the french government, having conspicuously failed to win its anticipated coup, is doubling the stakes each time it loses. when will it end? and where will it end? it is ill gambling with human passions. they are all engaged in this wild venture—on both sides of the table. pride, greed, vanity, obstinacy, temper, combativeness, racial antagonisms, but also patriotism, love of justice, hatred of wrong and high courage. each side draws from the same arsenal of fiery human emotions. unless some one steps in to induce a halt i fear the result will be devastating.
france has now abandoned all hope of being able to run the mines, railways, and workshops of the ruhr by military agencies. in these days you cannot shoot every worker who fails to excavate so many hundredweights of coal per diem, or who refuses to fill a wagon or drive a locomotive when and by whomsoever he is told to do so. france[pg 168] cannot provide the necessary complement of miners and railwaymen from outside to fill vacancies created by sulky workers. and even if she could it would take many months ere they become sufficiently accustomed to their new conditions to work without peril to themselves. so a new policy has been improvised. it is nothing less than the siege of germany. sixty millions of germans are to be starved into surrender. that is a long business, as every one knows who has been engaged on the difficult operations of strike breaking. we have often witnessed workers with little support or sympathy from the rest of the community hold out for weeks after their funds have been exhausted. in germany all classes are united in resistance. the national pride fortifies endurance and incites to sacrifice. and the ports are still open. meanwhile incidents may happen, developments may occur which will create a situation that will baffle all the resources the invaders can command.
it is very little use looking backward. but there are many who are disposed to say that the invasion of the ruhr was bound to come and the sooner the safer. the ruhr coal mines were the wild oats of reparation. get it over quickly. the headache[pg 169] will bring repentance and france will then settle down to a quiet life. that is the argument. i must enter an emphatic protest against this view. if this ill-judged enterprise had been put off for a few more months i do not believe any french government would have embarked upon it. there is no french statesman of any standing who, in his heart, believes in its wisdom. now that the credit of france is involved in its success they will all support it. but french opinion, as a whole, was moving with startling rapidity from this policy. the parisian pulse was still feverish, but the provinces had completely calmed down. vacancies occurring in the senate, the chamber of deputies and the provincial assemblies during several months have afforded an opportunity of testing real french opinion and the results have been sensational. at election after election, fought in typical constituencies all over france, the champions of ruhrism have been beaten by emphatic majorities. masses of french workmen have always opposed this policy. the peasant in every land always moves slowly. but there can be no doubt that the french peasant has had enough of military adventures. his sons were never numbered amongst the[pg 170] "exempts," and the losses in the peasant homes of france were appalling. driving through the villages in agricultural france you find yourself asking, "where are the young men?" the answer invariably comes, "this village suffered severely in the war." you will receive the same answer in the next village, and the next. we cannot wonder, therefore, that by-elections in rural as well as in urban france display an unmistakable weariness of plans which involve the marching of armed frenchmen into hostile territory. the sorrowing people of france have good reason to shrink from any course of action that leads to further shedding of blood.
for these reasons i have steadily favoured every scheme that had the effect of postponing decision as to the ruhr. delay meant ultimate defeat for the chauvinists. that is why they strove so hard to rush their government into this precipitate action. the abrupt termination of the paris conference was their opportunity and they seized it with tingling fingers. until then there had never been a clean break on which violence could be founded. the friends of moderation both here and on the continent had seen to that. there had been [pg 171]reference of questions for the scrutiny of experts and calming adjournments to await their report. when it arrived there were endless suggestions and counter-suggestions to meet difficulties. in the end europe was saved from the catastrophe of once more handing over its destinies to the guidance of blind force. unhappily, weariness or impatience induced the paris negotiators in a few hours to drop the reins which had for at least four years held the furies from dashing along their career of destruction. there were many alternative plans that might have been discussed. there was the proposal to refer the whole question to the league of nations. it is true that when i suggested it in august last m. poincaré summarily rejected it. but the allies also rejected m. poincaré's proposals by a majority of four to one at that conference. that did not prevent his repeating them in january—and this time he succeeded in winning over the majority to his view. a little more persistence and less pessimism might have persuaded belgium, italy and japan to aid our appeals to france to trust rather to the league of nations than to the uncertainties of war.
what is still more inexplicable is the failure of[pg 172] the conference to take any note of mr. secretary hughes's new haven speech. neglected opportunities litter the path of this troublesome question. there were the cannes conversations, broken off just as they were reaching fruition. had they been continued another week they would have ended in a helpful settlement which would have brought reparations to france, confidence to germany, and peace to europe. they struck on one of the many sunken reefs which bestrew the french political seas, and it will not surprise me to find that the whole cargo of reparations disappeared then beyond salvage into the deep with these shipwrecked negotiations.
again, germany threw away a great opportunity at genoa when all the nations of europe came together for the first time to discuss their troubles in the spirit of equality and amity. it is true that reparations were excluded at the instance of france from the programme of the conference. but the spirit engendered by a friendly settlement of all other outstanding questions would have rendered a reasonable and temperate consideration of reparations inevitable. germany, by its foolish staging of its russian agreement, made all that impossible.[pg 173] resentment and suspicion were once more equipped with a scourge and they used it relentlessly to drive out all goodwill for germany from the purlieus of that great congress. another lost opportunity.
then there was the bankers' committee, appointed to consider the question of raising an international loan to help france to finance the repair of her devastated area and also to assist germany to restore her demoralised currency. i remember how eager poor rathenau was to float that loan and how sanguine he was that it would succeed. he was confident that the german nationals who have invested their gold in other lands could be induced to subscribe heavily to the loan. the bankers concerned—all were of the highest reputation in the financial world—were confident that if german reparations were fixed at a reasonable sum investors throughout the world would gladly put their money into a great international loan which would help to restore europe. the french government testily declined to consider the essential conditions indicated by the bankers. another lost opportunity, and europe once more lumbered along its dreary way to seek another.
it came with mr. hughes's famous speech. it[pg 174] was clearly the result of prolonged consideration. for weeks there had been rumours of much consultation in washington on the state of europe, and we were encouraged to hope that america meant business. the result was mr. secretary hughes's offer. it was made four days before the paris conference and was obviously intended to be discussed by the allies there. an endeavour has been made to minimise the importance of this american approach to europe, but it is incomprehensible to me how so momentous a pronouncement has been treated as if it were merely the casual utterance of a politician who had to find some topic of more or less interest with which to illuminate a discourse. another opportunity lost—perhaps the greatest—perhaps the last. never has luck striven so hard to save stupidity. but luck loses its temper easily and then it is apt to hit hard.
london, february 15th, 1923.
