american mediation

at midsummer, 1916, the political lull desired by colonel house actually set in. the colonel betook himself to one of the beautiful lakes of new hampshire, in the far north of the united states, where in the ordinary way i could only reach him by letter or telegram. how secret we kept our communications is shown by the fact that, according to agreement, i wrote and telegraphed to colonel house under the pseudonym "martin." this caution proved to be fully justified, as the inquiry by the senate committee has shown that the letters from the embassy were frequently opened by agents of the entente propaganda, whether with or without the connivance of the american secret police i will not definitely say. i have already had occasion to mention this question in connection with the robbing of mr. albert. there are in the secret police of all countries men of doubtful honor. it might be taken as certain that there were such men in the pay of the entente agents.

soon after the settlement of the sussex incident—on 27th may—mr. wilson made public, for the first time, his plan for the league of nations. this idea was to constitute the foundation-stone of his mediation and fulfil all the hopes of the american pacifists for a compulsory court of arbitration in international disputes and general disarmament. before the war many shrewd men in the united states thought that the arbitration system page 271 initiated by the american government would exclude the possibility of great wars. the outbreak of the world war showed that this was an illusion, and the question arose what precautions could be taken to prevent a recurrence of the world catastrophe. mr. wilson was one of the first in whom the idea matured that the scheme, hitherto regarded as utopian, of a league binding all civilized nations to a peaceful settlement of their disputes was capable of being made a practical proposition if backed, as a means of compulsion, by a commercial boycott, similar to that which the entente, in contravention of international law, employed with such terrible results against germany.

the most important sentences of the speech which the president addressed to the american peace league ran as follows:

"when the invitation for me to be here to-night came to me, i was glad to accept,—not because it offered me an opportunity to discuss the programme of the league,—that you will, i am sure, not expect of me,—but because the desire of the whole world now turns eagerly towards the hope of peace, and there is just reason why we should take our part in counsel upon this great theme....

"with its causes and its objects we are not concerned. the obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore....

"and the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made poignantly clear is, that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, page 272 and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seek to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at least in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established. it is clear that nations must in future be governed by the same high code of honor that we demand of individuals....

"repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in the war have made it plain that their thought has come to this, that the principle of the public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression; that henceforth alliance must not be set up against alliance, understanding against understanding, but that there must be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and mankind....

"this is undoubtedly the thought of america. this is what we ourselves will say when there comes a proper occasion to say it....

"we believe these fundamental things: first, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. like other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, as our franker historians have been honorable enough to admit; but it has become more and more our rule of life and action. second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. and, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance page 273 of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.

"so sincerely do we believe in these things that i am sure that i speak the mind and wish of the people of america when i say that the united states is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation....

"but i did not come here, let me repeat, to discuss a programme. i came only to avow a creed and give expression to the confidence i feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some common force will be brought into existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interests of all peoples and all governments, where coercion shall be summoned, not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common peace. god grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and co-operation may be near at hand!"

this speech displayed all the characteristics of mr. wilson's oratory: brilliant command of the english language, dazzling wealth of vocabulary and nebulous sentence construction which made the purpose clear only to the initiated. nevertheless, the vital points of the speech could not be misunderstood. it prepared the world for american mediation by strong emphasis of the league of nations idea.

the political lull of midsummer brought an important improvement in public feeling towards us. this change for the better was reflected with special clearness in the reception given to the merchant submarine deutschland, as i have already described.

page 274 at the time of this speech of mr. wilson's, i sent the following report:

report in cipher

"washington, 28th may, 1916.

"the placation of american public opinion is progressing. hardly any mention is now made in the press of german-american relations. only two persons are still wavering. the american government are delaying the publication of my letter on the subject of the lusitania settlement, because they think that it will not satisfy public opinion here. it may be assumed that its publication will take place at the beginning of june, during the republican national convention, so that it may pass as far as possible unnoticed in the general excitement about domestic politics. the american government's delay in this matter shows clearly how great the opposition has been. while we thought to have made important concessions, the american government here consider that they have not attained the objective prescribed for them by public opinion.

"further, the igel incident is not yet settled. on this question there is a difference of opinion between the state and law departments. the former confirming our standpoint that the seizure of the papers was illegitimate and that they must be returned. the law department, on the other hand, holds that herr von igel has been guilty of a legal offence and so has forfeited his diplomatic privileges. consequently i get no further, and the case is continually deferred. it is to be hoped that the state department will soon bestir itself to make a decision which will, however, in any case, necessitate the recall of herr igel.

"mr. wilson's peace plans are becoming more and more tangible. the only question is whether he possesses page 275 sufficient authority to force our enemies to agree to negotiations. colonel house is convinced that mr. wilson will succeed. the president is considering the plan of calling together a conference at the hague, in which the neutrals will only participate so far as the 'freedom of the seas' is concerned. if the project materializes, colonel house is sure to take part in the conference, even though he may not be the official american representative. his influence, however, would be sure to be great, for no one else is so completely in touch with mr. wilson's views. the latter is still of the opinion that the united states should under no circumstances take part in the actual settlement of the peace conditions. he and his alter ego are meanwhile very much afraid that our enemies might remain obdurate, since they are under the impression, or are trying to spread the impression, that the president, in opening the peace negotiations, is acting for germany. certainly england continually drags this idea into the discussion. at one time it is said that prince bülow is coming here to submit the german peace conditions to mr. wilson; at another, that germany is on the brink of starvation and must therefore sue for peace. we ought as far as possible to counteract this propaganda of our enemies. it is to be hoped that it will not do serious harm, because the peace vote in america continues to grow and mr. wilson can count with certainty on re-election if he establishes a peace conference. we shall therefore daily gain ground here so long as we appear to be ready to encourage the american peace movement, while our enemies adopt an unfavorable attitude. the american people is now pacifically minded. it becomes clearer every day how difficult it is to arouse enthusiasm for war preparedness, etc. no one who has lived here for any length of time can help coming to the conclusion that peaceful money-making is the americans' page 276 chief interest in life. only when they think that their rights have been seriously infringed do they lash themselves into an hysterical war-fever. why should war passion smoulder in the hearts of a people whose boundaries are so secure that no enemy has ever been seen inside them, nor in all human probability ever will be?"

after the settlement of the sussex incident the imperial government naturally hoped that mr. wilson would take steps to justify our concessions with regard to the submarine question. accordingly i received the following general instructions:

"berlin, 7th june, 1916.

"order a. 56.

"confidential.

"more than a month has passed since our last note to the united states without president wilson making up his mind to approach the english government on the question of the blockade. true i do not expect that england would allow herself to be influenced by the united states to abandon her infringement of international law; nor do i imagine that a rejection of the american demands by england would lead to a serious disturbance of the relations between these two countries. the existing arbitration treaty, which makes it possible in extreme cases to delay the settlement of the points of contention indefinitely, rules this out. but the complete passivity of mr. wilson, which could be understood so long as he wished to avoid giving the impression that he was acting under german coercion, but which cannot continue to be justified on these grounds, is bound to re-act very unfavorably on public opinion here and puts the imperial government in an extremely difficult position.

page 277 "from the information which has reached you, your excellency will already realize that our surrender to america on the submarine question has met with approval in wide and influential circles in germany. if president wilson persists in his passive attitude towards england, it is to be feared that the section of german public opinion whose attitude has so far been favorable to the government will ally themselves with the opponents of the government policy, and that the whole of public opinion in germany will clamor for the resumption of the submarine campaign on the old lines. in that case, the imperial government would be all the less in a position to resist this demand for any length of time, as all the military authorities have always been unanimous in regarding and urging unrestricted submarine warfare as the only effective means to bring about the defeat of england. moreover, as we have received secret information that the entente have decided on a drastic tightening of the blockade, and at the same time have agreed in future to meet the protests of the neutrals, and particularly america, with the argument that only in this way can the end of the war, which is also in the interests of the neutral countries, be brought about. your excellency will therefore bring to the notice of president wilson and mr. house the serious dangers which his passivity towards england involves.

"with regard to mr. wilson's plans for mediation, they are meanwhile meeting with vigorous opposition in england. if they are rejected by england, the result cannot but be favorable to us, for we are naturally sceptical of mediation on the part of a statesman so partial to england, and at the same time so na?ve as president wilson. this necessarily follows on the consideration that the president would primarily be concerned to construct peace on the basis of the status quo ante, and particularly page 278 in respect of belgium. although there is to-day little on which to form an estimate as to how far we shall be in a position to bring about a solution in conformity with our own interests to the belgian question, which is the direct result of the war, so much is certain, that if the war continues in our favor, a peace on the basis of the absolute status quo ante would not be acceptable to us. so, as the president interprets his r?le as the chosen champion of all that, in his opinion, is right and just, it is to be feared that a refusal on our part to make peace on this basis might induce him to go over openly to the enemy's camp. it is not, however, out of the question that public opinion in england may in time again turn to mr. wilson and his desire for mediation. as soon, therefore, as mr. wilson's mediation plans threaten to assume a more concrete form and there is evidence of an inclination on the part of england to fall in with them, it will be your excellency's duty to prevent president wilson from approaching us with a positive proposal of mediation. the choice of means for attaining this object without endangering our relations with the united states i think i may leave to your excellency's diplomatic skill, as from here i am not in a position to get a clear insight into the position of affairs in america.

"von jagow."

i have already mentioned that mr. wilson had for some time past subordinated the question of the "freedom of the seas," i.e., in this concrete instance the english blockade, to his desire for mediation. regarded from his point of view, this new ordering of his plans was based on an entirely correct political train of thought. the president gave first place to the attainable, with a view to taking up later what was for the time being unattainable. in view of the fact that we could bring no pressure page 279 to bear to change mr. wilson's point of view, it only remained for us to exploit his plans as far as possible in the interests of german policy.

as my instructions on the most important point—the question of mediation—did not appear to me sufficiently clear, i asked in the following report, dated from the summer quarters of the embassy, for a more detailed explanation:

report in cipher

"in reply to order a. 56,

"rye, 13th july, 1916.

"the inactivity of mr. wilson, who has only one thought, re-election, is due in the first place to the fact that no pressure is being put upon him by american public opinion to take action with regard to england. it is obvious that conditions here are not favorable to such action. those american circles which are suffering financial losses as a result of the english blockade, have no weight in face of the tremendous stream of gold which our enemies have poured lavishly over this country, not haggling over details, and conniving at 'graft.' for the rest, mr. wilson's train of thought with regard to action in respect of england practically coincides with that expressed by your excellency. he does not think at present that it is likely to meet with any success, as he has no means of bringing pressure to bear. no one would take him seriously if he threatened england with war.

"the position is quite different with the president's well-known anxiety to bring about peace in europe. in this matter he now has the whole of american public opinion behind him. he also believes that, after the expected failure of their present offensives, our enemies will be ready to open peace negotiations. if this assumption page 280 proves unfounded, and our enemies reject an american invitation on these lines, the main question dealt with in your excellency's instructions to me will be settled. meanwhile, he is sure to make an attempt to negotiate peace, if only for election purposes. i therefore venture to request your excellency to cable me further brief instructions as to how i am to interpret the words 'more concrete form of mediation plans,' and 'positive proposal of mediation.' i am assuming that the main part of my respectful reports will only reach your excellency at the same time as this. therefore, mr. gerard, when your excellency spoke with him at the beginning of may, on the question of mediation, would not have received detailed instructions as to the president's intentions. in any case, he was mistaken as to the attitude your excellency should adopt with regard to an american peace-movement. on the strength of a telegram received at that time from mr. gerard, mr. wilson believed that the imperial government was ready to accept his mediation, and i accordingly contradicted this assumption as instructed. as far as i know, mr. wilson refuses definitely to take any part in the discussion of territorial questions, but confines his interest to 'disarmament' and 'freedom of the seas.' his idea is that there should be a conference at the hague, in which the united states and other neutral powers would only take part in so far as these two questions are concerned. 'disarmament' may certainly be very undesirable for us, but, on the other hand, the 'freedom of the seas,' ought, without a doubt, to bring us on the side of the united states. if it once comes to peace negotiations between the combatants, i regard it as out of the question—even were they to fail—that the united states would enter the war against us. american public feeling in favor of peace is too strong for that. it required the hysterical excitement roused by page 281 the lusitania question, and the incidents connected with it, to produce a state of mind among americans which at times made war seem inevitable. in the absence of similar incidents, such a state of public feeling could not be aroused. the admiration with which the cruise of the submarine deutschland was regarded showed plainly which way the wind blows now.

"i made the above mentioned request because i consider it out of the question to prevent mr. wilson from taking action with regard to peace. i am in doubt, however, whether by a 'positive proposal of mediation' your excellency means such a proposal as that made by mr. roosevelt after the russo-japanese war. on that occasion it is well known that the negotiations were carried on under direct american influence. this, as i have already said, is not what mr. wilson wants. he only wants to play the part of peace-instigator; he would like to deserve the credit for having brought the combatants to negotiate one with the other. such a success would, in view of the state of feeling here, probably assure his re-election.

"i am therefore convinced that within the next few weeks the president will institute proceedings with regard to peace, provided that the enemy offensive continues to prove abortive. mr. wilson will then tell england that he has been obliged on the grounds of domestic politics to make a sharp protest against the blockade, provided that peace negotiations have not been opened. for me the question now arises whether i am to try to stand in the way of these proceedings. of course i could exert strong influence on colonel house. wilson, however, would immediately suspect that we were attempting to deal with his successor, and to give mr. hughes the honor of instigating peace proceedings.

page 282 "as far as i can judge from here, there seem to be three possibilities:

"1. that the wilson peace movement should fail in consequence of the obduracy of our enemies. in that case, if we were to reopen the submarine campaign to bring england to her knees, the situation would at least be more favorable to us than before.

"2. that the peace movement should fail through us, and that we should resume the submarine war.

"3. that the peace movement should be accepted by both sides.

"in the first case, i consider war with the united states probable; in the second, certain. this is the reason for my request for more definite instructions as to whether i am to impede a peace movement, or only a positive proposal that would bind us in respect of territorial conditions."

to this report i received the following reply, containing quite clear instructions, emphatically to encourage mr. wilson in whatever course he might take:

telegram in cipher

"berlin, 18th august, 1916.

"in reply to report a. 350 of the 13th inst.

"mediation by the president intended lead to the opening of peace negotiations between the combatants we are gladly ready to accept. please encourage emphatically the president's efforts in this direction. naturally it must not be imagined that in accepting such mediation we bind ourselves to any concrete peace conditions. a general peace conference with participation of neutrals only tolerable on the lines of previous successful peace-negotiations between combatants with page 283 regard to general and international questions of freedom of the seas and disarmament.

"bethmann-hollweg."

in close connection with the above exchange of letters with berlin, stood an interchange of telegrams dealing with the eventual reopening of the unrestricted submarine campaign. i received the following telegrams:

telegram in cipher

"(strictly confidential.)

"berlin, 12th june, 1916.

"the army and navy are again urging submarine warfare as the only weapon against england, and particularly against her blockade, to which president wilson has never, nor can very well, take exception.

"it now remains to be decided:

"1. whether after his nomination wilson would still be prepared to press matters as far as a rupture and war, even if we spare human life in the new submarine war?

"2. what attitude the republican candidate would adopt on this matter?

"public opinion in england is opposed to mediation by wilson, which is also not wanted on principle here, because too unpopular.

"von jagow."

i dispatched as quickly as possible to berlin the following telegram:

telegram in cipher

"washington, 19th june, 1916.

"assuming that it is intended that the resumption of the submarine campaign be accompanied by the official page 284 or clandestine withdrawal of the concessions granted in our note of the 4th may, such a withdrawal or modification of our concessions would in my opinion lead to a rupture and america's entry into the war. by condoning such a move wilson would forfeit all hope of being re-elected and hughes, who is already suspected of being the german candidate, could not afford to recommend a surrender. with regard to mediation and blockade i am in constant communication with house. the former to be expected in course of summer, for election reasons; probably wilson will inform our enemies that he will have to resort to sharp measures if peace is not attained."

from the orders and telegrams here reproduced i gathered that the political situation was, as far as i was concerned, to be regarded as a kind of race between the unrestricted submarine campaign on the one hand and the american peace mediation on the other. there was apparently no third possibility.

on the 1st september i saw colonel house again. in order that this visit should not attract notice i went to stay with other friends in new hampshire for the customary american september holidays (labor day). from there i motored to new london, where colonel house had been spending the summer. the conversation brought out that the president considered a postponement of mediation unavoidable, because the entente were now filled with hopes of victory in consequence of rumania's entry into the war. in all my conversations with colonel house we both proceeded from the assumption that an attempt to bring about american mediation could only succeed provided that the entente had given up hope of victory without the entry into the war of the united states. for this reason colonel house repeated page 285 his advice that there should be less public talk in berlin of an early peace than had hitherto been the case, since in this way we were betraying weakness and making america's task more difficult.

colonel house also said that the president now intended to await the further development of the war, and, if he should be re-elected, immediately to take steps towards mediation. before the presidential election the time was too short for any action, for the entente would pay no heed to the mediation of a problematical candidate.

looking back, i am still convinced even to-day that colonel house's estimate of the situation with regard to the president was entirely correct from the american point of view. mr. wilson could only afford to offer his mediation provided that he was sure of success. for us the position was in my opinion different. for germany american mediation would have been welcome at any time. it would either succeed and bring about an acceptable peace, or the entente would reject wilson's proposal after we had accepted it. in the latter case we should score a diplomatic success in washington which would make it very difficult for the american government to enter the war. the third possibility, that the german government, after all that had passed, might refuse mr. wilson's mediation, i did not even consider.

immediately after my return from new hampshire i telegraphed the following to the foreign office:

telegram in cipher no. 100

"rye, 6th september, 1916.

"wilson's mediation postponed until further notice because for the moment out of question, owing to rumania's entry into war and consequent renewed prospect page 286 of victory for our enemies. wilson thinks he cannot now mediate before the election, because england might pay little attention to him until after the election, and if he were not elected would have nothing further to do with him. if, however, wilson wins at the polls, for which the prospect is at present favorable, and if the war meanwhile remains at a standstill, the president will at once take steps towards mediation. he thinks in that case to be strong enough to compel a peace conference.

"wilson regards it as in the interest of america that neither of the combatants should gain a decisive victory."

this telegraphic report of my conversation with colonel house reached berlin when they were beginning to grow impatient of the delay in the peace movement. according to karl helfferich's account the question was discussed at the time between himself, the imperial chancellor and herr von jagow. thereupon, according to general ludendorff's "war memories," "the chancellor proposed to his majesty that instructions should be given to ambassador count bernstorff to induce the president at the earliest possible moment, and in any case before the presidential election, to make a peace offer to the powers." herr helfferich then goes on to report that the chancellor cabled to me to question me quite personally as to my opinion of wilson as a peace mediator. the accounts of both these gentlemen are doubtless accurate, but they do not mention that the inquiry addressed to me did not, nor was intended to, create a new situation, but had as its sole object to obtain my opinion as to the prospects of a movement which had long been set on foot. in the inquiry, as herr helfferich also reports, i was informed that we would evacuate belgium. this was of course a necessary preliminary to mr. wilson's mediation, which otherwise, in view of the page 287 feeling prevailing in america, would have been entirely out of the question.

the chancellor's inquiry read as follows:

telegram in cipher no. 74

"berlin,2nd september, 1916.

"confidential.

"our west front stands firm. east front naturally threatened somewhat by rumania's declaration of war. rolling up of front or collapse of austria, however, not to be feared. turkey and bulgaria to be relied on. greece uncertain. hopes of peace before winter, as result of russian or french war-weariness, diminished by this development. apparently, if no great catastrophe occurs in east, wilson's mediation possible and successful if we guarantee required restoration of belgium. otherwise, unrestricted submarine warfare would have to be seriously considered. request you give purely personal opinion without inquiry in any quarter.

"bethmann-hollweg."

to this inquiry i replied as follows:

telegram in cipher no. 101

"rye, 8th september, 1916.

"in reply to telegram no. 74.

"your question answered in substance by my telegram no. 100. i take it then that your excellency intends yourself to invite wilson's mediation. in so far as the united states of america concerns itself with territorial questions—which hitherto i have always categorically opposed—restoration of belgium should constitute america's principal interest, since public opinion is almost exclusively favorable to this.

page 288 "if wilson is re-elected, i think there is good prospect of his mediation before the end of the year.

"from this point of view the attainment of peace through unrestricted submarine war seems hopeless, since the united states would inevitably be drawn into the war—no matter what may be the result of the election—and consequently the war would be prolonged."

i should like particularly to draw the reader's attention to this telegram, because it expresses definitely my opinion that the submarine campaign could not bring us peace.

soon afterwards i was again instructed by the chancellor to hasten mr. wilson's peace movement. his telegram is here reproduced:

telegram in cipher

"berlin, 26th september, 1916.

"for your excellency's personal information.

"the enemy's intention of breaking through our fronts has not, so far, succeeded, and will not succeed, any more than his salonika and dobrudja offensives. on the other hand, the operations of the central powers against rumania are making encouraging progress. whether we shall succeed this year in gaining a victory there that will bring the war to an end is still doubtful; therefore, for the present we must be prepared for a further prolonging of the war. meanwhile, the imperial navy is confident that by the unrestricted employment of large numbers of submarines they could in view of england's economic position, meet with a success which would in a few months make our principal enemy, england, more disposed to entertain thoughts of peace. it is therefore essential that g.h.q. should include a submarine campaign among their other measures to relieve the situation on the somme front, by impeding the transport page 289 of munitions, and so making clear to the entente the futility of their efforts in this area.

"the whole situation would change if president wilson, following out the plans he has already indicated, were to make an offer of mediation to the powers. this would, of course, not have to include any definite proposals of a territorial nature, as these questions should form part of the agenda of the peace negotiations. such a move, however, would have to be made soon, as otherwise we could not continue to stand calmly aside and watch england, realizing as she does the many difficulties to be reckoned with, exert with impunity increasingly strong pressure on the neutrals, with a view to improving her military and economic position at our expense, and we should have to claim the renewed liberty of action for which we stipulated in the note of the 4th of may of this year. should mr. wilson insist on waiting until immediately before or after the election, he would lose the opportunity for such a step. also the negotiations should not at first aim at the conclusion of an armistice, but should be carried on solely by the combatant parties, and within a short period directly bring about the preliminary peace. a further prolongation would be unfavorable to germany's military situation, and would result in further preparations being made by the powers for the continuance of the war into next year, so that there would be no further prospect of peace within a reasonable time.

"your excellency should discuss the position cautiously with colonel house, and find out the intentions of mr. wilson. a peace movement on the part of the president which bore the outward appearance of spontaneity would be seriously considered by us, and this would also mean success for mr. wilson's election campaign.

page 290 "gerard has applied for leave, as the result of a private letter from colonel house, but he has received no reply from the state department.

"bethmann-hollweg."

the explanation of the final sentence of the above telegram is as follows. i have already mentioned that mr. gerard was not popular in berlin, owing to his very highly-strung temperament, his impetuosity and his want of tact. his recall was eagerly desired. consequently, i had received instructions to arrange, if possible, for the replacement of mr. gerard, and in any case that the ambassador should be recalled for a time to washington, so that his nerves might have a chance to rest. as always, in strictly confidential matters, i referred this to colonel house, who told me that in view of the existing political situation there could be no question of a recall of gerard. he would, however, arrange for the ambassador to be summoned at once to washington for fresh instructions. if once mr. gerard learned that the president now had the definite intention of mediating with a view of peace, colonel house thought he would be received in a more friendly manner in berlin.

i answered the chancellor's last telegram as follows:

telegram in cipher

"washington, 5th october, 1916.

"no. 121.

"telegram no. 89 discussed according to instructions.

"no change here in the situation reported in telegrams nos. 100 and 101.

"in view of possibility of surprises in war and election, wilson, for reasons already stated, refuses to attempt mediation until re-elected. result of election, page 291 which is being fought exclusively on foreign politics, uncertain. president showing surprising firmness. if unrestricted submarine campaign unavoidable, advise emphatically, postpone at least until after election. now, immediate rupture with united states would be certain; after election wilson's mediation probable on the one hand; on the other hand at least slight possibility of finding modus vivendi by negotiation with united states."

the instructions from berlin gave me occasion for repeated conversations with colonel house. the imperial government were now ready to accept mr. wilson's league of nations programme, which provided for general disarmament, freedom of the seas, and compulsory arbitration. my reports to berlin on this question had the result that on 9th november the chancellor in a speech publicly espoused this programme, and that i, at my own suggestion, received permission to communicate officially the chancellor's speech to the american peace league, which published my communication.

on the other hand, the imperial government desired that the territorial questions should be regulated by direct negotiations between the combatant powers. mr. wilson, as colonel house told me, was in agreement with this. mr. wilson had already expressed himself to this effect in the above mentioned speech of the 27th may, and in general adopted the point of view that the united states had no interest in the details of territorial adjustment; but that it was of equally fundamental importance for america as for europe that in future wars should be avoided. the president was only willing to intervene in so far as he was certain of having american public opinion behind him. in my conversations with colonel house we never spoke of the evacuation of any german page 292 territory. we always confined ourselves exclusively to a real peace by negotiation on the basis of the status quo ante. with such a peace germany's position in the world would have remained unimpaired. the freedom of the seas, a principal point in the wilson programme, could not but be welcome to us. the president and colonel house have been the sponsors of this idea in america. both were indefatigable in their efforts to materialize this idea in such a way that war on commerce should be abolished and that all commerce, even in war-time, should be declared free. as a necessary result of this development of the laws of naval warfare mr. wilson hoped to bring about general naval disarmament, since navies would lose their raison d'être if they could only be used against each other and no longer against commerce and for purposes of blockade. it is a regrettable fact that at the hague conference we accepted the english standpoint on the question of war on commerce, and not the american.

in october i was again instructed from berlin to speed up mr. wilson's peace movement. with regard to this new urgency herr von jagow, on the 14th april, 1919, granted an interview to the berlin representative of the new york sun, the substance of which was as follows:

"in the autumn of 1916 the emperor, count bernstorff and i opposed the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, which was urged with increasing vigor by our military and naval departments, as being the only means of bringing the war to an early conclusion. week after week we watched for the hoped-for peace move of president wilson, which, however, did not come. at last, in october, the emperor, upon whom increasing pressure was being brought to bear to give his consent to the unrestricted submarine campaign, sent a memorandum to page 293 the american government, reminding them or certain mediation promises which had been made at the time of the sussex crisis.

"when this memorandum, addressed to mr. gerard, reached berlin mr. gerard had already left for america. i, therefore, cabled the text to washington and instructed count bernstorff to hand the memorandum to mr. gerard on his arrival in new york. count bernstorff, who had been made fully aware that the emperor wished to avert the submarine campaign and a rupture with the united states, was also informed by me that the memorandum had been written by the emperor in person. for reasons which there is no need for me to mention here, count bernstorff handed the memorandum, not to mr. gerard, but to colonel house, who certainly communicated it to the president."

the telegram in which the emperor's memorandum was communicated to me read as follows:

telegram in cipher

"berlin, 9th october, 1916.

"his majesty the emperor desires that the following memorandum should be handed to ambassador gerard on the latter's arrival.

"your excellency should do this in strict confidence and say that the memoir is not intended to convey a threat of submarine warfare. i should only like you to remind the ambassador before his interview with the president of the expectations we based in the spring on wilson and to call his attention to the increasing ruthlessness with which the enemy is carrying on the war. i take it for granted that gerard will treat my memoir as strictly confidential and will not publish it.

"should your excellency, however, regard the delivery page 294 of the memorandum as indiscreet, i request that it may be deferred.

"for your excellency's information (strictly confidential):

"1. the memorandum is written personally by his majesty.

"2. unrestricted submarine warfare is for the present deferred.

"memorandum

"your excellency hinted to his majesty in your last conversation at charleville in april that president wilson possibly would try towards the end of summer to offer his good services to the belligerents for the promotion of peace. the german government has no information as to whether the president adheres to this idea, and as to the eventual date at which his step would take place. meanwhile the constellation of war has taken such a form, that the german government foresees the time at which it will be forced to regain the freedom of action that it has reserved to itself in the note of may 4th last, and thus the president's steps may be jeopardized."

mr. gerard arrived in new york a few days after i had received the emperor's memorandum. he was accompanied by the american journalist, herbert swope, a correspondent of the world, who had spent a considerable time in berlin. this gentleman professed to be mr. gerard's confidant, and even from the ship sent wireless messages to his paper in which he reported that the unrestricted submarine campaign was imminent. the ambassador also, after landing in new york, expressed himself, as i at once learned, to the same effect, and mr. swope continued his open press-campaign in this direction.

page 295 under these circumstances i considered it inopportune to give mr. gerard the emperor's memorandum, as i assumed that he would read into it merely a confirmation of his view, and would discuss it in that light. if, however, the idea spread abroad that we were about to begin the unrestricted submarine campaign all prospect of success for peace mediation was lost. it was indeed clear that the entente would not accept american mediation if they could hope for the submarine campaign and consequent declaration of war by the united states. it must continually be repeated that mediation could only succeed if the entente had already abandoned all hope of american assistance. on these considerations i handed the memorandum to colonel house, of whose discretion i had two years' experience. in this way it came into the hands of the equally unusually discreet president, without anyone else learning anything about it. the memorandum at once produced a great effect, as now the american authorities had no further doubt that the imperial government would accept the intended mediation. this could, however, not be speeded up because mr. wilson did not want to undertake a great political movement so shortly before the election.

at this time i sent the following report to the chancellor:

telegram in cipher

"washington, 17th october, 1916.

"for a week there has again been some excitement here about foreign policy. this is due to a variety of causes. at first the rumor was that ambassador gerard was bringing with him a peace proposal from the german government. in spite of all denials this rumor was believed for a time, because it was started by one of the first bankers of new york. unfortunately mr. gerard page 296 heard of this canard while he was still on the ship, and as he was travelling with herbert swope a denial, sent by wireless, appeared in the world, which was worse than the rumor itself. in this swope reported that mr. gerard was coming over to announce the approaching beginning of ruthless submarine war. just at this moment the u53 appeared at newport, and two days later i had an audience of the president, which had been arranged a long time before, that i might hand to mr. wilson the reply of his majesty the emperor and king on the question of polish relief.

"colonel house, with whom, as is known, i am in constant communication, expected that on his landing mr. gerard would let fall some intentional or unintentional diplomatic lapsus lingu?, and therefore went in the early morning to the quarantine station in order to protect gerard from the reporters. mr. gerard received a very hearty reception, which, however, had certainly been engineered for election purposes, because it is to the interest of the democratic administration to extol their ambassador and their foreign policy. immediately after the reception gerard breakfasted with house, and there everything was denied that had been actually said or implied.

"as i have known mr. and mrs. gerard for many years i had a longish conversation with them on the day after their arrival. the quintessence of the ambassador's remarks was that he was completely neutral, but that berlin expected more than that.

"now everything has calmed down again here, and nothing is talked about except the election, which will be decided in three weeks' time. as i have several times had the honor to report, the result is most uncertain. while four months ago a republican victory seemed certain, to-day wilson's success is very possible. this is page 297 explained by the fact that mr. hughes has made no permanent impression as a speaker, whereas roosevelt blew the war trumpet in his usual bombastic fashion. if hughes should be defeated he can thank roosevelt. the average american is, and remains a pacifist 'er segnet friede und friedenszeiten,' and can only be drawn into war by passionate popular excitement."

with the facts contained in the above report the following telegram is also concerned, which i despatched after the visit to the president mentioned above:

telegram in cipher

"washington, 11th october 1916.

"wilson gave particular force to his remarks by pointing out that the leaders of the opposition roosevelt, lodge and co., desired war with germany, which he was quite unable to understand. his only desire was to remain neutral, and to help to bring the war to an end as a decision by force of arms seemed to him out of the question. he thought that neither of the belligerent parties would be able to gain a decisive victory. therefore it was better to make peace to-day than to-morrow. but all prospect of ending the war would vanish if the united states were also drawn in.

"as wilson always spoke as though he was holding himself in readiness, in case his services as mediator were required, i told him that in my opinion there was no prospect of any advances being made by the belligerent powers.

"it was obvious that wilson would have preferred to be directly encouraged to make peace before the election because in that case he would have been sure of being re-elected. if, however, he were re-elected without this, he would have to make up his mind to take the initiative page 298 himself. result of the poll still very doubtful. wilson surprisingly strong, as hughes has little success as a speaker and roosevelt does more harm than good."

to this i received the following reply from the chancellor:

cipher telegram

"berlin, 14th october, 1916.

"demand for unrestricted submarine campaign increasing here with prolongation of war and improbability of decisive military blow, without, however, shaking the government's attitude.

"direct request for wilson's mediation still impossible, in view of favor hitherto shown to entente, and after last speeches of asquith and lloyd george. spontaneous appeal for peace, towards which i again ask you to encourage him, would be gladly accepted by us. you should point out wilson's power, and consequently his duty, to put a stop to slaughter. if he cannot make up his mind to act alone he should get into communication with pope, king of spain and european neutrals. such joint action, since it cannot be rejected by entente, would insure him re-election and historical fame.

"bethmann-hollweg."

the incident of the emperor's memorandum closed with the following telegram sent by me:

cipher telegram

"washington, 20th october, 1916.

"i thought it better to give memorandum to gerard for house, as in this way greater discretion is assured. latter was incautious in his utterances to press here. house will speak with gerard. both gentlemen see wilson shortly, and are accordingly in constant touch.

"it is still not to be expected that wilson will make peace advances before the election. nor that he will get page 299 into communication with pope or king of spain as hitherto every suggestion of joint action has met with immovable opposition, chiefly based on tradition. meanwhile prospect of wilson's re-election becomes obviously greater every day. should this occur i believe that wilson will very soon attempt mediation and with success, chiefly because the feeling against england has greatly increased, which england is seeking to hide. if peace is not concluded serious anglo-american differences of opinion are to be expected. until now every fresh dispute with germany with regard to the submarine question has always been exploited by our enemies here to bridge the differences with england. already the agitation in the german press for unrestricted submarine warfare is persistently used for this purpose."

after a hard struggle mr. wilson was re-elected president. the pacifist tendency in the united states had won, for the battle was fought under the watchword that mr. wilson had preserved peace for the united states. "he kept us out of the war" had been the battle-cry of the democrats. the few electioneering speeches made by the president breathed the spirit of neutrality and love of peace. it is particularly to be noticed that at that time, mr. wilson, in an address, dealt in a thoroughly objective way with the question of guilt for the origin of the war, which was later to be the determining factor in his attitude towards us. the way was now cleared for the opening of the peace movement. public feeling had also become more favorable to us, inasmuch as the american war industry no longer attached so much importance to the prolongation of the war after the victorious democratic party had drawn up an extensive armament programme and so indicated to the industry the prospect of great state contracts.

page 300 on the subject of my own attitude with regard to the election, innumerable legends have been spread through germany. the few german-americans who shared the views of the so-called "german-american chamber of commerce" have reproached me with having brought about mr. wilson's election by influencing the german-americans. anti-german-american newspapers maintained, on the other hand, that i had used every lever to bring about the election of the republican candidate, mr. hughes, so as to punish mr. wilson for his attitude towards the submarine campaign. my position was an extraordinarily difficult one, as i could neither take part in the election nor give up the relations which naturally and in the course of my duty bound me to the german-americans and pacifists. in general i may say that the vast majority of german-americans had absolute confidence in me throughout. a splendid testimony of this was given at the great german bazaar which was held in new york in aid of the red cross. this undertaking made the astounding net profit of 800,000 dollars. at the opening nearly 30,000 people were present, who gave me an indescribably enthusiastic ovation simply because they believed that i had prevented war between germany and the united states.

i never for a moment denied that i personally should be glad to see mr. wilson re-elected, as i was convinced that he had the determination and the power to bring about peace. it was at that time impossible for me to foresee that our government would change its attitude to this question. all american pacifists belonged to the democratic camp, all militarists belonged to the republican party.

a change in our favor was, therefore, not to be expected from the election of mr. hughes. apart from the usual relations with the pacifists and german-americans page 301 already mentioned, which were in no way altered during the election, i held myself aloof as my position demanded. if it had been possible to accuse me of taking sides, the agents of the entente would not have missed the opportunity of bringing me to book, as this they regarded as their object in life. i continually received letters from agents provocateurs, asking for my opinion on the elections. of course i never replied to these. neither were the false statements of anti-german newspapers any more successful which announced that on the day of the election i had openly shown my support of mr. hughes.

new york at night after the polling is one of the sights of america. all streets, squares, theatres and restaurants are filled to overflowing. the election results are displayed everywhere by electric light and cinematograph. particularly when the result is very uncertain, as in 1916, the crowd are tremendously excited. at 11 p.m. the election of mr. hughes seemed certain, as the eastern states had voted for him almost to a man, and it was said that a democratic candidate can only gain the victory if he wins over new york state. next day the picture changed, after the results had come gradually from the west, where the democratic party was everywhere triumphant. the majority, however, was so slight that it was several days before mr. wilson's election was secure.

the malcontents among the german-americans already mentioned maintain that if mr. hughes had been elected, congress would have used the four months between the election and the 4th march, during which mr. wilson was powerless and mr. hughes had not yet got the reins into his hands, to rush through the warning of american citizens against travelling on british passenger-ships. in that case, mr. hughes, on assuming office, would have found himself faced with a situation which would have page 302 prevented him from entering the war, in view of the national inclination towards peace. therefore, the german-americans ought to have supported hughes. this had been clear to the germans in the east. they maintained that wilson's re-election was due to the german votes in the western states which had obeyed a more or less clear order from the german embassy.

this line of argument is yet another proof that the germans in question had no idea of the situation in america. they kept exclusively to themselves in the deutscher verein, and scarcely ever saw a real, true-bred american. to begin with, it is difficult to see why the germans in the west should obey the alleged order from me if the germans in the east did not do so. but the important thing is that wilson had firmly made up his mind, in case mr. hughes was elected, to appoint him secretary of state immediately and, after hughes had informed himself on the political position in this office, to hand over the presidency and himself retire. mr. wilson considered it impossible to leave the country without firm leadership at such a dangerous moment.

immediately after the official announcement of his reelection, mr. wilson wrote a peace-note, but unfortunately kept it in his desk, because, unhappily, just at that time a new anti-german wave swept over the country on account of the belgian deportations. mr. wilson was at that time in the habit of typing the drafts of his notes and speeches himself, and only submitting them to his advisers on points of law or other technicalities. whether he still works in this way i do not know. if the unhappy measure of the belgian deportations had not been adopted, and particularly just as we had informed the president that we did not want to annex belgium, the history of the world would probably have taken a different course. the american mediation would have anticipated page 303 our peace offer and, therefore, would probably have succeeded, because we could not then have reopened the unrestricted submarine campaign without letting the mediation run its course.

in november several submarine incidents occurred in which there was a doubt as to whether the rules of cruiser warfare had been followed. the ships marina and arabia came under particular consideration. i will not go into these cases as they had no political importance. president wilson caused the investigations to be carried on in a dilatory fashion because he did not want to see his peace move disturbed by controversies.

of greater importance was the wish that was again cropping up in berlin to open the so-called "intensified submarine campaign." i learned this in the following from secretary of state von jagow:

cipher telegram no. 112.

"berlin, 8th november, 1916.

"navy wishes at least torpedo armed enemy cargo-vessels without warning. does your excellency consider this dangerous, apart from probable mistakes, particularly in view of fact that now many americans are lured to travel on such steamers!

"von jagow."

as the "intensified submarine campaign" would have destroyed all prospect of american intervention, i advised strongly against it in the two following telegrams:

(1) cipher telegram no. 152

"washington, 17th november, 1916.

"it is urgently desirable not to reopen disputes about armed merchantmen, especially in view of wilson's peace plan."

page 304 (2) cipher telegram

"washington, 20th november, 1916.

"in reply to telegram no. 112 which was delayed.

"pursuant to telegram no. 152.

"urge no change in submarine war, until decided whether wilson will open mediation. i consider this imminent."

at the same time i received the first news of the intended peace offer of the german government. to begin with, the following telegram arrived from secretary of state von jagow:

cipher telegram

"berlin, 16th november, 1916.

"desirable to know whether president willing to take steps towards mediation, and if so, which and when? question important for decision of possible steps in same direction elsewhere.

"how does mexican question stand?

"von jagow."

then followed a further telegram which read as follows:

cipher telegram

"berlin, 22nd november, 1916.

"strictly confidential.

"for your excellency's strictly personal information. so far as favorable military position permits we intend, in conjunction with our allies, immediately to announce our readiness to enter into peace negotiations.

"von jagow."

page 305 to the first of these two telegrams i sent the following reply:

cipher telegram

"washington, 21st november, 1916.

"wilson spontaneously commissioned house to tell me in strict confidence that he is anxious to take steps towards mediation as soon as possible, probably between now and the new year. he makes it a condition, however, that until then, mediation should be spoken and written of as little as possible, and further, that we should conduct the submarine war strictly according to our promises and not allow any fresh controversies to arise.

"wilson's reasons for the above conditions are as follows: he believes that he can only resort to mediation provided that public opinion over here remains as favorable to us as it has been during the last few months. on this account he deplores the so-called belgian deportations. any new submarine controversy would again affect public feeling adversely for us, whereas if this question can be eliminated the tension with regard to england will increase. the british reply on the subject of the black lists and the english press utterances on wilson's election have created a bad impression in government circles over here. the submarine question, however, will always divert this resentment against us again.

"wilson still hesitates to intervene because the state department expects a refusal on the part of our enemies, while house urges it strongly and is very hopeful. i have, according to instructions, encouraged him as much as possible, by telling him, that in my opinion, our enemies would be quite unable to refuse to enter into negotiations, and that is all that wilson has in view. house seemed very much impressed when i reminded him how, throughout the whole war, the english government had page 306 tried by lying and diplomatic trickery to bring public opinion on to their side. this house of cards, built on lies and deception, would immediately collapse if our enemies were now to refuse negotiations and thus would have to admit openly their desire for conquest. i am rather afraid that england may make a pretense of entering into negotiations and then try to put us in the wrong.

"i chose this line of argument because wilson fears above all things the humiliation of a refusal. if it does come to negotiations, even unsuccessful, wilson will have scored a great success. whether the negotiations will lead to a definite result i cannot judge from here. in any case, if it should come to negotiations, strong pressure will be exerted by the government over here in the direction of peace.

"the mexican question is still in a state of stagnation as a result of diplomatic negotiations. this affair interests practically no one any more and proved to have no influence on the election.

"if your excellency still desires wilson to intervene it is necessary, in view of the above, to get rid as soon as possible of the marina and arabia incidents without further controversy and not to allow any fresh controversies to arise. i think that, with the help of house, i can bury these two incidents without attracting much attention, as this is the wish of wilson himself. as house said, the president takes a tragic view of these incidents, because, after the sussex note, he could not possibly write another note, and therefore, there is nothing left but to break off diplomatic negotiations, should it be impossible to dispose of the matter privately and confidentially with me.

"next week gerard will be in washington for a day or two: he will lunch with me and dine with lansing. house page 307 keeps him in strict control. in case gerard's return to berlin is not desired, please send me instructions. otherwise he should be there again at the end of the year."

to this telegram, which announced very definitely the american mediation, i received from the foreign office the following reply:

cipher telegram no. 121

"berlin, 26th november, 1916.

"replacement, or at least further retention, of gerard in america desired in berlin, provided that it is possible without wounding his vanity and sensitiveness to our disadvantage, that it is certain that this hint from our side will not become known in america and that a suitable successor is available.

"we should prefer wilson's peace move to the step on our part mentioned in our telegram no. 116 of the 22nd november. for this reason it is eminently desirable that wilson should make up his mind for immediate action if possible at the opening of congress or immediately afterwards. if it is put off until the new year or later, the lull in military operations during the winter campaign would moderate the desire of public opinion for peace, and on the other hand would make preparations for the spring offensive necessary which would probably strengthen the military opposition of a peace movement. please place this point of view cautiously and without empressement before house as your personal opinion and keep me closely instructed by telegram as to the position.

"zimmermann."

page 308 to this telegram i sent the following replies:

cipher telegram no. 164

reply to telegram no. 121

"washington, 1st december, 1916.

"to-morrow i shall see house in new york and will try to arrange that gerard, who is to sail on 5th december, is kept back.

"lansing expressed himself very strongly to me on the subject of the american protest with regard to the belgian deportations. these have endangered the whole belgian relief movement; in addition, feeling here has been poisoned against us, and that just at a moment when it looked as though peace negotiations might be begun. lansing expressed the view that, if the imperial government could find a way of yielding to the protests of the neutrals, this would make a strong impression in our favor and that it would probably be possible immediately afterwards to propose the opening of peace negotiations. hitherto, unfortunately, something has always intervened.

"the federal reserve board's warning to the banks against unsecured promissory notes of foreign states is the first sign that the government here wishes to put pressure on our enemies."

cipher telegram

"washington, 4th december, 1916.

"pursuant to telegram no. 164 of the 1st inst.

"house told me in strict confidence question of mr. gerard's return has been thoroughly discussed by him with mr. wilson and mr. lansing. mr. gerard's unpopularity in berlin and his unfriendly manner were well known here. however, no satisfactory successor was page 309 available, and mr. gerard is at least straightforward and does exactly what he is told. he has received very detailed instructions here, and is even quite enthusiastic over the idea of assisting in bringing about peace. in addition, mr. gerard was so pleased at the appointment of the secretary of state that he is sure to adopt a more friendly attitude in future.

"as a matter of fact, mr. gerard has everywhere described the changes in the personnel at the foreign office as extraordinarily favorable for german-american relations, and laid particular stress on his personal friendship with the secretary of state.

"everything is prepared for a peace move, but with mr. wilson still hesitating, it is still doubtful when he will take action. all the authorities here have now been won over to favor such a step. this may then come at any time, especially if it is possible for us to adopt a conciliatory attitude on the belgian question. mr. wilson believes that he is so hated in england that he won't be listened to. this train of thought largely explains his eagerness in the belgian question. in any case, so much is certain, that house is continually urging mr. wilson to take action; moreover, peace propaganda here is steadily increasing, notwithstanding that it is for the moment very seriously hampered by the belgian question. if mr. wilson—as is to be expected—finds a strong feeling for peace in congress, he should at last make up his mind."

after a stay of about two months in america, mr. gerard, furnished with fresh instructions, left for berlin on the 5th december. when later the ambassador, at the much discussed adlon dinner, declared that the relations between the united states and germany had never been so good as at that moment since the beginning of the war, this speech was the keynote of his instructions. page 310 if on the other hand herr helfferich said that the exuberance of the ambassador astonished him, this is explained by the fact that berlin never believed in mr. wilson's intention to bring about peace. why such incredulity should persist notwithstanding that colonel house had twice travelled to berlin for this very purpose, and that the president's peace policy had been the burden of all my reports, i shall never be able to understand, while, on the other hand, i can quite understand that mr. wilson's passivity with regard to the english breaches of international law had engendered strong distrust of him in germany.

for the rest, mr. gerard seemed to be imperfectly informed about the situation in berlin. he was certainly right in his prediction of the unrestricted submarine campaign, but in this case the wish was father to the thought. it accorded with mr. gerard's anti-german feeling, to which he gave expression later in his gossipy literature and film production, that he should welcome the submarine campaign, and with it the rupture with the united states, as well as our defeat. but after all, the ambassador' proved at the adlon dinner that he could sing another tune.

when mr. gerard lunched with me in washington, i had just learned by cable from berlin that herr von jagow had resigned and had been replaced by herr zimmermann. on hearing this news, the ambassador said that now there would be no rupture between germany and the united states, for herr zimmermann was his personal friend and was opposed to war, while herr von jagow, as an aristocrat, did not love the americans, and looked down on bourgeois gerard. a grosser misreading of the actual situation in berlin can scarcely be conceived, as the unrestricted submarine campaign was only made possible by the resignation of herr von jagow, who was page 311 the chief opponent in berlin of the submarine campaign, and the pillar on which the idea of american intervention rested. as long as herr von jagow remained secretary of state, a breach with the united states was regarded as impossible. one of his last official acts was to write a private letter to me on the 20th november, 1916, concluding with the following sentence:

"as you have seen from your instructions, we are thoroughly in sympathy with the peace tendencies of president wilson. his activity in this direction is to be strongly encouraged. naturally his mediation tendencies must not extend to concrete proposals (because these would be unfavorable to us.)"

we now come to the moment in this account when the peace offer of the imperial government got involved with mr. wilson's plans for mediation. it is not my intention to go closely into the events that occurred in berlin or the considerations that took effect there, as i only know them through their reaction on the instructions sent to me. i will only mention briefly, that, according to the statement of herr von bethmann-hollweg before the commission of the national assembly, the peace offer of the imperial government was made with a view to influencing the pacifist minorities in the entente countries, and working, through the people, on the governments. beyond this there was no intention of cutting out mr. wilson's peace move, but the imperial government wanted to have "two irons in the fire." finally, all the utterances of the imperial government, which do not seem to tally with these two principles of their policy, are to be regarded as based on purely tactical motives. accordingly, the decisive turn in our policy did not occur until the 9th january, 1917, when the decision to resort page 312 to the unrestricted submarine war was taken. until then the policy followed was that of "two irons in the fire."

this is the way in which i read the situation in washington at the time. if i had been convinced that the resignation of herr von jagow and the german peace offer meant a definite departure from the policy which we had hitherto followed with regard to mr. wilson's peace step, i should have immediately sent in my resignation, as i was completely identified with this policy. however, i shall return to this side of the question later.

the following telegram from the foreign office gave me the official information of our peace offer:

cipher telegram no. 128

"berlin, 9th december, 1916.

"confidential, for your personal information.

"we have decided to make use of the favorable position created by the fall of bukarest in order, according to telegram number 116 of the 21st november, to make a peace offer in conjunction with our allies, probably on thursday, the 12th december. we do not at the present moment run any risk of damaging our prestige or showing signs of weakness. should the enemy reject the offer the odium of continuing the war will fall upon them. for reasons stated in telegram number 121 we could not wait any longer for president wilson to make up his mind to take action.

"the american embassy here will at the given moment receive a note in which the american government will be requested to communicate our peace offer to those of our enemies with whom they represent our interests. our other enemies will be informed through the medium of switzerland and spain respectively. american representative in conversation with chancellor on 5th page 313 december expressed himself, in confidence, on the president's mission, among other things, as follows: 'what the president now most earnestly desires is practical cooperation on the part of german authorities in bringing about a favorable opportunity for soon and affirmative action by the president looking to an early restoration of peace.' chancellor replied to american representative, he was 'extremely gratified to see from the president's message that in the given moment he could count upon the sincere and practical co-operation of the president in the restoration of peace, as much as the president could count upon the practical co-operation of german authorities.' we think we may assume that our action meets the wishes of the president.

"please interpret it in any case in this sense to the president and house.

"von stumm."

to this telegram i replied as follows:

cipher telegram

"washington, 13th december, 1916.

"in reply to telegram no. 128.

"have carried out instructions with house, who is at present staying at the white house. i have not yet received answer from wilson, but it is generally believed here that he will strongly support peace proposals.

"mr. gerard, in a speech at a farewell dinner given to him in new york, declared that germany had won, and could not be robbed of her victory. although not published, this speech attracted attention, especially as mr. gerard emphasized the fact that he had reported to mr. wilson in this sense."

before the commission of the national assembly i page 314 was asked whether i had made an attempt to stand in the way of our peace offer, lest it should interfere with mr. wilson's action. i took no such steps, because i thought that i was faced with a firm resolve of the imperial government, and because i did not think that our peace offer would substantially compromise mr. wilson's action.

it was also stated before the commission that i might have helped my policy to prevail in berlin if i had insisted on it more strongly. with regard to this, i must say at once, that i did not consider stronger influence on my side really called for, as my instructions had always categorically laid down that i was to encourage mr. wilson to take peace action. i had also been informed that the imperial government would prefer such action to a peace offer from our side, and that the correct moment for the latter would have to depend on the military situation. i was, therefore, until the arrival of the berlin telegram, number 128, not clear as to which of the actions would come first, especially as, according to my instructions, i was to keep our peace offer secret and could not discuss it with colonel house.

under ordinary circumstances, i should have travelled to berlin several times during the war to confer with the authorities. unfortunately, however, that was impossible, as the english would never have allowed me to travel to and fro. if i had had the ways and means to enlighten german public opinion on the situation in america, it would certainly have done a lot of good. according to the evidence given before the commission of the national assembly, the chief reason for our rejection of mediation was distrust of mr. wilson. nevertheless, i still believe that ignorance and undervaluation of america was a stronger influence. at least i cannot conceive that all the authorities concerned would have page 315 voted for unrestricted submarine war if they had been firmly convinced that the united states would come into the war with all her military and economic power. however that may be, i tried at least to do what i could and i made an attempt to send herr albert, who was completely in accord with me, to berlin on the submarine deutschland. the captain of the deutschland, however, had scruples against carrying passengers, and herr albert's voyage had therefore to be given up. after my experience of the journeys of herren meyer gerhardt and dernburg, i certainly do not think that herr albert would have done very much in berlin. even i could hardly have hindered the opening of the unrestricted submarine campaign where herr von jagow, herr von kühlmann and others had failed, and after all, that was the main point.

mr. wilson's intention of bringing about peace had been reported to me so definitely and so often that i took it for granted that the president would carry through his plan in spite of our peace offer. as i had received no instructions to the contrary, i held to my previous interpretation of the situation, and assumed that, although it was true that we had ourselves made a peace offer because wilson's action was so long in coming, we should nevertheless still be glad to avail ourselves of the president's help. in my opinion, this was the only interpretation that could be put on the foreign office telegram number 128, given above. the president himself, as colonel house told me, was very disappointed when he received the news of our peace offer. colonel house told me that he would naturally have liked to take the first step himself. apart from this, he had always warned us against mentioning peace, because this would be interpreted by the entente as weakness. he therefore regarded our peace offer as an obstacle to action on page 316 his part, as it was bound to diminish the enemy's readiness to enter into negotiations. on the other hand, the step of the imperial government exerted a favorable influence on american public opinion, and this influence would have been even more favorable if the offer had been made less in the tone of a victor. the attitude of american public opinion, and the fear lest peace negotiations might be opened without his co-operation, must have been the chief reasons that influenced mr. wilson publicly to support our peace offer. in connection with this i sent the following information to berlin:

cipher telegram

"washington, 16th december, 1916.

"lansing tells me the following statement, which i could not send by wireless to-day, comes from wilson personally.

"president wilson has decided that the notes of the central powers, proposing a discussion of peace to the entente allies, will be sent forward by the american government acting as intermediary without any accompanying offer of his own. he has not determined whether any action on behalf of peace will be taken later by the united states on its own account, but is holding himself in readiness to serve in any possible way towards bringing the warring nations together."

"from lansing's remarks i gather that he is convinced that our enemies will agree to a conference and that then the american government will have an opportunity to speak in favor of peace. as the press here is also in general of the opinion that our enemies cannot refuse a conference without turning public opinion against themselves, i have grounds for assuming that the american page 317 embassy in london, in spite of the official statement mentioned above, will assert this view."

as i expected, the president did not allow himself to be turned from his purpose, and on the 18th december dispatched the note which had long been ready, with certain alterations, to the belligerent powers. he certainly would not have taken this step if he had not reckoned on certain success. mr. wilson's note could not help but bear out our peace plans, and was therefore regarded throughout america as "pro-german." for this very reason it caused a sensation. on the new york exchange it was followed by a slump in war industry values. a few anti-german newspapers, which began to suspect that i was the only diplomatist in washington who knew anything of the president's intentions, declared that i had made millions by speculating on this probability. i had already been accused of every other imaginable crime by the jingo and entente press. mr. wilson's son-in-law, secretary of the treasury mcadoo, was also suspected of having abused his political information to speculate on the exchange. soon afterwards, when i was dining with the president, he asked me in jest what i had to say to the accusation of the american press that i had made millions in this way. i replied that i had gradually got used to such attacks, and they only amused me. mr. wilson replied: "that is right. my son-in-law takes the matter much too seriously. i tell him 'if you get so angry, people will think the story is true.'"

the american press was thrown into the greatest excitement by the president's note and stormed the state department. mr. lansing was surrounded by questioners and remarked that the united states had the greatest interest in bringing the war to an end, because otherwise she would be drawn in herself. as of late, as has already been mentioned, several doubtful submarine incidents page 318 had occurred, the press took this remark to mean that the united states would enter the war against us if the intervention move came to nothing. mr. wilson immediately, realized that such an interpretation of mr. lansing's words would seriously jeopardize his peace move. if the entente could hope for american participation in the war, there would be no prospect of their consenting to a "peace without victory." in that case the direction of their policy was defined beforehand. they only required to reject the offer of mediation to reach the goal of their long-cherished hopes. the president therefore at once requested mr. lansing to contradict the statements of the press. this was done, with the observation that there was no probability of the united states entering the war. the harm could not, however, be completely wiped out, as denials are always regarded with doubt.

the vital parts of mr. wilson's note read as follows:

"the president suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future, as would make it possible frankly to compare them. he is indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this. he would be happy himself to serve, or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment, in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. one way will be as acceptable to him as another if only the great object he has in mind be attained.

"in the measures taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and the government of the united page 319 states are as vitally and as directly interested as the governments now at war.

"the president does not feel that it is right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an inquiry be done civilization itself which can never be atoned for, or repaired.

"yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitely stated.

"the leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said stated those objects in general terms. but, stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. the world has been left to conjecture what definite results, what actual exchange of guaranties, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success even, would bring the war to an end.

"it may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable.

"the president is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. he is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may page 320 be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing. he believes that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects which he seeks will be understood by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new light into the affairs of the world."

as this note in its positive proposals was considered rather tentative and obscure—with the intention, of course, of making a direct negative answer impossible—i asked mr. lansing what procedure the president would like. with regard to this conversation i reported to berlin in the following telegram:

cipher telegram no. 188

"washington, 21st december, 1916.

"lansing informed me a few days ago of wilson's peace note, and said that the american government were becoming more and more involved in an intolerable position as a result of repeated infringements of their rights. therefore they hoped for frank statements from the belligerent powers on their peace conditions. i gave it as my personal opinion that this would be difficult except through a conference because of the press, etc. lansing replied that the statements could be confidential, and might gradually lead to a conference. this seems to bear out the view, widely held here, that wilson would like to act as a 'clearing house' for the further steps towards peace. he has american public opinion behind him with the exception of our inveterate enemies, who regard wilson's note as pro-german."

my conversation with mr. lansing, and the wording of the american note, made it perfectly clear that the president, in the first place, only wished to be informed of the peace conditions of both sides. this was just what the page 321 berlin government did not want, because it would have aroused a bitter struggle between the different shades of public opinion as to the "war aims." my telegram therefore received the following negative reply:

cipher telegram no. 142

"berlin, 26th december, 1916.

"in reply to telegram no. 188.

"i would reply to the american peace note that a direct interchange of ideas seems to us most likely to attain the desired result. we should, therefore, propose immediate conference of delegates of belligerent states in neutral place. we share president's view that work of preventing future wars could only begin after conclusion of present war.

"for your exclusive personal information: as place for possible conference of delegates only neutral europe can be considered. apart from the difficulty of getting to and from america, the portsmouth experiences teach that american indiscretion and interference make appropriate negotiations impossible. interference by president, even in form of 'clearing house,' would be detrimental to our interests and is, therefore, to be prevented. the basis for future conclusion of peace we must decide in direct conference with our enemies if we are not to run the risk of being robbed of our gains by neutral pressure. we, therefore, reject the idea of a conference. on the other hand, there is no objection, after conclusion of peace, to sending delegates to an international congress to confer on problem of safeguarding future world peace.

"zimmermann."

from this telegram it might be assumed that the imperial government wished to limit mr. wilson's activity page 322 to bringing the belligerent parties to the conference table. we might also very well have gone on working with the president if the unrestricted submarine campaign had not intervened. it was, however, understandable that the imperial government, on grounds of domestic politics, should not want to name our peace terms at once. accordingly the answer to the wilson note, which reached berlin with extraordinary promptness on the 26th december, amounted to a friendly negative.

the german note ran as follows:

"the imperial government have received and considered the president's magnanimous suggestion, that the foundation should be laid on which to build a lasting peace, in the friendly spirit which permeates the president's communication. the president points to the goal which is dear to his heart, and leaves the choice of the way open. to the imperial government a direct interchange of ideas would seem the most appropriate way of attaining the desired result. they, therefore, have the honor to suggest, in the sense of their statement of the 12th inst., in which they offered the hand to peace negotiations, an immediate conference of delegates of the belligerent states in a neutral place.

"the imperial government are also of the opinion that the great work of preventing future wars cannot be begun until after the conclusion of the present struggle of the nations. when this time has come they will gladly be ready to co-operate with the united states of america in this noble work."

the reasons of domestic politics which prevented the imperial government from naming our peace conditions were not understood in america. when secretary of page 323 state lansing discussed with me the german note of 26th december he said that he did not understand why we refused to name our conditions. if both the belligerent parties communicated their conditions a compromise would eventually be reached. to my objection that our demands were so moderate that they would be interpreted as weakness he replied that we ought to ask for more, indeed, ask for anything at all so long as we said something that would provide a starting-point from which negotiations could be opened and settled.

this conversation had no immediate practical results, as colonel house asked me on the same day to call on him in new york with regard to the result of our conversation i telegraphed to berlin as follows:

cipher telegram no. 192

"washington, 29th december, 1916.

"house told me it is wilson's opinion that a conference will not come about without previous confidential negotiations, for our enemies, as things are at present, would refuse the invitation or make their consent dependent on conditions. these words of colonel house were accompanied by an invitation to strictly confidential negotiations, of which only he and mr. wilson should know. under these circumstances complete discretion was assured, as wilson and house, unlike most americans, are both fairly clever at keeping secrets.

"i beg for early instructions as to whether i should reject such negotiations, or whether your excellency wishes to authorize me to accept and will furnish me with instructions accordingly. as i have always reported, wilson lays comparatively little importance on the territorial side of the peace conditions. i am still of the opinion that the chief emphasis should be laid on what are here called the guarantees for the future. if page 324 we could give wilson these as fully as possible he thinks he could bring about a conference, for with that the chief argument of our enemies would be disposed of. the latter maintain that we would like to make peace now in order to begin the war when a more favorable opportunity occurs, while our enemies are obliged to hold together the coalition that has been formed against us in order to attain a lasting peace. wilson's ideas about such guarantees are known to your excellency. they consist, in the first place, of disarmament by land and sea (freedom of the seas), provisions for arbitration and a peace league. i think, from your excellency's speech in the reichstag, that the imperial government would give such guarantees on condition that peace was restored.

"with house i adopted chiefly a listening attitude in order not to compromise your excellency in any way. however, i agree with colonel house's view that a peace conference cannot be brought about without the help of the united states. our enemies will try to put us in the wrong by saying that we did, indeed, propose a conference but would not breathe a word about our conditions or guarantees. i can, of course, only judge from the american standpoint. we have, by our peace offer, brought about a great change in public opinion over here. this advantage we shall lose entirely if the idea spread by our enemies that we have only made a deliberately theatrical peace gesture for the benefit of german public opinion is confirmed. what steps wilson will take should your excellency empower me to enter upon such negotiations is not yet certain and depends entirely on your excellency's instructions. house had an idea of travelling to england in person. the more detailed the information your excellency can give me as to our conditions and readiness to give guarantees the better from my point of view. however, i do not know whether your page 325 excellency may not perhaps prefer to let the negotiations break down rather than accept american help. in my opinion it is not necessary that the united states should take part in all the negotiations. all that is necessary would be for us to pledge ourselves to the guarantees, which would be settled in detail at a general conference, after a conference of the belligerents had concluded a preliminary peace.

"i submit to your excellency the above proposal because i am convinced that our enemies will not consent to negotiations unless strong pressure is brought to bear. this, however, will, in my opinion, occur if your excellency thinks it possible to accept american intervention. with the exception of the belgian question the american government ought to bring us more advantage than disadvantage, as the americans have only just come to realize what england's mastery of the seas means."

this telegram i consider the most important of the entire negotiations, inasmuch as it reached berlin on the 3rd january, therefore six days before the decision in favor of unrestricted submarine war. when i re-read my telegrams to-day, i still—even after the evidence given before the commission of the national assembly—have the same impression as at that time, that mr. wilson agreed with our wishes and regarded it as his principal task to bring about a conference of the belligerent parties. i cannot, therefore, understand how it was possible to regard this american offer as anything but an offer of peace mediation, and how the foreign office could declare to g. h. q. that there had never been any question of peace mediation by mr. wilson. on the other hand, i quite understand that bethmann-hollweg, as he stated before the commission of the national assembly, was very sceptical with regard to the president's policy. page 326 nevertheless, an offer of mediation was made which had to be accepted or refused. in the first case it was necessary to bring forward the submarine war as little as possible; in the other we should have to create a clear diplomatic situation in washington, if we were to avoid the reproach of having negotiated with wilson on the subject of peace while at the same time planning the submarine campaign, which was bound to bring about a rupture with the united states.

when i spoke with colonel house at that time i assumed that the principal aim of the german note of the 26th december was to lay particular emphasis on our old point of view, already known to mr. wilson, according to which the regulation of territory was to be dealt with by the belligerent powers, and the league of nations question in a world conference under the american presidency. at the time colonel house himself always spoke of two conferences which the president hoped to bring together at the hague. the one was to consist only of the belligerent powers and settle the territorial questions, the other was to be a world conference to found the league of nations. mr. wilson did not wish to invite the conference to washington because of the great distance from europe and the peculiar position of the american press.

as i have already mentioned, their opening of the "intensified submarine campaign" had been planned weeks before. this question had now become acute, and i received the two following foreign office telegrams on this subject:

cipher telegram no. 145

"berlin, 4th january, 1917.

"question of armed merchantmen in opinion of navy and g. h. q. cannot be further postponed.

page 327 "request you discuss with lansing following memorandum which is closely connected with american memorandum of 25th march and leave with him as aide-memoire. our action against armed merchantmen, which will follow the lines of the memorandum, does not, of course, imply any withdrawal of our assurance in the note of 4th may, 1916, as to sinking of merchantmen.

"zimmermann."

cipher telegram no. 148

"berlin, 5th january, 1917.

"pursuant to telegram no. 145 of 4th january.

"please telegraph to me immediately your excellency's personal opinion as to impression and consequent action with regard to telegram no. 145. this must, not, however, be discussed with lansing, as, for your own strictly personal information, action against armed ships will begin immediately.

"von stumm."

as the question of the "intensified submarine war," in consequence of the further course of events, became of no importance, there is no need for me to go into detail, and i will confine myself to giving my two answers as follows:

(1) coded wireless telegram

"washington, 9th january, 1917.

"telegrams nos. 145 and 148 received to-day.

"request most urgently to postpone further steps till you have received my answer."

page 328 (2) cipher telegram

"washington, 10th january, 1917.

"in reply to telegram 1488.

"memorandum lansing received. in my opinion steps in sense of this memorandum will cause collapse of wilson's peace mediation, and bring about instead a rupture with america, unless action is postponed at least until agreement is reached with american government. it may perhaps be possible to arrange that americans should be warned against serving on ships armed for attack. in any case, however, time must be allowed the government here to bring this about. as everything is decided by wilson, discussion with lansing is mere formality. he never gives an answer until he has received instructions from wilson. in present case latter must read memorandum first.

"how much importance your excellency attaches to wilson's peace mediation i cannot judge from here. apart from that it is my duty to state clearly that i consider rupture with the united states inevitable if immediate action be taken on the lines of the memorandum."

at the time of sending the telegram i received, in the following telegram, the reply of the foreign office to mr. wilson's last proposals, which had been communicated to me through colonel house:

cipher telegram no. 149

"berlin, 7th january, 1917.

"in reply to telegram no. 192 of 29th december.

"for your personal information.

"american intervention for definite peace negotiations is entirely undesirable to us owing to public opinion here. also at the present moment we must avoid anything that page 329 might deepen the impression among our enemies that our peace offer is in any way the result of our finding ourselves in a desperate position. that is not the case. we are convinced that economically and from a military point of view, we can bring the war to victorious conclusion. the question of stating our conditions, therefore, your excellency will handle dilatorily. on the other hand, i authorize you to state now our readiness to cooperate in that part of the programme in which the president is particularly interesting himself, and which seems to be identical with the so-called 'second convention' outlined by colonel house here. in this we include arbitration machinery, peace league, and examination of the question of disarmament and of the freedom of the seas. we are, therefore, in principle, prepared for those guarantees which could be settled in detail in a general conference after a conference of the belligerents has brought about a preliminary peace. to prove our bona fides in this direction, we are also ready in principle to open immediate negotiations with the united states.

"your excellency will be so good as to inform the president of this, and request him to work out the programme for the conference to secure world peace, and to communicate it to us as soon as possible.

"please also emphasize to colonel house and president wilson that our actual peace conditions are very moderate, and, in contrast to those of the entente, are kept within thoroughly reasonable limits; this is also particularly the case with regard to belgium, which we do not wish to annex. moreover, we desire regulation of commercial and traffic communications after the war without any idea of a boycott, a demand which we think will be understood at once by all sane people. on the other hand, the question of alsace and lorraine we cannot consent to discuss.

page 330 "i should like to know how your excellency thinks that pressure could be brought to bear by president wilson to incline the entente to peace negotiations. in the light of our experience during the two years of war, it seems to us that a prohibition of the export of war material and foodstuffs, which would be the step most likely to bring the entente into line and would also be the best for us, is unfortunately little likely to be realized. only an effective pressure in this direction could relieve us on our side of the urgent necessity of resorting again to unrestricted submarine warfare. should your excellency have proposals to make as to how the unrestricted submarine warfare can be conducted without causing a rupture with america, i request you to report, immediately by telegram.

"zimmermann."

i understood from this telegram that i was to continue the negotiations with colonel house. the refusal contained in this telegram was only concerned with a demand which had never been made by the united states. moreover, i have never personally had much faith in the appeal to public opinion which would have nothing to do with mr. wilson. if the imperial government had a few weeks before desired such intervention, they must have believed that german public opinion would agree to it. in my opinion, too, an agitation in favor of american intervention would have set in in germany quite on its own account if the german people had known that such action by president wilson offered good prospects of leading to a peace by understanding. later, when i returned from america to germany, i was struck by the small number of my countrymen who privately favored the submarine war. i therefore still think that german page 331 public opinion could easily have been persuaded to accept mr. wilson's mediation, if the terrorism of the supporters of submarine war had been dealt with in time. herr von bethmann-hollweg has spoken before the commission of the national assembly of the hypnotic effect exerted on german public opinion by the submarine war.

though the foreign office telegram of the 7th january mentions the ways in which president wilson could bring pressure to bear on the entente, it had already struck me at that time that the first step taken by the united states to force the conclusion of peace had not made the impression in germany that its importance warranted.

the various "war memories" that have now been published in germany do not touch on this point. as has already been mentioned, the "federal reserve board," which corresponds to our reichsbank, had issued a warning against the raising of loans for belligerent states. in this way the american source of funds was practically cut off. already foreign securities were in general unwillingly handled. if the loans had been completely forbidden, such results would not have transpired, as the american avails himself of bank credit to a far greater extent than is usual in other countries. it is well known that the government of the united states, after they had entered the war, themselves raised "liberty loans," and advanced money to their allies because this procedure accorded much more closely with american inclinations than the raising of foreign loans.

as is well known, after the german peace action had failed, the definite decision to declare unrestricted submarine war was taken in pless on the 9th january. in this way, as the chancellor said, the rubicon was crossed. war with the united states seemed inevitable, unless it were found possible at the eleventh hour to annul the page 332 decision of the german government. herr von bethmann-hollweg has declared before the commission of the national assembly that he had not sufficient faith in mr. wilson's peace intervention to advise the emperor to oppose the demand of g. h. q. for the declaration of unrestricted submarine war.

at the end of this chapter i give a report which i drew up on the attitude of american public opinion towards intervention.

i should like once more to emphasize that in judging and estimating american politics i have always given more weight to public opinion than to the views or intentions of any individual statesman.

"washington, 11th december, 1916.

"during the last phases of the presidential elections the american press used to be so much occupied with questions of domestic policy that there was little space left for the discussion of foreign events. in contrast with this, in this year's campaign the press politics on questions of foreign policy played a very important part, but the discussion was naturally so much under the influence of the aims and considerations of party politics that a report on the attitude of the press towards the european belligerents at that time could not have given a true picture. this was quite particularly the case with regard to germany. on one hand the republican organs, out of regard for the votes of the german-americans, found it necessary considerably to moderate their speech, while on the other the democratic press branded the republican candidate as a 'kaiserite,' owing to his german-american following, and at the same time threw more mud than ever over germany and everything german; until in the last weeks of the election campaign the dawning hope of bringing over great masses of bindestrichler page 333 into the democratic camp brought about a sudden moderation in the tone of this organ.

"only now, after the absurdities of the presidential election are over, is it again possible to arrive at an approximately clear judgment as to the attitude of the press towards germany and the other belligerent nations.

"this judgment may be briefly stated as follows:

"the american press in general takes sides less passionately with either party than was formerly the case, and is heartily tired of the war. this does not in any way imply that our enemies have not still the support of a number of very influential partisans, who are all the time fighting loyally for the 'cause of the allies,' let slip no opportunity to malign germany and, in the event of a threatened crisis, form an element of danger for us which should not be underestimated. it may even be admitted that the tone which the organs of this tendency, particularly strongly represented in new york, boston and philadelphia, adopt against germany has become, if possible, more bitter during the last few months. but it is questionable whether the great mass of the influential papers, particularly in the remoter districts of the atlantic coast, have become more impartial. they don't like us and don't trust us, but have also gradually got to know but not to esteem england.

"the present attitude of america towards the cause of the entente powers, with which that of the greater part of the independent press coincide, was defined as follows by the new york tribune, one of the most inveterate champions of our enemies at the present time: 'despite a very widespread sympathy for france and a well-defined affection for great britain in a limited circle of americans, there has been no acceptance of the allied page 334 points of view as to the war, and there is not now the smallest chance that this will be the case.... the thing that the british have failed to get before the american people is the belief that the war was one in which the question of humanity and of civilization was uppermost for the british. the germans have succeeded in making americans in very great numbers believe that it is purely and simply a war of trade and commerce between the british and the germans, and the various economic conference proposals have served to emphasize this idea.'

"the violation of greece, the ruthless procedure against ireland since the easter rebellion—on which a well-directed press service of american-irish, in spite of the strict english censorship, keeps public opinion constantly informed—the selfish sacrifice of serbia, montenegro and rumania, as well as the illegal economic measures against holland and scandinavia, have seriously shaken england's reputation here as the protectress of the small nations.

"certain remarks of the english press of altogether too free a nature on the american government, their disparaging cartoons of the president and the patronizing air adopted by many english war journals and often in the english daily press towards america—as, for example, in a recent number of the morning post, alleged former german hankerings for colonies in south america, from the realization of which the union is said to have been protected by england—are arousing increasing dissatisfaction here. the persistent and systematic attempts of the british press bureau to sow dissension between america and germany on the question of the submarine war are resented. the sharp british replies to american representations on the question of the 'black list' and the 'post-blockade,' and, england's latest pin-prick, the refusal of the request for a free passage for page 335 the austrian ambassador, condemned even by such a pro-british paper as the philadelphian public ledger as a 'british affront,' have created a very bad impression. 'it is unmistakable,' says the pro-entente evening sun, 'that american opinion has been irritated and sympathy estranged by many acts which have damaged our interests and wounded our national self-respect.'

"above all, however, the serious shortcomings of the enemy general staffs, which are criticised here with unprofessional exaggeration, and their ineffectiveness—'a lamentable succession of false moves,' as they are called by the respected springfield republican—have produced a general disillusionment as to the efficiency of our enemies, which has damped even the old enthusiasm over the heroic bearing of the french army and its commander-in-chief, who is very popular over here. 'we give thanks for joffre,' was the heading of a typical leading article in the new york sun on thanksgiving day. the recent warning of the american banks by the federal board against accepting through the post large quantities of unsecured foreign treasury notes—a warning which could only refer to the issue by the morgan bank of english and french short-dated securities—has also shattered the belief in the inexhaustible economic resources of france and england. with a quite exceptional expenditure of effort the newspapers under british or french influence, of which the most important are the new york times, new york herald and evening telegram; the philadelphian public ledger, the chicago herald, and the providence journal, in addition to a number of other sworn partisans of the entente powers, among which may be mentioned particularly the new york tribune, new york sun and evening sun; new york evening post, journal of commerce, new york globe; brooklyn daily eagle, boston evening transcript and philadelphian page 336 inquirer, have lately been trying to raise our enemies in the esteem of public opinion here. this is shown particularly in the headlines and the arrangement of the war news in these papers. all news that is detrimental to the german cause, even when it comes from an unreliable source, is printed in heavy type in the most striking position. every gain of ground by the allies, however, slight, is hailed as a great victory, and even the communications of private agencies which are in contradiction to the official reports of the enemy, and obviously inventions, appear as accomplished facts in the headlines of the papers. their leading articles pour out hatred and malice against germany. their letter boxes are filled with contributions which are full of venom and gall against germany and her allies, and their feuilletons or sunday supplements contain about the strongest attacks that have ever been brought against us even in the american press. but it looks as though their tactics no longer have the same success as of old. their utterances, apart from such as deal with the belgian or lusitania themes, no longer make any impression.

"on the other side the consistently friendly attitude of the ten papers of the hearst syndicate, which come daily into the hands of more than three million readers in all parts of the country, has of late become even much more friendly as a result of the english boycott of the international news service and the exclusion of all the hearst publications from circulation in canada. mr. hearst has replied to the inconceivably shortsighted policy of the british authorities towards his news service in a series of forcible, full-page leading articles against the british censorship which must have seriously shaken the confidence, apart from this already weakened long ago, of the american press in all news coming from england. not only did the articles in question contain a page 337 crushing criticism of the english system of suppressing and distorting the truth, but they also proved that for years america had been misled systematically from london in its judgment of foreign nations—e.g., the 'degenerate' french. apart from this the hearst newspapers repeatedly explained in detail how in the autumn of 1916 the position of the central powers was excellent, while that of england and her allies was completely hopeless. it should be emphasized that the hearst newspapers are, nevertheless, not to be regarded as blindly pro-german, for they publish a good deal that can hardly be desirable for us—e.g., occasional articles on the 'german peril,' for which new food was provided by the exploits of the deutschland, and more especially u53, and was exploited here to support the idea of increasing the army and navy. the papers named are based on a sound american policy, but with their sharp, anti-english tendency do us much more good than papers with admitted pro-german bias. the chief value of the pro-german attitude of the organs of the hearst syndicate lies in the fact that their influence is not limited to any particular town or district, but extends over the whole union. an english critic, s. k. ratcliffe, recently wrote about american newspapers in the manchester guardian.... 'northern papers are of no account in the south; the most influential new york journals do not exist for the people of the pacific coast, and carry little weight in the middle states. hence, summaries of opinion—confined to a small number of papers published east of the mississippi—are imperfectly representative of the republic.' this accurately observed geographical limitation of the influence of the leading american newspapers is substantially overcome by the hearst organization, for the leading articles which appear in the new york american to-day will appear to-morrow in the allied papers of boston, chicago page 338 and atlanta, and the day after in san francisco and los angeles.

"another factor that has improved the attitude of the american press towards germany is the recent important development of the wireless news service. by this i do not mean so much the extension of the trans-atlantic service in the communications of which a considerable part of the press here seems unfortunately to take little interest, but the radiographic transmission of the full reports of american correspondents in berlin and on the german fronts to the american newspapers or news agencies. among the interesting reports that have been received direct and unmutilated in this way those of messrs. william b. hale, karl von wiegand, cyril brown and karl w. ackerman have exerted a particularly favorable influence for us, especially at the critical moments of the break-through in southern galicia and the battles of the somme, when, without the special news service via nauen, the american press would have been completely misled by the mass of reports that were flowing in from london. among american journalists who worked in germany, herbert swope should be particularly mentioned, who, after his return, published in the world and other pulitzer papers, a series of fourteen articles on the situation and feeling in germany which attracted the attention of both the press and the reading public. in a most undesirable way mr. swope in his first articles which appeared immediately before the election—it was simply an electioneering man?uvre—emphasized the deep hatred of the german people for the united states and the alleged general wish of all german circles to see mr. wilson defeated at the election as a punishment for his unneutral attitude. to compensate for this he performed a very valuable service for us in his later articles by giving a convincing account of the economic page 339 situation in germany at that time, which removed all doubt over here as to the ability of our enemies to starve germany out, and revived public respect for germany's efficiency and organizing-power.

"the great and respectful tribute which the american press pays to german 'efficiency' at every opportunity—and during the last few months there have been many such opportunities—can, however, do little or nothing to alter the deep 'sentiment' against germany. as soon as the above-mentioned themes of belgium and the lusitania are mentioned, there are few papers that do not indulge, either in aggressive or more moderate terms, in expressions of horror at german 'frightfulness' and 'ruthlessness.'

"this deep-rooted feeling of the whole press has been once more revived in very regrettable fashion by the recent belgian deportations. the indignation of the press at this 'slavery' which is being imposed on belgium is general, deep-rooted and genuine. even newspapers which express themselves in pretty harsh terms on the subject of the english illegalities condemn these deportations in no measured terms. the interview given by governor-general von bissing to the journalist cyril brown on the subject of these deportations, published on the front page of the new york times, has unfortunately not made the slightest impression here. general von bissing's second statement on the same subject in which, among other things, he emphatically declared it his duty to see that as few germans as possible should be kept out of the firing line to guard belgium, was grist for the mill of the enemy press. 'the cat is out of the bag,' writes the new york times, which does not miss the opportunity of reminding its readers of general von bissing's responsibility for the shooting of edith cavell. 'not a word about economic necessity, germany needs page 340 men at the front. simple, almost crude in fact, and completely german.' the philadelphian public ledger says: 'the original offence, the invasion of belgian territory, regardless of treaty obligations, has almost been obliterated by the cruelty which is now depopulating the land, stripping it of all its resources, sending its people into exile and slavery, making a wilderness and calling it order. there has not been such a tragedy since the fierce barbarian tribes swept over europe; none would have believed two years ago that it could be enacted.' such expressions as 'huns,' 'attila,' 'hohenzollern slave trade,' and others of a similar nature are the order of the day, and the excitement is further fanned by reports from london and le havre, which no one here can verify, and provocative interviews, among which special mention must be made of that of herr carton de wiart with the world correspondent. the news that mr. lansing had forwarded to berlin a protest against the belgian deportations was received with great applause by the whole of the press. the resulting official statement that this protest had been made not in the name of the united states but in the name of the kingdom of belgium, represented by the american government, caused dissatisfaction and a demand that the united states government should also protest to berlin on its own account. resolutions of protest were sent to the president and published in the press, and indignation meetings on a large scale are announced to take place in boston and new york which will offer the press further opportunities for anti-german demonstrations.

"with regard to the question of submarine warfare the american press are quite unanimous on one point, that a withdrawal of the assurances given by germany after the sussex incident, or even an intentional breach of these, is bound to bring about, as it were, automatically, page 341 a breaking-off of diplomatic relations with germany; and it is also clear that such a rupture would only be the first step towards open war. the great majority of the leading american newspapers express at every opportunity the genuine hope that such a contingency will not arise. only the chauvinistic, anti-german element in the press holds that the casus ruptionis has actually arisen and devotes itself to publishing and commenting on, in the most sensational manner, the alleged crimes of the german submarines. the newspapers of this order are abundantly supplied with pertinent material, particularly news of alleged sinkings without warnings, of which they on their side—probably with the co-operation of the british authorities here—know how to increase the effect by means of exaggerated reports of out-of-date 'sacrifices to german frightfulness,' which are eagerly swallowed here. in spite of the masterly skill with which this working on public feeling against the handling of our submarine war is managed, it may be taken for granted that it does not get a hold. however deep and however genuine may be the horror with which the american people regard such incidents as the sinking of the lusitania—a fact that must be continually emphasized—equally great is obviously their indifference towards the destruction of non-american neutral shipping, so long as the rules of cruiser warfare continue to be observed. people over here have gradually got accustomed to reading daily reports of the sinking of another half dozen british or other vessels. the daily papers print them quite as a matter of course, and only in a prominent position when the bag reaches an unusually high figure. in the editorial columns of many papers a certain malicious joy is even observable, that england, who boasts of having mastered the submarine, should now be so mercilessly and persistently bled.

page 342 "one phase of the submarine war has, indeed, thrown nearly the whole of the american press into a state of excitement, namely, the piratic exploits of u53 off the coast of new england. the destruction wrought by this boat so close at hand, and the consequent paralysis for several days of all merchant shipping, was too much even for the moderate papers, and resulted in strong outbursts against our 'ruthlessness.' apparently this circumstance has recently been exploited by our enemies as a new way of influencing public opinion against us. mysterious british battleships off the atlantic coast are supposed to send out wireless warnings against the alleged approach of german submarines, and these are published in the american press partly under panic headlines, and arouse indignation. this shady procedure, in which the pro-english press naturally takes the lead, recently aroused mr. lansing to make a forceful speech against the unknown originators of these rumors. it may be particularly emphasized, speaking quite generally, that the great influence exerted by the state department on the washington correspondents of the leading newspapers during the last few months, during which there has been a constant threat of the submarine question coming to a head, has always been on the side of peace, with the result that in more than one case, and particularly in the cases of the sinking of the marina and arabia, any serious agitation on the part of the press has been avoided. with regard to the general war situation, the conviction has for some time been gaining ground with the great majority of the leading american newspapers, that a decisive victory by either of the two belligerent groups of powers is no longer to be expected. with the exception of a continually dwindling minority which even to-day still promise their readers the 'ultimate victory' of the entente powers, the verdict of the page 343 american press on the probable result of the war is 'a draw,' 'a stalemate.' only a few newspapers, to which belong those of the hearst syndicate, confess to the belief in 'a stalemate, or a victory of the teutonic allies.' how those newspapers which are at the service of our enemies, and which still hold to the legend of a miscarried german war of aggression, really judge the situation is only seen occasionally from incidental statements like the following confession of the new york tribune, which preaches against a peace on the basis of the present position; this paper says that the american people should see that if the allies were to conclude peace now the result would be a tremendous victory for germany. such isolated, misleading views as this do not, however, succeed in affecting in any way the general impression that by far the greater part of the leading newspapers regard the war as indecisive, especially after the fruitless conclusion of our operations before verdun, the collapse of the great offensives on the somme and in southern galicia, as well as in view of the fact, confirmed on many sides, that the british blockade has not attained its end, the starvation of germany.

"our recent feats of arms in rumania have hardly affected this opinion. in view of the great hopes, placed by our enemies and the newspapers in their service, on rumania's entry into the war, these successes are recognized on all sides readily or grudgingly and without any spark of sympathy for the defeated country, and in some cases are even hailed as brilliant military achievements of the first rank. the preponderating opinion of the press, however, passes over the fact that the conquest of rumania, although opening up to germany important new resources, is scarcely likely to influence to any considerable degree the situation which has resulted from the war page 344 of positions in east and west, and the still unbroken british mastery of the seas.

"the view that the war has reached a stalemate which, since president wilson's speech at charlotte in may of this year, had been maintained by several papers, but which has recently become general, apart from the definitely pro-ally organs, is closely connected with the discussion of the question of peace restoration which for the american press is in many cases synonymous with the question of intervention by the united states or all the neutral nations.

"there was a time when a very important part of the american press seemed to stand on the level of the catch-phrase which was going the round at that time: 'wall street now fears nothing except the outbreak of peace.' these times, however, are long since past. the desire for a speedy end of the hostilities in europe is to-day genuine, and shared by almost the whole press. from the enemy camp we get the following testimony in the new york tribune, which would like to convert its readers to less humane views: 'for millions of americans this war is a tragedy, a crime, the offspring of collective madness,' and in its view the greatest service that america can render to the world—an allusion to the catch-phrase coined by henry ford for his ill-starred peace mission is—'to fetch the lads out of the trenches.' the discussion of the premises for the conclusion of peace, therefore, has for some time occupied an important place in the daily papers, and also to some extent in the reviews. reports on the meetings of the many american peace societies are given with the greatest fulness, and anything in the overseas news connected with the question of a restoration of peace is printed in a prominent position and duly discussed in the leading articles.

"it would lead me too far to give even an approximately page 345 complete picture of this discussion with which the whole press is occupied. but one point demands closer examination: the attitude of the leading papers to the german readiness for peace, publicly expressed by your excellency on three different occasions in the last few weeks.

"your excellency's great speech before the budget committee of the reichstag unfortunately reached here at a time when the whole interest of the press and public was directed to the at first uncertain result of the presidential election. though generally printed, in the evening papers for the most part only in extracts, it was practically passed over in the editorial columns. an attempt to start a belated press discussion of the speech by circulating it in the form of specially printed brochures, or at least to induce those papers which had only given extracts to publish the whole text, unfortunately failed; only the current history, a special war magazine of the new york times, felt itself called upon to reprint the speech in extenso in its december number. on the other hand, the passage of the speech which stated our readiness after this war to take a part in international organizations for insuring peace was widely circulated here, and attracted corresponding attention. as i, according to instructions, communicated this passage to the 'league to enforce peace' as the official german message for their banquet held here on the 24th inst., it was circulated throughout the country in the detailed press reports on this association, which is greatly respected here, and commented on by many newspapers with all the more sympathy since germany's sceptical reserve hitherto towards the question of a peaceful settlement of international differences has always worked strongly against us here.

"the interview granted by your excellency to the page 346 american journalist hale has been printed particularly fully by the ten hearst newspapers, and further by all the other subscribers to the international news service. in the new york american on thanksgiving day it occupied, together with a portrait of your excellency, the whole front page. at special request from many quarters the paper repeated the report three days later.

"germany's readiness to enter into peace negotiations, expressed once more by your excellency at this interview, as well as your excellency's statement in the reichstag on the 29th inst., that germany is ready for any peace that will guarantee her existence and future, have during the last few days been fairly thoroughly discussed in the new york papers, which particularly dwell on the words 'a peace guaranteeing our existence and future,' and agree unanimously as to the urgent desirability of a further and more exact formulation of the german peace conditions.

"the new york times says: 'all depends on what guarantees of the existence and the future of germany are expected.' the paper goes on to ask how germany could imagine her future assured from a territorial point of view, but points out in conclusion that these are only external details, and concludes, returning to its favorite theme, as follows: 'deeper than all, fundamental in any discussion of peace, is the question of the german political ideals, of german machtpolitik and weltpolitik, of prussian militarism.' ... 'the fear, the practical certainty, that von bethmann-hollweg's guarantees would be not merely guarantees of the existence and future of germany, but of new and not distant wars with her, stands in the way of any serious discussion of his remarks.'

"the evening sun remarks sarcastically that obviously no such guarantees as deutschland über alles should be page 347 given to any country. its verdict, too, is that: 'the peace that germany craves still is a peace that will enable her to begin the next war in five or ten years, with a certainty of immediate victory and complete conquest of the overlordship of europe, if not america.' the brooklyn daily eagle writes: 'if an inconclusive peace, a peace based upon the theory that the war is a draw, a peace fertile in the liabilities to future trouble, is not in the mind of the german chancellor, what is in his mind? he should speak out. he will never have a better opportunity to be specific. the whole neutral world is listening, ready to give careful and intelligent consideration to his words.'

"more important than these and other utterances of the papers which follow in our enemies' wake is the trenchant leading article of the world, which on foreign questions generally expresses the point of view of the administration. this paper says: 'if germany is ready to end the war, the first thing for the imperial government to do is to make definite proposals for peace. those proposals need not be made officially to the allies, to the united states, or any other intermediary. they could be made to the world at large. the chancellor could describe to the reichstag the conditions under which germany would regard her existence and future assured.' 'germany began the war. it is proper that germany should take the first steps towards ending the war, but something more than vague generalizations is necessary. at present there is nothing to talk about. there are no terms, not even extravagant and ridiculous terms, that can be discussed as a possible basis of settlement. thus far there has been no evidence of good faith in the repeated german professions of a desire for peace. in consequence nobody takes them seriously until there is at least a tentative proposal of terms. when that is made, the responsible ministers of other belligerent governments page 348 will be forced to meet the issue. public opinion in great britain and france, no less than in germany and austria-hungary, will have a chance to make itself heard. when peace comes it cannot be merely the peace of diplomats and of governments. it must be a peace in which popular sentiment has the final word, and popular sentiment has no means of expression until there is something tangible to discuss.'

"the general impression left by the utterances of the american press on the subject of peace is that on the one hand—apart from a small number of influential papers—it is anxious for peace, from which anxiety it is obvious that it intends to pass over the extravagant war aims so often heard from the entente statesmen; but that on the other hand it cannot as yet find any practicable way of bringing about an early conclusion of peace, and also that it cannot see any advance in this direction in the last statements of your excellency, which only a few papers have discussed to any extent.

"the change in the direction of the foreign office has been discussed at comparative length in the leading articles of the important newspapers, which, as a rule, deal with european ministerial changes only in their news columns—less with regard to the personality of the retiring minister, who was not very well known here, than that of the new secretary of state. the only paper which devoted a few friendly words to herr von jagow was the new york times, which described him, in connection with his conferences with baron beyens and sir edward goschen at the outbreak of war, as a 'gentleman in war and peace,' and also recognized his sympathetic attitude during the negotiations on the submarine war controversy. herr zimmermann's appointment as secretary of state, on the other hand, was greeted by many papers, and indeed by the press in general—only a few papers page 349 were made somewhat uneasy by the news received lately by telegram, of his attitude towards the question of armed merchantmen—with great applause. the tone of these comments must have been set by the flattering and sympathetic utterances of ambassador gerard and the journalist swope, on the subject of the new secretary of state, and a longer article by gilbert hirsch published by the new york evening post and other papers under the heading 'our friend zimmermann.' the note struck by this article and by the german press comments transmitted and printed everywhere over here, that herr zimmermann is a particularly warm friend of the united states was joyfully echoed by the whole american press. also the fact was everywhere emphasized that in herr zimmermann the important post of chief of the foreign office hitherto reserved for 'prussian junkerdom,' had been given to a member not of the diplomatic, but of the humbler consular service, and indeed, to a bourgeois. here and there speculation was indulged in as to whether this appointment might not be interpreted as the first step towards a 'liberal régime,' in which a not unimportant section of the american press still sees the future salvation of germany and of the world.

"the announcement of autonomy for poland is, to say the least of it, received with scepticism by the american press which is comparatively well informed on the polish question. the words of the virtuoso paderewski, who is working here in the interests of the polish sufferers through the war: 'this means only more suffering for my people; it means that another army will be raised, and that there will be more killing and more devastating,' were reproduced by many newspapers and regarded as an authoritative statement of what might be expected from the german-austrian proclamations. many papers declared it to be simply a move to raise more recruits. page 350 others sarcastically pointed out that the proclamation left the most vital questions, such as the boundaries of the new state and its form of government, to be settled later. only a few of the leading newspapers, among them the new york evening post and the philadelphia north american, allowed the allied governments a certain modicum of recognition, for, as they pointed out, in no case could the heavy hand of russia, which had so long oppressed the country, be forgotten. the polish press here was at first very reserved. their point of view is represented by the following leading article of the weekly paper free poland, founded since the war and published by the polish national council of america: 'what the poles desire is an independent poland. the powers have acknowledged poland's right to live, but either with a limitation of independence or diminution of territory. the russians would fain lop off eastern galicia. and now the germans grant poland an autonomy, but without posen, west prussia, or silesia, in return demanding a polish army to take up their cause against russia. though this move on the part of germany will at least draw the world's attention to the inalienable rights of poland as a nation, and make of the polish question an international one, yet it must not be forgotten that the poles in europe will vehemently protest against any curtailment of their national aims and aspirations.

"the impression, on the whole unfavorable, made by the polish measures on the american press was gradually in part balanced by the announcement that the polish jews had been recognized as an independent religious community. since it was thought in many quarters that this might be taken to be the first step towards cultural and political emancipation of the eastern jews, it was discussed with great interest, in view of the strong influence page 351 exerted by the american jewish community on an important section of the american press, particularly that of new york.

"finally, there remains to be examined the attitude of the press towards one question, in itself of a purely domestic, economic interest, but which promises to become of the most wide-reaching importance for foreign politics, namely, that of an embargo on corn. the price of most articles of food has risen to such an abnormal height during the last few months that the new york sun can say without too great exaggeration, that if the war had lasted two more years the cost of living in berlin and vienna would have risen to the level of that of new york. in particular the serious position of the wheat market and the fairly certain prospect of an acute rise in the price of wheat in the course of the winter or next spring prompt the press to constant discussion, the burden of which is the question whether the government of the united states should or should not prohibit the exportation of corn. the opponents of such a measure, among which are the world, new york times, new york evening post, journal of commerce, the boston evening transcript, the philadelphia public ledger, the saint louis globe-democrat, the pittsburg post, the saint paul pioneer press, the indianapolis news and many others, maintain that the supporters of the embargo, whose main object is to injure the allies, represent the situation as much more threatening than it is in reality. the world tries to console its readers by explaining that the high price of food represents the american people's contribution to the cost of the greatest war of destruction in the history of the world; while the new york times points out the danger of estranging the allies through an embargo. the newspapers which are friendly to germany, particularly the hearst newspapers, and the milwaukee page 352 free press, energetically urge an embargo on all articles of food, by which, as they more or less openly allow it to appear, england would be forced to make peace. but in addition a number of the most bitter opponents of germany, for example the philadelphia inquirer, favor an early embargo for purely material reasons. it is to be expected that this question will be one of the first to come up at the opening of the approaching session of congress, when the press polemics of the opponents of the embargo, with the arrière pensée of protecting england's interests and those of her allies, should reach their climax."