the british forces cross the sutlej, and are concentrated at kussoor—visit of ghoolab singh and dhuleep singh to the governor-general—the army advance to lahore—the sikh army disperse and surrender their guns.

no action ever fought in the east was more decisive than that of sobraon, and few battles of modern times have exhibited a greater loss in proportion to the numbers engaged.

it must appear that the enemy's intentions in building a bridge of boats across the river, in face of the british army, was to deter sir henry hardinge from transferring the war to the opposite shore, where the sikh soldiery[pg 250] were well aware that they had much to apprehend from national dissension as well as private intrigue amongst the sirdars.

as the british army, after its concentration, subsequent to the battle of ferozeshuhur, remained some time inactive, awaiting the arrival of the siege train, the enemy began to regain confidence. it appears probable that the sikhs would, ere long, have commenced active hostile measures, otherwise the attitude assumed at sobraon must be quite inexplicable.

it is almost superfluous to notice the error committed by the sikhs in neglecting to complete their entrenchments, (for which they had ample time,) and in weakly garrisoning the weakest part of their works. to that cause, and fighting with a river in their rear, which offered a main obstacle to their retreat, must be attributed the enormous losses suffered by the enemy, from which a hasty retirement had saved them on former occasions.

in each action, the sikhs had lost nearly all their cannon, and the greater part of their[pg 251] artillerymen; and as these could not be replaced by raw levies, each defeat had been more serious than at the first glance it may have been considered. indian history offers no parallel to the resolution displayed by the enemy in preparing for a renewal of active measures immediately after each defeat.[55] it had long been a favourite saying with military men in india, that the sikhs would certainly fight one good battle when hostilities ensued, and that the remainder of the war would amount to no more than the reduction of their forts. this established maxim, however, did not prove that we were very thoroughly acquainted with the sikh disposition—and after ferozeshuhur, it lost all its advocates. the military theorists were compelled to trace a new line of operations, which proved, even after sobraon, tolerably indefinite, for there[pg 252] were few officers in the army who did not expect a smart action on the opposite shore.

the heavy losses suffered by the british at sobraon, were mainly owing to the strong works which the centre and right divisions of the army so gallantly stormed. had the attack upon those points been delayed until the enemy's weaker parts on his right had been carried, (the sikh entrenchments being then taken in reverse,) his batteries would have been rendered unserviceable, whilst our horse artillery might, with the sappers' assistance, have been brought into the area of the works, to act against the disordered masses. under such circumstances, it appears likely that the action would have been sooner over, and sir harry smith's and general gilbert's divisions spared the storm in which they suffered so heavily. at the same time that the enemy would have been compelled to face his new assailants, being attacked by the reserve division, his retreat would have been completely intercepted, and his final and utter destruction been apparently inevitable.

[pg 253]

as it happened, the sikh losses were undoubtedly enormous. the entrenchments were defended by about thirty thousand troops, aeen battalions and bundookcheras, besides irregulars and cavalry, who retreated early from the scene of action. of this army, fully one half were destroyed in the trenches, or in the passage of the river. during the battle, four boats, connecting the bridge of boats with the opposite shore, had been removed, which caused the whole fabric rapidly to give way when oppressed with the weight of the retreating multitude. this removal of the boats was generally understood to have been a pre-concerted arrangement with ghoolab singh, for the destruction of a force which caused him, as well as many others, considerable disquietude. i give this merely as a prevalent report, and one likely enough to be true, judging from the accomplishments in treachery which the sikh history evinces, in common with other nations of hindostan; but the secrets of the political department are necessarily maintained for a time, and have not yet become public.

[pg 254]

the revelation would certainly be inconvenient to ghoolab singh; and its suppression, if founded in fact, is perhaps incumbent on those in authority.

whilst the sikhs were thus being effectually repelled from our north-western frontier, the force in scinde, under sir charles napier, was rapidly advancing, to co-operate with the british main column. that energetic warrior hastened towards the scene of warfare, in advance of his forces, but did not succeed in reaching the field of operations before the final act of the tragedy had been performed, and the curtain had fallen. those who are acquainted with that chivalrous family may judge of the disappointment endured by a napier arriving too late for a battle!

at the same time that the british army were concentrated at kussoor, brigadier wheler's division at loodiana crossed the sutlej, opposite the fortress of philoor, unopposed by the sikhs, although a portion of the khalsas made their appearance in the neighbourhood; but finding that the ground had been preoccupied,[pg 255] no attempt was made to molest the british general.

on the 11th, 12th, and 13th of february, the whole of the british army having been poured across the bridge of boats, advanced, and took post on the strong defensible ridge at kussoor, where a picket of the enemy, which had occupied that position, fell back, and left them in undisputed possession of the strongest ground between the river and the metropolis.

the shattered remnant of the sikh army, after the defeat at sobraon, had fallen back, and bivouacked in the neighbourhood of umritsir, where they remained irresolute, and awaiting the result of the deliberations going on at lahore. the whole materiel of that army had been so utterly dismantled, that little apprehension was entertained of even such efforts as might be prompted by the influence of despair. their guns,[56] in which the main[pg 256] confidence of the sikh army had ever been placed, had been nearly all captured, and their artillerymen lay on the field of sobraon. the aeen battalions, who had readily and gallantly borne the brunt of battle in defence of the batteries and entrenchments, had suffered most severely, especially in the two last engagements. under this combination of disasters, the khalsa army was from that day forth no longer worthy of consideration; nor is there any probability that the sikhs will ever again, during our time, arrive at the same military predominance which they once possessed.

still, it appeared doubtful that our advance towards the capital would be effected without another struggle, for their mettle had been now too fully tested to be treated any longer with contempt; though any efforts which might be made when reinforced from lahore must have been hopeless, as no time had been allowed them to entrench themselves. it was conjectured that the sirdars would willingly come forward to sue for terms, but their influ[pg 257]ence with the punchayut was not reckoned on with much certainty.

in the midst of all doubts on this head, on the 15th of february rajah ghoolab singh, who had long corresponded through secret emissaries with the british government, approached the lines of kussoor in order to sue for a suspension of hostilities, and, accompanied by a slender escort, arrived at our outposts.

the sikh chieftains, with little show of the pride or pomp of other days, and dressed in the simplest garb of asiatic soldiery, were conducted to the quarters of sir henry hardinge, and received with solemn distrust.

no eagerness was manifested on the part of the british government to negotiate with the deputation from the lahore court; but ghoolab singh and his companions exhibited such unquestionable proofs of uneasiness, anxiety, and humility, that it was almost painful to behold the stately and chilling deportment which it was deemed politically expedient to assume towards the humbled sikh chieftains. no firing[pg 258] of cannon, no ceremonious salutes were made use of on the occasion; and when ghoolab singh tendered his nazzur[57] he was requested to keep his presents until he had sufficiently testified, by his future fidelity, the dependence which might be placed upon his amicable professions towards the british.

the crest-fallen chiefs appeared willing and anxious to assent to such conditions as were demanded, and listened with affected humiliation and evident apprehension to the catalogue of iniquities laid to the charge of their countrymen. when, at length, ghoolab and his chosen colleagues retired to a secret and conclusive interview with the secretaries, it was more with the air of malefactors about to receive their sentence, than with the bearing of men who professed themselves the firm and faithful advocates of british supremacy. the sikh chiefs were vested with full powers from the lahore durbar and the military punchayut, to arrange whatever terms could be obtained, and,[pg 259] after an interview protracted to a late hour of the night, the rajah took his departure, having assented to every proposal, and no doubt much relieved to find the terms were not more stringent.[58]

the conditions demanded on our part, and agreed to on that of ghoolab singh, were—

1. the surrender to the british of the lands[59] lying between the rivers beeas and sutlej.[60]

2. the payment of one and a half crore of rupees (a million and a half pounds sterling) as an indemnity for the expenses of the war.

3. the disbandment of the sikh army, and its reorganization on the system and[pg 260] pay of the time of runjeet singh.[61] the limitation of this army to be determined in communication with the british government.

4. the surrender of all guns used in the late campaigns against the british.

5. the entire control of the river frontier, and the organization of future administration in the punjaub.

it was also arranged that the young maharajah, dhuleep singh, should be sent from lahore to meet the governor-general on his advance from kussoor, and to accompany him to the capital.

before leaving kussoor, an officer and six privates, who had been taken prisoners at buddewal, were sent from lahore, where they had experienced the most liberal treatment from their captors, especially after the news of sobraon reached the capital.

the population of the district in which we were encamped professed much satisfaction at[pg 261] the change of administration about to be effected. one hoary headed old mahommedan advanced towards a group of officers in our lines, smacking his lips, and protesting that he felt immense confidence in the new government, and had already enjoyed a fair taste of its benefits, by eating a portion of a slaughtered bull,[62] a food of which he had not partaken for upwards of forty years. the superannuated epicure met with very little encouragement from our party.

on the morning of the 18th of february the whole british army advanced from kussoor towards lahore, marching in order of battle, to guard against any change of mind on the part of our newly acquired friends.

a brigade of cavalry were left in charge of the baggage, and this onerous duty caused the troops to march more in the semblance of a funeral procession than that of the advance of a victorious army.

the weather, at this season, was fine, though[pg 262] the sun at noon was becoming rather severe. the country was generally open and cultivated, but with large patches of low jungle or underwood interspersed, which rendered it unfavourable for cavalry man?uvres, and would have afforded excellent shelter for the enemy's light infantry; but they had had fighting enough to satisfy them for the present.

on the evening of the 18th, after our arrival in camp, at a small village named lullianee, the sikh chiefs arrived from lahore, escorting their youthful maharajah. the deputation were fully as humble in their deportment as the most punctilious despot could have required; and dhuleep singh, having been graciously forgiven for the offences of his countrymen, and raised to the precarious honours of acknowledged sovereignty, was at last treated to a royal welcome from the voices of our heavy cannon. a proclamation had been issued from kussoor, giving notice that territorial aggrandisement was not the object of the british government, but that they were desirous only of establishing such authority at lahore as would be competent to[pg 263] restrain the soldiery from the perpetration of outrages similar to the past. the chiefs and sirdars were invited to act in concert for the furtherance of such an arrangement, and as the wording of the proclamation gave a special invitation to the "well wishers of the descendants of runjeet singh," the lahore durbar were made aware that the semblance and name of a kingdom would not be taken from them.

subsequently to dhuleep singh's visit at lullianee, a second proclamation was issued from our camp, giving notice that the durbar had acquiesced in all the terms, and that if no further opposition were offered to the british arms, measures would be taken to re-establish the descendants of runjeet, and to protect the inhabitants.

the british army, continuing to advance in the same order as before, came in sight of lahore on the morning of the 20th of february, and took up their encampment about three miles from the city, forming three sides of a square, and occupying the parade ground and[pg 264] cantonments recently held by the aeen battalions.

the soldiers were strictly required not to stray from their lines or visit the city, which at present was crowded with people of every denomination, few of whom, it may be supposed, could feel very favourably disposed towards their conquerors. the troops of ghoolab singh were encamped near the walls, and held the most important positions in the capital.

on the afternoon of our arrival, the secretary to government, accompanied by a large military escort, under the directions of brigadier cureton, proceeded to the palace with the young maharajah. marching round the walls of the city, nearly suffocated with dust, which rolled in dense columns and obscured the whole scene, we were received and saluted by ghoolab singh's forces, drawn up on their several posts around lahore. most of these were fine wiry looking soldiers, and bore some resemblance in appearance to our goorkha battalions, though inferior in appointments, and evidently not half disciplined. the gateway to the palace, then[pg 265] occupied by the ranee, opened from the north-western quarter of the city, and the escort formed line fronting the citadel, whilst the governor-general's representative and his party proceeded on their mission. on arriving at the entrance, the political agent and a few officers proceeded to the interior, and shortly afterwards a salute from the light guns announced that the boy whom we had set up to be a king over the sikhs had been placed in the hands of his anxious mother, the ranee, of drunken notoriety.

the interview was not of long duration, much to our relief, as the sombre walls which we were left to contemplate did not present a very cheerful aspect, and the inhabitants of lahore evinced no interest or curiosity in the transactions.

the ceremonial being ended, we wound about the exterior of the city towards our camp, thus completing the whole circuit of the walls, and returned to our quarters about nightfall, after a tolerably fatiguing day; but we had now become so well used to living in our saddles,[pg 266] that it was rather a variety to pass the day anywhere else.

as the conclusion of the war now rested in the hands of the political department, we were at length able to lie down at night, with some hopes of not being trumpeted into our saddles before we had well fallen asleep; and there were few soldiers of the british army who did not take full advantage of this immunity, save the unfortunate members of the standard guards and outlying pickets.

the remainder of the sikh forces still continued encamped between the river and lahore, but an intimation was sent to them, that such as chose to come into lahore would receive payment of all arrears due to them, and must then consider themselves as no longer required for military service. the irregular cavalry hastened in crowds to take advantage of this offer, but the regular battalions heard at first with feelings of indignation that they were to be disbanded, and professed their resolution to hazard another battle with the remaining thirty-six cannon which had been saved from[pg 267] the wreck at sobraon, owing to their remaining on the opposite bank. the chiefs, tej singh and lal singh, seeing the game was up, refused to lead the soldiers to action, and having also assured the sikh army that a great portion would be re-enlisted for future service, and that those who were most ready to accept the proffered terms would undoubtedly have the first choice in re-enlistment, these arguments produced a salutary effect.

the surrender of all the cannon which had been used against the british was at length reluctantly complied with, for the attachment of native troops to their guns is proverbial throughout the east, and when this point was carried, the complete dispersion of the regular battalions ensued.

the reluctance on the sikh part to abandon their profession, must appear an inexplicable matter to those who judge of soldiers' attachment to their trade by its unpopularity amongst our countrymen; but throughout the greater portion of asia military zeal is a prevalent feature, and in the indian armies, dismissal[pg 268] from the service has hitherto been deemed one of the gravest punishments which could be inflicted.

the most surprising feature in this campaign was the readiness with which the sikhs rose after each defeat, fresh for another contest. but with that nation war is one of the principles of religion, and as the wily mahomet led his daring soldiers to believe that they were fighting their way to paradise, so the presumptuous sikh was taught that his greatest moral obligation consisted in being a brave soldier. to further this object, he was trained in early youth to the use of his weapons, and learned to consider them as the most useful part of his costume. under this hardy regime they rose from a sect into a formidable nation. in this instance they formed no exception to the general rule amongst all nations, where military prowess has always been a necessary condition in the scale of ascendancy.