france has once more jumped on the prostrate form of germany, and the sabots have come down with a thud that will sicken the hearts of multitudes on both sides of the atlantic whose friendship for france stood the losses and griefs of a four years' war.
germany having been overthrown and disarmed after a prodigious effort, involving a strain upon the combined strength of america, italy, and the whole british empire, as well as france, and her arms bound with the thongs of a stern treaty, the process of dancing upon her while she is down can at any time now be performed with complete impunity by any one of these powers alone.
the spectacle every time it is repeated, provides much satisfaction to those who indulge in the barren delights of revenging the memory of past wrongs. there is no doubt some joy for the [pg 157]unsportsmanlike mind in kicking a helpless giant who once maltreated you and who, but for the assistance of powerful neighbours, would have done so a second time.
but what good will it bring devastated france or her overtaxed allies? the additional coal and timber that will be wrung out of germany will barely cover the direct cost of collection. although germany bears the extra cost, the expense of these punitive measures must all in the end diminish the means of reparation, and therefore fall on the victor.
how many students of the problem of reparations have ever taken the trouble to ascertain the extent to which the maintenance of allied armies of occupation has already drained the resources of germany? between direct cash payments, the cost of supplies, and outlay in labour and material for building huge barracks, these armies have already cost germany 6,000,000,000 gold marks—roughly 1,200,000,000 dollars, or over ￡300,000,000.
how much better it would have been if most of this money had gone towards rebuilding the devastated area!
it is not without significance, now that war is[pg 158] being waged against germany for what the american representative in paris termed her technical default, to recollect that, between the expense of the army of occupation and contributions already made towards reparations, germany has already paid to the allies over three times the amount of the total indemnity exacted by bismarck in 1871.
this is without making any allowance for the vast and highly developed colonies which she surrendered. let, therefore, no one approach this problem as if he were dealing with a recalcitrant country that is deliberately refusing to acknowledge any of her obligations under a treaty which she has signed.
the costs of the last war are acknowledged to be irrecoverable. it is difficult enough to find the means for payment of damages. who will pay the growing cost of this new war?
so far i have referred only to the direct outlay upon these aggressive measures. the indirect cost to victor and vanquished alike will be crushing.
it is already accumulating. the mere threat has depreciated the value of the franc, and thus reduced its purchasing capacity abroad. this loss must be borne by the french consumer. there may be a[pg 159] rally; but i shall be surprised if the improvement is more than temporary.
all that is obvious for the moment to the untrained eye is the way in which the mark is dragging the french and belgian franc slowly along its own downward course.
as the distance between them lengthens and the invisible cord which ties them together becomes more and more attenuated, it may ultimately snap and the franc be released from this dangerous association. that i doubt, for a bankrupt germany means a country to which even the most hopeful cannot look as a means of redeeming french deficits.
once that is clear to the french peasant he will not so readily part with his savings, and the real difficulties of french finance will begin at that stage. a policy, therefore, which demoralises the german currency is one which is also fatal to the solvency of french finance.
let us follow the probable sequence of events. the terrified german mark is rushing headlong to the bottom of the pit where the austrian krone is already lost beyond rescue.
as long as reparation coal is dug out by bayonets,[pg 160] and reparation timber is cut down by swords, it is idle to talk of restoring the mark by putting german finance in order.
no tariff, however nimble, can keep pace with the runaway mark. it would baffle the most resourceful finance minister to adapt his budget to a currency which disappears beyond the horizon while he is sitting at his desk to pen his proposals.
if the mere threat of force has produced such a panic, what will be the effect of the actual measures? it is safe to predict that the advance of french troops into germany will not restore the composure of the frightened mark and arrest its flight.
what, then, becomes of the hope of renewed payments of the annuity? at best germany could only be expected to pay when her foreign trade was so improved that she could provide a margin out of her exports with which to pay her annuities. her foreign trade is largely dependent upon her foreign exchanges. these are now destroyed beyond prospect of recovery for years.
britain proposed a voluntary moratorium for a short term of years in order to place germany in a position where she could at the end of that term pay a reasonable annuity. the french [pg 161]government have in effect substituted a compulsory moratorium for an indefinite period with no prospect of payment in sight.
the only chance of securing an early instalment of reparation payments was by pressing germany to put her finances in order and giving her fair time in which to do so. the only chance of negotiating a loan on german security to assist france to pay for the repair of her devastated provinces, and to enable her to put her own finances in order, was by restoring the stability of german currency.
french statesmen have deliberately thrown both these chances away. the effect on the value of their own currency must be grave, and frenchmen will have to pay in increased cost of living for a venture dictated by short-sighted and short-tempered statesmanship.
when one thinks of the consequences one is driven to ask whether french politicians are really seeking reparations or are pursuing another purpose quite incompatible with the recovery of money payments under the treaty.
this is the wrong road to reparations. it leads in exactly the opposite direction.
whither, then, does it lead? there is no doubt[pg 162] that its effect will be ruinous as far as german industry is concerned. i have already dealt with its disastrous influence upon german currency, and with the indirect effect of a rapidly depreciating currency upon german foreign trade. the seizure of the ruhr mines will have another serious effect.
even now the result of the compulsory alienation of so much of germany's coal supply in the ruhr, in silesia, and the saar, from german industry, has diminished german productiveness. the fuel deficiency thereby created inside germany has been partially supplied by purchases of coal from outside sources. the necessity for providing gold to pay for foreign coal has added considerably to germany's financial difficulties.
a still larger foreign purchase will be the inevitable result of the forcible diversion of large quantities of ruhr coal to france and italy, with further financial embarrassments as a consequence.
that is bad enough. but i fear worse. will the german miner work with the same regularity and efficiency for a foreign master as he does for a german employer? is there the least possibility of the production being maintained at its present level?
the influence of this added muddle on world[pg 163] trade is incalculable. nobody gains; everybody is a loser by the move. how is a germany whose embarrassed finances are made still more involved—how is a germany whose industry becomes more and more difficult—how is a germany reduced to despair to be of the slightest use to france, belgium, italy, or anybody else?
the feather-headed scribes who have advocated this rash policy assume that france will be helped because germany will thus be reduced to impotence. for how long?
the disintegration of germany is not an unlikely consequence of this move. i know that is the expectation. frenchmen still hanker after the days when saxons and bavarians and wurtembergers were allies, and almost vassals, of france against prussia. it was the lure that led the third napoleon to his ruin. it is the attraction which is now drawing france once more to a sure doom. the policy will bring no security to france in the future. it deprives her of all hope of reparations in the immediate present. there will no longer be a germany to pay. it would be too hopeless a task to attempt recovery from each of the severed states.
[pg 164]
but what of increased security? nothing can keep germans permanently apart. they will, at the suitable moment reunite under more favourable conditions, freed from external as well as internal debt. france will have lost her reparations and only retained the hatred of an implacable foe become more redoubtable than ever.
how would europe have fared in the interval whilst france was learning from events what every other country can see now? there is no knowing what will happen when a brave people of 60,000,000 find themselves faced with utter ruin. whether they turn to the left or to the right will depend on questions of personal leadership, which are not yet determined. all we can be sure of is that they can hardly go on as they are, maintaining an honest struggle for ordered freedom and democratic self-government. the french proclamation, with its threat of "severest measures in case of recalcitrancy," is ominous of much that may happen. no people accustomed to national independence have ever been able long to tolerate a foreign yoke.
chancellor cuno's action is the first manifestation of the spirit of revolt. it will certainly grow in intensity. the lash will then fall, sooner or[pg 165] later, and germany will be inevitably driven to desperate courses. a communist germany would infect europe. european vitality is so lowered by exhaustion that it is in no condition to resist the plague. would a reactionary germany be much better—brooding and scheming vengeance?
russia, with her incalculable resources of men and material, is at hand, needing all that germany can best give and best spare. the bolshevik leaders only require what germany is so well fitted to supply in order to reorganise their country and convert it into the most formidable state in europe or asia.
nations hard pressed on the east have in the past moved forward irresistibly to the west. in obedience to the same law a people hard pressed on the west will look to the east.
when the french troops marched on essen they began a movement the most far-reaching, and probably the most sinister in its consequences, that has been witnessed for many centuries in europe. and these are the people who, after fifty years of patient and laborious waiting, have demonstrated to the world in 1918 the stupidity of abusing victory in 1871.
[pg 166]
if the teacher so soon forgets his own special lesson the pupil is not likely to remember when fury overcomes terror.
algeciras, january 15th, 1923.
