1791–1792
cornwallis takes command of the army—advance on bangalore—order of march—floyd’s reconnoissance—imprudent advance—floyd badly wounded—casualties—capture of bangalore—advance on seringapatam—battle of arikera—army in great straits—forced to retreat—junction of mahratta contingent—19th sent to madras—rejoin cornwallis—advance on seringapatam—night attack—floyd detached to meet abercromby—seringapatam invested—peace made—tippoo’s hostages—19th return to shevtamodoo.
cornwallis assumed command of the army, at vellout, on the 29th january 1791. by taking the field in person, he ensured the fullest co-operation of the civil and military administration, while it was hoped that his presence at the head of the troops, would induce the nizam and the[82] mahrattas to prosecute the war with more vigour than they had yet shown. instead of attacking mysore from the south, as had been done in the preceding year, cornwallis proposed to operate on a more direct line. the considerations that had led to the rejection of this line in 1790, were, that seringapatam could not be approached without first taking bangalore, a place only second to seringapatam in strength. the siege of bangalore would have to be carried on at a distance of ninety miles from the nearest dep?t, amboor; and the country between seringapatam and bangalore was unfertile, and not likely to furnish much in the way of supplies.
the army left vellout on the 5th february. tippoo, who had remained in the neighbourhood of pondicherry, on hearing of the movement, hastily regained mysore by the changama and palicode passes. cornwallis, after making a feint towards amboor, which completely deceived the sultan, turned northwards, and carried the army through the mooglee pass without opposition. without firing a shot, the whole army was concentrated on the mysore plateau by the 18th february. here the army was joined by sixty-seven elephants from bengal, the first occasion of these animals being employed in any considerable number by a british force. hitherto, the movements of our armies had been greatly hampered by the difficulties of moving heavy siege guns; but on this occasion, by yoking the bullocks four instead of two abreast, and by the use of elephants to lift and push the guns in bad ground, the heavy guns were able to move with nearly as much ease as any other part of the army.
among other beneficial changes made by lord cornwallis, was an improvement in the order of march of the army. before this war, our armies in india had marched[83] with few cavalry and very small trains of artillery. they moved in a single column two or three files deep, with the stores, baggage and camp followers on one flank, covered by a strong party. this order was fatiguing to the troops, made rapid movement impossible, caused great delay in assuming any formation on coming in contact with the enemy, and exposed the camp followers and baggage to great losses from the enemy’s cavalry. colonel fullarton, in his brief campaign of 1783, remedied this, to some extent, by making the army move on a broad front of three brigades, the artillery and baggage following in rear covered on each flank by other brigades. the troops marched with intervals to permit of speedily forming line in any direction.
at the commencement of the campaign of 1790 the old order was reverted to. the battering train, which marched in rear of the column, often fell so far behind, that it did not reach the camping ground till the following day. it was then placed in the centre of the column. this only had the effect of delaying all in rear of the guns, and separating the army into two portions. it was then tried to improve matters, by placing the heavy guns in front of the column. this answered better when the guns were few, but with a large battering train gave bad results. the plan adopted by cornwallis, was to make the infantry and cavalry move in parallel columns, some distance apart. between them, moved two columns one composed of artillery and stores, while the other was composed of the baggage and camp followers, controlled by a baggage master. the army thus moved in a huge oblong, with the fighting men on the flanks. the front was covered by the advance guard, consisting of a cavalry regiment and the infantry picquets coming on duty. in the same way, the rear was covered by a regiment of cavalry and the infantry picquets last on duty, forming the rear guard.[84] the same order was observed in encamping. the infantry and cavalry camped in two lines, facing outwards, with the artillery, engineer corps, stores, baggage and camp followers in the space between. the order thus established by cornwallis during this campaign, may be said to have held good in india up till the present day.
this appearance of a british army on the plateau of mysore, marks the increase that had taken place in the military power of the east india company during the past five years. in our previous wars with hyder ali and tippoo, the operations of our armies had been confined to the low-lying country below the ghauts, and the scene of warfare had been almost always the company’s own territories in the vicinity of madras, or the territories of our native allies in the carnatic. now, for the first time, the war was carried into the very heart of mysore territory.
tippoo’s movements, at this time, were characterised by unwonted indecision and want of energy. instead of impeding and harassing the march of the army, he contented himself with watching the advance, with the intention rather of taking advantage of any mistake committed by the english commander, than of following any plan of his own.
on the 5th march, the british force reached bangalore, and took up its ground without any loss, beyond a few casualties caused by a distant cannonade on the march. on the following day, the army changed ground, and took up a better position on the north west face of the pettah.[27] in the afternoon, colonel floyd was detached to the south west of the town, to cover a reconnoissance by the engineers. he had with him his own brigade, consisting of the 19th light dragoons under captain child, and five regiments of native cavalry, besides a brigade of three battalions of infantry, with a detachment of artillery under major gowdie.
[85]
the work was satisfactorily accomplished, and the force was about to return, when a body of the enemy’s horse appeared. leaving the infantry and guns, floyd moved against it, and, on its giving way, discovered some mysore infantry, and guns, with large masses of baggage and stores, elephants, bullock carts, camels and all the paraphernalia of an eastern army on the march. tippoo was changing his ground, and, by accident, the reconnoitring party had crossed the rear of his line of march. disregarding his orders, floyd allowed himself to be persuaded to attack, by the young officers who were clamorous for the fray. the temptation was irresistible, and the cavalry advanced at a gallop. some parties of infantry were charged and broken, and nine guns captured. as the advance continued, the ground became much broken with ravines and low rocky hills. the horses were exhausted, and the enemy, collecting their forces, opened a heavy fire of musketry and rockets that checked the advance. at this moment, floyd fell from his horse, apparently dead, with a musket ball in his head. at his fall, the squadron behind him made a half wheel to avoid trampling on their leader. this threw the line into confusion, the flank squadrons took it for a signal to retire, and, in a few moments, the whole force was falling back. fortunately for floyd, corporal murray and private buchanan remained with him, and, examining his wound, found that it was not mortal. murray remained with him, while buchanan galloped after the regiment, and in a short time returned with a troop of the 19th, under cornet roderick mackenzie: floyd was mounted on buchanan’s horse and brought back to the regiment. he was able to halt the regiment, and show a front to the enemy, which checked them; but darkness was coming on; the enemy pressed on, and the confusion was very great. the exhausted horses were scarcely able to get back through the[86] ravines they had cleared with ease in their advance, and had it not been for the good judgment of major gowdie, who had advanced a mile beyond the place where he had been left, and covered the retreat with his brigade, the losses would have been very great. lord cornwallis, who had been able to see what was occurring from the encampment, put a division in motion, and met the whole detachment returning. floyd’s wound was caused by a bullet through his cheek, which lodged in his neck. it was never extracted, and he carried it to his grave, but he was sufficiently recovered to take up his command again eleven days later. the losses of the detachment were as follows:—
killed—
1 officer.
1 trumpeter.
18 rank and file.
36 horses.
wounded—
2 officers (european).
3 native officers.
43 rank and file.
7 horses.
missing—
2 trumpeters.
1 rank and file.
228 horses.
the losses of the 19th light dragoons were—
killed—
1 trumpeter.
2 rank and file.
11 horses.
wounded—
1 lieutenant colonel.
7 rank and file.
missing—
4 horses.
[87]
major skelly, lord cornwallis’ aide-de-camp, writing of the event a short time afterwards, says: “i never saw lord cornwallis completely angry before that evening. to this day he cannot speak of that night’s business without evident signs of disapprobation.”
the loss of so many horses at this early stage of the campaign was a serious one, as they could not be replaced. the cavalry had been constantly employed for the last three days, and the horses had not been regularly fed. those that did not succumb on this occasion were of little use for the remainder of the campaign.
on the following day, the pettah was taken by assault, and some much-needed supplies were obtained: but there was great scarcity of forage, and horses and transport animals suffered greatly. “the draught cattle were daily dying at their pickets; grain and every other necessary, including ammunition, were at the lowest ebb.” in these straits, lord cornwallis resolved to try and take the fort by a coup-de-main. on the night of the 21st, the assault was delivered by moonlight, and in an hour the fort was captured under the eyes of the sultan, who made no serious attempt to cause a diversion.
the capture of bangalore was the first great blow that had been struck against the power of mysore, by any foe, since its establishment by hyder ali.
leaving a garrison in the place, cornwallis moved northward, on the 28th, with the twofold object of forming a junction with a corps of the nizam’s cavalry, and of meeting a convoy that was expected from amboor. after some delay, caused by false intelligence purposely spread by tippoo, the british force was joined at cotapilli, on 13th april, by 10,000 irregular horse of the nizam’s, and, a week later, the much-needed convoy, escorted by four thousand men, was met at venkitagheri. the combined force then returned to bangalore, which was reached on[88] the 28th. arrangements were at once made for the siege of seringapatam, against which the sultan sought to guard himself, by wasting the intervening country; a measure that was not without effect on subsequent events.
on the 13th may, the british force reached arikera, about nine miles from seringapatam. the army moved with extreme difficulty, and there was great distress, owing to the inadequate transport and the wasted state of the country. the nizam’s cavalry refused to forage beyond the outposts, and added to the scarcity: great quantities of ammunition were dependent for carriage on the private resources of officers and other individuals with the army. before laying siege to seringapatam, it was cornwallis’ object to cross the cauvery at caniembadi, and form a junction with the bombay force, under abercromby, which was shortly expected. the sultan, who had hitherto confined himself to harassing the line of march, found it necessary to offer battle, to prevent if possible the threatened junction. with this purpose he took up an extremely strong position about three miles from seringapatam, with his right resting on the cauvery, and his left on a rugged hill. his front was covered by a deep, swampy ravine the passages of which were defended by batteries along the whole front. cornwallis determined to turn tippoo’s left wing, and, by a night march, to place himself between seringapatam and a great portion of the mysore army. halting at arikera on the 14th, the force marched at night, leaving the camp standing, with the heavy guns and stores. unfortunately, there was a storm of extraordinary violence that lasted several hours, which added to the confusion and difficulties of a night march, and, when day broke, the force had only accomplished three or four miles. all hope of surprise was at an end, but cornwallis continued his advance. to meet the movement, tippoo threw back his left, and in order to cover his change of[89] front, detached a large corps of cavalry and infantry, with eight guns, to occupy a strong rocky ridge on his left, at right angles to the line of march of the british column. owing to the depth of the ravine to be crossed, and the weakness of the gun bullocks, it took two hours before the british force could form up in line for attack; during which it was exposed to a galling artillery fire, and to some charges of cavalry, which were repulsed. the british force was disposed, with nine battalions under major general medows, in the first line, opposite to the enemy’s main body; four battalions in the second line, under lt. col. harris; while five battalions, under lt. col. maxwell, were destined to attack the enemy’s corps on the ridge to the right. the cavalry under floyd, consisting of the 19th light dragoons and five regiments of native cavalry, and the nizam’s horse, were left on the opposite side of the ravine, out of reach of artillery fire.
the action commenced by an advance of maxwell’s force against the ridge, which was taken, while the cavalry crossed the ravine, and fell on the rear of the mysore infantry, inflicting considerable loss. but the exhausted horses could not raise a gallop, and they were obliged to fall back from a strong body of infantry, that had rallied and made a stand in some broken rocky ground. at this juncture, the nizam’s horse, which had followed the british cavalry across the ravine, threw itself in an unwieldy mass in front of the left wing, preventing its advance, and detaining it under the fire of the enemy’s batteries in seringapatam. this unfortunate circumstance, which by many was ascribed to treachery on the part of the nizam’s commander, saved the enemy from destruction. the british line was for some time unable to advance, and the enemy’s guns and infantry, in great confusion, were able to withdraw under protection of their batteries across the river. four guns were taken. the british loss was 81[90] killed, 339 wounded, and 6 missing. of this, the 19th light dragoons lost
killed—
1 officer. cornet james patterson.
2 troopers.
wounded—
2 officers. cornet roderick mackenzie.
cornet john fortnam.
2 troopers.
horses—
13 killed.
11 wounded.
the army was now in such a state, owing to want of proper supplies, want of carriage, and an epidemic of smallpox, that it was necessary to join hands with the bombay force under abercromby, before undertaking the siege. abercromby had encountered great difficulties in ascending the passes into mysore, and so excellent was the work done by tippoo’s cavalry, that cornwallis was without any precise information as to his advance. nor was anything known of the mahratta contingent, beyond the fact that they had captured dharwar. cornwallis therefore resolved on continuing his march on caniembadi, to meet abercromby. “for two marches, all the battering train and almost every public cart in the army were dragged by the troops,” and cornwallis came to the conclusion, that the state of his force rendered a retirement on bangalore imperative. the siege train and heavy stores could be carried no farther, and it was resolved to destroy them. on the 21st may, orders were despatched to abercromby, who was then at periapatam, about 25 miles to the westward, to destroy his heavy stores, and retire below the passes, and cornwallis’ army was retained five days in position, to cover abercromby’s movement. on the 22nd, the whole of the battering train and heavy stores were destroyed, and on the 26th, the first march of six[91] miles was made in retreat. the distress was very great: the troops were on half rations, and the only way of carrying what grain was available was to distribute it among the fighting men. “great part of the horses of the cavalry were so reduced by want and fatigue, that they could no longer carry their riders; and many, unable to march, were shot at their pickets. the ground at caniembadi, where the army had encamped but six days, was covered, in a circuit of several miles, with the carcasses of cattle and horses.”[28] “all that occurred of mortality among the cattle, during the siege of bangalore, fell far short of the horrible scene and pestilential air of this disgusting ground.”[29]
in the middle of the first day’s painful march, a body of two thousand cavalry appeared on the left flank. preparations were made to meet them, and shots were fired, when it was suddenly discovered that they were the advanced guard of the mahratta force. it was not known that they were within a hundred and fifty miles of seringapatam, and not one of the numerous messengers they had sent to convey notice of their approach, had succeeded in escaping tippoo’s scouts. there were, in fact, two forces; one, under hari punt, consisting of twelve thousand horse, and the other, under pareshram bhow, of twenty thousand horse and foot, with two battalions of bombay sepoys, under captain little. they brought with them abundant supplies, and plenty once more reigned in the british camp. their cavalry foraged boldly in every direction, bringing in supplies from great distances, in striking contrast to the behaviour of the nizam’s force. but they came too late to permit of an attack on seringapatam. had cornwallis known of their approach five days sooner, all would have been well, and another campaign would have been spared him. but his[92] siege train no longer existed, the bombay force had descended the ghauts, and there was nothing for it but to adhere to his resolve of falling back. the allied forces remained in the vicinity of seringapatam till the 6th june, when they leisurely moved northwards to nagmunglum, and thence eastward to bangalore, taking the small hill fort of hooliadroog on the way. “so reduced were the horses of our cavalry from want and fatigue, that the only service they could now render was to walk on slowly with the sick and wounded soldiers on their backs, for whom we were in great want of conveyance; and it was highly pleasing to see the cheerfulness with which the troopers walked by the side of their horses, while their distressed comrades of the infantry rode upon the march.”[30] the mahratta cavalry effectually prevented the march being harassed by the enemy, from whom they took some convoys and elephants.
pending the completion of arrangements for another advance on seringapatam, the mahratta force withdrew northwards to sara; the nizam’s force also withdrew to gunjicotta, which, with several other small places, had been captured by a force of the nizam’s.
the 19th light dragoons with the rest of the cavalry were sent, under floyd, to the carnatic, to recruit. the regiment reached madras early in august; and, as horses to remount the cavalry were not procurable, three native cavalry regiments were dismounted in order to complete the horses required for the 19th. the 3rd and 5th native cavalry had their ranks partially filled in the same way, so that by the end of the monsoon these three regiments were ready to rejoin the army.
“the 19th light dragoons, which under their gallant leader, had made so powerful an impression on the minds[93] of the enemy during the war, was again completely remounted; and with the addition of the draughts and recruits that had arrived from england, was in nearly as great force as when it first took the field. this favourite corps was reviewed by general musgrave at the mount in the beginning of october, when it shewed near four hundred mounted, both men and horses in perfect order.”[31]
meanwhile, the army at bangalore was engaged in securing the passes into the carnatic, and in reducing the numerous hill fortresses that abounded in mysore. the most important of these, nundydroog and savandroog, were taken by assault on the 19th october and 21st december, respectively. tippoo, on his side, had not been idle. in the middle of june a large mysore force invested coimbatore, which was weakly held. the defence was obstinate, and after a two months’ siege the place was relieved from palghat. in october, it was invested a second time, and, the attempts to relieve it being unsuccessful, coimbatore was forced to surrender, on 3rd november. several parties of mysore horse also succeeded in making raids into the carnatic, doing much mischief. one party penetrated to within a few miles of madras, early in january, after the cavalry had marched to rejoin cornwallis, and carried off much plunder. during the preceding half century, the country within fifty miles of madras had been the constant scene of warlike operations. in that period, madras had fallen to a french attack, and been held by them for four years. again, it had been frequently threatened and once besieged, by france, and hyder had dictated a peace within sight of fort st. george. too often, the inhabitants of madras had heard the sound of an enemy’s guns, and seen the sky red with the glare of burning villages: and now again the horsemen of mysore were plundering and burning within[94] sight of the mount. but it was for the last time. shevtamodoo was plundered and burned by one of these parties.
in the meantime, large convoys of supplies and material were being forwarded to bangalore, the last and most important, conveying all the ammunition for the army, being escorted by the 19th light dragoons under colonel floyd. ascending by the pednaikdirgum pass, on the 23rd december, and marching by kolar, ooscotta and bangalore, he joined cornwallis at magre, near ootradroog, on the 12th january 1792. everything was now ready for an advance on seringapatam, and the army was in a more efficient state than it had been at any time since the war began. owing to lord cornwallis’ excellent arrangements, supplies of all sorts were in the greatest abundance. the only deficiency was in horses for the cavalry. the losses experienced in this respect, in the previous year, had not been made good, and this arm of the service was represented only by the 19th light dragoons, six troops, the 3rd native cavalry, six troops, the 5th native cavalry, four troops, and the body guards of lord cornwallis and general medows, one troop each. the force altogether consisted of 22,033 men, of which about 15,500 were infantry. the advance was still delayed by the absence of the nizam’s force, which was occupied in the siege of gurramconda. on the 25th january it arrived, under the command of the nizam’s son, secunder jah. part of the mahratta contingent, under hari punt, had already joined lord cornwallis, but the greater part, under pareshram bhow, had gone off on a plundering expedition to the northwestward, in defiance of the agreement made six months before. it did not join the british force, till the campaign was over.
the bombay army, under abercromby, consisting of eight thousand four hundred men, was also on the march from the westward. ascending by the poodicherim pass, abercromby directed his march by periapatam and[95] eratoor, so as to join hands with cornwallis in front of seringapatam.
on the 31st january, cornwallis held a review of his whole force at hooliadroog, for the benefit of his allies. as the nizam’s son reached the right of the line “a salute of 21 guns was fired from the park, while the cavalry, with drawn swords and trumpets sounding, received him with due honours as he passed their front. he returned the officers’ salute, and looked attentively at the troops. the 19th dragoons, of which they had all heard, attracted their particular notice.”[32] on the following day, the army marched, and encamped within sight of seringapatam, at about seven miles’ distance, on the 5th february. no opposition on the march was experienced.
seringapatam is situated on an island in the cauvery river, four miles in length and a mile and a half broad. at the western end of the island was the fortress, the eastern portion being also strongly defended by connected batteries and redoubts. on the north side, on what may be called the main land, was an oblong space about three miles in length, enclosed by a hedge of cactus and other thorny plants, and commanded by redoubts on the highest points. in this space tippoo was encamped. he believed that he could protract the defence, till the coming of the monsoon and the scarcity of supplies should force cornwallis to raise the siege; he further believed that no serious attack would be made on the position, till the arrival of abercromby’s force. but cornwallis had plans of a very different nature. the 6th being spent in reconnoitring, orders were issued, about sunset, for the troops to parade at once for a night attack. about 8 o’clock all was ready, and the infantry advanced in three columns, the centre column being headed by cornwallis in person. the cavalry were left to guard the camp, and[96] the artillery were left behind also. when all was ready, cornwallis sent word of his plans to his native allies, who were dismayed at hearing of an advance against a fortified camp without artillery, and that his lordship should have gone to fight “like a common soldier.” moving in silence, the heads of the columns, which were more than a mile apart, came in touch with the enemy about half past ten. the attack was completely successful. one redoubt after another was carried, tippoo’s camp was taken, some of the troops, in their ardour, crossing the stream and penetrating to the farther side of the island. the brunt of the fighting fell on the centre column, which, towards daylight, was heavily attacked by the mysore troops, who had recovered from their first surprise. the fighting continued till five o’clock in the afternoon of the 7th, the last serious attack being headed by tippoo’s french regiment. but nothing availed to dislodge the british troops from the positions they had gained, and tippoo was forced to withdraw on to the island, where also our troops had made good their footing. our loss amounted to 535 of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing. eighty guns and an enormous quantity of supplies were captured. the enemy’s loss was estimated at four thousand killed, great numbers having been forced into the river and drowned. greater still was the loss caused by desertion; numbers of the enemy having taken advantage of the confusion, to throw down their arms and make off to their homes. the whole loss to the sultan, in killed, wounded and missing, was estimated at twenty thousand men.
on the 12th, the cavalry under floyd were detached to meet abercromby, with whom he effected a junction on the 14th. in a private letter, still extant, he writes:—
“on the 11th february i convoyed 13,000 brinjarries (brinjara bullocks carrying grain) into camp. on the[97] 12th february, i was detached with nine squadrons, one battalion of sepoys, and about 1500 allied horse, to meet general abercromby, and his army.
on the 14th of february, i was attacked by full 4000 of the enemy’s horse, who had got in among my baggage, and attached themselves to my allied horse. i soon recovered every article of my baggage, but was forced to stop there, not being able to distinguish friend from foe. the nizam’s horse under a son of the nawab of canoul, and the mahratta horse also kept firm. the enemy drew off, rather worsted by the allied horse. immediately, the head of abercromby’s column appeared at a distance, and the enemy made for them. i posted my battalion, my allied horse, and my baggage, and ranged along between the enemy and abercromby’s with the nine squadrons of our own horse; the enemy collected and went clear off.”
dirom, the principal chronicler of the campaign, says:—
“tippoo had meant a more serious opposition to this junction, and for that purpose had detached the whole of his cavalry on the evening of the 13th; they had crossed (the cauvery) a few miles above the fort, and lay in wait till colonel floyd moved in the morning of the 14th. the detachment of allies, in spite of the colonel’s orders, and the remonstrance of major scott, who was sent with them, remained loitering on the ground for some time after the colonel had marched: the sultan’s horse seized the opportunity, and attacked them with great vigour. they stood their ground for some time, and then retreating towards colonel floyd, he returned to support them, and soon put the enemy to the rout.”
on the 16th, abercromby joined cornwallis on the north side of seringapatam, without further hindrance, and preparations were made for prosecuting the siege. on the 19th, abercromby made a detour, and, crossing the cauvery, invested the place from the south. a strong brigade, under colonel stuart, was entrenched on the island, and floyd with the cavalry was stationed about four thousand yards to the eastward, linking up the distance between cornwallis and abercromby. seringapatam[98] was completely invested. on the 22nd, an attack on abercromby’s force was repulsed with loss, and then tippoo, who had been for some days in negotiation with cornwallis, realised that the time for surrender had arrived. the losses he had experienced in the fighting of the 6th and 7th, rendered prolonged resistance impossible.
it was no part of lord cornwallis’ policy to destroy the mysore state, but the disposition of tippoo, “a faithless and violent character on whom no dependence could be placed” required that his power should be so far curtailed, as to render him less dangerous. on the 23rd february, the preliminaries of peace were signed by tippoo, and warlike operations ceased, much to the disgust of the army, whose minds were inflamed to an extraordinary degree against the sultan, on account of the barbarous cruelties inflicted by him on all prisoners that fell into his hands. one of the stipulations was that two of tippoo’s sons should be handed over, as hostages for the due performance of the treaty of peace. on the 26th, the young princes were received by lord cornwallis with much ceremony. the occasion seems to have made a great impression at the time. three,[33] if not more, pictures of the event were painted by a. w. devis, a well-known artist, who was present. in all of them, colonel floyd is prominently represented, a fine martial figure. cornet hale and captain child of the 19th light dragoons also appear in some of the pictures. this was evidently regarded in india as the most striking event in lord cornwallis’ career in the country. the base of the statue erected to him in madras, has another representation of the scene.
the princes remained in british territory till march 1794, when they were sent back to the sultan with all honour.
an officer of the xixth light dragoons, 1792.
to face p. 99.
[99]
a considerable amount of prize money gained during the war was further enhanced by the surrender of their respective shares by lord cornwallis and general medows, and by liberal gratuities from the government. the share of every private soldier amounted to ￡14, 11. 9., the shares of other ranks being in proportion.
sixty-seven forts and eight hundred and one guns were captured during the three campaigns; of which, fifty-six forts and six hundred and fifty-six guns were captured by the british forces, the remainder falling to their native allies.
on the 20th march, the treaty of peace was duly ratified, and on the 26th, the army marched from seringapatam, for madras, which was reached about the end of may. the 19th light dragoons returned to their old quarters at shevtamodoo.
a medal for the three campaigns, 1790–92, was bestowed on the bengal native troops who took part in them.
