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CHAPTER XLIII. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.

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an elector, in the sense of the constitution, is one who has been appointed to choose or elect the president of the united states. electors have been chosen in various ways. at first they were often appointed by the state legislatures, or these passed a law directing their election by the people. this has gradually disappeared, and now the people, by law of congress assemble on the first tuesday after the first monday in november preceding the close of a presidential term, and vote for the electors. the electors in each state are called its electoral[375] college. they meet on the first wednesday in december following their election, in their respective states, and vote by ballot for a president and vice-president. these cannot both, according to the constitution, be citizens of the same state. they count, certify, and seal these votes and send the sealed package by a messenger, appointed for that express purpose, to the president of the united states senate. on the second wednesday in february following, the members of the senate and house of representatives assemble together, the packages are opened and the votes counted in their presence, and the result is officially proclaimed. it is evident that this is now a mere form, and the president and vice-president are virtually determined by the people in november. it is not in harmony with the other parts of our system of government, which aims at simplicity and practical usefulness, and it will probably soon be dispensed with. it was originally designed, by those who framed the constitution, to act as a check to party spirit, and was expected to serve a very useful purpose. they felt the great importance attaching to the office of chief magistrate, on whom they had conferred so much power, and thought, by this means, to raise his election above disturbing influences. it was not expected that the candidates for those offices would come in question, in the popular elections. the choice was designed to be left with the electors, with whom, being chosen by the people for that purpose, it was supposed they would feel safe in leaving it. it was believed that a select body of eminent men would act with more prudence and wisdom than the people at large. but the people felt themselves competent to judge for themselves, and have, like imperious sovereigns, imposed their choice on the electors, so that that part of our constitutional machinery has become a dead letter. the people know their own minds better, and are more resolute in imposing their will on their representatives than was expected; and they have favorably disappointed the best hopes of those who believed most in their discretion. so we see that the failure of the electoral system, planned[376] by the fathers of the republic, is an honorable commentary on the ability of the people for self-government.

their success in making their own choice authoritative has led them to overlook the incongruity of the system, so that they have never resolutely required it to be abolished. perhaps the idea that it might be useful in some important crisis of national affairs has had an influence to prevent interference with it. as its retention is attended with considerable expense, when questions of economy come to take a leading place in public policy it is likely to be laid aside, in form, as well as in fact.

the elections for president, congressmen, governors of the states and their legislatures, determining the general policy of the government, and the class of men who shall be appointed to the various minor offices under its control; those who feel a strong interest in that policy from their judgment of its effect on the welfare of the country, or their desire to promote special measures; and those who are anxious to obtain or hold office, are very warmly interested in them. they divide into parties according to their views and exert themselves to the utmost to influence the result.

most human affairs have their good and bad side, and this is not an exception. this party warmth is useful in causing discussion, examination, and thought, and stirring up the people to a careful study of their institutions and the principles of government, and the effect which particular measures may have on the public welfare. its tendency, in this direction is, to make all the people statesmen—a point of the highest importance in a free government, where the people are sovereign. the disadvantage is, that it often awakens an undue degree of passion and prejudice, the parties and men who are candidates for office abuse and misrepresent each other in order to destroy each others influence, when, perhaps, they are equally in earnest in seeking the good of the country. for this there is no apparent remedy, but in the intelligence and good sense of the people themselves. they must learn to be[377] careful and candid in their judgment of men and measures, and to examine all sides of a question before rendering a decision. all should strive toward this intelligent moderation during important elections.

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