instability of the administration in the united states
in america the public acts of a community frequently leave fewer traces than the occurrences of a family—newspapers the only historical remains—instability of the administration prejudicial to the art of government.
the authority which public men possess in america is so brief, and they are so soon commingled with the ever-changing population of the country, that the acts of a community frequently leave fewer traces than the occurrences of a private family. the public administration is, so to speak, oral and traditionary. but little is committed to writing, and that little is wafted away forever, like the leaves of the sibyl, by the smallest breeze.
the only historical remains in the united states are the newspapers; but if a number be wanting, the chain of time is broken, and the present is severed from the past. i am convinced that in fifty years it will be more difficult to collect authentic documents concerning the social condition of the americans at the present day than it is to find remains of the administration of france during the middle ages; and if the united states were ever invaded by barbarians, it would be necessary to have recourse to the history of other nations in order to learn anything of the people which now inhabits them.
the instability of the administration has penetrated into the habits of the people: it even appears to suit the general taste, and no one cares for what occurred before his time. no methodical system is pursued; no archives are formed; and no documents are brought together when it would be very easy to do so. where they exist, little store is set upon them; and i have amongst my papers several original public documents which were given to me in answer to some of my inquiries. in america society seems to live from hand to mouth, like an army in the field. nevertheless, the art of administration may undoubtedly be ranked as a science, and no sciences can be improved if the discoveries and observations of successive generations are not connected together in the order in which they occur. one man, in the short space of his life remarks a fact; another conceives an idea; the former invents a means of execution, the latter reduces a truth to a fixed proposition; and mankind gathers the fruits of individual experience upon its way and gradually forms the sciences. but the persons who conduct the administration in america can seldom afford any instruction to each other; and when they assume the direction of society, they simply possess those attainments which are most widely disseminated in the community, and no experience peculiar to themselves. democracy, carried to its furthest limits, is therefore prejudicial to the art of government; and for this reason it is better adapted to a people already versed in the conduct of an administration than to a nation which is uninitiated in public affairs.
this remark, indeed, is not exclusively applicable to the science of administration. although a democratic government is founded upon a very simple and natural principle, it always presupposes the existence of a high degree of culture and enlightenment in society. *d at the first glance it may be imagined to belong to the earliest ages of the world; but maturer observation will convince us that it could only come last in the succession of human history.
d
[ it is needless to observe that i speak here of the democratic form of government as applied to a people, not merely to a tribe.]
charges levied by the state under the rule of the american democracy
in all communities citizens divisible into three classes—habits of each of these classes in the direction of public finances—why public expenditure must tend to increase when the people governs—what renders the extravagance of a democracy less to be feared in america—public expenditure under a democracy.
before we can affirm whether a democratic form of government is economical or not, we must establish a suitable standard of comparison. the question would be one of easy solution if we were to attempt to draw a parallel between a democratic republic and an absolute monarchy. the public expenditure would be found to be more considerable under the former than under the latter; such is the case with all free states compared to those which are not so. it is certain that despotism ruins individuals by preventing them from producing wealth, much more than by depriving them of the wealth they have produced; it dries up the source of riches, whilst it usually respects acquired property. freedom, on the contrary, engenders far more benefits than it destroys; and the nations which are favored by free institutions invariably find that their resources increase even more rapidly than their taxes.
my present object is to compare free nations to each other, and to point out the influence of democracy upon the finances of a state.
communities, as well as organic bodies, are subject to certain fixed rules in their formation which they cannot evade. they are composed of certain elements which are common to them at all times and under all circumstances. the people may always be mentally divided into three distinct classes. the first of these classes consists of the wealthy; the second, of those who are in easy circumstances; and the third is composed of those who have little or no property, and who subsist more especially by the work which they perform for the two superior orders. the proportion of the individuals who are included in these three divisions may vary according to the condition of society, but the divisions themselves can never be obliterated.
it is evident that each of these classes will exercise an influence peculiar to its own propensities upon the administration of the finances of the state. if the first of the three exclusively possesses the legislative power, it is probable that it will not be sparing of the public funds, because the taxes which are levied on a large fortune only tend to diminish the sum of superfluous enjoyment, and are, in point of fact, but little felt. if the second class has the power of making the laws, it will certainly not be lavish of taxes, because nothing is so onerous as a large impost which is levied upon a small income. the government of the middle classes appears to me to be the most economical, though perhaps not the most enlightened, and certainly not the most generous, of free governments.
but let us now suppose that the legislative authority is vested in the lowest orders: there are two striking reasons which show that the tendency of the expenditure will be to increase, not to diminish. as the great majority of those who create the laws are possessed of no property upon which taxes can be imposed, all the money which is spent for the community appears to be spent to their advantage, at no cost of their own; and those who are possessed of some little property readily find means of regulating the taxes so that they are burdensome to the wealthy and profitable to the poor, although the rich are unable to take the same advantage when they are in possession of the government.
in countries in which the poor *e should be exclusively invested with the power of making the laws no great economy of public expenditure ought to be expected: that expenditure will always be considerable; either because the taxes do not weigh upon those who levy them, or because they are levied in such a manner as not to weigh upon those classes. in other words, the government of the democracy is the only one under which the power which lays on taxes escapes the payment of them.
e
[ the word poor is used here, and throughout the remainder of this chapter, in a relative, not in an absolute sense. poor men in america would often appear rich in comparison with the poor of europe; but they may with propriety by styled poor in comparison with their more affluent countrymen.]
it may be objected (but the argument has no real weight) that the true interest of the people is indissolubly connected with that of the wealthier portion of the community, since it cannot but suffer by the severe measures to which it resorts. but is it not the true interest of kings to render their subjects happy, and the true interest of nobles to admit recruits into their order on suitable grounds? if remote advantages had power to prevail over the passions and the exigencies of the moment, no such thing as a tyrannical sovereign or an exclusive aristocracy could ever exist.
again, it may be objected that the poor are never invested with the sole power of making the laws; but i reply, that wherever universal suffrage has been established the majority of the community unquestionably exercises the legislative authority; and if it be proved that the poor always constitute the majority, it may be added, with perfect truth, that in the countries in which they possess the elective franchise they possess the sole power of making laws. but it is certain that in all the nations of the world the greater number has always consisted of those persons who hold no property, or of those whose property is insufficient to exempt them from the necessity of working in order to procure an easy subsistence. universal suffrage does therefore, in point of fact, invest the poor with the government of society.
the disastrous influence which popular authority may sometimes exercise upon the finances of a state was very clearly seen in some of the democratic republics of antiquity, in which the public treasure was exhausted in order to relieve indigent citizens, or to supply the games and theatrical amusements of the populace. it is true that the representative system was then very imperfectly known, and that, at the present time, the influence of popular passion is less felt in the conduct of public affairs; but it may be believed that the delegate will in the end conform to the principles of his constituents, and favor their propensities as much as their interests.
the extravagance of democracy is, however, less to be dreaded in proportion as the people acquires a share of property, because on the one hand the contributions of the rich are then less needed, and, on the other, it is more difficult to lay on taxes which do not affect the interests of the lower classes. on this account universal suffrage would be less dangerous in france than in england, because in the latter country the property on which taxes may be levied is vested in fewer hands. america, where the great majority of the citizens possess some fortune, is in a still more favorable position than france.
there are still further causes which may increase the sum of public expenditure in democratic countries. when the aristocracy governs, the individuals who conduct the affairs of state are exempted by their own station in society from every kind of privation; they are contented with their position; power and renown are the objects for which they strive; and, as they are placed far above the obscurer throng of citizens, they do not always distinctly perceive how the well-being of the mass of the people ought to redound to their own honor. they are not indeed callous to the sufferings of the poor, but they cannot feel those miseries as acutely as if they were themselves partakers of them. provided that the people appear to submit to its lot, the rulers are satisfied, and they demand nothing further from the government. an aristocracy is more intent upon the means of maintaining its influence than upon the means of improving its condition.
when, on the contrary, the people is invested with the supreme authority, the perpetual sense of their own miseries impels the rulers of society to seek for perpetual ameliorations. a thousand different objects are subjected to improvement; the most trivial details are sought out as susceptible of amendment; and those changes which are accompanied with considerable expense are more especially advocated, since the object is to render the condition of the poor more tolerable, who cannot pay for themselves.
moreover, all democratic communities are agitated by an ill-defined excitement and by a kind of feverish impatience, that engender a multitude of innovations, almost all of which are attended with expense.
in monarchies and aristocracies the natural taste which the rulers have for power and for renown is stimulated by the promptings of ambition, and they are frequently incited by these temptations to very costly undertakings. in democracies, where the rulers labor under privations, they can only be courted by such means as improve their well-being, and these improvements cannot take place without a sacrifice of money. when a people begins to reflect upon its situation, it discovers a multitude of wants to which it had not before been subject, and to satisfy these exigencies recourse must be had to the coffers of the state. hence it arises that the public charges increase in proportion as civilization spreads, and that imposts are augmented as knowledge pervades the community.
the last cause which frequently renders a democratic government dearer than any other is, that a democracy does not always succeed in moderating its expenditure, because it does not understand the art of being economical. as the designs which it entertains are frequently changed, and the agents of those designs are still more frequently removed, its undertakings are often ill conducted or left unfinished: in the former case the state spends sums out of all proportion to the end which it proposes to accomplish; in the second, the expense itself is unprofitable. *f
f
[ the gross receipts of the treasury of the united states in 1832 were about $28,000,000; in 1870 they had risen to $411,000,000. the gross expenditure in 1832 was $30,000,000; in 1870, $309,000,000.]
tendencies of the american democracy as regards the salaries of public officers
in the democracies those who establish high salaries have no chance of profiting by them—tendency of the american democracy to increase the salaries of subordinate officers and to lower those of the more important functionaries—reason of this—comparative statement of the salaries of public officers in the united states and in france.
there is a powerful reason which usually induces democracies to economize upon the salaries of public officers. as the number of citizens who dispense the remuneration is extremely large in democratic countries, so the number of persons who can hope to be benefited by the receipt of it is comparatively small. in aristocratic countries, on the contrary, the individuals who fix high salaries have almost always a vague hope of profiting by them. these appointments may be looked upon as a capital which they create for their own use, or at least as a resource for their children.
it must, however, be allowed that a democratic state is most parsimonious towards its principal agents. in america the secondary officers are much better paid, and the dignitaries of the administration much worse, than they are elsewhere.
these opposite effects result from the same cause; the people fixes the salaries of the public officers in both cases; and the scale of remuneration is determined by the consideration of its own wants. it is held to be fair that the servants of the public should be placed in the same easy circumstances as the public itself; *g but when the question turns upon the salaries of the great officers of state, this rule fails, and chance alone can guide the popular decision. the poor have no adequate conception of the wants which the higher classes of society may feel. the sum which is scanty to the rich appears enormous to the poor man whose wants do not extend beyond the necessaries of life; and in his estimation the governor of a state, with his twelve or fifteen hundred dollars a year, is a very fortunate and enviable being. *h if you undertake to convince him that the representative of a great people ought to be able to maintain some show of splendor in the eyes of foreign nations, he will perhaps assent to your meaning; but when he reflects on his own humble dwelling, and on the hard-earned produce of his wearisome toil, he remembers all that he could do with a salary which you say is insufficient, and he is startled or almost frightened at the sight of such uncommon wealth. besides, the secondary public officer is almost on a level with the people, whilst the others are raised above it. the former may therefore excite his interest, but the latter begins to arouse his envy.
g
[ the easy circumstances in which secondary functionaries are placed in the united states result also from another cause, which is independent of the general tendencies of democracy; every kind of private business is very lucrative, and the state would not be served at all if it did not pay its servants. the country is in the position of a commercial undertaking, which is obliged to sustain an expensive competition, notwithstanding its tastes for economy.]
h
[ the state of ohio, which contains a million of inhabitants, gives its governor a salary of only $1,200 a year.]
this is very clearly seen in the united states, where the salaries seem to decrease as the authority of those who receive them augments *i
i
[ to render this assertion perfectly evident, it will suffice to examine the scale of salaries of the agents of the federal government. i have added the salaries attached to the corresponding officers in france under the constitutional monarchy to complete the comparison.
united states
treasury department
messenger ............................ $700
clerk with lowest salary ............. 1,000
clerk with highest salary ............ 1,600
chief clerk .......................... 2,000
secretary of state ................... 6,000
the president ........................ 25,000
france
ministere des finances
hussier ........................... 1,500 fr.
clerk with lowest salary, 1,000 to 1,800 fr.
clerk with highest salary 3,200 to 8,600 fr.
secretaire-general ................20,000 fr.
the minister ......................80,000 fr.
the king ......................12,000,000 fr.
i have perhaps done wrong in selecting france as my standard of comparison. in france the democratic tendencies of the nation exercise an ever-increasing influence upon the government, and the chambers show a disposition to raise the low salaries and to lower the principal ones. thus, the minister of finance, who received 160,000 fr. under the empire, receives 80,000 fr. in 1835: the directeurs-generaux of finance, who then received 50,000 fr. now receive only 20,000 fr. [this comparison is based on the state of things existing in france and the united states in 1831. it has since materially altered in both countries, but not so much as to impugn the truth of the author's observation.]]
under the rule of an aristocracy it frequently happens, on the contrary, that whilst the high officers are receiving munificent salaries, the inferior ones have not more than enough to procure the necessaries of life. the reason of this fact is easily discoverable from causes very analogous to those to which i have just alluded. if a democracy is unable to conceive the pleasures of the rich or to witness them without envy, an aristocracy is slow to understand, or, to speak more correctly, is unacquainted with, the privations of the poor. the poor man is not (if we use the term aright) the fellow of the rich one; but he is a being of another species. an aristocracy is therefore apt to care but little for the fate of its subordinate agents; and their salaries are only raised when they refuse to perform their service for too scanty a remuneration.
it is the parsimonious conduct of democracy towards its principal officers which has countenanced a supposition of far more economical propensities than any which it really possesses. it is true that it scarcely allows the means of honorable subsistence to the individuals who conduct its affairs; but enormous sums are lavished to meet the exigencies or to facilitate the enjoyments of the people. *j the money raised by taxation may be better employed, but it is not saved. in general, democracy gives largely to the community, and very sparingly to those who govern it. the reverse is the case in aristocratic countries, where the money of the state is expended to the profit of the persons who are at the head of affairs.
j
[ see the american budgets for the cost of indigent citizens and gratuitous instruction. in 1831 $250,000 were spent in the state of new york for the maintenance of the poor, and at least $1,000,000 were devoted to gratuitous instruction. (william's "new york annual register," 1832, pp. 205 and 243.) the state of new york contained only 1,900,000 inhabitants in the year 1830, which is not more than double the amount of population in the department du nord in france.]
difficulty of distinguishing the causes which contribute to the economy of the american government
we are liable to frequent errors in the research of those facts which exercise a serious influence upon the fate of mankind, since nothing is more difficult than to appreciate their real value. one people is naturally inconsistent and enthusiastic; another is sober and calculating; and these characteristics originate in their physical constitution or in remote causes with which we are unacquainted.
these are nations which are fond of parade and the bustle of festivity, and which do not regret the costly gaieties of an hour. others, on the contrary, are attached to more retiring pleasures, and seem almost ashamed of appearing to be pleased. in some countries the highest value is set upon the beauty of public edifices; in others the productions of art are treated with indifference, and everything which is unproductive is looked down upon with contempt. in some renown, in others money, is the ruling passion.
independently of the laws, all these causes concur to exercise a very powerful influence upon the conduct of the finances of the state. if the americans never spend the money of the people in galas, it is not only because the imposition of taxes is under the control of the people, but because the people takes no delight in public rejoicings. if they repudiate all ornament from their architecture, and set no store on any but the more practical and homely advantages, it is not only because they live under democratic institutions, but because they are a commercial nation. the habits of private life are continued in public; and we ought carefully to distinguish that economy which depends upon their institutions from that which is the natural result of their manners and customs.
whether the expenditure of the united states can be compared to that of france
two points to be established in order to estimate the extent of the public charges, viz., the national wealth and the rate of taxation—the wealth and the charges of france not accurately known—why the wealth and charges of the union cannot be accurately known—researches of the author with a view to discover the amount of taxation of pennsylvania—general symptoms which may serve to indicate the amount of the public charges in a given nation—result of this investigation for the union.
many attempts have recently been made in france to compare the public expenditure of that country with the expenditure of the united states; all these attempts have, however, been unattended by success, and a few words will suffice to show that they could not have had a satisfactory result.
in order to estimate the amount of the public charges of a people two preliminaries are indispensable: it is necessary, in the first place, to know the wealth of that people; and in the second, to learn what portion of that wealth is devoted to the expenditure of the state. to show the amount of taxation without showing the resources which are destined to meet the demand, is to undertake a futile labor; for it is not the expenditure, but the relation of the expenditure to the revenue, which it is desirable to know.
the same rate of taxation which may easily be supported by a wealthy contributor will reduce a poor one to extreme misery. the wealth of nations is composed of several distinct elements, of which population is the first, real property the second, and personal property the third. the first of these three elements may be discovered without difficulty. amongst civilized nations it is easy to obtain an accurate census of the inhabitants; but the two others cannot be determined with so much facility. it is difficult to take an exact account of all the lands in a country which are under cultivation, with their natural or their acquired value; and it is still more impossible to estimate the entire personal property which is at the disposal of a nation, and which eludes the strictest analysis by the diversity and the number of shapes under which it may occur. and, indeed, we find that the most ancient civilized nations of europe, including even those in which the administration is most central, have not succeeded, as yet, in determining the exact condition of their wealth.
in america the attempt has never been made; for how would such an investigation be possible in a country where society has not yet settled into habits of regularity and tranquillity; where the national government is not assisted by a multiple of agents whose exertions it can command and direct to one sole end; and where statistics are not studied, because no one is able to collect the necessary documents, or to find time to peruse them? thus the primary elements of the calculations which have been made in france cannot be obtained in the union; the relative wealth of the two countries is unknown; the property of the former is not accurately determined, and no means exist of computing that of the latter.
i consent, therefore, for the sake of the discussion, to abandon this necessary term of the comparison, and i confine myself to a computation of the actual amount of taxation, without investigating the relation which subsists between the taxation and the revenue. but the reader will perceive that my task has not been facilitated by the limits which i here lay down for my researches.
it cannot be doubted that the central administration of france, assisted by all the public officers who are at its disposal, might determine with exactitude the amount of the direct and indirect taxes levied upon the citizens. but this investigation, which no private individual can undertake, has not hitherto been completed by the french government, or, at least, its results have not been made public. we are acquainted with the sum total of the charges of the state; we know the amount of the departmental expenditure; but the expenses of the communal divisions have not been computed, and the amount of the public expenses of france is consequently unknown.
if we now turn to america, we shall perceive that the difficulties are multiplied and enhanced. the union publishes an exact return of the amount of its expenditure; the budgets of the four and twenty states furnish similar returns of their revenues; but the expenses incident to the affairs of the counties and the townships are unknown. *k
k
[ the americans, as we have seen, have four separate budgets, the union, the states, the counties, and the townships having each severally their own. during my stay in america i made every endeavor to discover the amount of the public expenditure in the townships and counties of the principal states of the union, and i readily obtained the budget of the larger townships, but i found it quite impossible to procure that of the smaller ones. i possess, however, some documents relating to county expenses, which, although incomplete, are still curious. i have to thank mr. richards, mayor of philadelphia, for the budgets of thirteen of the counties of pennsylvania, viz., lebanon, centre, franklin, fayette, montgomery, luzerne, dauphin, butler, alleghany, columbia, northampton, northumberland, and philadelphia, for the year 1830. their population at that time consisted of 495,207 inhabitants. on looking at the map of pennsylvania, it will be seen that these thirteen counties are scattered in every direction, and so generally affected by the causes which usually influence the condition of a country, that they may easily be supposed to furnish a correct average of the financial state of the counties of pennsylvania in general; and thus, upon reckoning that the expenses of these counties amounted in the year 1830 to about $361,650, or nearly 75 cents for each inhabitant, and calculating that each of them contributed in the same year about $2.55 towards the union, and about 75 cents to the state of pennsylvania, it appears that they each contributed as their share of all the public expenses (except those of the townships) the sum of $4.05. this calculation is doubly incomplete, as it applies only to a single year and to one part of the public charges; but it has at least the merit of not being conjectural.]
the authority of the federal government cannot oblige the provincial governments to throw any light upon this point; and even if these governments were inclined to afford their simultaneous co-operation, it may be doubted whether they possess the means of procuring a satisfactory answer. independently of the natural difficulties of the task, the political organization of the country would act as a hindrance to the success of their efforts. the county and town magistrates are not appointed by the authorities of the state, and they are not subjected to their control. it is therefore very allowable to suppose that, if the state was desirous of obtaining the returns which we require, its design would be counteracted by the neglect of those subordinate officers whom it would be obliged to employ. *l it is, in point of fact, useless to inquire what the americans might do to forward this inquiry, since it is certain that they have hitherto done nothing at all. there does not exist a single individual at the present day, in america or in europe, who can inform us what each citizen of the union annually contributes to the public charges of the nation. *m [footnote l: those who have attempted to draw a comparison between the expenses of france and america have at once perceived that no such comparison could be drawn between the total expenditure of the two countries; but they have endeavored to contrast detached portions of this expenditure. it may readily be shown that this second system is not at all less defective than the first. if i attempt to compare the french budget with the budget of the union, it must be remembered that the latter embraces much fewer objects than then central government of the former country, and that the expenditure must consequently be much smaller. if i contrast the budgets of the departments with those of the states which constitute the union, it must be observed that, as the power and control exercised by the states is much greater than that which is exercised by the departments, their expenditure is also more considerable. as for the budgets of the counties, nothing of the kind occurs in the french system of finances; and it is, again, doubtful whether the corresponding expenses should be referred to the budget of the state or to those of the municipal divisions. municipal expenses exist in both countries, but they are not always analogous. in america the townships discharge a variety of offices which are reserved in france to the departments or to the state. it may, moreover, be asked what is to be understood by the municipal expenses of america. the organization of the municipal bodies or townships differs in the several states. are we to be guided by what occurs in new england or in georgia, in pennsylvania or in the state of illinois? a kind of analogy may very readily be perceived between certain budgets in the two countries; but as the elements of which they are composed always differ more or less, no fair comparison can be instituted between them. [the same difficulty exists, perhaps to a greater degree at the present time, when the taxation of america has largely increased.—1874.]]
m
[ even if we knew the exact pecuniary contributions of every french and american citizen to the coffers of the state, we should only come at a portion of the truth. governments do not only demand supplies of money, but they call for personal services, which may be looked upon as equivalent to a given sum. when a state raises an army, besides the pay of the troops, which is furnished by the entire nation, each soldier must give up his time, the value of which depends on the use he might make of it if he were not in the service. the same remark applies to the militia; the citizen who is in the militia devotes a certain portion of valuable time to the maintenance of the public peace, and he does in reality surrender to the state those earnings which he is prevented from gaining. many other instances might be cited in addition to these. the governments of france and of america both levy taxes of this kind, which weigh upon the citizens; but who can estimate with accuracy their relative amount in the two countries?
this, however, is not the last of the difficulties which prevent us from comparing the expenditure of the union with that of france. the french government contracts certain obligations which do not exist in america, and vice versa. the french government pays the clergy; in america the voluntary principle prevails. in america there is a legal provision for the poor; in france they are abandoned to the charity of the public. the french public officers are paid by a fixed salary; in america they are allowed certain perquisites. in france contributions in kind take place on very few roads; in america upon almost all the thoroughfares: in the former country the roads are free to all travellers; in the latter turnpikes abound. all these differences in the manner in which contributions are levied in the two countries enhance the difficulty of comparing their expenditure; for there are certain expenses which the citizens would not be subject to, or which would at any rate be much less considerable, if the state did not take upon itself to act in the name of the public.]
hence we must conclude that it is no less difficult to compare the social expenditure than it is to estimate the relative wealth of france and america. i will even add that it would be dangerous to attempt this comparison; for when statistics are not based upon computations which are strictly accurate, they mislead instead of guiding aright. the mind is easily imposed upon by the false affectation of exactness, which prevails even in the misstatements of science, and it adopts with confidence errors which are dressed in the forms of mathematical truth.
we abandon, therefore, our numerical investigation, with the hope of meeting with data of another kind. in the absence of positive documents, we may form an opinion as to the proportion which the taxation of a people bears to its real prosperity, by observing whether its external appearance is flourishing; whether, after having discharged the calls of the state, the poor man retains the means of subsistence, and the rich the means of enjoyment; and whether both classes are contented with their position, seeking, however, to ameliorate it by perpetual exertions, so that industry is never in want of capital, nor capital unemployed by industry. the observer who draws his inferences from these signs will, undoubtedly, be led to the conclusion that the american of the united states contributes a much smaller portion of his income to the state than the citizen of france. nor, indeed, can the result be otherwise.
a portion of the french debt is the consequence of two successive invasions; and the union has no similar calamity to fear. a nation placed upon the continent of europe is obliged to maintain a large standing army; the isolated position of the union enables it to have only 6,000 soldiers. the french have a fleet of 300 sail; the americans have 52 vessels. *n how, then, can the inhabitants of the union be called upon to contribute as largely as the inhabitants of france? no parallel can be drawn between the finances of two countries so differently situated.
n
[ see the details in the budget of the french minister of marine; and for america, the national calendar of 1833, p. 228. [but the public debt of the united states in 1870, caused by the civil war, amounted to $2,480,672,427; that of france was more than doubled by the extravagance of the second empire and by the war of 1870.]]
it is by examining what actually takes place in the union, and not by comparing the union with france, that we may discover whether the american government is really economical. on casting my eyes over the different republics which form the confederation, i perceive that their governments lack perseverance in their undertakings, and that they exercise no steady control over the men whom they employ. whence i naturally infer that they must often spend the money of the people to no purpose, or consume more of it than is really necessary to their undertakings. great efforts are made, in accordance with the democratic origin of society, to satisfy the exigencies of the lower orders, to open the career of power to their endeavors, and to diffuse knowledge and comfort amongst them. the poor are maintained, immense sums are annually devoted to public instruction, all services whatsoever are remunerated, and the most subordinate agents are liberally paid. if this kind of government appears to me to be useful and rational, i am nevertheless constrained to admit that it is expensive.
wherever the poor direct public affairs and dispose of the national resources, it appears certain that, as they profit by the expenditure of the state, they are apt to augment that expenditure.
i conclude, therefore, without having recourse to inaccurate computations, and without hazarding a comparison which might prove incorrect, that the democratic government of the americans is not a cheap government, as is sometimes asserted; and i have no hesitation in predicting that, if the people of the united states is ever involved in serious difficulties, its taxation will speedily be increased to the rate of that which prevails in the greater part of the aristocracies and the monarchies of europe.
