we hear it maintained by people of more gravity than understanding, that genius and taste are strictly reducible to rules, and that there is a rule for everything. so far is it from being true that the finest breath of fancy is a definable thing, that the plainest common sense is only what mr. locke would have called a mixed mode, subject to a particular sort of acquired and undefinable tact. it is asked, “if you do not know the rule by which a thing is done, how can you be sure of doing it a second time?” and the answer is, “if you do not know the muscles by the help of which you walk, how is it you do not fall down at every step you take?” in art, in taste, in life, in speech, you decide from feeling, and not from reason; that is, from the impression of a number of things on the mind, from which impression is true and well founded, though you may not be able to analyse or account for it in the several particulars. in a gesture you use, in a look you see, in a tone you hear, you judge of the expression, propriety, and meaning from habit, not from reason or rules; that is to say, from innumerable instances of like gestures, looks, and tones, in innumerable other circumstances, variously modified, which are too many and too refined to be all distinctly recollected, but which do not therefore operate the less powerfully upon the mind and eye of taste. shall we say that these impressions (the immediate stamp of nature) do not operate in a given manner till they are classified and reduced to rules, or is not the rule itself grounded, upon the truth and certainty of that natural operation?

how then can the distinction of the understanding as to the manner in which they operate be necessary to their producing their due and uniform effect upon the mind? if certain effects did not regularly arise out of certain causes in mind as well as matter, there could be no rule given for them: nature does not follow the rule, but suggests it. reason is the interpreter and critic of nature and genius, not their law-giver and judge. he must be a poor creature indeed whose practical convictions do not in almost all cases outrun his deliberate understanding, or who does not feel and know much more than he can give a reason for. hence the distinction between eloquence and wisdom, between ingenuity and common sense. a man may be dexterous and able in explaining the grounds of his opinions, and yet may be a mere sophist, because he only sees one-half of a subject. another may feel the whole weight of a question, nothing relating to it may be lost upon him, and yet he may be able to give no account of the manner in which it affects him, or to drag his reasons from their silent lurking-places. this last will be a wise man, though neither a logician nor rhetorician. goldsmith was a fool to dr. johnson in argument; that is, in assigning the specific grounds of his opinions: dr. johnson was a fool to goldsmith in the fine tact, the airy, intuitive faculty with which he skimmed the surfaces of things, and unconsciously formed his opinions. common sense is the just result of the sum total of such unconscious impressions in the ordinary occurrences of life, as they are treasured up in the memory, and called out by the occasion. genius and taste depend much upon the same principle exercised on loftier ground and in more unusual combinations.

i am glad to shelter myself from the charge of affectation or singularity in this view of an often debated but ill-understood point, by quoting a passage from sir joshua reynolds’s discourses, which is full, and, i think, conclusive to the purpose. he says:—

‘i observe, as a fundamental ground common to all the arts with which we have any concern in this discourse, that they address themselves only to two faculties of the mind, its imagination and its sensibility.

‘all theories which attempt to direct or to control the art, upon any principles falsely called rational, which we form to ourselves upon a supposition of what ought in reason to be the end or means of art, independent of the known first effect produced by objects on the imagination, must be false and delusive. for though it may appear bold to say it, the imagination is here the residence of truth. if the imagination be affected, the conclusion is fairly drawn; if it be not affected, the reasoning is erroneous, because the end is not obtained; the effect itself being the test, and the only test, of the truth and efficacy of the means.

‘there is in the commerce of life, as in art, a sagacity which is far from being contradictory to right reason, and is superior to any occasional exercise of that faculty which supersedes it and does not wait for the slow progress of deduction, but goes at once, by what appears a kind of intuition, to the conclusion. a man endowed with this faculty feels and acknowledges the truth, though it is not always in his power, perhaps, to give a reason for it; because he cannot recollect and bring before him all the materials that gave birth to his opinion; for very many and very intricate considerations may unite to form the principle, even of small and minute parts, involved in, or dependent on, a great many things:— though these in process of time are forgotten, the right impression still remains fixed in his mind.

‘this impression is the result of the accumulated experience of our whole life, and has been collected, we do not always know how or when. but this mass of collective observation, however acquired, ought to prevail over that reason, which, however powerfully exerted on any particular occasion, will probably comprehend but a partial view of the subject; and our conduct in life, as well as in the arts, is or ought to be generally governed by this habitual reason: it is our happiness that we are enabled to draw on such funds. if we were obliged to enter into a theoretical deliberation on every occasion before we act, life would be at a stand, and art would be impracticable.

‘it appears to me therefore’ (continues sir joshua) ‘that our first thoughts, that is, the effect which any thing produces on our minds on its first appearance, is never to be forgotten; and it demands for that reason, because it is the first, to be laid up with care. if this be not done, the artist may happen to impose on himself by partial reasoning; by a cold consideration of those animated thoughts which proceed, not perhaps from caprice or rashness (as he may afterwards conceit), but from the fulness of his mind, enriched with the copious stores of all the various inventions which he had ever seen, or had ever passed in his mind. these ideas are infused into his design, without any conscious effort; but if he be not on his guard, he may reconsider and correct them, till the whole matter is reduced to a commonplace invention.

‘this is sometimes the effect of what i mean to caution you against; that is to say, an unfounded distrust of the imagination and feeling, in favour of narrow, partial, confined, argumentative theories, and of principles that seem to apply to the design in hand, without considering those general impressions on the fancy in which real principles of sound reason, and of much more weight and importance, are involved, and, as it were, lie hid under the appearance of a sort of vulgar sentiment. reason, without doubt, must ultimately determine everything; at this minute it is required to inform us when that very reason is to give way to feeling.’16

mr. burke, by whom the foregoing train of thinking was probably suggested, has insisted on the same thing, and made rather a perverse use of it in several parts of his reflections on the french revolution; and windham in one of his speeches has clenched it into an aphorism —‘there is nothing so true as habit.’ once more i would say, common sense is tacit reason. conscience is the same tacit sense of right and wrong, or the impression of our moral experience and moral apprehensions on the mind, which, because it works unseen, yet certainly, we suppose to be an instinct, implanted in the mind; as we sometimes attribute the violent operations of our passions, of which we can neither trace the source nor assign the reason, to the instigation of the devil!

i shall here try to go more at large into this subject, and to give such instances and illustrations of it as occur to me.

one of the persons who had rendered themselves obnoxious to government and been included in a charge for high treason in the year 1794, had retired soon after into wales to write an epic poem and enjoy the luxuries of a rural life. in his peregrinations through that beautiful scenery, he had arrived one fine morning at the inn at llangollen, in the romantic valley of that name. he had ordered his breakfast, and was sitting at the window in all the dalliance of expectation when a face passed, of which he took no notice at the instant — but when his breakfast was brought in presently after, he found his appetite for it gone — the day had lost its freshness in his eye — he was uneasy and spiritless; and without any cause that he could discover, a total change had taken place in his feelings. while he was trying to account for this odd circumstance, the same face passed again — it was the face of taylor the spy; and he was longer at a loss to explain the difficulty. he had before caught only a transient glimpse, a passing side-view of the face; but though this was not sufficient to awaken a distinct idea in his memory, his feelings, quicker and surer, had taken the alarm; a string had been touched that gave a jar to his whole frame, and would not let him rest, though he could not at all tell what was the matter with him. to the flitting, shadowy, half-distinguished profile that had glided by his window was linked unconsciously and mysteriously, but inseparably, the impression of the trains that had been laid for him by this person; — in this brief moment, in this dim, illegible short-hand of the mind he had just escaped the speeches of the attorney and solicitor–general over again; the gaunt figure of mr. pitt glared by him; the walls of a prison enclosed him; and he felt the hands of the executioner near him, without knowing it till the tremor and disorder of his nerves gave information to his reasoning faculties that all was not well within. that is, the same state of mind was recalled by one circumstance in the series of association that had been produced by the whole set of circumstances at the time, though the manner in which this was done was not immediately perceptible. in other words, the feeling of pleasure or pain, of good or evil, is revived, and acts instantaneously upon the mind, before we have time to recollect the precise objects which have originally given birth to it.17 the incident here mentioned was merely, then, one case of what the learned understand by the association of ideas: but all that is meant by feeling or common sense is nothing but the different cases of the association of ideas, more or less true to the impression of the original circumstances, as reason begins with the more formal development of those circumstances, or pretends to account for the different cases of the association of ideas. but it does not follow that the dumb and silent pleading of the former (though sometimes, nay often, mistaken) is less true than that of its babbling interpreter, or that we are never to trust its dictates without consulting the express authority of reason. both are imperfect, both are useful in their way, and therefore both are best together, to correct or to confirm one another. it does not appear that in the singular instance above mentioned, the sudden impression on the mind was superstition or fancy, though it might have been thought so, had it not been proved by the event to have a real physical and moral cause. had not the same face returned again, the doubt would never have been properly cleared up, but would have remained a puzzle ever after, or perhaps have been soon forgot. — by the law of association as laid down by physiologists, any impression in a series can recall any other impression in that series without going through the whole in order; so that the mind drops the intermediate links, and passes on rapidly and by stealth to the more striking effects of pleasure or pain which have naturally taken the strongest hold of it. by doing this habitually and skillfully with respect to the various impressions and circumstances with which our experience makes us acquainted, it forms a series of unpremeditated conclusions on almost all subjects that can be brought before it, as just as they are of ready application to human life; and common sense is the name of this body of unassuming but practical wisdom. common sense, however, is an impartial, instinctive result of truth and nature, and will therefore bear the test and abide the scrutiny of the most severe and patient reasoning. it is indeed incomplete without it. by ingrafting reason on feeling, we ‘make assurance double sure.’

’tis the last key-stone that makes up the arch . . .

then stands it a triumphal mark! then men

observe the strength, the height, the why and when

it was erected; and still walking under,

meet some new matter to look up, and wonder.

but reason, not employed to interpret nature, and to improve and perfect common sense and experience, is, for the most part, a building without a foundation. the criticism exercised by reason, then, on common sense may be as severe as it pleases, but it must be as patient as it is severe. hasty, dogmatical, self-satisfied reason is worse than idle fancy or bigoted prejudice. it is systematic, ostentatious in error, closes up the avenues of knowledge, and ‘shuts the gates of wisdom on mankind.’ it is not enough to show that there is no reason for a thing that we do not see the reason of it: if the common feeling, if the involuntary prejudice sets in strong in favour of it, if, in spite of all we can do, there is a lurking suspicion on the side of our first impressions, we must try again, and believe that truth is mightier than we. so, in ordering a definition of any subject, if we feel a misgiving that there is any fact or circumstance emitted, but of which we have only a vague apprehension, like a name we cannot recollect, we must ask for more time, and not cut the matter short by an arrogant assumption of the point in dispute. common sense thus acts as a check-weight on sophistry, and suspends our rash and superficial judgments. on the other hand, if not only no reason can be given for a thing, but every reason is clear against it, and we can account from ignorance, from authority, from interest, from different causes, for the prevalence of an opinion or sentiment, then we have a right to conclude that we have mistaken a prejudice for an instinct, or have confounded a false and partial impression with the fair and unavoidable inference from general observation. mr. burke said that we ought not to reject every prejudice, but should separate the husk of prejudice from the truth it encloses, and so try to get at the kernel within; and thus far he was right. but he was wrong in insisting that we are to cherish our prejudices ‘because they are prejudices’: for if all are well founded, there is no occasion to inquire into their origin or use; and he who sets out to philosophise upon them, or make the separation mr. burke talks of in this spirit and with this previous determination, will be very likely to mistake a maggot or a rotten canker for the precious kernel of truth, as was indeed the case with our political sophist.

there is nothing more distinct than common sense and vulgar opinion. common sense is only a judge of things that fall under common observation, or immediately come home to the business and bosoms of men. this is of the very essence of its principle, the basis of its pretensions. it rests upon the simple process of feeling — it anchors in experience. it is not, nor it cannot be, the test of abstract, speculative opinions. but half the opinions and prejudices of mankind, those which they hold in the most unqualified approbation and which have been instilled into them under the strongest sanctions, are of this latter kind, that is, opinions not which they have ever thought, known, or felt one tittle about, but which they have taken up on trust from others, which have been palmed on their understandings by fraud or force, and which they continue to hold at the peril of life, limb, property, and character, with as little warrant from common sense in the first instance as appeal to reason in the last. the ultima ratio regum proceeds upon a very different plea. common sense is neither priestcraft nor state-policy. yet ‘there’s the rub that makes absurdity of so long life,’ and, at the same time, gives the sceptical philosophers the advantage over us. till nature has fair play allowed it, and is not adulterated by political and polemical quacks (as it so often has been), it is impossible to appeal to it as a defence against the errors and extravagances of mere reason. if we talk of common sense, we are twitted with vulgar prejudice, and asked how we distinguish the one from the other; but common and received opinion is indeed ‘a compost heap’ of crude notions, got together by the pride and passions of individuals, and reason is itself the thrall or manumitted slave of the same lordly and besotted masters, dragging its servile chain, or committing all sorts of saturnalian licenses, the moment it feels itself freed from it. — if ten millions of englishmen are furious in thinking themselves right in making war upon thirty millions of frenchmen, and if the last are equally bent upon thinking the others always in the wrong, though it is a common and national prejudice, both opinions cannot be the dictate of good sense; but it may be the infatuated policy of one or both governments to keep their subjects always at variance. if a few centuries ago all europe believed in the infallibility of the pope, this was not an opinion derived from the proper exercise or erroneous direction of the common sense of the people; common sense had nothing to do with it — they believed whatever their priests told them. england at present is divided into whigs and tories, churchmen and dissenters; both parties have numbers on their side; but common sense and party spirit are two different things. sects and heresies are upheld partly by sympathy, and partly by the love of contradiction; if there was nobody of a different way of thinking, they would fall to pieces of themselves. if a whole court say the same thing, this is no proof that they think it, but that the individual at the head of the court has said it; if a mob agree for a while in shouting the same watchword, this is not to me an example of the sensus communis, they only repeat what they have heard repeated by others. if indeed a large proportion of the people are in want of food, of clothing, of shelter — if they are sick, miserable, scorned, oppressed — an d if each feeling it in himself, they all say so with one voice and one heart, and lift up their hands to second their appeal, this i should say was but the dictate of common sense, the cry of nature. but to waive this part of the argument, which it is needless to push farther — l believe that the best way to instruct mankind is not by pointing out to them their mutual errors, but by teaching them to think rightly on indifferent matters, where they will listen with patience in order to be amused, and where they do not consider a definition or a syllogism as the greatest injury you can offer them.

there is no rule for expression. it is got at solely by feeling, that is, on the principle of the association of ideas, and by transferring what has been found to hold good in one case (with the necessary modifications) to others. a certain look has been remarked strongly indicative of a certain passion or trait of character, and we attach the same meaning to it or are affected in the same pleasurable or painful manner by it, where it exists in a less degree, though we can define neither the look itself nor the modification of it. having got the general clue, the exact result may be left to the imagination to vary, to extenuate or aggravate it according to circumstances. in the admirable profile of oliver cromwell after —— the drooping eyelids, as if drawing a veil over the fixed, penetrating glance, the nostrils somewhat distended, and lips compressed so as hardly to let the breath escape him, denote the character of the man for high-reaching policy and deep designs as plainly as they can be written. how is it that we decipher this expression in the face? first, by feeling it. and how is it that we feel it? not by reestablished rules, but by the instinct of analogy, by the principle of association, which is subtle and sure in proportion as it is variable and indefinite. a circumstance, apparently of no value, shall alter the whole interpretation to be put upon an expression or action and it shall alter it thus powerfully because in proportion to its very insignificance it shows a strong general principle at work that extends in its ramifications to the smallest things. this in fact will make all the difference between minuteness and subtlety or refinement; for a small or trivial effect may in given circumstances imply the operation of a great power. stillness may be the result of a blow too powerful to be resisted; silence may be imposed by feelings too agonising for utterance. the minute, the trifling and insipid is that which is little in itself, in its causes and its consequences; the subtle and refined is that which is slight and evanescent at first sight, but which mounts up to a mighty sum in the end, which is an essential part of an important whole, which has consequences greater than itself, and where more is meant than meets the eye or ear. we complain sometimes of littleness in a dutch picture, where there are a vast number of distinct parts and objects, each small in itself, and leading to nothing else. a sky of claude’s cannot fall under this censure, where one imperceptible gradation is as it were the scale to another, where the broad arch of heaven is piled up of endlessly intermediate gold and azure tints, and where an infinite number of minute, scarce noticed particulars blend and melt into universal harmony. the subtlety in shakespear, of which there is an immense deal scattered everywhere up and down, is always the instrument of passion, the vehicle of character. the action of a man pulling his hat over his forehead is indifferent enough in itself, and generally speaking, may mean anything or nothing; but in the circumstances in which macduff is placed, it is neither insignificant nor equivocal.

what! man, ne’er pull your hat upon your brows, etc.

it admits but of one interpretation or inference, that which follows it:—

give sorrow words: the grief that does not speak,

whispers the o’er-fraught heart, and bids it break.

the passage in the same play, in which duncan and his attendants are introduced, commenting on the beauty and situation of macbeth’s castle, though familiar in itself, has been often praised for the striking contrast it presents to the scenes which follow. — the same look in different circumstances may convey a totally different expression. thus the eye turned round to look at you without turning the head indicates generally slyness or suspicion; but if this is combined with large expanded eyelids or fixed eyebrows, as we see it in titian’s pictures, it will denote calm contemplation or piercing sagacity, without anything of meanness or fear of being observed. in other cases it may imply merely indolent, enticing voluptuousness, as in lely’s portraits of women. the languor and weakness of the eyelids give the amorous turn to the expression. how should there be a rule for all this beforehand, seeing it depends on circumstances ever varying, and scarce discernible but by their effect on the mind? rules are applicable to abstractions, but expression is concrete and individual. we know the meaning of certain looks, and we feel how they modify one another in conjunction. but we cannot have a separate rule to judge of all their combinations in different degrees and circumstances, without foreseeing all those combinations, which is impossible; or if we did foresee them, we should only be where we are, that is, we could only make the rule as we now judge without it, from imagination and the feeling of the moment. the absurdity of reducing expression to a preconcerted system was perhaps never more evidently shown than in a picture of the judgment of solomon by so great a man as n. poussin, which i once heard admired for the skill and discrimination of the artist in making all the women, who are ranged on one side, in the greatest alarm at the sentence of the judge, while all the men on the opposite side see through the design of it. nature does not go to work or cast things in a regular mould in this sort of way. i once heard a person remark of another, ‘he has an eye like a vicious horse.’ this was a fair analogy. we all, i believe, have noticed the look of a horse’s eye just before he is going to bite or kick. but will any one, therefore, describe to me exactly what that look is? it was the same acute observer that said of a self-sufficient., prating music-master, ‘he talks on all subjects at sight’— which expressed the man at once by an allusion to his profession, the coincidence was indeed perfect. nothing else could compare with the easy assurance with which this gentleman would volunteer an explanation of things of which he was most ignorant, but the nonchalance with which a musician sits down to a harpsichord to play a piece he has never seen before. my physiognomical friend would not have hit on this mode of illustration without knowing the profession of the subject of his criticism; but having this hint given him, it instantly suggested itself to his ‘sure trailing.’ the manner of the speaker was evident; and the association of the music-master sitting down to play at sight, lurking in his mind, was immediately called out by the strength of his impression of the character. the feeling of character and the felicity of invention in explaining it were nearly allied to each other. the first was so wrought up and running over that the transition to the last was very easy and unavoidable. when mr. kean was so much praised for the action of richard in his last struggle with his triumphant antagonist, where he stands, after his sword is wrested from him, with his hands stretched out, ‘as if his will could not be disarmed, and the very phantoms of his despair had a withering power,’ he said that he borrowed it from seeing the last efforts of painter in his fight with oliver. this assuredly did not lessen the merit of it. thus it ever is with the man of real genius. he has the feeling of truth already shrined in his own breast, and his eye is still bent on nature to see how she expresses herself. when we thoroughly understand the subject it is easy to translate from one language into another. raphael, in muffling up the figure of elymas the sorcerer in his garments, appears to have extended the idea of blindness even to his clothes. was this design? probably not; but merely the feeling of analogy thoughtlessly suggesting this device, which being so suggested was retained and carried on, because it flattered or fell in with the original feeling. the tide of passion, when strong, overflows and gradually insinuates itself into all nooks and corners of the mind. invention (of the best kind) i therefore do not think so distinct a thing from feeling as some are apt to imagine. the springs of pure feeling will rise and fill the moulds of fancy that are fit to receive it. there are some striking coincidences of colour in well-composed pictures, as in a straggling weed in the foreground streaked with blue or red to answer to a blue or red drapery, to the tone of the flesh or an opening in the sky:— not that this was intended, or done by the rule (for then it would presently become affected and ridiculous), but the eye, being imbued with a certain colour, repeats and varies it from a natural sense of harmony, a secret craving and appetite for beauty, which in the same manner soothes and gratifies the eye of taste, though the cause is not understood. tact, finesse, is nothing but the being completely aware of the feeling belonging to certain situations, passions, etc., and the being consequently sensible to their slightest indications or movements in others. one of the most remarkable instances of this sort of faculty is the following story, told of lord shaftesbury, the grandfather of the author of the characteristics. he had been to dine with lady clarendon and her daughter, who was at that time privately married to the duke of york (afterwards james ii.), and as he returned home with another nobleman who had accompanied him, he suddenly turned to him, and said, ‘depend upon it, the duke has married hyde’s daughter.’ his companion could not comprehend what he meant; but on explaining himself, he said, ‘her mother behaved to her with an attention and a marked respect that it is impossible to account for in any other way; and i am sure of it.’ his conjecture shortly afterwards proved to be the truth. this was carrying the prophetic spirit of common sense as far as it could go.