position now required to be strengthened and the plan of operations to be changed. the line of communications was secured by calling up additional infantry and levies, but it was evident that the hindustani settlements on the mahaban mountain could not now be reached by the chamla valley, with a powerful and hostile tribe on the left flank of the line of march.
on the 24th all sick, superfluous baggage and spare transport were passed down the pass to the rear, and the troops—on this date about 6000 in number—were employed in improving the communications. the bunerwals remained quiet, but it was noticed that they were joined by large bodies of the hassanzais, chagarzais, mada khels and hindustanis.
shortly after daylight next morning the enemy were observed on a ridge opposite and close to the advanced picquets of the right defence, and major keyes, who was there in command, advanced and dislodged them. he took up a position on a ridge commanding the plain over which the enemy had retired, and found he was then himself commanded, at a range of 700 yards, from a conical hill on which the tribesmen were collecting. he sent into camp for reinforcements, but these did not reach him until 2 p.m., when the hill was attacked and captured. it afterwards transpired that the enemy had intended to attack both sides of the camp, but one force did not come on.
88the attention of the general commanding was now drawn to the left side of the camp, where was the guru mountain separating the ambela pass from buner. the enemy had collected here in large bodies, and it was necessary to meet any attack from that quarter, and to provide for the security of a sick convoy which it was proposed to send to the rear. on the morning of the 26th, therefore, the left picquets, under lieutenant-colonel vaughan, were reinforced with the following:
hazara mountain battery.
30 marksmen, 71st and 101st regiments.
200 rifles, 71st regiment.
5th punjab infantry.
6th punjab infantry.
the “eagle’s nest”
these troops proceeded to the vicinity of the “eagle’s nest” picquet, situated a full mile from the camp, and occupying the top of a very steep, rocky knoll rising out of the southern face of the mountain, and forming the apex of that portion overlooking the left side of the camp. this picquet had hitherto only been held during the day. colonel vaughan now placed the thirty marksmen with eighty men of the 20th punjab infantry in the “eagle’s nest”—as many as it was capable of holding—and stationed another 120 men of the 3rd[47] and 20th punjab infantry among some large rocks at the base of the knoll. the rest of the force with colonel vaughan was disposed about a small underfeature, 400 yards west of the picquet.
89on the crest of the hill opposite to and distant 500 yards from our picquet, was a breastwork occupied by about 2000 of the enemy, and shortly after noon these made two fierce assaults upon the “eagle’s nest,” and also attacked the rest of the troops immediately under colonel vaughan. all these attacks were gallantly repulsed, but our casualties were heavy, amounting to twenty-nine killed and ninety-two wounded; the enemy also lost seriously, and though no further attack was made, a heavy fire was kept up during the rest of the day. the picquet was not, as usual, withdrawn at sunset, and colonel vaughan’s party maintained its positions all night; next day it was determined to hold permanently the “eagle’s nest” with forty british and 300 native soldiers, and another post on an adjoining height, called “vaughan’s picquet,” with the hazara mountain battery, fifty british and 300 native soldiers. of the enemy’s killed and wounded many were hindustanis, and some were apparently ex-soldiers of the late 55th native infantry.
news was now received that the akhund of swat, the border pope, had thrown in his lot with the bunerwals, and had summoned also the people of bajaur and dir; chamla sent its quota; the utman khels, afridis from lundkhwar, also took the field; and it was evident that there was now a general combination against us of almost all the tribes from the indus to the boundary of afghanistan. old feuds seemed to be forgotten, for tribes and chiefs, usually bitter enemies, were now ready to fight side 90by side against us; and it was clear how greatly the situation had changed for the worse since the force had first entered the ambela pass. then the troops had merely to deal with the tribes on the mahaban mountain, to expel the hindustanis from that tract, and march to its borders through a friendly, or at least a not actively hostile, country. general chamberlain recognised that it would be inadvisable to make any advance, such as had been contemplated, with his present force against so large a combination. he therefore decided to remain on the defensive in the position he now occupied, which was secure, where at any rate his communications were safeguarded, and where supplies and reinforcements could easily reach him, trusting that the discouragement of repeated unsuccessful attacks would gradually weaken the enemy’s numbers and break up the coalition.
between the 27th and 29th the force was strengthened by the arrival of two guns of the 3rd punjab light field battery,[48] the 14th sikhs, and the 4th gurkhas, but it was known that the tribesmen too had received reinforcements, and that an attack was shortly to be made upon the camp defences.
the “crag picquet”
on the night of the 29th–30th the advanced picquets of the right defence were furnished by the 1st punjab infantry and a company of the guides, under major keyes. above the main picquets and commanding them was “the crag”—a high rock, the ascent to which was most precipitous, and the summit of which was incapable of containing more than a very few 91men. shortly before daybreak this position was heavily attacked, and it soon became apparent that its garrison was hard pressed. reinforcements were at once sent forward from the lower picquets, but, before “the crag” could be reached, the small garrison was overpowered and driven off the rock, though the men held the ground lower down. major keyes decided to hold his ground until daylight among the rocks immediately below the summit and sent for help. as day broke the picquets were here reinforced by the 20th punjab infantry under major brownlow, and this officer advanced by a ridge which ran to the right of “the crag” and threatened the enemy in rear, while major keyes attacked in front. the assault thus carried out and supported was entirely successful; a hand-to-hand fight ensued when the summit of the rock was reached, but the enemy were driven out at the point of the bayonet and the position was recovered. no sooner had “the crag” been recaptured than the right attack fell to pieces and the tribesmen fled in panic. lieutenants fosbery, 104th fusiliers, and pitcher, 1st punjab infantry, were awarded the victoria cross for gallantry on this occasion.
while this attack on the right was in progress, another by men from swat was delivered on the front of the camp, but this was easily repulsed; a demonstration was also made against the upper left flank picquets. our losses on this day amounted to fifty-five killed and wounded, but those of the enemy had been so heavy, and the effect of the defeat so 92great, that many of the tribesmen returned to their homes.
the general commanding now decided to arrange for a new line of communications which should not be exposed to attack from the direction of the guru mountain. a line of road was therefore selected between the villages of khanpur and sherdara, and the base of operations was changed from rustam to parmalao. on the 28th october and 5th november the 7th fusiliers, 93rd highlanders, 23rd[49] and 24th[50] punjab native infantry were ordered up to this frontier; a body of 275 police, horse and foot, was sent up to nawa kala to assist in the protection of the rearward communications; and later on 4200 camels and 2100 mules were collected at nowshera, in view of the demand for pack transport which might have to be met when the force eventually moved forward. working parties were also employed in making a road, to facilitate the forward march on ambela, along the western slopes of the right ridge, and thus covered from any fire from the guru mountain. on the 6th november the operations on this road caused us considerable loss. the working parties had been sent forward as usual, covered by picquets beyond and above them, and all had gone well until the time came to withdraw. the working parties were successfully retired, but the forward covering parties seem to have, for some unknown reason, remained too long on their ground, and were surrounded by the enemy, who moved up in large numbers. the 93light was failing, and the enemy seem to have broken in between some of the picquets: many of the covering party fought their way back to camp, but our losses this day amounted to seventy-eight of all ranks killed and wounded; the bodies of some of the former had temporarily to be left behind, but were recovered next day.
on the 8th the new road to the rear was taken into use, and a commencement was made in removing supplies, etc., to the south side of the pass, where it was proposed to form a new camp, thereby saving much picquet duty and affording an actually stronger position.
“crag picquet” attacked
on the 11th the enemy ascended the hills about lalu, on our right front, in large numbers, evidently with the intention of attacking the picquets on that side of the camp. these were accordingly reinforced and their defences strengthened. “the crag” had recently been much enlarged and improved, and was now capable of accommodating a garrison of 160 men, while it was supported by the mountain guns of the peshawar battery from the main picquet. at 4 p.m. on the 11th major brownlow assumed command of “the crag,” having under him fifteen of the 101st fusiliers, thirty of the 14th sikhs, and 115 of the 20th punjab native infantry. two of the four mountain guns commanded the left shoulder of “the crag” hill and the front of the “centre” picquet below. the enemy occupied a position about half a mile in length on a ridge facing and within 250 yards of “the crag” picquet. between the two positions 94was a hollow intersected by a ravine. the right and rear of “the crag” were precipitous and practically unassailable; the left face was the weak point, there being cover for an attacker to within a few yards of the position. anticipating an attack, every effort was this day made to improve the defences. about 10 p.m. the enemy moved down in large numbers to the hollow in front of the picquet, and shortly after made repeated desperate attacks until daybreak upon the front and left of the picquet, but were beaten back with loss, although at one time they nearly penetrated the position at its left front angle; the situation was saved by the gallantry and devotion of major brownlow and five men of his regiment. by morning but very few of the enemy were anywhere visible, and as major brownlow’s men had been for forty-eight hours on duty, they were relieved at 8 a.m. on the 30th by ninety men of the 1st punjab infantry under lieutenant davidson.
this officer soon after asked major keyes for reinforcements, as he did not consider his ninety men sufficient garrison for the position, and thirty additional men were sent him, all that could at the moment be spared, as serious attacks were anticipated upon other portions of the defence. these reinforcements had only just reached “the crag,” when the men of the picquet were seen to be vacating it and rushing down the hill in confusion. major keyes at once proceeded to and occupied a breastwork on the road between “the crag” and the main picquet, and there rallied the retreating men and checked the 95advance of the enemy. feeling the urgent need of the moral effect of a counter attack and the necessity for giving time for the arrival of support, he ordered an assault upon “the crag.” this, though bravely led and executed, was unsuccessful, owing to the paucity of men available, and the detachments fell back. the enemy occupying “the crag” were now pouring a heavy fire into the camp, and its continued possession by them would render the lower picquets untenable. lieutenant-colonel wilde, commanding the right defences, now asked for the 101st regiment, and taking also three companies of the guides, made for the advanced picquets, where the state of affairs was as follows: major ross, with some of the 14th sikhs and men of other corps, was holding on halfway up “the crag” hill, but unable to advance any further; parties of the enemy, attacking the lower picquets, were only kept back by the well-directed fire of the mountain guns; while the 1st, 20th, and two companies of the guides with major keyes still held the breastwork, but could not hope to do so for long.
re-capture of the “crag”
the 101st now at once advanced direct upon “the crag,” and never halted or broke until they had gallantly stormed the heights and secured the picquet, driving the enemy over the hills beyond, while the three companies of guides swept the enemy from the right of the position. all opposition now ceased along the whole line, the enemy having lost very heavily, their casualties being 89 killed and 140 wounded. the defenders of “the crag” seem to have been seized 96with an unaccountable panic, owing to the enemy concentrating a large force, unobserved, upon a weak picquet: lieutenant davidson was killed at his post.
during the next four or five days no attacks of a serious character were made by the enemy. early on the morning of the 18th, the new camp being ready for occupation, the whole of the troops occupying the guru mountain were withdrawn, and the entire camp and troops transferred to the heights on the south of the pass, while steps were also taken to extend the position so as more effectually to command the water supply. imagining from the evacuation of the guru position that the force was retreating, the new left front of the camp was this day fiercely attacked, but the enemy were repulsed with heavy losses on both sides.
“crag” lost and re-captured
on the 20th november “the crag” picquet was garrisoned by 100 bayonets from the 101st fusiliers and an equal number from the 20th punjab native infantry; the “water” picquet, within 450 yards of it, by 100 bayonets of the 71st foot and 100 men of the 3rd punjab infantry. about 9 a.m. the enemy began to collect in large numbers near these picquets, principally threatening “the crag,” but were to some extent checked by the fire of the peshawar mountain battery. up to late in the afternoon the tribesmen had made no impression, though they had succeeded in establishing themselves within a few yards of the breastworks. about 3 p.m., however, the unaccountable conduct of an officer on the left of the picquet, who suddenly ordered the troops immediately under 97his command to retire, gave the enemy possession of the post—though not without a desperate resistance from the remainder of the garrison. on the fall of “the crag” being reported, general chamberlain ordered up the 71st foot and the 5th gurkhas to retake it; the 71st stormed the position in front, the gurkhas and 5th punjab infantry attacking the lower portion in flank, and the work was retaken without much loss on our side. among the wounded, however, was the general commanding, who had accompanied the storming party. thus for the third time was “the crag” lost and won—a spot which, from the heavy casualties there sustained on either side, had become known in the country side as the katlgar, or place of slaughter.
this action, despite the temporary success gained, seemed to have a depressing effect on the enemy; their numbers dwindled down, and from this date until the 15th december they made no further attack in any force. sir nevill chamberlain’s wound proving more serious than was at first expected, he asked to be relieved of the command, and on the 30th november his place was taken by major-general garvock.
meanwhile the political officers had had some success in their attempts to detach certain clans from the coalition. two divisions of the bunerwals had thus seceded; 2000 swatis had been induced to return to their homes; one or two influential chiefs had drawn off their followers; while amongst the men who remained in the field a general mistrust prevailed. the gathering, in fact, seemed to be only now held 98together by the influence of the akhund of swat and of the maulvi. still reinforcements reached the tribesmen from kunar and bajaur, while our force was strengthened by the arrival of the 7th fusiliers, the 93rd highlanders, the 3rd sikhs and 23rd punjab native infantry.
it was becoming increasingly evident that the buner and chamla tribes were weary of the war, and were beginning to realise that we had never harboured any idea of invading their country; and on the 10th december they sent a deputation into our camp and agreed to accompany a force sent to destroy the hindustani settlement at malka, and to expel the hindustanis from their country. on the 14th, however, they found themselves obliged to admit that they had promised more than they could perform; that their proposals had been over-ruled; and they advised us that an attack would be made on the camp on the 16th, and promised that, in the event of our taking the initiative, they, the bunerwals, would not actively oppose us.
the force moves forward
general garvock accordingly determined to attack the village of lalu, where there was a force of about 4000 of the enemy, and for this purpose he moved out on the 15th with some 4800 men, unencumbered by tents or baggage, formed into two columns. the first column assembled at the base of “the crag” picquet and drove the enemy before it to the “conical” hill. the second column now emerged from the camp, and deploying in prolongation of the line formed by the other column, both prepared to assault 99the “conical” hill—a most formidable position, extraordinarily precipitous, rocky, and scarped by nature. covered by the mountain guns, both columns descended the hill, crossed the valley, drove the enemy from the heights, and captured the position. colonel wilde secured the line of hills overlooking the chamla valley, while the rest of the force, pushing on after the enemy, captured the villages of banda and lalu. the enemy made a vigorous assault upon colonel wilde’s position, but were driven off with great slaughter, and a desultory attack was also made upon the front and left of the camp, now held by some 3000 men under colonel vaughan. that night the first column occupied the ground it had gained about lalu; colonel wilde that between the camp and “conical” hill. not a shot was fired that night. early next morning the cavalry—some 400 sabres under lieutenant-colonel probyn—were brought from camp, and the advance of the two columns was resumed, colonel wilde leading. advancing across the valley towards the buner pass, as the column debouched into the open country the enemy appeared in great force on the hills covering the approach to ambela—a well-chosen position, of great strength, and peculiarly capable of defence; but fearing that their left would be turned by the cavalry and the other column, the tribesmen abandoned the position and retreated slowly towards the pass leading to buner. the force pressed on, captured and burnt the village of ambela, and the first column endeavoured to cut off the enemy’s retreat from the pass 100towards which they were retiring. here the tribesmen stood, and made a furious onset on the left of the line, entangled in broken and wooded ground. but the attackers were destroyed almost to a man, and the force pushed forward into the pass, driving the enemy before it. it was now getting late, there was no wish to invade buner, and the enemy further was in great strength. general garvock therefore withdrew his troops, and bivouacked that night in the vicinity of ambela. during these two days the tribesmen present in the field were estimated at 15,000, chiefly hindustanis, bajauris, and men from dir and swat—none of the bunerwals had taken any prominent part in the fighting.
that night the men of bajaur and dir fled to their homes, and the swatis alone remained in the field; on the morning of the 17th the buner jirgah came once more into camp, actually asking for orders. it was wisely decided to require the bunerwals themselves to destroy malka without any aid from our troops, and to this the buner jirgah unanimously consented. accordingly, on the 19th, a party of six british officers, escorted by the guides and accompanied by part of the buner jirgah, left ambela, and marched through chamla and amazai territory—by kuria and nagrai—to malka, which was reached on the 21st. on the following day the settlement was burnt to the ground by the bunerwals and amazais, and the party rejoined the force on the 23rd in the ambela pass. during these four days matters once or twice looked uncertain, and indeed threatening, 101but throughout the bunerwals maintained their reputation for keeping their engagements, while the sight of so powerful a clan carrying out our orders upon their own allies, afforded a salutary lesson to the surrounding tribesmen.
end of ambela expedition
general garvock’s force now began to withdraw to the plains, and the whole had reached nawa kala by christmas day. our casualties during the whole of these operations had been 238 killed and 670 wounded, while the estimated total loss of the enemy was 3000.
during the next few years the behaviour of the bunerwals may, in comparison with that of many other frontier tribes, be described as “good.” raids were committed upon our border villages in 1868 and 1877, and in 1878 and 1879 there was a certain amount of unrest in buner, due to the inflammatory preachings of certain mullahs. in 1884 renewed outrages had to be punished by a blockade of the salarzai bunerwals; and in 1887 a small column composed of cavalry and infantry was sent to destroy the village of surai malandri in punishment for the incursions of raiding parties across the malandri pass, but at the end of the year, the bunerwals submitting, the long-continued blockade was removed. during the black mountain expedition of 1888 the bunerwals evinced a disposition to take part against us, but refrained from doing so; while in 1895 they sent a contingent to help hold the passes against general low’s force, but arriving too late for the malakand fighting, this party returned home again. 102in 1897, however, the bunerwals were well to the fore in much of the fighting at the malakand and in upper swat, but when called to account at the end of 1897 they merely sent defiant answers to the ultimatum of the political officers, and it therefore became necessary to despatch an expedition into their country.
expedition against the bunerwals and chamlawals, january 1898.—the buner field force was placed under the command of major-general sir bindon blood, and the greater part of it concentrated at sanghao: it was composed as under:
first brigade.
brigadier-general meiklejohn, c.b., c.m.g.
1st battalion royal west kent regiment.
16th bengal infantry.[51]
20th punjab infantry.
31st punjab infantry.
second brigade.
brigadier-general jeffreys, c.b.
1st battalion the buffs.
21st punjab infantry.[52]
guides infantry.
divisional troops.
10th field battery r.a.
no. 7 mountain battery r.a.
no. 8 bengal mountain battery r.a.[53]
1 squadron 10th bengal lancers.[54]
103guides cavalry.
2nd battalion highland light infantry.
6 companies 3rd bombay light infantry.[55]
no. 4 company bengal sappers and miners.
no. 5 company madras sappers and miners.
buner expedition of 1898
sir bindon blood, with the bulk of his troops at sanghao, intended to force the tanga pass, about a mile to the northward, while a small column composed of the 31st punjab infantry, the guides infantry and a section of no. 4 company bengal sappers and miners, was to capture the pirsai pass, when the cavalry, moving from rustam, was to cross over the pirsai pass and cut the enemy’s line of retreat from the tanga. this last-named pass was known to be held by about a thousand of the enemy, as were the ambela and malandri, but only forty or fifty men had collected for the defence of the pirsai. the 2nd brigade advanced on the morning of the 7th january and found the position defended by at least 2000 men, and from a parallel ridge facing the pass the buffs and mountain guns opened fire at 1500 yards, under cover of which the rest of the troops pushed forward through the ravine, while the 20th punjab infantry had ascended a steep spur to the east, leading to a high peak overlooking the position. when the 20th were seen to be approaching their objective, the frontal attack commenced. the enemy, however, demoralised by the heavy gun and rifle fire, made no real stand, and, pressed by the 20th on their right, early began 104to abandon their position, and finally fled down the valley towards kingargali and the hills beyond. three battalions of the 1st brigade pushed on to kingargali, which was found deserted. meanwhile the cavalry and infantry from rustam and pirsai had captured the pirsai pass without meeting with but slight resistance, and the cavalry pushed on up the narrow valley as far as kuhai, returning to chorbanda, two miles north of the pass, where the night was spent. on the 10th this column joined the 1st brigade at bampokha.
two divisions of bunerwals now at once came in and tendered their submission, but it was decided to visit the territory of every division, and general meiklejohn’s column accordingly marched to jawar bai, hildai, rega, where the house of the mad fakir (of whom more will be heard later) was destroyed, and barkeli. the 2nd brigade, which had returned to sanghao after the capture of the tanga pass, entered buner by the ambela pass and occupied koga and nawagai, the cavalry reconnoitring the chamla valley. these measures led to the prompt and complete submission of all divisions of the bunerwals and of the men of chamla, and the force was withdrawn by the ambela pass, and reached mardan on the 20th january.
operations against the gaduns
during the ambela expedition of 1863 the behaviour of the gadun tribe had not been uniformly satisfactory, and consequently on the break up of the force colonel wilde took a strong brigade into their country, visited meni, and also khabal in the 105territory of the utmanzais, whose conduct had been of an equally hostile character. no opposition was experienced, but it was decided to require the two tribes to perform a similar service to that demanded of the bunerwals, viz. to destroy a hindustani fort and settlement called mandi adjacent to sitana. this was carried out and the force was then broken up; the effect of these measures was immediately apparent, for within the next few weeks the mada khels, the amazais and the remaining sections of the hassanzais all sent deputations to our political officers and made their submission. for some years, however, the gaduns continued to give trouble, committing outrages of all kinds and raiding on the border. they were blockaded, coerced and fined, but continued to be troublesome; in 1897, too, they were implicated in the attacks on the malakand and chakdara posts, but in the end of that year they finally made submission and paid up the fines demanded of them.
this chapter commenced with some account of our dealings with the hindustani fanatics, and may fittingly end with a few final words about them. expelled in 1864 from malka, they retreated into the chagarzai country north of the barandu river, but were not very comfortable there, their hosts frequently threatening them with expulsion. in 1868 they appear to have moved from their settlements in the chagarzai territory to bajkatta in buner, and here in april they were joined by feroz shah, the son of the last king of delhi. the presence 106of the hindustanis in buner was abhorrent to the akhund, who induced his co-religionists to decide to expel them. in consequence of this resolve, the fanatics, now some 700 strong, hurriedly retreated to malka, where they commenced re-building their houses. some of them eventually got permission to return to buner, but, intriguing against the akhund, the order of expulsion was again put in force, and they were hunted out of the country, suffering heavy losses, and took refuge, first with the chagarzais, then at palosi—moving again to thakot, and eventually back again to the country of the hassanzais who rented them some land at maidan near palosi, where they remained until 1888. after their dramatic appearance at kotkai in the black mountain operations of 1888, they resought an asylum among the chagarzais, but are now, to the number of 700, living among the amazais, neither occupying themselves greatly with local feuds nor being seriously implicated in other disturbances. but of late years there have not been wanting signs—faint, perhaps, but discernible—of a slight revival of their former activity.
