the trans-frontier portion of this tribe occupies the country between the rud river on the north, the panjkora and swat rivers on the east and south-east, and the ambahar river on the south and south-west: their neighbours being the bajauris on the north, the akozai yusafzais or swatis on the east, and the mohmands on the west; while the peshawar district is the southern boundary. the country is a network of low hills and nullahs, and is generally unfertile and unproductive. the cis-frontier people of the tribe own certain lands in the northern portion of the yusafzai plain, originally bestowed upon them by the baizais, when these, some time in the sixteenth century, were being pressed by the ranizais. in the course of time the baizais have practically been pushed from their own country by the utman khels. the utman khels hold the villages situated on the spur running down from the pajja and morah ranges, and also the villages of shamozai and matta, on the north-west slopes of the ganga ghar mountain.

the utman khel are said to be sarbani pathans of 144the kodai karlanri branch, who moved eastwards with the yusafzais when these migrated from their earlier homes north-west of the suleiman range, occupying their present territory simultaneously with the yusafzai conquest of swat. they are a hardy set of mountaineers, of good physique, hardworking, many of them eking out a scanty livelihood as labourers about peshawar; “often,” so oliver tells us, “naked from the waist up—a custom opposed to pathan ideas—but not very civilised. they live in small groups of houses, rather than villages, stuck on the mountain side, secure in their inaccessibility.” there are no chiefs of any importance among them, and they are a very democratic people. they are estimated to number some 9,000 fighting men, poorly armed. the trans-frontier utman khels have always held themselves rather aloof, and few of them enlist with us; but the cis-frontier men have lately taken more freely to service in the levies, and even in the indian army, and are said to make excellent soldiers.

their country lies on both banks of the swat river until the limits of the mohmand territory are reached, and here the river bends to the south and forms the boundary between the two tribes. the country is throughout very difficult, there are few roads passable by any but a pedestrian, and the only means of crossing the swat—here rushing a deep swift torrent between steep cliff-like banks—is afforded by a few rope bridges. to the north of the river are a number of valleys between spurs running out from the koh-i-mohr. to the south and south-east of this mountain 145are the important divisions of barang and ambahar; to the north-east lies arang; and south of the swat river, and between it and british territory, is the narrow hilly tract of laman or daman, traversed by the sulala range.

utman khel clans

the tribe is divided into eight main clans as under:

1.

ismailzai.

2.

mandal.

3.

alizai.

4.

matakai.

5.

gurai.

6.

peghozai.

7.

bimarai.

8.

sinazai.

the ismailzai is by far the largest and most important clan, and occupies the right bank of the swat river and the northern slopes of the koh-i-mohr. the three last-named clans of the tribe live in totai on the left bank of the swat below its junction with the panjkora, within sam ranizai limits, and separated from the laman by the jhindai valley. the laman accommodates a number of other tribes besides the utman khel.

the roads leading from our territory into the utman khel country are all difficult, but there is a good road from matta, on the mohmand border, through pandiali to ambahar. the dwellers in laman can be easily coerced, but in their time, and particularly during the first years of british occupation of the frontier country, they have given a great deal of trouble, raiding the border and sheltering outlaws.

the utman khels are quite a distinct people, being unconnected with any of the pathan races which 146surround them—whether mohmands, bajauris, or yusafzais; they have more than once waged war with the mohmands, but consider themselves to be on specially friendly terms with the shinwaris.

operations.

in the middle of the last century the favourite raiding ground of the restless spirits of the utman khels was the hastnagar division. early in 1852, they permitted one ajun khan, a notoriously disaffected man, to take up his residence in utman khel villages to the north of the district, and here he gathered together a band of adventurers like himself to raid upon our border. finally in april, ajun khan collected some 200 mounted men, attacked charsada, the headquarters of the division, plundered the treasury and slew some of our officials. on the following day he occupied abazai, and then visited pranghar and nawedand, where he took up his quarters. within a week, however, sir colin campbell was moving troops out against him from peshawar.

expedition against the independent utman khels, 1852.—sir colin campbell established his headquarters at abazai and there concentrated the following force:

first troop, 1st brigade horse artillery.

two 8–inch howitzers, 4th battalion artillery.

300 bayonets, 32nd foot.

one squadron 2nd irregular cavalry.

one squadron guides cavalry.

2nd company sappers and miners.

147300 bayonets, 28th native infantry.

300 bayonets, 66th gurkhas.

guides infantry.

expedition of 1852

on the 11th may the force moved out and destroyed nawedand, experiencing some slight opposition, and while the operations were in progress sir colin was joined by the 1st punjab infantry under captain coke, and by two squadrons of the 1st punjab cavalry under lieutenant hughes. these regiments had left kohat at 2 a.m. on the 8th and reached peshawar, forty miles distant, the same day; there was a delay in crossing the kabul river owing to the bridge of boats having been swept away, but by the evening of the 10th coke’s party was across, arriving at abazai at daybreak with a two hours’ halt en route. finding at abazai that sir colin had left to attack nawedand, coke again pushed on, took part in the attack, and returned with the force to abazai, having thus covered another forty miles, or a total of eighty since 2 a.m. on the 8th.

on the 12th general campbell moved about seven miles to gandera, and on the 13th he attacked, carried and destroyed pranghar, the stronghold of the utman khels, who were in considerable strength and held out gallantly against the fire of our ten guns. the force then withdrew.

at the end of this year the fort of abazai was erected for the better security of this part of the border.

after this expedition, the conduct of the independent utman khels—as distinguished from the utman 148khels of sam baizai—was uniformly good, and for more than twenty years the indian government had no grounds for any complaint against them. on the 9th december, 1876, however, an offence of the very gravest description was committed by this tribe, chiefly by men from ambahar and the laman; a number of them, instigated by persons of influence in british territory, attacking a body of unarmed coolies engaged in the preliminary operations connected with the canal about to be taken from the swat river near abazai. it appears that the party, consisting of a hundred men, surrounded the tents in which the coolies were sleeping about 2 a.m.; then, at a given signal, having cut through the ropes of the tents, threw them down and butchered the helpless, struggling inmates through the tent-cloth. the camp was then robbed of almost everything it contained, some of the dead and wounded being stripped of the very clothes on their backs. of the sixty-five coolies, six were killed and twenty-seven wounded, some dangerously. having plundered the camp, the raiders effected their escape to the hills before any assistance could reach the spot from fort abazai; but all the neighbouring headmen, suspected of complicity, were apprehended and sent into peshawar.

it seems probable that this raid would never have taken place if proper steps had been taken for the protection of the men employed on the canal works—a project, and the taking up land for which, known to have aroused suspicion and dislike; and it cannot be denied that sufficient precautions were not taken by 149the responsible officers to prevent an attack of this kind, when the work was being carried on so near the border. it could not, however, have well been anticipated that a muhammadan tribe would, without provocation and with no quarrel with the british government, attack and kill an unarmed body of their co-religionists—a dastardly outrage, which brought down upon the perpetrators the virtual excommunication of the aged akhund of swat.

expedition of 1878

operations against the independent utman khels, 1878.—in consequence of this affair, the utman khels were, as a tribe, excluded from british territory, but at the time it was not possible to take more active measures against them. at the beginning of 1878, however, it was proposed to government that an attempt should be made to surprise the village of sapri, where dwelt the man who had been the leader of the party concerned in the attack on the coolie camp; for it was felt that while he was at large and unpunished, any really satisfactory settlement with the tribe would be practically impossible; his village, moreover, was close to our border. the proposal was sanctioned, and at 7 p.m. on the 14th february, 1878, captain wigram battye,[66] accompanied by captain cavagnari,[67] marched from mardan with 264 sabres and twelve bayonets of the guides, the infantry mounted on mules.

the party moved by the main tangi-abazai road 150for some distance, but on arrival near tangi, the column turned off to the north, crossed the line of the swat canal, and arriving within two miles of abazai, left the horses there under a small escort. the troops had marched thirty-two miles, making a long detour so as to avoid villages whence news of the movement might have been conveyed across the border. moving on, the swat river was struck, and its left bank ascended for about four miles to mada baba ziarat, where a mountain torrent joins the river; and climbing a rough path by the side of this torrent, the kotal leading to the village of sapri was soon reached. it was still dark, but from here captain battye sent a small party on to a spur commanding the village, and especially the towers of the man particularly wanted for the outrage near abazai. with daylight the village was rushed, the tribesmen being taken completely by surprise, and mian rakan-ud-din, the leader, was shot down. some of his immediate attendants surrendered, and others bolted to the hills above the village, whence they kept up a desultory fire on the troops. but captain battye was able to withdraw his party to fort abazai without further molestation. our casualties were eight wounded.

as a result of this measure some of the utman khel villages showed themselves most anxious to effect a satisfactory settlement with government; others, however—those of zirak and pakhai—remained recusant, and consequently, while the submission of the repentant villages was accepted, it was decided to coerce 151the remainder. on the 20th march, therefore, lieutenant-colonel jenkins left mardan for the utman khel border with a force composed of four guns of the hazara mountain battery, 245 sabres and 453 bayonets of the guides. the zirak villages were first dealt with. the force entered the hills as day was breaking, and experienced no opposition at the first village, tarakai, but moving on from here entered a valley formed by the sulala range of hills and divided into two parts by the tor tam hill; on the near side of this hill were the remaining zirak villages, and on the other were those of pakhai. the first village was found to be deserted, but our troops were fired on from the others; the enemy were, however, easily dispersed and the remaining zirak villages cleared. leaving now the guides cavalry in occupation, colonel jenkins secured possession of the tor tam hill with the infantry and guns without any serious opposition, and thence had the pakhai villages at his mercy. the zirak and pakhai headmen were now called upon to submit, which they did after the usual hesitation, and agreed to pay the fines demanded of them. the force then withdrew from the valley unmolested, and bivouacked that night at the jhinda outpost of the swat canal works, having marched over forty miles since noon of the previous day. mardan was again reached on the 22nd.

punitive measures

during 1882 there was a slight revival of trouble in connection with the canal works, but thenceforward the utman khels gave us no cause for complaint until 1895, when some divisions opposed general 152low’s advance[68] at the passage of the swat river; they also shared in other attacks upon us during the operations of that spring, but no punitive measures were taken against them for these signs of hostility. in 1897 again large numbers of utman khels took part in the attacks on the malakand; some assisted their old enemies the mohmands in the fighting about shabkadar; and others again of the divisions which live on the further bank of the swat river helped in the assaults on chakdara, and later tried to seize the bridge over the panjkora, but were forestalled by general meiklejohn.

the trans-frontier utman khels thereafter only broke out once, joining the mamunds in the attack on general jeffreys’ camp described in chapter vii., but, on the whole, they remained quiet while our troops were in bajaur, and even helped to keep open the lines of communications where these passed near their border.

expedition against the utman khels, 1897.—as stated in chapter v., general blood had intended sending a brigade from lower swat into the utman khel country, but at the moment the services of the troops were required elsewhere, and operations against the utman khels had to be postponed. for the time, therefore, government contented itself with imposing terms upon such clans as had shown themselves hostile, and demanding the submission of the whole tribe. by the close of the year, however, the utman khel generally had evinced no inclination to comply 153with our terms, and on the 22nd november, therefore, a small force was collected to compel submission. it was concentrated near dargai, at the southern foot of the malakand pass, and was placed under the command of colonel a. j. f. reid; it was composed as under:

one squadron, 10th bengal lancers.

no. 8 bengal mountain battery.

no. 5 company madras sappers and miners.

1st battalion the buffs.

21st punjab infantry.

35th sikhs.

expedition of 1897

in addition to the above, the 16th bengal infantry was sent to abazai to protect the head of the swat river canal, and to help the local political officers in dealing with the utman khels of the laman. the initial destination of the force was the totai valley, and on the 23rd colonel reid marched to hariankot at the foot of the pass leading to kot, which was reached next day. the road over the pass, although it had been improved by working parties, was found very difficult for laden camels. on the west side of the pass the valley widens considerably, and is highly cultivated. the villagers of lower totai showed every sign of wishing to be friendly, and many jirgahs came in asking for terms. all the clans accepted our terms without hesitation, except the agra jirgah, and the force accordingly arranged to march into that valley. two routes were reconnoitred from kot, but that via silai patai was eventually adopted, although it required much work 154to make it passable. the villagers along the route proved very submissive, bringing in supplies, and the agra jirgah met colonel reid on their boundary to tender submission. on the 27th the troops marched to bargholai along a very difficult track through a narrow gorge. the agra valley was thoroughly explored, reconnaissances were pushed forward to the passes, and much useful survey work was done. all the representatives of the utman khel had now submitted except the kanauri ismailzai, so a small column was detailed to visit the kanauri villages, which lay high up in the hills above kot, to the west of colonel reid’s camp. the road was very bad and steep, but halfway there the jirgah was met hurrying down to submit.

by the 4th december all the clans had complied with our terms, and the troops were withdrawn to hariankot and the column broken up.

since that date this tribe has given no serious trouble to the british government.