the "sussex" incident

on the 24th march the unarmed passenger-ship sussex was torpedoed without warning, and several americans lost their lives. the first information about this incident was so vague that the matter was at first treated in a dilatory fashion in washington. at the time i sent the following report to berlin:

report in cipher

"washington, 4th april, 1916.

"during the fourteen months that have passed since the opening of the submarine campaign there have been intermittent periods in which the american government have shown themselves aggressive towards us, and others in which the now proverbial expression 'watchful waiting" formed the leit-motif of their attitude. the past month belonged to the second category until the sinking of the sussex and other similar incidents stirred american public opinion to fresh excitement. officially i have, during the last four weeks, heard nothing further from the american side on the subject of the submarine campaign. during this time mr. lansing even allowed himself a fortnight's holiday for recuperation. on my side there was no occasion to reopen the submarine question as a complete understanding with the american government cannot be attained,[*] and in my opinion it is advisable to avoid as far as possible any new crisis in our page 242 relations with the united states. i therefore contented myself with keeping in touch with colonel house so that i should not be taken by surprise by any volte-face on the part of the american government. as soon as a new crisis arises mr. wilson will, as usual, be in a fearful hurry and bring us to the brink of war. whether such a crisis will be precipitated by the sussex incident, and whether the president in that case will shrink from war at the last moment, it is difficult to foretell, as this question—like all others at the present moment—will be viewed exclusively from the standpoint of the approaching presidential election.

[footnote: *i.e., without instructions from berlin.]

"except for the surprises that are usual over here, things are at present quite calm. this is due, in the first place, to the desire for peace shown by the population, who are not anxious to be disturbed in their congenial occupation of money-making, and secondly, to the development of the mexican question. this latter question stands in the forefront of public interest, and it seems to be increasingly probable that the punitive expedition against villa will lead to a full-dress intervention. a few days ago it was reported that villa was defeated, then wounded, and finally even a prisoner. all this good news proved later to be false and now villa is said to have escaped south and won over fresh supporters. so long as the mexican question holds the stage here we are, i believe, safe from an act of aggression on the part of the american government.

"on the other hand it looks as though mr. wilson were looking for a fresh way out of the impasse into which his attitude on the question of the submarine campaign has led him. as i have already had the honor to cable, colonel house holds out the prospect of an early move towards peace by the president. the view is entertained here, and strengthened by the impressions gathered from page 243 colonel house, that gradually the stress of circumstances will force all the neutral powers into the war. if this happens there will be no further prospect of the conclusion of peace, as there will be no one available to set the ball rolling. it is therefore essential that the foundations of peace should be laid before the world conflagration spreads any further and finally destroys the prosperity of every nation. this view may sound like pure theory, but it gains substance from the fact that it can very well be made to harmonize with mr. wilson's election campaign. in his capacity of founder of peace in europe, and peace-maker—i.e., indirectly conqueror—of mexico, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to vanquish mr. wilson in the election. mr. theodore roosevelt would then shout himself hoarse to no purpose and mr. charles hughes, the strongest republican candidate, would perhaps not even go so far as nomination if his position seemed hopeless."

in that report i announced for the first time that mr. wilson had so far changed his policy as now to put peace mediation in the foreground and to give the question of the 'freedom of the seas' second place. i shall return later to this political development.

when news reached washington which left no doubt that the sussex had been torpedoed by a german submarine, i immediately cabled to berlin for instructions in order to be in a position to give an official disavowal of the act. it required nothing further to convince me that it was now a question of bend or break. i had no means of knowing whether the supporters of the submarine campaign or the partisans of an understanding with the united states would win the day. in the former case war was inevitable. to provide for the second alternative i recommended in my cablegram that there should be no question of an official exchange of notes, because i page 244 was anxious that our withdrawal should not be accompanied by a humiliation. if our government were prepared to give way i regarded as the most appropriate modus procedenti the immediate issue of instructions to me, empowering me to offer the american government satisfaction and compensation for this fresh incident. there was no hope of purchasing immunity from a break with any less concession than a pledge to carry on the submarine campaign for the future in accordance with the principles laid down by international law for cruiser warfare. i recommended, however, a provisional cessation of the submarine war on the basis of an oral agreement with the american government. if this proposal had been acted on, the american government would have been obliged to follow suit and there would have been no sharp exchange of notes, which still further prejudiced the position on both sides. if, after such a pause in the submarine war and the establishment of a really clear diplomatic situation, mr. wilson failed us and made no positive progress either with regard to his programme for the 'freedom of the seas' or the conclusion of peace, we should have held quite a different position from which—if we really thought it desirable—to reopen unrestricted submarine warfare. we had always made the mistake of dealing in half-hearted concessions. in my opinion it was essential for us to strive for a complete understanding with america if we were not prepared to carry on the submarine campaign without regard to consequences.

no attention was paid to my suggestion in berlin at the time. admiral von tirpitz had just resigned and the decision had been taken against the continuance of unrestricted submarine warfare. i do not know why the dispatch of an official note was preferred to the oral negotiations i had suggested, but i think that the deciding page 245 factor was consideration for public opinion in germany.

a few days later i cabled the following to berlin:

telegram in cipher

"washington, 8th april, 1916.

"house gave me a very gloomy view of the position with regard to the sussex. at the white house the situation is regarded as hopeless because the view is held that, in spite of tirpitz's resignation, the german government, with the best will in the world, cannot curb the submarine campaign. it has hitherto been merely due to good luck that no american has lost his life and any moment might precipitate a crisis which would be bound to lead to a break. the american government are convinced that the sussex was torpedoed by a german submarine. a repetition of such mistakes would be bound to drive the united states of america into war with us, which wilson would greatly regret, as he is anxious—as i have already reported—to lay the foundations of peace in a few months. if the united states were drawn into the war all hope of an early peace would be at an end.

"i request to be furnished with instructions on the basis of which i can pacify the government here, which now has doubts of our bona fides."

after mr. gerard, apart from other questions concerning doubtful cases of torpedoing, had also submitted a similar inquiry to the foreign office on the subject of the sussex incident, an official reply was handed to him on the 10th april which read in the following terms:

"a decision as to whether the channel steamer sussex was damaged by a german submarine or not is made extraordinarily difficult owing to the fact that no exact page 246 information is known as to the place, time and accompanying circumstances of the sinking, and moreover a picture of this ship could not be obtained until the 6th april. consequently the inquiry has had to be extended to all submarine enterprises which took place on the day in question, 24th march, in the channel anywhere on the course between folkestone and dieppe.

"in this area on the 24th march, in the middle of the english channel, a long, black vessel, flying no flags, with a gray funnel, small gray superstructure and two high masts was hit by a german submarine. the german captain was definitely convinced that she was a ship of war, and indeed a mine-layer of the newly-built english arabic class. he was led to this conviction:

"1. by the flush deck of the ship.

"2. by the shape of the stern, which sloped outwards.

"3. by the paintwork, which was that of a ship of war.

"4. by the high speed of about eighteen knots which the ship developed,

"5. by the fact that the ship was not steering the course north of the light buoys between dungeness and beachy head within which frequent observation had led the german submarines to keep a look out for merchant shipping, but was in mid-channel, heading almost for le havre.

"consequently, the submarine fired a torpedo at 3.55 p.m. central european time, 1-1/2 knots southeast of the bull rock. the torpedo struck, and so heavy an explosion occurred that the whole of the ship forward of the bridge broke away. the unusually heavy explosion leaves no doubt that there were large stores of ammunition on board.

"the german captain has prepared a sketch of the ship he attacked, of which two copies are sent herewith. the two copies of pictures of the sussex, also enclosed, page 247 were photographed from the english newspaper the daily graphic, of the 27th inst. a comparison of the sketches and the photograph shows that the vessel attacked is not identical with the sussex; particularly striking is the difference in the position of the funnel and the shape of the stern. no other attack was made by a german submarine on the course between folkestone and dieppe at the time of the sussex incident.

"from this the german government are obliged to assume that the sinking of the sussex is to be set down to other causes than attack by a german submarine. some light may be thrown on the incident by the fact that on the 1st and 2nd april alone no less than twenty-six english mines were destroyed in the channel by german naval forces. in general the whole of that area is rendered dangerous by drifting mines and not torpedoes. off the english coast the channel is also made increasingly dangerous by german mines which have been laid for the enemy naval forces.

"if the american government should have at their disposal any further data that may help to elucidate the sussex incident, the german government beg that it may be communicated to them so that they may subject it to examination. in the event of differences of opinion arising between the two governments the german government now declare themselves ready to submit the whole incident to an international commission in accordance with the third clause of the 'hague convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes of the 18th october, 1907.'"

i have reproduced this note in full because its influence was quite particularly fateful and because it was probably the most unfortunate document that ever passed from berlin to washington. mr. wilson thought he detected page 248 a direct untruth, and the mixture of an uneasy conscience and clumsiness which the german note appeared to betray prompted the sharp tone of the president's reply. for the sake of his prestige mr. wilson was now compelled by the recent course of events to take action, although the excitement of public opinion was this time undoubtedly less than was the case after the torpedoing of the lusitania and the arabic. the american government, therefore, couched the note which they dispatched on the 18th april in the terms of an ultimatum. in the meantime, the discovery in the hull of the sussex of a piece of a german torpedo placed the matter beyond all doubt. additional importance was given to the ultimatum by the fact that before dispatching it mr. wilson laid it personally before congress at a special sitting.

it is my firm conviction that had it not been for this ultimatum diplomatic relations would not have been broken off immediately, even in 1917. in the increased tension of the situation resulting from the exchange of notes on the subject of the sussex i see, therefore, one of the immediate germs of the war with america. after this exchange of notes a challenge in the form of our formal declaration of the 31st january, 1917, could no longer be tolerated. the clumsiness of such formal declarations was, as i have said, only surpassed by the regrettable impression of a juristic argument produced by our first lusitania note.

as the american ultimatum later formed the basis on which the american government, immediately after the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, broke off diplomatic relations, i here give the vital contents of the american note of the 18th april verbatim:

"again and again the imperial government has given its solemn assurances to the government of the united page 249 states that at least passenger ships would not be dealt thus with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire impunity. as recently as february last it gave notice that it would regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed naval forces of its adversaries, and deal with them as with men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed and to accord security of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation their submarine commanders have recklessly ignored.

"the government of the united states has been very patient. at every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war, and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and government of germany. it has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the imperial government as of course given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the imperial government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. it has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation.

"if it is still the purpose of the imperial government to prosecute an indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the government of the united states must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the page 250 government of the united states is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course to pursue. unless the imperial government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the government of the united states can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the german empire altogether. this action the government of the united states contemplates with the greatest reluctance, but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations."

after this note it is obvious that there was no longer any doubt in berlin, that persistence in the point of view they had hitherto adopted would bring about a break with the united states, for i received instructions to make all preparations for german merchant ships lying in american ports to be rendered useless by the destruction of their engines.

i also received orders to arrange that mr. gerard, who had not been informed of the minimum demands of the american government, should be instructed accordingly.

my reply was as follows:

cablegram in cipher

"washington, 1st may, 1916.

"house has informed me that at his request gerard has already been informed of the minimum demands of the american government. wilson is strongly influenced by peace votes. even the anti-german ring desires the end of the war, as otherwise they fear financial loss. my suggestions are based on the view that submarine warfare, according to international law, is valueless, and in any case, the opening of peace negotiations is more important. it would be advisable in the note of reply to touch only on the principal points, to talk much of international page 251 law and humanity, and to leave details to be settled at a later date. i fear that the continuance of the submarine campaign, on the lines of cruiser warfare, only means the postponement of the rupture as fresh incidents are bound to occur."

on the 4th may followed the german reply, which averted the fourth serious crisis, by declaring that the submarine campaign would return to the recognized laws of cruiser-warfare. the note began by opposing, in strong terms, the american view, and concluded with the following sentences:

"the german government feel themselves justified in declaring that it would be impossible to answer to humanity and history, if, after twenty-one months of war the contention over the submarine war were allowed to develop into a serious menace to peace between the german and american peoples. such a development the german government will do everything in their power to prevent. they desire, at the same time, to make a final contribution towards confining—so long as the war lasts—the war to the present combatant powers, an aim which includes the freedom of the seas, and in which the german government believe themselves still to be in agreement with the government of the united states.

"on this assumption the german government beg to inform the government of the united states that instructions have been issued to the german naval forces to observe the general principles of international law, with regard to the holding up, searching and destruction of merchant vessels, and not to sink any merchant vessel, even within the war zone, without warning and rescue of the passengers and crew, unless they attempt to escape or offer resistance.

"the german government hope and expect that these page 252 new instructions to the naval forces will also remove in the eyes of the united states government every obstacle that might stand in the way of the realization of the offer of co-operation contained in the note of the 23rd july, 1915, towards restoring the freedom of the seas during the war, and they do not doubt that the united states government will now insist with all possible emphasis on the immediate observation by the british government of those international rules which were universally accepted before the war, and which are specifically stated in the notes of the american government to the british government of the 28th december, 1914, and the 5th november, 1915. should it happen that the steps taken by the government of the united states do not meet with the desired result of insuring recognition of the laws of humanity by all the combatant nations, the german government would consider themselves faced by a new situation, for which they must reserve for themselves full freedom of decision."

the german note reached the german embassy piecemeal, and while the first part was being deciphered, its harsh tone produced in an increasing degree the impression: "then it is war," which was not relieved until we came to the conclusion of the text.

the attempt made by the imperial government to reserve to themselves the right to resume the submarine campaign at a later date was not accepted by mr. wilson, and so the difference of opinion remained, which was bound to become a casus belli if we reverted to unrestricted submarine warfare. this reservation led to a further note from washington, which i give here:

"the note of the imperial german government under date of may 4th, 1916, has received careful consideration by the government of the united states. it is especially page 253 noted, as indicating the purpose of the imperial government as to the future, and that it 'is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents,' and that it is determined to impose on all its commanders at sea the limitations of the recognized rules of international law upon which the government of the united states has insisted. throughout the months which have elapsed since the imperial government announced on february 4th, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily abandoned, the government of the united states has been constantly guided and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising from that policy. accepting the imperial government's declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the government of the united states will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the imperial government, such as will remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the united states and germany.

"the government of the united states feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the imperial german government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly-announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the government of the united states and any other belligerent government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the imperial government's note of the 4th instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. in order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the government of the united states notifies the imperial government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion page 254 that respect by german naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the united states upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."

this american note, however, in no way affected the peaceful conclusion of the negotiations.

as a direct result of the sussex incident, a step forward was taken in the question of american peace mediation. when i called on colonel house, during the last days of the crisis, we had a long conversation on this question. as always, colonel house had used his influence on the side of peace with regard to the sussex incident. he took this opportunity to convey to me the pleasing news contained in a cablegram from mr. gerard, that the german government were now ready to agree to american mediation.

this cablegram was the outcome of the following facts: mr. gerard, on account of his anti-german tendency, was not popular in berlin. he regarded it as a personal slight that the most important negotiations should have been carried on partly in washington, and partly by colonel house in berlin. the ambassador wanted therefore, to use the opportunity of the sussex incident to assert himself, and expressed a desire to visit g.h.q. and explain the american point of view in person to the emperor. on the 1st may, mr. gerard was received by the emperor, in the presence of the imperial chancellor, on which occasion he received the assurance contained in his telegram. karl helfferich's account in weltkrieg gives the impression that the question of american mediation was mentioned for the first time on the 1st page 255 may. the two journeys of colonel house, which were of far greater importance than mr. gerard's visit to g.h.q., are not mentioned in the helfferich account. for the rest i have to rely for my information about events in germany on this and other publications, in addition to the evidence given before the commission of the national assembly. in any case, colonel house regarded the telegram from berlin as the sequel of his own negotiations there, which point was placed beyond all doubt by the text of the information he communicated to me. in order to inform myself on my side also as to the attitude of our government, i sent the following telegram to berlin, to ascertain whether the information from the american ambassador was in accordance with the facts:

telegram in cipher

"washington, no. 26, 4th may.

"house informs me that gerard has cabled that we would agree to the president's mediation, and that a visit from house to berlin, with this object, would be welcomed. nothing known here about solution of lusitania question. mediation naturally depends on this running smoothly, which would be most easily assured by cessation of submarine campaign during negotiations."

i received the following reply from the imperial chancellor:

telegram in cipher

"berlin, 6th may, 1916.

"reply to telegram no. 26.

"for your excellency's information.

"we hope that our note and great concession finally removes cause of mistrust, and opens era of greater page 256 mutual confidence. animosity of public opinion here against wilson, as result of tone and contents of his note and impression of parti pris against us, however, so great that he must take open and unmistakable action with regard to england before he would be accepted as unbiassed mediator by german people. to this extent gerard's telegram is premature. if wilson neglects to take such action, there is danger that the animosity may become irremediable and possibility of mediation driven into distant future. smoothing the way for peace, of course, always desired. action against england, however, seems necessary to encourage conciliatory attitude there, if a peace exclusively favorable to england is to be avoided.

"if it is found impossible to induce england to discuss peace with us, even though unofficially perhaps at first, we shall, as england refuses to return to the provisions of the declaration of london, be placed in an absolutely free position with regard to our great concession amounting to abandonment of submarine campaign. a visit from house very welcome here at any time.

"bethmann-hollweg."

karl helfferich's account confirms the view i held at that time, that our concessions in respect of the submarine campaign were essentially prompted by the hope of mediation by mr. wilson. the following words of the emperor make this plain:

"in politics it is necessary, before all things, to know the other party's point of view; for politics are a question of give and take. gerard's utterances had made it clear that wilson was seeking a ladder for re-election. it was better, then, that we should offer him the ladder of page 257 peace than the ladder of war, which will eventually fall on our own heads."

moreover, herr von bethmann-hollweg has declared before the commission of the national assembly that he had expressed to mr. gerard the hope that the president would now take steps to bring about the restoration of peace.

when, at that time, colonel house was discussing with me the german reservation in the note of the 4th may, in connection with the questions of the "freedom of the seas" and peace, he said that the circumstances were then such that the president no longer possessed the power to compel england to observe international law. england would only give way before the menace of war. in view, however, of the state of natural feeling in the united states, and the development of trade relations between america and the entente, war with england was out of the question. on the other hand, mr. wilson possessed the power to bring about peace, because on this question he could rely on the support of the majority of the american nation. when the time was ripe, the president would take the desired steps, but a neutral act of this nature would be cried down by the very active entente party in the united states as pro-german, and could only be carried through if the national feeling towards germany took a more friendly turn. it was, therefore, necessary that there should be a period of lull, during which germany should possibly not be discussed at all. the approaching hot season and the usual exodus of political personages from washington to the country would offer a favorable opportunity to let all negotiations rest, especially as, after the settlement of the sussex question, no new incidents were to be expected. colonel house's remarks accurately reflected the actual page 258 position in the united states at the time. i could not but express my agreement, and felt no doubt that the american mediation would begin in the late summer. after our giving way on the submarine question in order to avoid a break with the united states, i regarded it as certain that we would not directly bring about the rupture which had just been averted with such difficulty by reopening the unrestricted submarine campaign, for in view of the american ultimatum of the 18th april, 1916, there was no alternative.

i should like to take this opportunity of making clear that i always regarded american mediation as the only possible way out of the war. i had no faith in the submarine campaign as likely to save the situation, because the entry of the united states into the war would more than outweigh all the advantages that the submarines could bring us. on the other hand i was convinced that if the american government established a peace conference, this would be sure to lead to peace itself. it could not be imagined that, in view of the nations' need of peace, such a conference could break up without having reached any result. moreover, after the meeting of a conference, the united states would no longer be in a position to enter the war, because american public opinion would not have allowed it. but without the help of the united states, the entente could not win. it resolved itself, therefore, into a question of the skill of our negotiators to ensure a tolerable peace for us, as the result of the conference. diplomatic negotiations have a way of ending owing to general weariness, in which case the party which holds the best cards secures the greatest advantages. if this happened, we should have the advantage of the position as our military gains would give us a strong lever in the negotiations.

here i may touch on another question which was engaging page 259 my attention at that time. since the lusitania catastrophe i had adopted the principle, and put it into practice as far as possible, of leaving the propaganda to our american friends, who were in a position to get an earlier hearing than we, and in any case understood the psychology of the americans better than the imperial german agents. indeed, the words "german propagandist" had already become a term of abuse in america. we were reproached there with being too indulgent, while in germany the opposite criticism was levelled at us. in spite of the difficulty of the situation, however, there were americans of german and other origin, who had the courage openly to champion our cause and to swim against the stream. among others, a "citizens' committee for food shipments" was formed, whose activities spread through the whole country, and were avowedly pro-german. a special function of the committee with dr. von mach as executive chief, was a month of propaganda throughout the country, with the object of obtaining the means to supply the children of germany with milk. the english control of the post even led to the bold plan of building a submarine to run the milk through the english blockade. the propaganda was very vigorously attacked by the greater part of the american press, but pursued its course unafraid, collected money, submitted protests to the state department against the attitude of the entente, and so on.

dr. von mach succeeded in bringing the matter to the notice of the president who actively interested himself in it, and promised to see that the milk should pass the english blockade and reach germany in safety. accordingly, the state department instructed the american embassy in berlin to issue a statement. meanwhile, the well-known american journalist, mcclure, returned from a tour of investigation in germany, where he had been page 260 supported in every way by the german government departments. he gave a very favorable account of the milk question, as of the feeding of infants in general, and this gave rise to the first disagreeable controversy. mr. mcclure took up an unyielding attitude. unfortunately, however, the state department then published an equally favorable report, which, coming from the american embassy and published with the approval of the foreign office in berlin, caused the complete collapse of dr. von mach. this incident made a very painful impression in america, and led to a series of bitter attacks on dr. von mach and the whole movement, which was thus exposed in a most unfortunate light. the favorable report on the milk question was drawn up by a dr. e. a. taylor, and definitely confirmed, and, indeed, inspired, by the german authorities.

i mention this incident to show that our propaganda was not by any means made easier by germany, although our press bureau repeatedly brought up this very question in berlin. this movement was particularly dear to us, because the americans are most easily won over when an appeal is made to their humanity. moreover, the favorable reports on the question of supplies in germany did not coincide in any way with our defence of the submarine campaign as an act of reprisal. this method of propaganda from home lost us our best argument. even to-day the majority of americans certainly have no idea how many children have been murdered by the blockade.

at the time of which i am speaking occurred also the much discussed bolo affair. it is quite astonishing how many lies were told before the commission of inquiry of the american senate with regard to this affair. among others, hotel servants, chauffeurs, etc., were sworn, and gave evidence that i had met bolo in the apartments of mr. hearst. true, i have often visited mr. hearst, which page 261 goes without saying, as he was the only important newspaper proprietor who maintained a neutral attitude throughout the war. i did not, however, meet bolo, either there or anywhere else; i have never made his acquaintance, or even seen him in the distance. i heard his name for the first time when he was brought up for trial in paris.

if the statements made before the commission of inquiry are to be relied on in any point at all, it is to be assumed that bolo first came to america to arrange a combine between the journal and the hearst press. this combine was to support the cause of pacifism after the war. who bolo's principal was i do not know, but so much seems to be established, that he was connected with the journal. apparently, bolo wanted to sell shares in this paper to mr. hearst, in order to acquire funds for the pacifist agitation. this theory seems justified since bolo, on the voyage to america, got into touch with mr. bartelli, hearst's representative in paris. the latter did fall in with bolo's ideas.

later—whether intentionally or not i do not know—bolo met the co-proprietor of the firm amsinck and co., herr pavenstedt, who was one of the most respected, if not the most respected, imperial german in new york, and intimately acquainted with all the members of the embassy. herr pavenstedt, who as a private citizen was not in a position to accept bolo's suggestions, then travelled to washington to lay the matter before me. he gave me to understand that a french acquaintance of long standing, for whose good faith he could vouch, had come to america to raise funds for a pacifist agitation in france. he said that national feeling in that country had reached a point which promised success for such a movement, if the prospect could be held out of a peace by negotiation. herr pavenstedt said that he could not, page 262 under any circumstances, disclose the gentleman's name. as the plans of the frenchman recommended by herr pavenstedt coincided with my policy for bringing about a peace by negotiation, and i had absolute confidence in herr pavenstedt, i communicated the matter to berlin, where the necessary money was granted. later, the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the united states interrupted the policy i had initiated, and also put an end to any prospect of effecting a change of feeling in france, where the hope of american assistance revived enthusiasm for the war.

i do not know how bolo's enterprise came to the knowledge of the french government. in any case this cannot have been due to the deciphering of my telegrams to berlin, as i did not know bolo's name. owing to this ignorance on my part it was arranged between herr pavenstedt and myself, at a second interview, that the anonymous frenchman should at a given time address further communications on the progress of the movement to our embassy at bern under the pseudonym "st. regis."

at the time of the sussex crisis a further awkward incident occurred which took us back to the days of conspiracies. in consequence of the welland canal case the american secret police came down upon herr von igel, the representative of the military attaché, in his new york office, for alleged complicity, arrested him by force and seized papers which were found on his table. i immediately laid a protest before the state department, whereupon herr von igel was set at liberty and a long international controversy arose which had not come to an end when herr von igel returned with me to germany. the american law department maintained that herr von igel was suspected of complicity in a legal offence, that he could not therefore plead extra-territoriality, and page 263 must stand his trial before an american court. the state department, it is true, had doubts as to whether an office in new york could be recognized as extraterritorial, but for the rest maintained a correct attitude and refused to agree to the opening of proceedings against herr von igel.

the seized documents were handed over to the state department, where they probably still lie. the state department declared to me their readiness to hand back the papers if i wished to declare them embassy documents. i, however, thought that an attempt might be made later to use such a declaration against me as a trap and i rejected the offer to return the papers on these conditions, as they were of no further importance to us. if there was among them material which could be used against the former attachés it might be assumed that the law department would long ago have had the documents copied.

the igel affair had no definite political result, as the american government dropped all controversies when they began to take up the question of mediation.

to return to the settlement of the sussex incident it should be mentioned that our surrender on the submarine question was widely resented in germany. further, it caused a check in submarine construction. at least, secretary of state von capelle has declared before the commission of the national assembly that an extensive submarine construction programme had to be abandoned because it would have been too sharp a contrast with germany's attitude after the settlement of the sussex affair. as a matter of fact, submarine construction was never carried on with full vigor after 1916 as has been pointed out by messrs. struve, gothein and co. in the light of this the gravity of the decision in 1917 to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare is doubled. it will page 264 be seen clearly here how our divided policy on the one hand permanently crippled the submarine policy and on the other that of mediation.

to conclude the sussex question, i will add one more telegram which i sent to the foreign office after secretary of state lansing had publicly mentioned an anglo-american agreement—a remark which in berlin was taken to mean that america had formed an alliance with england. it is well known that during the war such a statement has frequently been made.

telegram in cipher

"washington, 21st may, 1916.

"i am working confidentially in co-operation with house for the settlement of such still unsettled questions as the lusitania and the igel cases, so as to clear the air completely. feeling here now more favorable owing to the influence of the irish executions. wilson regards conflict with us as a thing of the past and desires to let things rest and soon to lay the foundations of peace. lansing's speech as to anglo-american agreement refers to the bryan agreement. he desired to make clear that war with england because of the blockade is out of the question, and therefore there is no means of bringing pressure to bear. the speech coincides with the american view i have already reported that it would be easier to bring the war to an end than to force england to raise the blockade."

hitherto i have not mentioned the different german vessels which visited united states ports during the war. besides their history is well known. i will therefore only describe their psychological influence and my own experiences.

page 265 the auxiliary cruisers kronprinz friedrich wilhelm and eitel friedrich were the first german ships to enter hampton roads, there to be interned.

much more interest was aroused by the arrival on the 15th february, 1916, of the appam, because it was then a long time since the german flag had been seen on the american side of the atlantic. the facts are familiar to german readers from count dohna's m?ve book. lieutenant berg's exploit met with general appreciation in the united states, especially as his conduct was completely in accord with the american conception of international law. even to-day i can hear the tone of absolute conviction in which secretary of state lansing told me at the metropolitan club that the voyage of the appam was a "marvellous achievement."

in the far-off future, students of international law will quote the appam case as a classic. at the german embassy in washington volumes were filled with the opinions of eminent lawyers, for the incident was not treated politically by the american government, but submitted to the courts. meanwhile the appam remained interned in hampton roads as a prize. the case was not settled until after the breaking-off of diplomatic relations, when it was no longer of any importance to us.

the interest roused by the appam shrank into nothing before the excitement caused by the arrival of the submarine deutschland on the 8th july, 1916. apart from those that followed the agreement on the arabic incident, the few days after the arrival of the deutschland were the pleasantest i experienced in america during the war. feeling on all sides was openly friendly, and captain k?nig was the most popular man in the united states. if we had sent ten such merchant submarines to america and for the rest had carried on the submarine campaign according to the principles laid down for cruiser warfare, page 266 we should have attained far greater political results than has been the case.

the arrival of the submarine deutschland at baltimore and captain k?nig's first visit to the town resembled a triumphal procession. i had intended to go there at once to welcome the hero of the day and his bold seamen, but thought it better to wait and see what would be the american attitude towards the protests of the english and french ambassadors, who had both claimed that the deutschland, as a submarine, should be regarded without hesitation as a ship of war. on the 13th july a most minute inspection of the deutschland was made by an american government commission consisting of three naval officers, and she was recognized as a genuine merchant vessel. in consequence the deutschland had a right to lie at baltimore as long as was necessary to take a cargo on board for the return journey. it was now possible for me to pay an official visit to baltimore and to view the deutschland. the mayor of the town accompanied me and went down with me, in spite of the terrific heat of about 40° centigrade, into the lowest parts of the submarine, which cost the stoutly-built gentleman considerable effort and a good deal of perspiration. in the evening the mayor gave a banquet which passed off as in the good days before the war. the rooms were decorated with german and american flags, the band played the "wacht am rhein," and many speeches were made on the good relations between the two countries.

again on her second visit, which took place in october in new london (connecticut), the deutschland met with a very friendly reception, even though the atmosphere was appreciably cooler. feeling in the new england state has always been particularly unfavorable to us. but there, to, i passed a very pleasant day with captain k?nig.

page 267 in contrast to the moral gain of the visit of the deutschland was the generally unfavorable impression created by the visit at the same time of the u53. quite unexpectedly i received the news that a german submarine had arrived at newport, the captain of which had reported himself to the american commandant and had handed him a letter addressed to me. the letter attracted a good deal of attention in the press, but it actually contained nothing further than the introduction of the captain. the episode of the u53 was, from a political point of view, most undesirable and of no military value. when, moreover, a few days later the news arrived that the u53 had sunk several ships off the american coast—always, it is true, according to international law—the incident assumed a fairly serious aspect. meanwhile i travelled direct to shadow lawn, the president's beautiful summer residence on the new jersey coast, to hand to mr. wilson a letter from the emperor. the president had appealed to the heads of all the combatant states to urge them to permit relief to starving poland, as had been done for belgium. as was to be expected, the entente rejected the proposal while the central powers agreed to it. the emperor's approval was contained in the letter which i brought to mr. wilson.

the president took this opportunity to speak to me very seriously on the cruise of the u53, and urged me to see to it that this incident was not repeated. otherwise he could not be responsible for public feeling in the united states, which might again become very bitter. the affair was very disagreeable to me personally, because i was building hopes on mr. wilson's mediation and because i feared that the cruise of the u53 would be interpreted as an attempt on our part to put difficulties in the way of the president's re-election. it might be assumed that his republican opponents would say that page 268 germany could now do what she liked, as mr. wilson had never adopted energetic measures.

on the subject of this conversation with mr. wilson i sent the following telegram to the foreign office:

telegram in cipher

"washington, 11th october, 1916.

"i had a conversation with mr. wilson on the occasion of handing over the emperor's autograph letter with regard to polish relief. the president is anxious to carry the matter further and asked me how this could best be done. i replied that the difficulties lay exclusively on the english side.

"the cruiser warfare undertaken by our submarines off the american coast is naturally regarded by mr. wilson with anxiety, because all his hopes of re-election are based exclusively on the fact that according to the opinion held over here he has kept the united states out of the war and in spite of that has put an end to our so-called illegal attacks on american lives. his whole position falls to pieces if american lives are lost now, or if indignation is aroused by a submarine campaign off the american coast. so far this has not occurred. the exploit of u53 is even hailed as a sporting achievement. this view will, however, be changed if the incident is repeated. for this reason wilson spoke plainly about a continuance of the submarine campaign off the american coast. he regarded as particularly serious the fact that two neutral ships were sunk, as well as a canadian passenger vessel making for the united states. he said that such incidents could not be understood by the american public."

to this telegram i received from the imperial chancellor the following reply:

page 269 telegram in cipher

"berlin, 4th october, 1916.

"england entirely responsible for difficulties with regard to polish relief. for your excellency's exclusive information it is not intended to continue submarine campaign off american coast. final decision as to activity of u53 not possible until she returns. our concessions to america are being strictly observed and will be until explicitly revoked.

"bethmann-hollweg."