"french troops occupying fresh german territory." "further advance into germany." "reinforcements." "french cut off the british bridgehead on the rhine." "proposals for new coinage in the ruhr." what is it all leading to? is it really reparations? signor nitti, who has made a thorough study of all the documents bearing on french designs against germany, has come definitely to the conclusion that these measures have no reference to the recovery of damages for the devastated area, but that they are all taken in the execution of a vast project for securing french control over all the coal and iron of continental europe. he supplies chapter and verse for his theory. something has undoubtedly roused the suspicions of signor mussolini. they come rather late in the day to be effective. he naturally does not relish the idea of an italy whose coal and steel supplies are placed at the mercy of a gigantic trust[pg 176] directed from paris. italy has no coal and iron of her own. her interest is, therefore, in a free market. hence signor mussolini's alarm. is there any ground for it? let those who imagine that italian statesmen are unnecessarily disturbed read the discussions in the french press leading up to the speeches recently delivered by m. millerand, m. barthou, and m. poincaré.
with regard to m. barthou's intervention, i feel i must, as one of the founders of the reparations commission, say a word. there were important questions of amount, method, and time which could not be determined before the signature of the peace treaty and could not be settled at all without giving germany a full opportunity of being heard. hence the appointment of the reparations commission. it was called into existence to settle these questions after hearing evidence and deliberating on its effect. of this commission m. barthou is now chairman. he, therefore, presides over a body which has committed to its charge judicial functions of a momentous character. he has to adjudicate from time to time on the case presented by germany under a multitude of different heads. inflammatory speeches on the very subjects upon[pg 177] which he has to preserve judicial calm are quite incompatible with his position. when he occupied the same post m. poincaré ultimately recognised that he could not continue to write controversial articles on questions which might come before him for decision as a judge. he, therefore, very properly resigned his commissionership.
but to revert to the speeches delivered by these eminent statesmen. if they mean what the actual words convey, then france means to stick to the ruhr. not by way of annexation. oh, no. that, according to m. barthou, is a "foolish, mendacious and stupid" lie. but france means to hang on to the gages until reparation is paid. what are the gages? the industries of the ruhr. if the french government is to control the industries which represent the life of this prosperous area for thirty years it assumes greater authority over the district than it exercises over the mining area of the pas de calais. in its own mining districts no government takes upon itself—except during a war—to give directions as to the destination and distribution of the coal produced. but there are indications that the control over the ruhr industries is to be of a much more far-reaching character than this. and[pg 178] this is where the hints—broad hints—thrown out by the french press come in. france, in order to secure the payment of the reparation instalments in future, is to be given shares in these great mines and industries. what proportion of shares? amongst the gages demanded by m. poincaré in august of last year were sixty per cent. of the shares in certain pivotal german industries in the rhine area. now the ruhr industries are clearly to be included within the scope of the demand. france has the iron ore of lorraine and the coal of the saar valley. her financiers have been engaged in buying up coal mines in silesia. if she can secure the controlling interest in the ruhr mines and belgium and poland can be persuaded to join in the deal, then the continent of europe will be at the mercy of this immense coal and iron combine.
i said in the previous chapter that the ports were still open. as long as they are, central europe can protect itself to a certain extent against this gigantic trust, for the products of britain and america will be available. but that possibility is to be provided against. nothing is to be left to chance. one of the gages is to be control over german customs. how can germany balance her[pg 179] budget without a revenue? how can she raise a revenue without a tariff? what more productive tariff than a duty on foreign coal and metal manufactures? and thus all competitive products will be excluded from the german markets. the combine will be supreme.
it is true that if this cynical scheme comes off there is an end of reparations—for the independence of german industry is strangled and its life will soon languish. but there are signs that french enterprise has abandoned all idea of recovering reparations and that it is now brooding upon loot—on an immense scale. for the discussions in the french press contemplate even wider and more far-reaching developments than those involved in the control of german industries. italy, poland, and even russia are to be brought in. the high line taken for years by the parisian papers about "no traffic with murder" is being given up. instead we have much sentimental twaddle about restoring the old friendly relations between france and russia—of course, for a consideration. russia is to buy; germany is to manufacture; france is to profit.
these proposals, which have for some time been[pg 180] in the air, are now actually in type. now the type is ordinary black—later on it may be red. twenty lives have already been lost over the preliminaries of execution. i fear there will be many more as the difficulties become more apparent.
it is not without significance that the terms which germany is to be called upon to accept in the event of her submission have never been formulated. no ultimatum was issued before invasion. if germany were to-morrow to throw up her hands what conditions would she have to comply with? who can tell? germany clearly does not know. the british government does not know. they were never discussed at the paris conference. m. poincaré has only asserted with emphasis that he "will not accept promises." if the ruhr is to be evacuated promises must be accepted at some stage, for germany cannot deliver ten years' coal instalments in advance, and she cannot pay fifty milliards of gold marks over the counter. so, if m. poincaré's statement means anything, then the control of ruhr industries must be vested in france until the whole of the mortgage has been redeemed. hence the vast plan for the exploitation of germany, and through germany of europe.
[pg 181]
a pretty scheme, but—like most plans which make no allowance for human nature—bound to fail. how long would italy and russia consent to be exploited for the enrichment of french capitalists? italy has already made it clear that she has no intention of walking into the trap. russia may or may not have been approached. it is not improbable that there have been informal soundings. it is not easy to reckon what the bolshevists may or may not do in any circumstances. but one can be fairly assured that they will not place their heads in the jaws of a rapacious capitalistic crocodile of this character. brigands are not made of that simple stuff.
will german statesmen consent to sell their country into political and economic bondage for an indefinite period? it is incredible. no doubt there had been feelers between french and german capitalists for some time before the ruhr invasion. m. loucheur and herr stinnes are credited with having had conversations on the subject of amalgamating the interests of lorraine iron ore and ruhr coal. but the ruhr invasion has awakened the patriotism of germany from its stupor. a potent new element has therefore been introduced[pg 182] into the calculation. this element does not mix well with international finance. it may be depended upon to resist to the last any effort to put german industry under foreign control, and without control the gage is worthless.
then there is the german workman who must be taken into account. the miner and the engineer in all countries are proverbially independent. they take no orders even from their own governments. during the war they had to be reasoned with before they could be persuaded to take a course urged upon them by the government of the day in the interests of their own country. they will view the commands of a syndicate controlled by foreign governments with suspicion and repugnance. should disputes arise—and they are more likely than ever to arise constantly under these conditions—who will be responsible for the protection of life, liberty, and property? will foreign troops operate? or will the german army and police act practically under orders given from paris? the popular sympathy will be with the strikers.
it is a fantastic idea born of failure and, therefore, bound itself to be a failure.
london, march 1st, 1923.
