corruption and vices of the rulers in a democracy, and consequent effects upon public morality

in aristocracies rulers sometimes endeavor to corrupt the people—in democracies rulers frequently show themselves to be corrupt—in the former their vices are directly prejudicial to the morality of the people—in the latter their indirect influence is still more pernicious.

a distinction must be made, when the aristocratic and the democratic principles mutually inveigh against each other, as tending to facilitate corruption. in aristocratic governments the individuals who are placed at the head of affairs are rich men, who are solely desirous of power. in democracies statesmen are poor, and they have their fortunes to make. the consequence is that in aristocratic states the rulers are rarely accessible to corruption, and have very little craving for money; whilst the reverse is the case in democratic nations.

but in aristocracies, as those who are desirous of arriving at the head of affairs are possessed of considerable wealth, and as the number of persons by whose assistance they may rise is comparatively small, the government is, if i may use the expression, put up to a sort of auction. in democracies, on the contrary, those who are covetous of power are very seldom wealthy, and the number of citizens who confer that power is extremely great. perhaps in democracies the number of men who might be bought is by no means smaller, but buyers are rarely to be met with; and, besides, it would be necessary to buy so many persons at once that the attempt is rendered nugatory.

many of the men who have been in the administration in france during the last forty years have been accused of making their fortunes at the expense of the state or of its allies; a reproach which was rarely addressed to the public characters of the ancient monarchy. but in france the practice of bribing electors is almost unknown, whilst it is notoriously and publicly carried on in england. in the united states i never heard a man accused of spending his wealth in corrupting the populace; but i have often heard the probity of public officers questioned; still more frequently have i heard their success attributed to low intrigues and immoral practices.

if, then, the men who conduct the government of an aristocracy sometimes endeavor to corrupt the people, the heads of a democracy are themselves corrupt. in the former case the morality of the people is directly assailed; in the latter an indirect influence is exercised upon the people which is still more to be dreaded.

as the rulers of democratic nations are almost always exposed to the suspicion of dishonorable conduct, they in some measure lend the authority of the government to the base practices of which they are accused. they thus afford an example which must prove discouraging to the struggles of virtuous independence, and must foster the secret calculations of a vicious ambition. if it be asserted that evil passions are displayed in all ranks of society, that they ascend the throne by hereditary right, and that despicable characters are to be met with at the head of aristocratic nations as well as in the sphere of a democracy, this objection has but little weight in my estimation. the corruption of men who have casually risen to power has a coarse and vulgar infection in it which renders it contagious to the multitude. on the contrary, there is a kind of aristocratic refinement and an air of grandeur in the depravity of the great, which frequently prevent it from spreading abroad.

the people can never penetrate into the perplexing labyrinth of court intrigue, and it will always have difficulty in detecting the turpitude which lurks under elegant manners, refined tastes, and graceful language. but to pillage the public purse, and to vend the favors of the state, are arts which the meanest villain may comprehend, and hope to practice in his turn.

in reality it is far less prejudicial to witness the immorality of the great than to witness that immorality which leads to greatness. in a democracy private citizens see a man of their own rank in life, who rises from that obscure position, and who becomes possessed of riches and of power in a few years; the spectacle excites their surprise and their envy, and they are led to inquire how the person who was yesterday their equal is to-day their ruler. to attribute his rise to his talents or his virtues is unpleasant; for it is tacitly to acknowledge that they are themselves less virtuous and less talented than he was. they are therefore led (and not unfrequently their conjecture is a correct one) to impute his success mainly to some one of his defects; and an odious mixture is thus formed of the ideas of turpitude and power, unworthiness and success, utility and dishonor.

efforts of which a democracy is capable

the union has only had one struggle hitherto for its existence—enthusiasm at the commencement of the war—indifference towards its close—difficulty of establishing military conscription or impressment of seamen in america—why a democratic people is less capable of sustained effort than another.

i here warn the reader that i speak of a government which implicitly follows the real desires of a people, and not of a government which simply commands in its name. nothing is so irresistible as a tyrannical power commanding in the name of the people, because, whilst it exercises that moral influence which belongs to the decision of the majority, it acts at the same time with the promptitude and the tenacity of a single man.

it is difficult to say what degree of exertion a democratic government may be capable of making a crisis in the history of the nation. but no great democratic republic has hitherto existed in the world. to style the oligarchy which ruled over france in 1793 by that name would be to offer an insult to the republican form of government. the united states afford the first example of the kind.

the american union has now subsisted for half a century, in the course of which time its existence has only once been attacked, namely, during the war of independence. at the commencement of that long war, various occurrences took place which betokened an extraordinary zeal for the service of the country. *p but as the contest was prolonged, symptoms of private egotism began to show themselves. no money was poured into the public treasury; few recruits could be raised to join the army; the people wished to acquire independence, but was very ill-disposed to undergo the privations by which alone it could be obtained. "tax laws," says hamilton in the "federalist" (no. 12), "have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed and the treasuries of the states have remained empty. the popular system of administration inherent in the nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them."

p

[ one of the most singular of these occurrences was the resolution which the americans took of temporarily abandoning the use of tea. those who know that men usually cling more to their habits than to their life will doubtless admire this great though obscure sacrifice which was made by a whole people.]

the united states have not had any serious war to carry on ever since that period. in order, therefore, to appreciate the sacrifices which democratic nations may impose upon themselves, we must wait until the american people is obliged to put half its entire income at the disposal of the government, as was done by the english; or until it sends forth a twentieth part of its population to the field of battle, as was done by france. *q

q

[ [the civil war showed that when the necessity arose the american people, both in the north and in the south, are capable of making the most enormous sacrifices, both in money and in men.]]

in america the use of conscription is unknown, and men are induced to enlist by bounties. the notions and habits of the people of the united states are so opposed to compulsory enlistment that i do not imagine it can ever be sanctioned by the laws. what is termed the conscription in france is assuredly the heaviest tax upon the population of that country; yet how could a great continental war be carried on without it? the americans have not adopted the british impressment of seamen, and they have nothing which corresponds to the french system of maritime conscription; the navy, as well as the merchant service, is supplied by voluntary service. but it is not easy to conceive how a people can sustain a great maritime war without having recourse to one or the other of these two systems. indeed, the union, which has fought with some honor upon the seas, has never possessed a very numerous fleet, and the equipment of the small number of american vessels has always been excessively expensive.

i have heard american statesmen confess that the union will have great difficulty in maintaining its rank on the seas without adopting the system of impressment or of maritime conscription; but the difficulty is to induce the people, which exercises the supreme authority, to submit to impressment or any compulsory system.

it is incontestable that in times of danger a free people displays far more energy than one which is not so. but i incline to believe that this is more especially the case in those free nations in which the democratic element preponderates. democracy appears to me to be much better adapted for the peaceful conduct of society, or for an occasional effort of remarkable vigor, than for the hardy and prolonged endurance of the storms which beset the political existence of nations. the reason is very evident; it is enthusiasm which prompts men to expose themselves to dangers and privations, but they will not support them long without reflection. there is more calculation, even in the impulses of bravery, than is generally attributed to them; and although the first efforts are suggested by passion, perseverance is maintained by a distinct regard of the purpose in view. a portion of what we value is exposed, in order to save the remainder.

but it is this distinct perception of the future, founded upon a sound judgment and an enlightened experience, which is most frequently wanting in democracies. the populace is more apt to feel than to reason; and if its present sufferings are great, it is to be feared that the still greater sufferings attendant upon defeat will be forgotten.

another cause tends to render the efforts of a democratic government less persevering than those of an aristocracy. not only are the lower classes less awakened than the higher orders to the good or evil chances of the future, but they are liable to suffer far more acutely from present privations. the noble exposes his life, indeed, but the chance of glory is equal to the chance of harm. if he sacrifices a large portion of his income to the state, he deprives himself for a time of the pleasures of affluence; but to the poor man death is embellished by no pomp or renown, and the imposts which are irksome to the rich are fatal to him.

this relative impotence of democratic republics is, perhaps, the greatest obstacle to the foundation of a republic of this kind in europe. in order that such a state should subsist in one country of the old world, it would be necessary that similar institutions should be introduced into all the other nations.

i am of opinion that a democratic government tends in the end to increase the real strength of society; but it can never combine, upon a single point and at a given time, so much power as an aristocracy or a monarchy. if a democratic country remained during a whole century subject to a republican government, it would probably at the end of that period be more populous and more prosperous than the neighboring despotic states. but it would have incurred the risk of being conquered much oftener than they would in that lapse of years.

self-control of the american democracy

the american people acquiesces slowly, or frequently does not acquiesce, in what is beneficial to its interests—the faults of the american democracy are for the most part reparable.

the difficulty which a democracy has in conquering the passions and in subduing the exigencies of the moment, with a view to the future, is conspicuous in the most trivial occurrences of the united states. the people, which is surrounded by flatterers, has great difficulty in surmounting its inclinations, and whenever it is solicited to undergo a privation or any kind of inconvenience, even to attain an end which is sanctioned by its own rational conviction, it almost always refuses to comply at first. the deference of the americans to the laws has been very justly applauded; but it must be added that in america the legislation is made by the people and for the people. consequently, in the united states the law favors those classes which are most interested in evading it elsewhere. it may therefore be supposed that an offensive law, which should not be acknowledged to be one of immediate utility, would either not be enacted or would not be obeyed.

in america there is no law against fraudulent bankruptcies; not because they are few, but because there are a great number of bankruptcies. the dread of being prosecuted as a bankrupt acts with more intensity upon the mind of the majority of the people than the fear of being involved in losses or ruin by the failure of other parties, and a sort of guilty tolerance is extended by the public conscience to an offence which everyone condemns in his individual capacity. in the new states of the southwest the citizens generally take justice into their own hands, and murders are of very frequent occurrence. this arises from the rude manners and the ignorance of the inhabitants of those deserts, who do not perceive the utility of investing the law with adequate force, and who prefer duels to prosecutions.

someone observed to me one day, in philadelphia, that almost all crimes in america are caused by the abuse of intoxicating liquors, which the lower classes can procure in great abundance, from their excessive cheapness. "how comes it," said i, "that you do not put a duty upon brandy?" "our legislators," rejoined my informant, "have frequently thought of this expedient; but the task of putting it in operation is a difficult one; a revolt might be apprehended, and the members who should vote for a law of this kind would be sure of losing their seats." "whence i am to infer," replied i, "that the drinking population constitutes the majority in your country, and that temperance is somewhat unpopular."

when these things are pointed out to the american statesmen, they content themselves with assuring you that time will operate the necessary change, and that the experience of evil will teach the people its true interests. this is frequently true, although a democracy is more liable to error than a monarch or a body of nobles; the chances of its regaining the right path when once it has acknowledged its mistake, are greater also; because it is rarely embarrassed by internal interests, which conflict with those of the majority, and resist the authority of reason. but a democracy can only obtain truth as the result of experience, and many nations may forfeit their existence whilst they are awaiting the consequences of their errors.

the great privilege of the americans does not simply consist in their being more enlightened than other nations, but in their being able to repair the faults they may commit. to which it must be added, that a democracy cannot derive substantial benefit from past experience, unless it be arrived at a certain pitch of knowledge and civilization. there are tribes and peoples whose education has been so vicious, and whose character presents so strange a mixture of passion, of ignorance, and of erroneous notions upon all subjects, that they are unable to discern the causes of their own wretchedness, and they fall a sacrifice to ills with which they are unacquainted.

i have crossed vast tracts of country that were formerly inhabited by powerful indian nations which are now extinct; i have myself passed some time in the midst of mutilated tribes, which witness the daily decline of their numerical strength and of the glory of their independence; and i have heard these indians themselves anticipate the impending doom of their race. every european can perceive means which would rescue these unfortunate beings from inevitable destruction. they alone are insensible to the expedient; they feel the woe which year after year heaps upon their heads, but they will perish to a man without accepting the remedy. it would be necessary to employ force to induce them to submit to the protection and the constraint of civilization.

the incessant revolutions which have convulsed the south american provinces for the last quarter of a century have frequently been adverted to with astonishment, and expectations have been expressed that those nations would speedily return to their natural state. but can it be affirmed that the turmoil of revolution is not actually the most natural state of the south american spaniards at the present time? in that country society is plunged into difficulties from which all its efforts are insufficient to rescue it. the inhabitants of that fair portion of the western hemisphere seem obstinately bent on pursuing the work of inward havoc. if they fall into a momentary repose from the effects of exhaustion, that repose prepares them for a fresh state of frenzy. when i consider their condition, which alternates between misery and crime, i should be inclined to believe that despotism itself would be a benefit to them, if it were possible that the words despotism and benefit could ever be united in my mind.

conduct of foreign affairs by the american democracy

direction given to the foreign policy of the united states by washington and jefferson—almost all the defects inherent in democratic institutions are brought to light in the conduct of foreign affairs—their advantages are less perceptible.

we have seen that the federal constitution entrusts the permanent direction of the external interests of the nation to the president and the senate, *r which tends in some degree to detach the general foreign policy of the union from the control of the people. it cannot therefore be asserted with truth that the external affairs of state are conducted by the democracy.

r

[ "the president," says the constitution, art. ii, sect. 2, section 2, "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." the reader is reminded that the senators are returned for a term of six years, and that they are chosen by the legislature of each state.]

the policy of america owes its rise to washington, and after him to jefferson, who established those principles which it observes at the present day. washington said in the admirable letter which he addressed to his fellow-citizens, and which may be looked upon as his political bequest to the country: "the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. so far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. here let us stop. europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. if we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of european ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? it is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, i mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. i hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. i repeat it; therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense; but in my opinion it is unnecessary, and would be unwise, to extend them. taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, in a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." in a previous part of the same letter washington makes the following admirable and just remark: "the nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. it is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest."

the political conduct of washington was always guided by these maxims. he succeeded in maintaining his country in a state of peace whilst all the other nations of the globe were at war; and he laid it down as a fundamental doctrine, that the true interest of the americans consisted in a perfect neutrality with regard to the internal dissensions of the european powers.

jefferson went still further, and he introduced a maxim into the policy of the union, which affirms that "the americans ought never to solicit any privileges from foreign nations, in order not to be obliged to grant similar privileges themselves."

these two principles, which were so plain and so just as to be adapted to the capacity of the populace, have greatly simplified the foreign policy of the united states. as the union takes no part in the affairs of europe, it has, properly speaking, no foreign interests to discuss, since it has at present no powerful neighbors on the american continent. the country is as much removed from the passions of the old world by its position as by the line of policy which it has chosen, and it is neither called upon to repudiate nor to espouse the conflicting interests of europe; whilst the dissensions of the new world are still concealed within the bosom of the future.

the union is free from all pre-existing obligations, and it is consequently enabled to profit by the experience of the old nations of europe, without being obliged, as they are, to make the best of the past, and to adapt it to their present circumstances; or to accept that immense inheritance which they derive from their forefathers—an inheritance of glory mingled with calamities, and of alliances conflicting with national antipathies. the foreign policy of the united states is reduced by its very nature to await the chances of the future history of the nation, and for the present it consists more in abstaining from interference than in exerting its activity.

it is therefore very difficult to ascertain, at present, what degree of sagacity the american democracy will display in the conduct of the foreign policy of the country; and upon this point its adversaries, as well as its advocates, must suspend their judgment. as for myself i have no hesitation in avowing my conviction, that it is most especially in the conduct of foreign relations that democratic governments appear to me to be decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different principles. experience, instruction, and habit may almost always succeed in creating a species of practical discretion in democracies, and that science of the daily occurrences of life which is called good sense. good sense may suffice to direct the ordinary course of society; and amongst a people whose education has been provided for, the advantages of democratic liberty in the internal affairs of the country may more than compensate for the evils inherent in a democratic government. but such is not always the case in the mutual relations of foreign nations.

foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient. democracy is favorable to the increase of the internal resources of the state; it tends to diffuse a moderate independence; it promotes the growth of public spirit, and fortifies the respect which is entertained for law in all classes of society; and these are advantages which only exercise an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. but a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. it cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience. these are qualities which more especially belong to an individual or to an aristocracy; and they are precisely the means by which an individual people attains to a predominant position.

if, on the contrary, we observe the natural defects of aristocracy, we shall find that their influence is comparatively innoxious in the direction of the external affairs of a state. the capital fault of which aristocratic bodies may be accused is that they are more apt to contrive their own advantage than that of the mass of the people. in foreign politics it is rare for the interest of the aristocracy to be in any way distinct from that of the people.

the propensity which democracies have to obey the impulse of passion rather than the suggestions of prudence, and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary caprice, was very clearly seen in america on the breaking out of the french revolution. it was then as evident to the simplest capacity as it is at the present time that the interest of the americans forbade them to take any part in the contest which was about to deluge europe with blood, but which could by no means injure the welfare of their own country. nevertheless the sympathies of the people declared themselves with so much violence in behalf of france that nothing but the inflexible character of washington, and the immense popularity which he enjoyed, could have prevented the americans from declaring war against england. and even then, the exertions which the austere reason of that great man made to repress the generous but imprudent passions of his fellow-citizens, very nearly deprived him of the sole recompense which he had ever claimed—that of his country's love. the majority then reprobated the line of policy which he adopted, and which has since been unanimously approved by the nation. *s if the constitution and the favor of the public had not entrusted the direction of the foreign affairs of the country to washington, it is certain that the american nation would at that time have taken the very measures which it now condemns.

s

[ see the fifth volume of marshall's "life of washington." in a government constituted like that of the united states, he says, "it is impossible for the chief magistrate, however firm he may be, to oppose for any length of time the torrent of popular opinion; and the prevalent opinion of that day seemed to incline to war. in fact, in the session of congress held at the time, it was frequently seen that washington had lost the majority in the house of representatives." the violence of the language used against him in public was extreme, and in a political meeting they did not scruple to compare him indirectly to the treacherous arnold. "by the opposition," says marshall, "the friends of the administration were declared to be an aristocratic and corrupt faction, who, from a desire to introduce monarchy, were hostile to france and under the influence of britain; that they were a paper nobility, whose extreme sensibility at every measure which threatened the funds, induced a tame submission to injuries and insults, which the interests and honor of the nation required them to resist."]

almost all the nations which have ever exercised a powerful influence upon the destinies of the world by conceiving, following up, and executing vast designs—from the romans to the english—have been governed by aristocratic institutions. nor will this be a subject of wonder when we recollect that nothing in the world has so absolute a fixity of purpose as an aristocracy. the mass of the people may be led astray by ignorance or passion; the mind of a king may be biased, and his perseverance in his designs may be shaken—besides which a king is not immortal—but an aristocratic body is too numerous to be led astray by the blandishments of intrigue, and yet not numerous enough to yield readily to the intoxicating influence of unreflecting passion: it has the energy of a firm and enlightened individual, added to the power which it derives from perpetuity.