the district of swat proper—as distinct from the tracts of country south of the malakand and morah mountains, and inhabited by the same clans—comprises the valley of the swat river, from its junction with the panjkora northwards to the village of ain, above which the country is known as swat kohistan. from ain to the landakai spur, five miles above chakdara, the valley is called bar, or upper swat, while kuz, or lower swat, is the name given to the portion from landakai downwards to the village of kalangai. the valley is about seventy miles long and some twelve miles wide from crest to crest of its watersheds. the river, fed by glaciers and snow, begins to rise in the middle of april, and rapidly becomes unfordable, falling again in the middle of september, and being passable almost anywhere by midwinter. the climate is much the same as that of buner, and the valley is unhealthy and malarious in summer.
of the country of swat, oliver, in across the border, writes: “its hill tops are clothed with rich forests, giving place to a variety of excellent fruit 108trees in its well-watered valleys. its climate is temperate even in summer, and its capabilities great. many parts of it are known to be rich in ancient remains; the frequent ruins in swat and bajaur indicate the former presence of greek, buddhist and hindu, and innumerable inscribed tablets in greek and pali—probably becoming fewer and less valuable every year—only await scientific investigation to throw much light on the ancient history of this part of the world.... the river from which the district takes its name, probably the suastos of arrian, debouches on british territory near the fort of abazai, whence, up to its junction with the panjkora—the ancient gauraios—it is a swift, deep torrent, rushing between precipitous banks; the surrounding hills impracticable for any except foot passengers, and not easy for them, being in the hands of the utman khels.... the whole valley is highly cultivated and densely populated, each glen or gorge has its village or hamlet, and the total population has been estimated at not far short of 100,000 souls. the fields are in terraces one above another, extensively irrigated by channels diverted from the river or the torrents flowing into it. the course of the river itself, working from side to side of the valley, is marked by more numerous villages, groves of trees, and almost unbroken cultivation. the very burying-grounds, usually especially sacred to pathans, are regularly ploughed up, and the dead buried in the fallow lands; hardly a single yard of tillable ground is neglected. wheat and most grains, 109sugar-cane, lucerne, tobacco, and vegetables are extensively grown, and upper swat yields excellent fruits. in the hot weather, when a great portion of the valley can be irrigated, the lands everywhere near the river are a sheet of luxuriant rice, the steamy exhalations from which no doubt contribute largely to the unhealthiness of the valley. picturesque it is in the extreme; the upper slopes of the mountains are well clothed with forests of pine and deodar; below lies a beautiful velvet-like turf, and again stretches of cultivation, dotted with houses—wretched hovels enough, but artistically half-hidden among rich clusters of plane or poplar; and bright clear streams everywhere rushing down to the brisk noisy swat, dashing over its boulder-strewn bed, like a scotch salmon river. all the same, the notorious insalubrity of the valley is a very serious drawback to all this beauty.... the men especially are weak, thin and feeble, hardly resembling pathans in form or feature, and more like the gujars of the lower punjab. the women, on the other hand, seem curiously much less affected, for they are described as stout and buxom, and though by no means good-looking, retain far more of the pathan appearance. they have, moreover, entirely reversed the position of the sexes prevailing in ordinary pathan communities. not only do they go unveiled, and enjoy more liberty, but rule the men to a greater extent than is known among pathans elsewhere. the men of the swat valley, are, in fact, credited with living to a great extent under petticoat government.”
the swat valley
110in character the people appear to differ but little from other pathans. they possess all the vices common to that race, and are not behind them in pride, cupidity, revengefulness or treachery. in the last-named vice, indeed, they may indisputably be given the first place among pathan tribes. at one time their courage was not held in very high esteem, but the fighting in 1895 and 1897 seems to prove that in this respect they have been by us and others curiously misjudged. beyond a few individuals, however, none of the swat tribes are represented in the indian regular army, although some 400 are serving in the dir and swat levies; this service is popular with them, as it is close to their homes, and as they are generally prosperous, they prefer not to wander far afield in search of military service.
the swat valley, and those to the west and south-west of it, form classic ground, for it was through them that alexander himself marched on his way to the invasion of india. it was in the winter of 327 b.c. that he left the city he had founded to the north of kabul, and somewhere west of jagdallak he divided his force into two parts. heph?stion, with the heavy troops forming the main body, followed the direct route through the khyber, marching on an ancient city, the capital of gandhara, and to the north-east of peshawar. alexander, with the light troops, entered the kunar valley and crossed the kunar watershed by the spinasuka pass, which leads direct from pashat, the present capital of kunar, into bajaur, and there found himself close to nawagai, the 111present chief town of bajaur. thence he passed over the gauraios or panjkora river some few miles below its junction with the swat, and so came to the siege and capture of massaga, identified as matkanai, near the malakand pass, by which alexander must have crossed from the swat valley to the plain country bordering the indus.
the language spoken in swat is pushtu, except in swat kohistan, where torwali and garhwi are used.
the best road into swat from the south is over the malakand pass; the shakot, further to the east, is shorter, but the ascent is steeper, while the morah pass entrance is still more difficult.
the government of swat
the government of swat, like that of all pathan tribes, is an almost complete democracy. the country is split up into nearly as many factions as there are villages. each sub-division of each division of each clan has its separate quarrels, and supports its own chief, who is generally at mortal feud with either his own relations or his neighbours, and who is seldom obeyed one instant longer than is convenient; so that nothing short of pressing danger to the whole community from without could ever bring together all the divisions into which swat is separated. but that which could not be effected by ordinary means has, in a measure, been brought about by the influence of one individual, working on the religious feelings of a mass of grossly ignorant and proportionately bigoted people, such as are the inhabitants of swat; this man was the late akhund of swat. the akhund exerted such a powerful influence, as already seen in the 112ambela campaign, not only over the district of swat, but over the whole of the yusafzai border, that an account of him somewhat in detail may not be out of place.
abdul ghafur, as was his original name, was born of poor and obscure parents, probably gujars, at the village of jabrai, in upper swat, and passed his early boyhood tending sheep and cattle. he was even then distinguished for his religious proclivities, and at the age of eighteen he decided to adopt the life of an ascetic, and proceeded to barangola to learn to read and write, and master the rudiments of his religion. thence, after a time, he set out as an “inquirer after wisdom,” and at first took up his abode in or near a mosque about three miles from mardan; but moving on again after a stay of a few months, he became, at tordhair, the disciple of a fakir who enjoyed in those parts a reputation for peculiar sanctity. here the akhund resolved to exchange the mosque for the hermitage, and became a recluse.
about the year 1816 he accordingly settled down, as a young man of barely twenty, to a life of the greatest austerity, at a lonely spot on the banks of the indus, below the village of beka, ten miles above attock, where for twelve years he followed the nakshbandia form of religious devotion—sitting silent and motionless, his head bowed on his chest, and his eyes fixed on the ground. his food was an inferior kind of millet moistened with water, and throughout his life—he died at the age of eightythree—his 113diet was equally simple, milk being, however, subsequently substituted for water. his fame as a saint dates from his sojourn at beka, and even to this day, in the most distant parts of persia, he is still remembered as “the hermit of beka.”
a militant priest
in an evil moment he unwisely allowed himself to be drawn into a quarrel between the khan of hund and saiyid ahmad of bareilly, and found himself obliged to abandon his retreat at beka, and wander forth unknown and of no account; but after some years he settled down in a ziarat at ghulaman, in british yusafzai, and recovering his old reputation for sanctity and piety, his advice and prayers were again in great request. thence in time he removed to the village of salim khan, in the south-east of british yusafzai and on the border of the khudu khels, and, being generally regarded as a saint, was given the title of akhund by the learned moslem doctors of the day.
on two occasions was the akhund beguiled—possibly from some dread of loss of ascendancy among his co-religionists should he refuse—into taking up arms for “the faith.” in the year 1835, dost muhammad khan, amir of kabul, invited him to join his force near peshawar, with as large a body of his disciples as he could persuade to accompany him, and attack the camp of the sikhs. this the akhund did, and he and his following had some trifling success against the soldiers of the khalsa. but the arrival of ranjit singh to command the sikh armies in person was enough to send the amir flying precipitately through 114the khyber, and to scatter the akhund’s fanatical rabble in all directions. the akhund himself made for buner with a few followers, who quickly deserted him, and then, returning to his ascetic and secluded life, he settled for a time in ranizai territory. from here he moved a few years later to the village of saidu mandz, in the baizai district of swat, where he lived surrounded by numerous disciples and visited by crowds of devotees. the akhund gained such an ascendancy over the minds of his co-religionists that they believed all kinds of stories about him; that he was supplied by supernatural means with the necessities of life, and that every morning a sum of money, sufficient for his own needs and for the entertainment of the pilgrims who flocked to consult him, was found under his praying carpet. but most wonderful of all—he was never known to accept any present offered to him.
“his ascendancy over the muhammadans of the border and eastern afghanistan,” says oliver, “was as great as that of loyola in rome or luther in saxony; his edicts regarding religious customs and secular observances were as unquestioned as the papal bulls in spain. when the chiefs of swat recognised the possibility of british military operations extending to their valley and the necessity for federation, it was to the akhund they turned to select them a king. his selection was a saiyid of sitana, who for some years carried on an organised government under the patronage of the border pope. putting aside the incredulous stories about him as 115priest, his life seems to have been one of devotion, humility, abstinence and chastity; the doctrines he taught were as tolerant and liberal as those of his wahabi opponents were intolerant and puritanical. judged by the standard applied to other religious leaders, he used his influence, according to his lights, for good, supporting peace and morality, discouraging feuds, restraining the people from raiding and offences against their neighbours, and enforcing the precepts of muhammadan law as far as ineradicable pathan custom would permit him.”
his ascendancy
for many years after settling at saidu mandz, he held himself aloof from secular affairs, preached peace towards all men, and counselled the tribesmen to cultivate friendly relations with the british government. in 1847 he did his best to prevent the swatis from assisting the baizais, whom we were engaged in punishing. when the mutineers of the 55th native infantry, flying from mardan before nicholson, crossed the boundary into swat, he caused them to be deported beyond the indus; and he supported our government so far as lay in his power during the anxious days of the mutiny. he had always opposed the colonies of hindustani fanatics, so that his conduct in 1863, when during the ambela expedition he sided with them, seems difficult to explain. colonel reynell taylor believed, and his belief was shared by those at the time best able to judge, that the akhund had taken the line he did in fear that if he did not show sympathy with buner on this occasion, his influence might pass to some more compliant leader. 116the pressure brought to bear on him was practically irresistible; the adjurations of the buner chiefs and people had been most passionate, all the mullahs of the country, with many of the women, having been deputed to beseech him to adopt their cause.
the expedition having come to an end, he went back to his former life, and never again took the field. he was then already seventy years of age, and thenceforth until his death in january, 1877, he did his best to hold in check the wild spirits of the border.
during his residence in saidu mandz the akhund married a woman of a neighbouring village; she bore him two sons and a daughter. the elder of the sons was abdul manan, alias mian gul, who, after the death of the akhund, became involved in a struggle for supremacy in swat with the khan of dir, and in 1883, aided by the chief of bajaur and the name of his father, he established himself for a brief period before his death. the younger son, abdul khalik, was, as his father before him, an ascetic and a hermit, but he had no influence whatever, and was unknown beyond the boundaries of his own valley.
“no border pontiff has yet arisen,” writes the author of across the border, “who can successfully fill the chair of his eminence abdul ghafur, the akhund of swat.”
the akozais, the inhabitants of swat, are separated into five divisions:
1.
baizai.
2.
ranizai.
3.
khadakzai.
4.
abazai.
5.
khwazozai.
divisions of the akozais
117the baizais inhabit the country on the left bank of the swat river from the borders of kohistan as far as and including thana; the division contains three sub-divisions, and of these certain sections live beyond the limits of the swat valley, in the ghurban, kana, puran and chakesar valleys, the drainage of which finds its way into the indus. in addition to the baizai there are also the sam, or lowland, baizai, who occupy the land from our border to the foot of the hills below the morah pass. the villages in this territory formerly belonged to the baizai maliks, and were occupied by their tenants and servants, but have now become independent.
the ranizais occupy the left bank of the swat river from the district of the most southerly sub-division of the baizais at thana to the utman khel boundary, which is about three miles above the junction of the swat with the panjkora. to the north their territory extends to the river, and includes the islands between the different channels, while the southern boundary is formed by the watershed of the hills on that side. the importance of the division lies mainly in their possession of the malakand and shakot passes; the digar pass, which is further to the west, also leads into the ranizai country, but the pass itself is partly in the hands of the utman khels.
formerly the whole of the country from the hills to the british border, now held by the sam ranizais, belonged to the ranizai division, as the people known as sam ranizais, and who are now independent, were originally servants and tenants of the ranizais.
118the ranizais contain five sub-divisions, and their principal village is aladand, at the mouth of the shakot pass.
the khadakzais are on the right bank of the swat river, extending from abazai territory to the country of the dusha khel; the principal village is barangola.
the abazais inhabit a small valley on the right bank of the swat river immediately below the adinzai sub-division of the khwazozais. both the abazais and the khadakzais are insignificant divisions of the akozai tribe, numbering between them no more than 750 fighting men, and within recent years these divisions and the adinzai sub-division of the khwazozai, which is stronger than the two combined, have been handed over to the khan of dir. the importance of the adinzai sub-division consists in their possession of the village of chakdara, where the river is bridged, and which is on the main route from india to bajaur and chitral. the swat river runs here in six channels, covering about three-quarters of a mile of ground; the village is on a bank 60 feet high, and some 600 yards from the nearest branch of the river. an iron girder bridge crosses the river three-quarters of a mile below the village, and there is a fort on the right bank.
the khwazozais are, next to the baizais, the strongest division of the swat clan; they are separated into five sub-divisions, and occupy the valley on the right bank of the river from kohistan to chakdara.
besides the above five divisions of the akozai clan, 119mention must be made of some others who inhabit territory adjacent to the country of swat. the dusha khels are yusafzais, whose territory lies south of the talash valley and east of the panjkora, running down in a narrow wedge between that river and the khadakzai country to the banks of the swat river. their country is very mountainous, they themselves are very independent in character, and bear a reputation for thieving. they have been handed over to the khan of dir.
north of swat proper, in swat kohistan, live the torwals and the garhwis, and in the panjkora kohistan are the bashkaris. little is known of these tribes, but they are not pathans, and are probably the descendants of the races occupying dir and swat prior to the arrival upon the scene of the pathans. the roganis, katnis and gurohs, who are supposed to be of kafir descent, are also located in dir.
operations.
up to the year 1895 the only akozais of swat with whom the british had had any dealings were the baizais and ranizais, who inhabited the country south of the morah mountain.
operations in 1847
operations against the baizais, 1847.—the first time we came in contact with these people was in october 1847, when major george lawrence, then holding the peshawar valley for the sikhs, was fired on by the men of the baizai village of babuzai, and, obtaining no satisfaction for the outrage, he determined to attack the village. this was awkwardly 120placed; a direct attack was inadvisable, for babuzai was situated at the further extremity of a cul-de-sac, 500 yards long and 300 yards broad, formed by two short, steep and rugged spurs from the lofty ridge of hills dividing lundkhwar from sudum. only the year previously the village had repulsed a superior force under the sikh sirdar, sher singh. the force under major lawrence was composed of a brigade of all arms belonging to the sikh durbar, aided by the newly-raised corps of guides. it was discovered that the heights above the village could be gained, and major lawrence accordingly sent some levies of the sudum chief, with thirty bayonets of the guides, to ascend the heights by night and co-operate at daybreak with the main frontal attack. early on the 11th major lawrence advanced, but one of his columns was at first driven back; the rear attack being now seen descending on the village, a general assault was ordered, and babuzai was carried and burnt. it being ascertained that men from palai, in sam baizai, had assisted in the defence of babuzai, major lawrence moved thither on the 14th, inflicted some loss on the enemy, destroyed the village and retired.
our casualties had been only one killed and thirteen wounded, and the moral effect of these operations was such that a few days after ten villages made their submission, several of which had never before tendered allegiance either to the durani or to the sikh rulers.
two years after these events the peshawar valley 121was annexed, and then and thereafter the swatis proved themselves bad neighbours. plunderers and marauders, mounted and on foot, issued from swat, passed through ranizai, and raided into our territory. they kidnapped almost all classes except pathans; and swat became an alsatia where evilly-disposed persons, criminals of all shades, and people hostile to the british government were readily granted help, asylum and countenance.
in october 1849 it was reported that the whole of the utman khel villages of sam baizai had refused to pay revenue or to receive the native revenue collector, and that the people were all preparing for war. the deputy-commissioner of peshawar urged that a military force should be sent into the country, pointing out that, whereas the sikhs collected their annual revenue under the cover of a considerable military force, none of our troops had ever been seen near this part of our border, and the hill tribes therefore imagined we had either no force to employ, or were afraid to entangle it in those fastnesses.
expedition of 1849
expedition against the sam baizais, 1849.—an expedition was sanctioned and a force as below detailed, and, under command of lieutenant-colonel bradshaw, c.b., 60th rifles, left peshawar on the 3rd december, 1849:
2nd troop, 2nd brigade horse artillery.
200 bayonets, 60th rifles.
300 bayonets, 61st foot.
13th irregular cavalry.[57]
122a company bombay sappers and miners.
3rd bombay native infantry,
strengthened later by the corps of guides and 100 bayonets, 1st punjab infantry.
on the 11th december colonel bradshaw moved with his whole force against the village of sanghao. this was situated in a very strong position, but, attacked in front and on both flanks, it was soon carried, the enemy effecting their retirement by a path up the height in rear of the village, which had not been noticed. the enemy were here very numerous, having been largely reinforced from buner. their loss was considerable; our casualties amounted to four killed and eighteen wounded.
on the 13th december the force marched to a position at the mouth of the bazdara valley, near the villages of palai, and of zormandai and sher khana in sam baizai. the enemy were here in great force; 5000 of them occupied a hill to the right of and commanding palai, while hills to the right and rear of the other villages were held by large bodies. they were also in strength in the valley in front of palai, their right and left resting on the hills which enclosed it. the hill to the right of palai was first stormed and captured, when the left was also turned, and the force swept up the valley, carrying and destroying the villages and driving off the enemy. colonel bradshaw then withdrew unmolested from the valley. our losses were three killed and twenty-two wounded. the enemy had been in great strength—the local fighting men having been assisted by people from 123swat proper numbering 5000 to 6000—and it was afterwards known that reinforcements of 15,000 were hastening to the scene when news of the defeat reaching them caused them to turn back.
trouble and outrage
this expedition did not have the effect of causing outrage and trouble to cease; raids continued by the tribesmen either upon one another or upon our subjects; in 1855 and 1857 disputes were constant, while during the ambela expedition the inhabitants of british baizai flocked in numbers to assist the bunerwals, and gave a good deal of trouble by cutting up stragglers between the british position and the rear. the suggestion that a punitive force should be sent against them was made, but was negatived. after the close of the campaign, however, the tribal maliks were sent for and a fine of rs. 2500 was imposed upon them.
the effect of this measure was, temporarily at any rate, to check outrage in our territory, while it seems to have led to disagreement, feud and fighting among the tribesmen themselves. serious fights took place between the men of different villages, the aid of villages within and without our border was invited and accorded, and a regular warfare, disturbing the whole of that portion of the frontier, went on for some time. heavy fines inflicted in 1865 did something to remedy the disturbed state of affairs, but in the following year quarrels broke out afresh, and it became evident that this lawlessness must be suppressed lest other districts should be affected. it was therefore determined to move out a force, the object 124of whose employment was merely to destroy certain refractory and aggressive villages, but which at the same time had to be strong enough to resist any combination of tribes which might be brought against it. on the 15th january, 1866, then, a force of 4000 men with twelve guns was assembled at nowshera, under the command of brigadier-general dunsford, c.b., and moved out to mardan. here it was found that the approach of a punitive force had of itself been sufficient to cause some of the villages to come to terms; the troops then marched on, destroyed the villages of sanghao, mian khan and barmul, and the inhabitants of these were forced to rebuild upon other and less inaccessible sites. after this there was an occasional recrudescence of trouble, but finally the people of baizai, realising how easily they could be reached and punished, made overtures to the assistant-commissioner of yusafzai, concluded satisfactory arrangements for the settlement of all outstanding claims, and for some years they gave us small cause of complaint.
colonel bradshaw’s operations in 1849 against the sam baizais had opened the eyes of the swat chiefs to the possibility of their own valley being one day visited by us, and they became alarmed. it was agreed to combine for defensive purposes under some one responsible chief, and to nominate a king of swat. there were naturally many claimants for the appointment, and the selection seemed likely to lead to so serious a broil as actually to defeat the union which it was proposed to establish. finally the akhund of 125swat suggested the election of saiyid akbar of sitana, a former follower and functionary of the famous hindustani fanatic, saiyid ahmad of bareilly, and he was accordingly installed. he appears to have marked his accession by the creation of a standing army, and eventually managed to collect a force of 800 mounted men, 3000 footmen and five or six guns. towards the end of 1861 the swatis began to move large bodies of armed men to the foot of the morah mountain and into sam ranizai for the purpose of creating disaffection on our border; and on the 6th march, 1862, a party of 180 horsemen, under mukaram khan, formerly of the peshawar police, made a sudden attack by night upon thirty sabres of the guides cavalry escorting a survey party, and who were stationed at the british village of gujar garhi. the guides, under ressaldar fateh khan, repelled the attack with great gallantry, inflicting a loss at least equal to that they themselves experienced.
expedition of 1852
expedition against the ranizais, 1852.—it being evident that this party had passed through and had probably been harboured in the sam ranizai territory, it was determined to punish them as a tribe. a force was accordingly got together under the command of brigadier sir colin campbell, k.c.b., and marched on the 11th march, 1852, from peshawar towards tangi. it was composed as follows:
1st troop 1st brigade, horse artillery.
600 bayonets, 32nd foot.
15th irregular cavalry.[58]
126wing, 29th native infantry.[59]
66th gurkha regiment.[60]
the force had reached turangzai when, on the 14th, the sam ranizais sent in offering to submit to any terms imposed, but this was evidently no more than a ruse to gain time, for the maliks shortly after declared they would oppose us and were expecting assistance from swat. the delay, however, had also favoured the british, since it enabled two heavy howitzers with elephant draught to join sir colin from peshawar. the force now marched on, and arrived on the 21st at our frontier village of sherghar, about eight miles from shakot.
the maliks now and again on the 22nd, while the force was marching to shakot, made offers of submission; they were told that the advance would continue into the ranizai valley, but that if all our terms were accepted no damage would be done to either villages or crops. eventually, after much shilly-shallying, the ranizai maliks tendered full submission, and conducted the force as far as dargai, close to the foot of the malakand pass. the general encamped that night at sherghar, returning peshawarwards on the 23rd.
in the following month some ranizais were implicated in an attack by the utman khels on the village of charsada, in hastnagar,[61] and while the fine imposed upon the tribe in march had not yet been liquidated, they now refused payment 127and repudiated the hostages who had been taken for its settlement. further coercion now, therefore, became necessary, and on the 15th may, a force, as detailed below and numbering 3270 of all arms, was assembled at sherghar under sir colin campbell:
six guns, 1st troop 1st brigade, horse artillery.
two guns, no. 19 light field battery.
32nd foot.
2nd irregular cavalry.[62]
guides cavalry.
1st punjab cavalry.[63]
2nd company sappers and miners.
28th native infantry.[64]
66th gurkha regiment.
1st punjab infantry.
from reports received it was evident that considerable numbers were flocking from swat and other parts to shakot to defend the ranizai valley, and that many ghazis had come over the passes to fight against us.
action at shakot
on the 18th the force moved on to shakot, situated between a very deep and narrow nullah on the east and some hills on the west, and here it was seen that the enemy were in strength, holding a position about a mile and a half long on the edge of the nullah. the horse artillery guns shelled the centre of the position with great accuracy, but the enemy stood firmly, availing themselves of the broken ground for 128cover. the guides and gurkhas now stormed the nullah, covered by the guns and supported by the 1st punjab infantry and the light company of the 32nd. a heavy fire and stern resistance were encountered, the tribesmen charging into the midst of the gurkhas and fighting hand-to-hand. the guns were advanced closer, and the enemy at last broke, some ascending the hills in rear of shakot and others making for the malakand pass. in their retreat the enemy lost heavily, both from the fire of the guns and the sabres of the cavalry. our casualties only amounted to eleven killed and twenty-nine wounded.
in addition to the armed villagers, about 4000 infantry and 500 mounted men, all from swat, had opposed us, while the king and the akhund had watched the fight from the crest of the malakand pass.
shakot and dargai were now completely destroyed, and the troops returned to sherghar on the following day. on the 20th the whole of the ranizai valley was traversed, and eight villages and much grain were destroyed, no opposition being met with. on the 22nd a strong force of all arms visited and burnt the village of hiro shah, nine miles distant, being followed, on retirement, by a matchlock fire until quite clear of the hills and ravines, but no casualties were sustained. the force then marched back through lundkhwar to gujar garhi, where it was broken up, and before the end of the next month the ranizais had tendered unconditional submission.
heirs of the akhund
129it was very evident that swat was the fountainhead of all this offending, and there were at this time some thoughts of despatching an expedition thither via the malakand pass. the idea was, however, eventually abandoned, and the necessity for an expedition did not again arise, for the swatis seemed to realise how heavy had been the punishment inflicted on the ranizais, and dreaded similar operations in their own valley. they abstained, therefore, from annoyance, and for some time at least the peshawar districts enjoyed immunity from marauding, either instigated or perpetrated by men from swat. strangely enough, the troubles of the mutiny year were not taken advantage of by the leaders in swat. the king died on the very day that the first news of the outbreak at meerut reached peshawar, and the akhund took no action inimical to british authority—on the contrary, as has been already stated, he deported the mutineers of the 55th native infantry who sought an asylum in swat. in 1863, however, he adopted a different line; but thereafter he invariably advised his people to behave as good neighbours, to meet our just demands, and comply with our terms. when he died he left two rival factions in his country; one was headed by sherdil khan, chief of the ranizais; the other by abdul manan, alias mian gul, the eldest son of the akhund.
with the death of the akhund in 1877 the ranizais again began to give trouble on our border, and the villagers of shakot acquired a bad name for harbouring outlaws and disregarding the orders of our frontier 130officials. this state of things could not be permitted to continue, and on the 13th march, 1878, colonel r. campbell left mardan to punish the men of shakot, accompanied by the hazara mountain battery, 249 sabres and 428 bayonets of the corps of guides, arriving unsuspected, within two miles of shakot, at 2 a.m. on the 14th. two companies of infantry were sent to seize a small detached hill commanding the village on the north-west, and when, at daybreak, the remainder of the force advanced, the headmen of shakot, seeing the hopelessness of resistance, came forward and made an unconditional surrender, no shot having been fired on either side. all our demands were at once agreed to without demur, thirty-three hostages were selected, and no attempt to assist shakot was made by any of the neighbouring villages, whose headmen now arrived to pay their respects. the troops remained in occupation of the village until 10 a.m., when the retirement commenced, and mardan was reached the same evening, the men having marched nearly fifty miles in twenty-four hours.
in this same year the two sons of the late akhund endeavoured to preach a jehad, but the movement was an utter failure. in 1880 sherdil khan died, and the chief political power in swat passed to rahmatulla khan, the chief of dir, who remained passive when, during the afghan war, the mohmand mullahs tried to stir up the tribes of dir and swat to attack our communications near jalalabad. in 1883 a desultory contest was carried on between mian gul 131and the khan of dir for supremacy in swat, but in march 1884 these two came to terms. during the next six years, however, the swat valley was greatly disturbed, and its people divided into factions, by the ambitions of umra khan of jandol, of whom more will be said later. abdul manan, otherwise mian gul, the akhund’s eldest son, died in 1887, and was succeeded by his brother, abdul khalik, and the political trouble was increased by the fact that mian gul had left two young sons, who had also supporters. in all these questions the indian government did not meddle, but since the easiest way to our outposts in chitral led by swat, it was impossible to permit any other power to acquire an influence over these countries, and by the durand mission our claims to include swat, dir and bajaur within our sphere of influence were pressed, and in some degree admitted.
appearance of umra khan
in 1890 umra khan expelled and dispossessed the khan of dir, and in 1893 he attacked the dusha khel and drove out the khan of aladand, putting in a nominee of his own. in the same year the last surviving son of the akhund died, and the succession, though temporarily in abeyance, was recognised in a son, saiyid badshah, of the elder mian gul. then, for the next two years, there was continual internal fighting in swat, but, so far as the indian government was concerned, it appeared that while the khans were anxious to be loyal, the priesthood was persistently preaching against us.
prior to the year 1895 no british troops had ever entered the swat valley, and the events which led to 132this forward policy, with the operations which resulted, will be found described in chapter vii.
the swatis opposed us in that year on the malakand, but quiet and friendly feelings were soon restored, and on the withdrawal of our force they seemed to acquiesce in the establishment of our posts on the malakand at the entrance to their valley, and at chakdara where their river was bridged. when umra khan fled from swat, the khan of dir returned, reassumed possession of his original territory, and became heir to that of his immediate predecessor; but his rule was not altogether acceptable or popular. there was a good deal of friction and constant faction fights; the khan interfered perhaps rather more than was wise, and his subjects made constant appeals to the british political agent at the malakand. so far as our presence in the country was concerned, no resentment was shown, and the annual reliefs of the chitral garrison were carried out in 1896 and 1897 without a shot being fired in swat.
early in 1897 the swatis, like all pathans along the border, had been influenced and disquieted by the preachings of the hadda mullah and others in dir and swat, but no serious trouble was anticipated until, about july, there appeared in lower swat a buner mullah, afterwards known as “the mad fakir.” regarded everywhere at first as an irresponsible lunatic, his preachings soon attracted earnest attention and large audiences, but no actual disturbance was expected to result.
attacks on the malakand and chakdara, july 1331897.—late on the 26th july, however, disquieting rumours as to the success of the mad fakir’s teaching reached the political agent; later still it was reported that this pestilent priest had reached aladand with a large gathering, and it was arranged to send out a column to seize the amandara pass, about a third of the way to chakdara, while the guides at mardan were asked by telegram to reinforce the malakand garrison as soon as possible. two reports now came in from the swat valley close upon one another. the first was from chakdara, stating that the fakir with his following had already passed khar village on his way to the malakand; the second was brought in person by a jemadar of levies, who announced that the fakir was now close at hand with a gathering of armed men swelled by every village through which he had come.
attack on the malakand
the troops of the malakand brigade were under the command of colonel meiklejohn, c.b., c.m.g., and occupied a rather extended position. to the south-west of the kotal and, in a direct line some 500 yards from it, was a fort garrisoned by 200 men of the 24th punjab infantry. north of the kotal, in a hollow known as “the crater,” were located six companies each of the 24th punjab infantry and 45th sikhs, and no. 5 company madras sappers and miners, with the engineer park and commissariat stores. on the high ground on either side of “the crater” were picquets, and to the front, closing in the camping grounds, was an isolated conical hill, called “gibraltar,” also held by a picquet. on either 134flank of “gibraltar” a road wound down to the valley; that to the west led to a second camp—north camp—situated on flat open ground within a breastwork, while the eastern road led down to the valley, and, passing through the amandara defile, ran on to chakdara and chitral. north camp was held by one squadron 11th bengal lancers (less twenty sabres at chakdara), no. 8 bengal mountain battery, and six companies, 31st punjab infantry; chakdara, at the bridge-head of the swat river crossing, had a garrison of twenty sabres of the 11th bengal lancers, and 180 men of the 45th sikhs; while at dargai, at the southern foot of the malakand pass, were 200 rifles of the 31st punjab infantry.
arrival of reinforcements
at 10 p.m., on receipt of the news brought by the levy jemadar, the “alarm” was sounded, and the troops had barely reached their posts when the attack opened. a party of the 45th sikhs seized the gorge, through which the old buddhist road descends from the kotal, just in time to check a rush of tribesmen; but the enemy succeeding in occupying the high ground on either side of the gorge, the sikhs fell back to a more commanding position in rear, where they withstood all attacks until 2 a.m., at which hour the enemy here beat a retreat. meanwhile large numbers had advanced along the main road, drove in the picquets, rushed the serai held by levies, attacked the bazar, and some forced their way into the commissariat enclosure. they twice charged the position in the centre of the camp held by the sappers and miners, and passed the abatis enclosing it, capturing a quantity 135of ammunition. a reinforcement of 100 men was sent for to the fort to reinforce the defenders of “the crater” camp, who were hard pressed, but at 4.30 a.m. on the 27th the enemy drew off. our casualties during the night had been one officer and twenty-two men killed, five officers (two of whom died) and thirty-one men wounded.
the troops in the north camp had not been seriously attacked, and were ordered to move out in pursuit, but, having arrived near khar village, were recalled, as a large hostile force was seen on the hills and in the valley beyond. the squadron of the 11th bengal lancers, however, pushing on, reached chakdara with two men and some horses wounded. this day north camp was evacuated, and the troops concentrated in the malakand position; the withdrawal, which was effected before dark, was rather harassed by the enemy. colonel meiklejohn had received a further welcome reinforcement before night in the arrival of the guides from mardan, the magnificent infantry of this corps covering the thirty-two miles in seventeen and a half hours. the reinforcement numbered 160 sabres and 300 rifles, of which latter fifty had remained at dargai to strengthen that post.
again on this night was an attack made, commencing at 8.30 and continuing until daylight, the centre and right being most closely pressed. the enemy were, however, everywhere repulsed with loss, while our casualties numbered eleven killed and forty-six wounded. throughout the 28th the enemy maintained 136a fire on the camp, and attacked again at night with great energy, but the troops had been employed during daylight in improving the defences, and the attack was more easily repulsed and without incurring so many casualties—two killed and sixteen wounded during this night. on the 29th the position was further improved, the front cleared, and arrangements made for lighting up the ground over which the tribesmen must advance.
chakdara signalled that it was successfully holding out, and the reinforcements ordered by the military authorities were beginning to arrive. a squadron 11th bengal lancers came in escorting ammunition, and in the evening the 35th sikhs and 38th dogras reached dargai, the first-named regiment having lost twenty-one men from heat apoplexy on its march from nowshera.
again, on the night of the 29th–30th, was the attack renewed, chiefly against the flanks, but was everywhere repulsed with great loss, and the same may be said of the following night, when the attack, though repeated, seemed to have lost something of its energy and fire. on these two nights our losses were one man killed and nineteen wounded. on the 31st reinforcements, amounting to over 700, reached the malakand position, and that night the usual attack was not delivered.
relief of chakdara
on the 1st august colonel meiklejohn made an attempt at the relief of chakdara, but the start was rather delayed, and the enemy showed themselves in such strength that the orders had to be cancelled. 137on this date major-general sir bindon blood, having been appointed to command a newly organised malakand field force, arrived in the position, and approved of a strong force moving out at daybreak on the 2nd to effect the relief of chakdara. the relieving force, under colonel meiklejohn, was stoutly opposed all the way, but the determination of the enemy only made their losses the heavier, the cavalry getting among them with their lances and the sikhs with the bayonet. as the force drew near, the enemy surrounding the fort began to withdraw, their retirement being hastened by a vigorous sortie by the garrison. the relieving column had five men killed and twenty-eight wounded, while the casualties of the chakdara garrison only amounted to three killed and nine wounded during their six days’ close investment, standing continually to their posts by day and night.
that day the villages of aladand and thana were visited, no opposition being met with, and colonel meiklejohn’s column marched to and remained in camp at amandara in preparation for the reconstitution of the field force.
operations of the malakand field force, 1897.—to punish all the attacks above described, the government of india sanctioned the despatch of a force, to be known as the malakand field force, to concentrate, the first brigade at amandara, the second at khar and malakand, the reserve at rawal pindi and mardan.
138first brigade.
brigadier-general meiklejohn, c.b., c.m.g.
1st battalion royal west kent regiment.
24th punjab infantry.
31st punjab infantry.
45th sikhs.
second brigade.
brigadier-general p. d. jeffreys, c.b.
1st battalion the buffs.
35th sikhs.
38th dogras.
guides infantry.
divisional troops.
one squadron 10th bengal lancers.
11th bengal lancers.
guides cavalry.
no. 1 m.b.r.a.
no. 7 m.b.r.a.
no. 8 bengal mountain battery.
22nd punjab infantry.
two companies 21st punjab infantry.
no. 4 company bengal sappers and miners.
no. 5 company madras sappers and miners.
third (reserve) brigade.
brigadier-general j. h. wodehouse, c.b., c.m.g.
1st battalion royal west surrey regiment.
2nd battalion highland light infantry.
6 companies 21st punjab infantry.
13939th garhwal rifles.
no. 10 f.b.r.a.
no. 3 company bombay sappers and miners.
extent of the rising
by this time some idea could be formed of the extent of the rising and how far the neighbouring tribes were infected by the spirit of unrest which had been aroused. it was known that a division of the bunerwals, the utman khels, the inhabitants of lower swat, and certain numbers of upper swatis had taken part in the attacks upon the malakand position; not to mention the dusha khels, certain divisions of the khwazozais, and other sub-divisions, whose names would only be worth repeating as showing how general was the rising among the local clans. but the tribes further north did not seem to have been infected with any excitement or restlessness; communication between gilgit and chitral was still open. the indus-kohistan, the mohmand country, the khyber, kohat and kurram, all then appeared to be undisturbed; the nawab of dir reported that the bajauris had remained tranquil, as had also the tribes on the peshawar border. the only disquieting frontier news to hand at this time was to the effect that a number of mullahs, with a following of fanatical tribesmen, had left ningrahar and the neighbourhood of jalalabad to join either the hadda mullah or the mad fakir. the bulk of the attacking force had been furnished by the men of lower swat, hitherto, and with some reason, despised as fighting men. thus the khan of aladand, whose conduct had been exemplary since the chitral campaign, whose people 140were largely employed as levies, and who himself drew a subsidy from government, was among those killed in one of the attacks. thana lost nearly all its young men, and men of other villages, who for the last two years had regularly furnished supplies, turned out for this “holy war” in obedience to the exhortations of the mad fakir.
the concentration of the troops composing the malakand field force was completed on the 8th august; and already on the next day and on the 12th certain ranizai and khwazozai jirgahs came in to sue for peace, their submission being accepted on payment of heavy fines, surrender of arms, and promise of future good behaviour and non-molestation of the troops.
action at landakai
on the 16th sir bindon blood, leaving his reserve brigade at mardan and rustam to observe the buner passes, advanced by the left bank of the river towards upper swat, bivouacking at thana, and sending forward to landakai his cavalry, who reported that the enemy were holding the hills above the village in strength. the position at landakai was naturally a very strong one, and was occupied by some 3000 tribesmen behind sangars on a steep rocky spur running down to the water’s edge from the mountains on the south. this spur commanded the approach by a gorge, the road through which only permitted of an advance in single file; but further to the west another ridge came down from a height overlooking the landakai spur and ended at the village of jalala. the few tribesmen holding jalala 141were early dispossessed, and the ridge being then seized by the west kent regiment, it was occupied as an artillery position by a field and mountain battery, and a heavy fire was opened from here upon the landakai spur.
the rest of the infantry, with another mountain battery, moved to the right along the rear of this position, and occupied a spur commanding the enemy’s left flank. the tribesmen, prevented from reinforcing this flank by the heavy infantry and gun fire from the jalala spur, began to waver and then to fall back. many escaped by the morah pass, and those who held on to the position were driven from their sangars by the advance of the whole of the infantry, who pursued them to kota, the cavalry following as far up the valley as abuwa, on the barikot road, and doing considerable execution. our losses this day were light—two killed and nine wounded. on the two following days the force moved on by ghalegai to mingaora, encountering no opposition, and finding the inhabitants ready enough to tender their submission and furnish supplies. from mingaora, where the force remained some days, reconnaissances were sent out in all directions, the country was as far as possible disarmed, and the terms of submission were enforced. by the 22nd august jirgahs, representing all the upper swat clans, had agreed to unconditional surrender, and the force then commenced to withdraw, reaching khar and the malakand on the 27th.
while the headquarters and the first brigade had been operating in upper swat, the second brigade had 142remained at khar to overawe the people of lower swat, pushing reconnaissances in all directions, the inhabitants remaining perfectly submissive. there had been some idea of employing this brigade for the punishment of the bunerwals and utman khels, implicated in the recent rising, but by this time the frontier generally was in a blaze, and it was decided that two of sir bindon’s brigades should be sent through dir and bajaur in order to co-operate with the mohmand field force from nawagai: these operations, in which the second and reserve (third) brigade were employed—the first brigade remaining in occupation of swat—will be found described in chapter vii.
since this year there has been no further outbreak of fanaticism and no other trouble in swat, and the prosperity of the country has made very real progress.
