genius or originality is, for the most part, some strong quality in the mind, answering to and bringing out some new and striking quality in nature.
imagination is, more properly, the power of carrying on a given feeling into other situations, which must be done best according to the hold which the feeling itself has taken of the mind.18 in new and unknown combinations the impression must act by sympathy, and not by rule, but there can be no sympathy where there is no passion, no original interest. the personal interest may in some cases oppress and circumscribe the imaginative faculty, as in the instance of rousseau: but in general the strength and consistency of the imagination will be in proportion to the strength and depth of feeling; and it is rarely that a man even of lofty genius will be able to do more than carry on his own feelings and character, or some prominent and ruling passion, into fictitious and uncommon situations. milton has by allusion embodied a great part of his political and personal history in the chief characters and incidents of paradise lost. he has, no doubt, wonderfully adapted and heightened them, but the elements are the same; you trace the bias and opinions of the man in the creations of the poe above the definition of genius. ‘born universal heir to all humanity,’ he was ‘as one, in suffering all who suffered nothing’; with a perfect sympathy with all things, yet alike indifferent to all: who did not tamper with nature or warp her to his own purposes; who ‘knew all qualities with a learned spirit,’ instead of judging of them by his own predilections; and was rather ‘a pipe for the muse’s finger to play what stop she pleasd,’ than anxious to set up any character or pretensions of his own. his genius consisted in the faculty of transforming himself at will into whatever he chose: his originality was the power of seeing every object from the exact point of view in which others would see it. he was the proteus of human intellect. genius in ordinary is a more obstinate and less versatile thing. it is sufficiently exclusive and self-willed, quaint and peculiar. it does some one thing by virtue of doing nothing else: it excels in some one pursuit by being blind to all excellence but its own. it is just the reverse of the cameleon; for it does not borrow, but lends its colour to all about it; or like the glow-worm, discloses a little circle of gorgeous light in the twilight of obscurity, in the night of intellect that surrounds it. so did rembrandt. if ever there was a man of genius, he was one, in the proper sense of the term. he lived in and revealed to otters a world of his own, and might be said to have invented a new view of nature. he did not discover things out of nature, in fiction or fairy land, or make a voyage to the moon ‘to descry new lands, rivers or mountains in her spotty globe,’ but saw things in nature that every one had missed before him and gave others eyes to see them with. this is the test and triumph of originality, not to show us what has never been, and what we may therefore very easily never have dreamt of, but to point out to us what is before our eyes and under our feet, though we have had no suspicion of its existence, for want of sufficient strength of intuition, of determined grasp of mind, to seize and retain it. rembrandt’s conquests were not over the ideal, but the real. he did not contrive a new story or character, but we nearly owe to him a fifth part of painting, the knowledge of chiaroscuro— a distinct power and element in art and nature. he had a steadiness, a firm keeping of mind and eye, that first stood the shock of ‘fierce extremes’ in light and shade, or reconciled the greatest obscurity and the greatest brilliancy into perfect harmony; and he therefore was the first to hazard this appearance upon canvas, and give full effect to what he saw and delighted in. he was led to adopt this style of broad and startling contrast from its congeniality to his own feelings: his mind grappled with that which afforded the best exercise to its master-powers: he was bold in act, because he was urged on by a strong native impulse. originality is then nothing but nature and feeling working in the mind. a man does not affect to be original: he is so, because he cannot help it, and often without knowing it. this extraordinary artist indeed might be said to have had a particular organ for colour. his eye seemed to come in contact with it as a feeling, to lay hold of it as a substance, rather than to contemplate it as a visual object. the texture of his landscapes is ‘of the earth, earthy’— his clouds are humid, heavy, slow; his shadows are ‘darkness that may be felt,’ a ‘palpable obscure’; his lights are lumps of liquid splendour! there is something more in this than can be accounted for from design or accident: rembrandt was not a man made up of two or three rules and directions for acquiring genius.
i am afraid i shall hardly write so satisfactory a character of mr. wordsworth, though he too, like rembrandt, has a faculty of making something out of nothing, that is, out of himself, by the medium through which he sees and with which he clothes the barrenest subject. mr. wordsworth is the last man to ‘look abroad into universality,’ if that alone constituted genius: he looks at home into himself, and is ‘content with riches fineless.’ he would in the other case be ‘poor as winter,’ if he had nothing but general capacity to trust to. he is the greatest, that is, the most original poet of the present day, only because he is the greatest egotist. he is ‘self-involved, not dark.’ he sits in the centre of his own being, and there ‘enjoys bright day.’ he does not waste a thought on others. whatever does not relate exclusively and wholly to himself is foreign to his views. he contemplates a whole-length figure of himself, he looks along the unbroken line of his personal identity. he thrusts aside all other objects, all other interests, with scorn and impatience, that he may repose on his own being, that he may dig out the treasures of thought contained in it, that he may unfold the precious stores of a mind for ever brooding over itself. his genius is the effect of his individual character. he stamps that character, that deep individual interest, on whatever he meets. the object is nothing but as it furnishes food for internal meditation, for old associations. if there had been no other being in the universe, mr. wordsworth’s poetry would have been just what it is. if there had been neither love nor friendship, neither ambition nor pleasure nor business in the world, the author of the lyrical ballads need not have been greatly changed from what he is — might still have ‘kept the noiseless tenour of his way,’ retired in the sanctuary of his own heart, hallowing the sabbath of his own thoughts. with the passions, the pursuits, and imaginations of other men he does not profess to sympathise, but ‘finds tongues in the trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in stones, and good in everything.’ with a mind averse from outward objects, but ever intent upon its own workings, he hangs a weight of thought and feeling upon every trifling circumstance connected with his past history. the note of the cuckoo sounds in his ear like the voice of other years; the daisy spreads its leaves in the rays of boyish delight that stream from his thoughtful eyes; the rainbow lifts its proud arch in heaven but to mark his progress from infancy to manhood; an old thorn is buried, bowed down under the mass of associations he has wound about it; and to him, as he himself beautifully says,
the meanest flow’r that blows can give
thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.
it is this power of habitual sentiment, or of transferring the interest of our conscious existence to whatever gently solicits attention, and is a link in the chain of association without rousing our passions or hurting our pride, that is the striking feature in mr. wordsworth’s mind and poetry. others have left and shown this power before, as wither, burns, etc., but none have felt it so intensely and absolutely as to lend to it the voice of inspiration, as to make it the foundation of a new style and school in poetry. his strength, as it so often happens, arises from the excess of his weakness. but he has opened a new avenue to the human heart, has explored another secret haunt and nook of nature, ‘sacred to verse, and sure of everlasting fame.’ compared with his lines, lord byron’s stanzas are but exaggerated common-place, and walter scott’s poetry (not his prose) old wives’ fables.19 there is no one in whom i have been more disappointed than in the writer here spoken of, nor with whom i am more disposed on certain points to quarrel; but the love of truth and justice which obliges me to do this, will not suffer me to blench his merits. do what he can, he cannot help being an original-minded man. his poetry is not servile. while the cuckoo returns in the spring, while the daisy looks bright in the sun, while the rainbow lifts its head above the storm —
yet i’ll remember thee, glencairn,
and all that thou hast done for me!
sir joshua reynolds, in endeavouring to show that there is no such thing as proper originality, a spirit emanating from the mind of the artist and shining through his works, has traced raphael through a number of figures which he has borrowed from masaccio and others. this is a bad calculation. if raphael had only borrowed those figures from others, would he, even in sir joshua’s sense, have been entitled to the praise of originality? plagiarism, in so far as it is plagiarism, is not originality. salvator is considered by many as a great genius. he is what they call an irregular genius. my notion of genius is not exactly the same as theirs. it has also been made a question; whether there is not more genius in rembrandt’s three trees than in all claude lorraine’s landscapes. i do not know how that may be; but it was enough for claude to have been a perfect landscape-painter.
capacity is not the same thing as genius. capacity may be described to relate to the quantity of knowledge, however acquired; genius, to its quality and the mode of acquiring it. capacity is power over given ideas combinations of ideas; genius is the power over those which are not given, and for which no obvious or precise rule can be laid down. or capacity is power of any sort; genius is power of a different sort from what has yet been shown. a retentive memory, a clear understanding, is capacity, but it is not genius. the admirable crichton was a person of prodigious capacity; but there is no proof (that i know) that he had an atom of genius. his verses that remain are dull and sterile. he could learn all that was known of any subject; he could do anything if others could show him the way to do it. this was very wonderful; but that is all you can say of it. it requires a good capacity to play well at chess; but, after all, it is a game of skill, and not of genius. know what you will of it, the understanding still moves in certain tracks in which others have trod it before, quicker or slower, with more or less comprehension and presence of mind. the greatest skill strikes out nothing for itself, from its own peculiar resources; the nature of the game is a thing determinate and fixed: there is no royal or poetical road to checkmate your adversary. there is no place for genius but in the indefinite and unknown. the discovery of the binomial theorem was an effort of genius; but there was none shown in jedediah buxton’s being able to multiply 9 figures by 9 in his head. if he could have multiplied 90 figures by 90 instead of 9, it would have been equally useless toil and trouble.20 he is a man of capacity who possesses considerable intellectual riches: he is a man of genius who finds out a vein of new ore. originality is the seeing nature differently from others, and yet as it is in itself. it is not singularity or affectation, but the discovery of new and valuable truth. all the world do not see the wh looking at. habit blinds them to some things; short-sightedness to others. every mind is not a gauge and measure of truth. nature has her surface and her dark recesses. she is deep, obscure, and infinite. it is only minds on whom she makes her fullest impressions that can penetrate her shrine or unveil her holy of holies. it is only those whom she has filled with her spirit that have the boldness or the power to reveal her mysteries to others. but nature has a thousand aspects, and one man can only draw out one of them. whoever does this is a man of genius. one displays her force, another her refinement; one her power of harmony, another her suddenness of contrast; one her beauty of form, another her splendour of colour. each does that for which he is bast fitted by his particular genius, that is to say, by some quality of mind into which the quality of the object sinks deepest, where it finds the most cordial welcome, is perceived to its utmost extent, and where again it forces its way out from the fulness with which it has taken possession of the mind of the student. the imagination gives out what it has first absorbed by congeniality of temperament, what it has attracted and moulded into itself by elective affinity, as the loadstone draws and impregnates iron. a little originality is more esteemed and sought for than the greatest acquired talent, because it throws a new light upon things, and is peculiar to the individual. the other is common; and may be had for the asking, to any amount.
the value of any work is to be judged of by the quantity of originality contained in it. a very little of this will go a great way. if goldsmith had never written anything but the two or three first chapters of the vicar of wakefield or the character of a village schoolmaster, they would have stamped him a man of genius. the editors of encyclopedias are not usually reckoned the first literary characters of the age. the works of which they have the management contain a great deal of knowledge, like chests or warehouses, but the goods are not their own. we should as soon think of admiring the shelves of a library; but the shelves of a library are useful and respectable. i was once applied to, in a delicate emergency, to write an article on a difficult subject for an encyclopedia, and was advised to take time and give it a systematic and scientific form, to avail myself of all the knowledge that was to be obtained on the subject, and arrange it with clearness and method. i made answer that as to the first, i had taken time to do all that i ever pretended to do, as i had thought incessantly on different matters for twenty years of my life;21 that i had no particular knowledge of the subject in question, and no head for arrangement; and that the utmost i could do in such a case would be, when a systematic and scientific article was prepared, to write marginal notes upon it, to insert a remark or illustration of my own (not to be found in former encyclopedias), or to suggest a better definition than had been offered in the text. there are two sorts of writing. the first is compilation; and consists in collecting and stating all that is already known of any question in the best possible manner, for the benefit of the uninformed reader. an author of this class is a very learned amanuensis of other people’s thoughts. the second sort proceeds on an entirely different principle: instead of bringing down the account of knowledge to the point at which it has already arrived, it professes to start from that point on the strength of the writer’s individual reflections; and supposing the reader in possession of what is already known, supplies deficiencies, fills up certain blanks, and quits the beaten road in search of new tracts of observation or sources of feeling. it is in vain to object to this last style that it is disjointed, disproportioned, and irregular. it is merely a set of additions and corrections to other men’s works, or to the common stock of human knowledge, printed separately. you might as well expect a continued chain of reasoning in the notes to a book. it skips all the trite, intermediate, level common-places of the subject, and only stops at the difficult passages of the human mind, or touches on some striking point that has been overlooked in previous editions. a view of a subject, to be connected and regular, cannot be all new. a writer will always be liable to be charged either with paradox or common-place, either with dulness or affectation. but we have no right to demand from any one more than he pretends to. there is indeed a medium in all things, but to unite opposite excellencies is a task ordinarily too hard for mortality. he who succeeds in what he aims at, or who takes the lead in any one mode or path of excellence, may think himself very well off. it would not be fair to complain of the style of an encyclopedia as dull, as wanting volatile salt; nor of the style of an essay because it is too light and sparkling, because it is not a caput mortuum. so it is rather an odd objection to a work that it is made up entirely of ‘brilliant passages’— at least it is a fault that can be found with few works, and the book might be pardoned for its singularity. the censure might indeed seem like adroit flattery, if it were not passed on an author whom any objection is sufficient to render unpopular and ridiculous. i grant it is best to unite solidity with show, general information with particular ingenuity. this is the pattern of a perfect style; but i myself do not pretend to be a perfect writer. in fine, we do not banish light french wines from our tables, or refuse to taste sparkling champagne when we can get it because it has not the body of old port. besides, i do not know that dulness is strength, or that an observation is slight because it is striking. mediocrity, insipidity, want of character is the great fault.
mediocribus esse poetis
non dii, non homines, non concessere columnae.
neither is this privilege allowed to prose-writers in our time any more than to poets formerly.
it is not then acuteness of organs or extent of capacity that constitutes rare genius or produces the most exquisite models of art, but an intense sympathy with some one beauty or distinguishing characteristic in nature. irritability alone, or the interest taken in certain things, may supply the place of genius in weak and otherwise ordinary minds. as there are certain instruments fitted to perform certain kinds of labour, there are certain minds so framed as to produce certain chef-d’oeuvres in art and literature, which is surely the best use they can be put to. if a man had all sorts of instruments in his shop and wanted one, he would rather have that one than be supplied with a double set of all the others. if he had them twice over, he could only do what he can do as it is, whereas without that one he perhaps cannot finish any one work he has in hand. so if a man can do one thing better than anybody else, the value of this one thing is what he must stand or fall by, and his being able to do a hundred other things merely as well as anybody else would not alter the sentence or add to his respectability; on the contrary, his being able to do so many other things well would probably interfere with and encumber him in the execution of the only thing that others cannot do as well as he, and so far be a drawback and a disadvantage. more people, in fact, fail from a multiplicity of talents and pretensions than from an absolute poverty of resources. i have given instances of this elsewhere. perhaps shakespear’s tragedies would in some respects have been better if he had never written comedies at all; and in that case his comedies might well have been spared, though they must have cost us some regret. racine, it is said, might have rivalled moliere in comedy; but he gave up the cultivation of his comic talents to devote himself wholly to the tragic muse. if, as the french tell us, he in consequence attained to the perfection of tragic composition, this was better than writing comedies as well as moliere and tragedies as well as crebillon. yet i count those persons fools who think it a pity hogarth did not succeed better in serious subjects. the division of labour is an excellent principle in taste as well as in mechanics. without this, i find from adam smith, we could not have a pin made to the degree of perfection it is. we do not, on any rational scheme of criticism, inquire into the variety of a man’s excellences, or the number of his works, or his facility of production. venice preserved is sufficient for otway’s fame. i hate all those nonsensical stories about lope de vega and his writing a play in a morning before breakfast. he had time enough to do it after. if a man leaves behind him any work which is a model in its kind, we have no right to ask whether he could do anything else, or how he did it, or how long he was about it. all that talent which is not necessary to the actual quantity of excellence existing in the world, loses its object, is so much waste talent or talent to let. i heard a sensible man say he should like to do some one thing better than all the rest of the world, and in everything else to be like all the rest of the world. why should a man do more than his part? the rest is vanity and vexation of spirit. we look with jealous and grudging eyes at all those qualifications which are not essential; first, because they are superfluous, and next, because we suspect they will be prejudicial. why does mr. kean play all those harlequin tricks of singing, dancing, fencing, etc.? they say, ‘it is for his benefit.’ it is not for his reputation. garrick indeed shone equally in comedy and tragedy. but he was first, not second-rate in both. there is not a greater impertinence than to ask, if a man is clever out of his profession. i have heard of people trying to cross-examine mrs. siddons. i would as soon try to entrap one of the elgin marbles into an argument. good nature and common sense are required from all people; but one proud distinction is enough for any one individual to possess or to aspire to.
