1790
war with tippoo—19th take the field—advance on coimbatore—division under floyd detached towards guzzulhutti pass—frequent skirmishes—satyamunglum—dispersion of the army—advance of tippoo—19th hotly engaged—tippoo’s body-guard destroyed—retreat from satyamunglum—casualties—march in pursuit of tippoo—private parkes—the tapoor pass—tippoo eludes pursuit, and ravages the carnatic—army returns to madras.
in 1790, the government of india again became involved in war with tippoo. he had been constrained to sign the peace of mangalore by the withdrawal of the french alliance, and the coalition of the british and mahrattas against him. but the war had been a triumph for mysore arms. south of the kistna river, mysore was the most powerful state in india, and no single power could hold its own against the son of hyder ali. but tippoo failed to realize the increase of power of the english company, due to five years of peace. in 1785, a quarrel broke out between him and the mahrattas, who allied themselves with the nizam, and invaded mysore territory. the campaign that ensued was in tippoo’s favour, and peace was concluded between the contending parties in april[67] 1787. tippoo’s warlike restlessness continued to be a menace to the other powers in india. in the end of 1787, overtures for an alliance against him, were made to calcutta by the mahrattas. to this, lord cornwallis, who had assumed the direction of affairs as governor general and commander in chief in september 1786, gave a refusal. but nothing could keep tippoo quiet. in 1788 he sent an embassy to france, to propose an alliance against the english, and, in december 1789, he attacked the rajah of travancore whom we were bound by treaty to protect. preparations were at once made to punish the aggression, and orders were transmitted to madras for the commencement of operations against mysore.
the time had come for the 19th light dragoons to show their worth. one morning, early in january, came the news that war was imminent, and that the regiment was to join the army ordered to assemble at trichinopoly. “my men were on horseback, going to water, when the news arrived, and they received it with three most cordial cheers. nothing but good humour and high hope prevail in the army. my regiment is ready in all that depends on us, and willing beyond description.”[24] but great delay ensued, and some weeks elapsed before a move was made. the madras government disobeyed the stringent orders of cornwallis, to warn tippoo that an attack on travancore would entail war, and to take all necessary steps for prosecuting war if the attack was made. there was a complete want of military preparation. fortunately, on 19th february, major general medows arrived from england with full powers as governor and commander in chief in madras, and preparations for the campaign were made in earnest. a force was assembled near wallajabad, and marched for trichinopoly on 29th march. the 19th light dragoons at this time mustered 355[68] sabres. meanwhile tippoo took advantage of the delay to prosecute his conquest over travancore, which he would have completed, had not a small force from bombay, under colonel hartley, landed in travancore, in the end of april, and taken up a strong defensive position. on 24th may, general medows took command of the army at trichinopoly, amounting to about 15,000 men. on the same day, tippoo turned his back on travancore, and made his way northwards to confront his foes.
mysore, the heart of tippoo’s kingdom, is a high plateau from 2000 to 3000 feet above the sea, open towards the north, but fenced in to the east, south and west by precipitous, cliff-like ranges that overlook the low country outside, and are only passable for an army at certain places. tippoo had also extensive possessions in the low country, from which he drew large revenues and plentiful military supplies. according to the plan of operations adopted, medows was to advance on mysore from the southward, and, if possible, enter it by the guzulhutti pass, after making himself master of the rich low country about coimbatore, where abundant supplies could be obtained. as this movement would uncover madras, a small force was held at conjeveram, under colonel kelly, which was augmented later by a force of six battalions of sepoys and some artillery, that were dispatched overland from bengal. on the west, a force from bombay under major general abercromby[25] was destined to act against tippoo’s possessions in malabar, and, if events rendered it desirable, to effect a junction with medows. on the occurrence of tippoo’s attack on travancore in december, the peishwa had renewed his offers of alliance to lord cornwallis. this time they were accepted, and a triple convention between the peishwa, the nizam and the british, was concluded. by it, the two former engaged to attack[69] tippoo’s northern possessions at once with 25,000 horse, and after the rains, to act with their utmost means. so dilatory were their movements, that it was not till the following year that their operations had any share of importance in the campaign.
walker & boutall sc.
map to illustrate
mysore campaigns
on the 26th may, the army marched from trichinopoly, but, owing to badness of transport, it was not till 15th june that karoor was occupied. avaracoorchi and darapooram were occupied, on the 5th and 10th july respectively. tippoo was at this time at coimbatore, where it was hoped he would make a stand. the siege guns and stores were therefore deposited in darapooram, and the army advanced. information was soon received of his having gone northward, and ascended the defiles on to the mysore plateau, leaving a force of cavalry numbering from 3000 to 5000, under said sahib, as a corps of observation. after recovering the heavy guns, the advance was continued, watched by said sahib who fell back on coimbatore, with the intention of burning the town on the near approach of the british force. to prevent this, floyd with the cavalry was dispatched to occupy the town, which was accomplished on 21st july, the main body arriving the following day, while said sahib fell back to demiacotta on the bhowani river. floyd, with the 19th light dragoons, three regiments of native cavalry, two companies of sepoys and four 6 pr. guns, was dispatched in pursuit. about ten o’clock at night on the 22nd, after a thirty-mile march, he surprised near demiacotta a small body of horse, about thirty of whom were made prisoners. the exaggerated accounts they gave him, led him to believe that the force with said sahib was larger than had been supposed. the fort of demiacotta having taken the alarm, opened fire, and, there being no forage obtainable, floyd considered it prudent to fall back a few miles. on the 28th, he moved forward again, and, on reaching the[70] banks of the river, discovered that said sahib had carried his force across the river, and was encamped on the other side. the bhowani river, at this time, was only fordable at certain places. a few long shots from the six pounders made said sahib decamp, and direct his march towards the guzulhutti pass. floyd then fell back to velladi, and remained in observation of the two roads leading from coimbatore to the bhowani river, moving occasionally to shawoor and occarro. on the 16th of august, colonel floyd with a corporal and six dragoons, set out from shawoor to visit occarro, where there was a troop of native cavalry on detachment duty. on arrival at occarro, it was reported to him that there was a body of the enemy’s horse in the neighbourhood. taking twelve men of the troop with his original escort, he went in search of them, and discovered them close to the village. he immediately charged them, and put the whole body to flight. four days later, major affleck[26] of the 19th light dragoons, with two troops of the 19th and an equal number of the 5th native cavalry, while patrolling, fell in with a large body of the enemy’s horsemen whom they instantly attacked, killing upwards of forty, and capturing twenty horses. not many days after this, an equally successful skirmish occurred under the command of lieut. bayly of the 19th light dragoons, who, with a troop of the 19th and two troops of native cavalry, put a large body of the enemy’s horse to rout, and drove them into the river. in a private letter written four months later, floyd says: “among a great number of cavalry skirmishes i was always successful, and fully established for the first time in india, the infinite superiority of european over native horse.”
while floyd was thus engaged to the north of coimbatore, a force under colonel oldham was sent against[71] erode, which surrendered, on the 6th august, after a feeble resistance. another force, under colonel stuart, was sent against dindigal, which surrendered, after one unsuccessful assault, on the 23rd august. several other small forts in the neighbourhood were also captured. further reinforcements were sent to stuart, who was directed to proceed against palghat. a breach was effected, and the place surrendered on 22nd september; but, before this, events had occurred that completely altered the aspect of affairs.
on the 26th of august, having been reinforced by three battalions of sepoys and five guns, floyd crossed the bhowani, and made himself master of the fort of satyamunglum, which was taken by surprise without any loss. a native battalion was placed in the fort, and all said sahib’s detached horsemen were driven into the guzulhutti pass. the force was then withdrawn to the south bank of the river, the fords of which were constantly visited by strong patrols. further reinforcements reached floyd, whose force now consisted of the 19th light dragoons and three regiments of native cavalry, h.m. 36th, and four battalions of sepoys, with eleven guns of different calibres. exclusive of the artillerymen, the force numbered about two thousand eight hundred fighting men.
so far, all had gone well in spite of much sickness in the army, and great difficulties due to the heavy rains. a chain of posts had been established to the foot of the guzulhutti pass, the flanks of the army were well protected, and tippoo’s garrisons had been expelled from every important place in the coimbatore district. the force under medows, at coimbatore, had been reduced to three native and two european battalions without their flank companies. floyd, with the force already mentioned, was watching the guzulhutti pass, some forty miles to the northward. with stuart besieging palghat, some thirty miles south west of coimbatore, were one regiment of[72] native cavalry, one european and five native battalions of infantry, besides six european companies belonging to three different regiments, and a detachment of artillery. besides this, there were detachments occupying karoor, erode, darapooram, dindigal, and a few other small posts. nothing but the fall of palghat was wanting to permit of a concentrated forward movement on the guzulhutti pass. to the eastward, the force that had been left at conjeveram under colonel kelly had been reinforced by the division from bengal, and had moved to arnee, where colonel kelly’s death gave the command to colonel maxwell. it consisted of one regiment of native cavalry, three european and eight native battalions of infantry, and some artillery, amounting altogether to nine thousand five hundred men. to the southward on the travancore border was colonel hartley, with one european and four native battalions of infantry, moving towards palghat, which he reached after its capture. the whole force was dangerously scattered, and tippoo, who had excellent intelligence of all that occurred, was not slow to take advantage of the circumstance. so far, the only active measure he had undertaken had been the dispatch of a small body of marauding horse into the carnatic by the changama pass. they plundered and burned porto novo, but did little other damage.
leaving seringapatam on the 2nd september, with forty thousand men and a large train of artillery, tippoo reached the guzulhutti pass on the 9th, and completed the descent in the two following days. floyd was not unaware of the increased force in his front, and of the reports of tippoo’s advance, and, in his report to medows, suggested the advisability of his falling back towards coimbatore. but the intelligence was disbelieved, and he was ordered to maintain his position. he was at that time encamped on the south side of the bhowani opposite to satyamunglum. on the 12th floyd dispatched an express messenger to[73] medows telling of the increased forces of the enemy, and that tippoo was advancing in person. at two o’clock in the morning of the 13th, cavalry picquets of the 19th light dragoons and 2nd and 5th native cavalry, under captain child of the 19th, were ordered to reconnoitre towards the poongar ford, about ten miles up the river. a few hours later, the 5th native cavalry, under major darley, was ordered to follow in support. by some mischance, darley took a different road from that which child had followed. tippoo had however begun to pass his troops over the river the day before, after the withdrawal of the morning reconnoissance, and child suddenly found himself opposed by a considerable body of horse. charging them at once, he drove them into the river, whereby many were killed and drowned: he then fell back by the same road. the country all around was laid out in small enclosures with cactus hedges, rendering it very difficult to see any distance. major darley, advancing by the other road, charged and overthrew a body of about two hundred horse, inflicting great loss, but was, immediately after, nearly surrounded by some six or seven thousand of the enemy’s cavalry. sending back news to the camp, he took up a position on some high ground where his flanks were protected by cactus hedges, and kept the enemy at bay by carbine fire. after some time he was joined by the 3rd native cavalry, and, a little later, floyd with the 19th light dragoons, and the picquets under captain child, attracted by the firing, came up. on seeing these reinforcements, the enemy drew off, floyd followed them up and inflicted heavy losses on them. two squadrons of the 19th charged a large body of the sultan’s body guard that had got entangled in an enclosure from which there was no outlet, and put upwards of five hundred, it is said, to the sword. the enemy’s leader was slain by a private dragoon, while his standard[74] bearer was cut down and the standard taken by a corporal. the green flag of islam was also captured. the field was cleared of every opponent, and the cavalry returned to camp. scarcely had they dismounted when a large force was seen approaching on the north bank of the river, whence some heavy guns were brought to bear. at the same time, a second force was perceived approaching the left flank along the south bank. this necessitated a change of position by our troops, and the sultan contented himself with keeping up a heavy cannonade, without a closer attack. during the whole day, the force remained in this trying position. floyd’s eleven guns were not only outnumbered, but were obliged to husband their ammunition which was limited. the cannonade ceased at nightfall, and the enemy withdrew to some distance. tippoo never liked camping too close to the english, for fear of a night surprise. of the english guns, three were disabled, and there had been serious casualties among the troops, the horses, and the gun bullocks. many of the bullock drivers had also deserted. the night was very dark with heavy rain, the infantry lay on their arms, and the cavalry remained at the heads of their horses. about midnight, it was determined to fall back upon coimbatore, through shawoor, the force having been driven from the direct line of retreat through velladi. it was necessary first to bring the garrison of satyamunglum across the river. in doing this, great delay ensued, and it was four o’clock before the troops could be put in motion. owing to the destruction among the gun bullocks, three guns were obliged to be left behind. fortunately for the english, the sultan’s army had been greatly inconvenienced by the heavy rain during the night, and it was some hours before tippoo could collect a sufficient force to follow the retreat. when he moved, his well-equipped artillery soon caught up the slow-moving british column, and pressed heavily on its flanks[75] and rear. the first attack was made by a body of cavalry, who fell upon the baggage, the greater part of which was lost, and the surgeon’s mate, sutherland, of the 19th light dragoons killed. the force reached occarro about eleven o’clock, but after a short halt was obliged to resume its march, as tippoo’s army was now moving on its flank. owing to the exhaustion of the gun bullocks, three more guns were obliged to be left behind there. the safety of the remaining guns was assured by a number of officers sacrificing their baggage, and giving their private bullocks to draw the guns. on account of the close nature of the country, the rear guard duty had to be taken by the infantry, and the cavalry was sent forward. during the whole march, the force was exposed to a continuous fire of musketry, heavy guns, and rockets, which was especially directed against h.m.’s 36th. on approaching shawoor, the enemy pressed so closely on the column, that the infantry were obliged to form up and show a front, while the cavalry, unable to act among the cactus hedges, led the column. at this moment, a report was spread that general medows had arrived to their assistance, and a detachment of the 19th light dragoons which had passed through shawoor, and appeared on the opposite side of the village, was mistaken for the head of his column. the news was greeted with cheers; and tippoo was also deceived by the report which spread through both armies. the infantry advanced, and drove back the enemy, whose discomfiture was completed by the cavalry, who pursued on both flanks, and completely cleared the field. the force remained in shawoor during the night, without being molested, tippoo, who at first believed the news of medow’s arrival, having drawn off to some distance. floyd fired three signal guns to show his position to general medows, who had marched on the same day to floyd’s assistance, but not being aware of his retreat by the[76] shawoor route, had marched on velladi, where he encamped that evening. floyd had received intelligence of medow’s march on velladi, and, recognizing the great importance of forming a junction, marched again before daylight, and reached velladi on the evening of the 15th. the enemy did not pursue, and the troops were enabled to get food and rest, after being three days without either. medows however was not at velladi, having gone on towards demiacotta, to which circumstance may be ascribed the peaceful march of floyd’s troops on the 15th. the junction between the two forces was effected on the 16th. the sultan, on hearing of medows’ movement towards demiacotta, withdrew on the same day to the north side of the bhowani. had he acted with greater energy, and pressed floyd’s force on the 15th, he might have won a great success. the troops were exhausted, and would have yielded to determined attacks on the third day of their retreat. in such an event, the disaster would certainly have extended to medows’ force, which consisted only of five incomplete battalions, and stuart’s force at palghat would also have been involved in ruin. the respect with which tippoo treated the retreating force was largely due to the gallant bearing of the 19th, and especially to the severe lesson they taught the enemy on the 13th. in addition to the six guns abandoned, the losses of the whole detachment under floyd, during the 13th and 14th, were as follows:—
europeans—
killed 43
wounded 98
missing 7
natives—
killed 128
wounded 137
missing 148
horses—
killed 22
wounded 8
missing 28
[77]
the infantry were the principal sufferers. the losses of the 19th light dragoons amounted to
killed—
1 assistant surgeon.
5 troopers.
wounded—
1 quarter-master.
8 troopers.
horses—
5 killed.
3 wounded.
five officers killed and eight wounded were among the casualties of the force, and nearly the whole of the baggage was lost. the losses of the enemy were very heavy, among the slain being tippoo’s brother-in-law and many leaders of note. in spite of their tactical success, the result of the two days’ fighting was to depress the spirits of tippoo’s men, while the minds of the british troops were proportionately elated at their successful retreat, in presence of such an overwhelming force. floyd received much credit, and medows was generous enough to acknowledge his error, in leaving the force in such an exposed position. tippoo ascribed his want of success to the cactus hedges, and, some years later, ordered them to be levelled throughout the whole district. the gallant bearing of the 19th light dragoons in this portion of the campaign, made an impression that spread to every native court in southern india, and gained them a reputation for fighting, that clung to them during the whole of their service in india.
on the 18th, medows marched from velladi, and returned to coimbatore on the 23rd, after visiting shawoor. at coimbatore, he was joined by colonel stuart from palghat. on the 29th he left coimbatore again, marching northward to the bhowani. tippoo meanwhile had gone towards erode, which fell into his hands on the 25th.[78] from erode, tippoo marched towards karoor, hoping to cut off a large convoy destined for medows’ army. medows followed, and received his convoy safely on the 7th october. tippoo meanwhile marched on darapooram, which he took on the 8th, and then marched towards coimbatore, where medows had left stores and heavy guns with but a feeble garrison. fortunately, under orders from medows, colonel hartley, on reaching palghat, had sent on three sepoy battalions, which reached coimbatore in time to save it from attack, and tippoo turned off northwards when within a few miles of the place. medows reached coimbatore on the 15th, and, after strengthening the defences, again marched for erode, which he reached on the 2nd november. some slight skirmishing with a small party of the enemy’s horse occurred on the march, during which private parkes of the 19th light dragoons signalised himself, while on flanking duty, by attacking, single handed, six horsemen whom he encountered in a narrow road, and bringing in three horses and a prisoner.
meanwhile, maxwell’s force had advanced from arnee, and entered the baramahal district near vaniembadi on the 24th october. this forced tippoo to leave the coimbatore district, and march northward to intercept maxwell. so well was the movement covered, that several days elapsed before medows discovered where he had gone. but tippoo, failing to find maxwell in a position favourable for attack, withdrew after threatening him for four days, and was nearly caught between two fires by medows’ advancing force. on the 17th, the two armies formed a junction, 12 miles south of cauveripatam. supplies were abundant, and medows was now at the head of the finest army the company had ever put into the field. but tippoo’s excellent system of intelligence, and the greater mobility of his army gave him the great advantage of choosing his own field of action, so long as[79] he was not brought to bay in the heart of his own country. he calculated with justice that, if he moved in the direction of the carnatic, medows would be obliged to follow him, and relinquish his projects on mysore. accordingly, on the 18th, he put his army in motion for trichinopoly by the tapoor pass. as fortune would have it, medows marched on the same day, with the intention of traversing the same pass, and reached it after the sultan’s army had begun to enter it. the british advance brigade, under colonel floyd, consisted of the 19th light dragoons, three regiments of native cavalry and three sepoy battalions. the sultan’s rear was covered by a body of two thousand cavalry, who showed a bold front. medows became over cautious, and waited for his artillery. so well were the mysore cavalry handled, that no advantage was gained beyond the cutting off from the pass of three battalions which were forced into the jungle. tippoo’s baggage also was unable to enter the pass, but suffered no loss; the main body got through, and continued its march without mishap. thus was let slip an opportunity of striking a severe blow under most advantageous conditions.
tippoo continued his march on trichinopoly, wasting the country as he proceeded, and hoping to make himself master of the place, which was not strongly defended, before medows could reach it. but the swollen state of the cauvery river saved the place from attack, and tippoo withdrew, in time to avoid medows, who arrived before trichinopoly on the 14th december. two days before this, lord cornwallis arrived in madras, with the intention of taking command of the army in the field; and at once summoned medows to bring the force to madras. meanwhile, tippoo turned northwards, and, ravaging the country as he passed, attacked tiaghur, a small rock fortress, under the walls of which a great number of the country people had gathered for protection. here also tippoo was rejoined[80] by his heavy baggage, which had become separated from him at the tapoor pass. after two assaults, which were repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants, the sultan left tiaghur, and marched on trinomalli which was not garrisoned. after a feeble resistance from the inhabitants, the place was plundered, and great barbarities committed. turning eastward, tippoo took permacoil, where there was only a single company of native infantry, whose commander had orders to retreat if threatened. owing to treachery, tippoo was able to surround the place before this could be done. tippoo then marched towards pondicherry, where he remained some time, and dispatched an embassy to france, proposing an alliance, and asking for a force of 6000 french troops to be sent him. medows followed the mysore force as far as trinomalli, whence he turned towards madras. the siege-guns and heavy stores were left at arnee, with a division under major general musgrave, and the remainder of the force reached vellout, eighteen miles from madras, on the 27th january 1791. before this, a brilliant success had been gained by colonel hartley, who, with three battalions, completely routed a large mysore force near calicut, on the 10th december, capturing tippoo’s lieutenant and two thousand four hundred prisoners, in the action and in the subsequent pursuit. the bombay force under general abercromby, whose movements had been greatly delayed, was not able to commence operations till the beginning of december. then tippoo’s garrisons in malabar were quickly captured, and the whole province occupied.
the mahrattas and the nizam had been tardy in their operations. both were unwilling to come within tippoo’s reach, until they could be certain of his being fully occupied with the english forces. on the 25th august, the mahrattas commenced operations, and, on 18th september, laid siege to dharwar. the attack was so badly conducted,[81] that the place did not capitulate till 4th april following, when the mahratta force, under pareshram bhow and hari punt, moved on toward seringapatam. the nizam moved in concert with the mahrattas, but delayed greatly, after crossing the kistna, before attacking kopaul, the siege of which was begun on the 28th october. the fortress capitulated on the 18th april following.
according to a muster roll taken at clive’s choultry on 24th december, the 19th light dragoons had fifty men in hospital, out of a total of 270 non-commissioned officers and troopers present. fourteen deaths occurred in the preceding six months. during the same period, 50 horses had died, and 14 had been rendered unfit for further service, out of a total effective strength of 386.
