the rupture of diplomatic relations

before i received official notice of the opening of the unrestricted u-boat campaign, i had a further interview with mr. house, concerning the peace activities of the president, and the telegram describing it which i sent to the foreign office, berlin, is reproduced below:

cipher telegram no. 212

"(answer to telegram no. 149 of the 7th january.)

"washington, january 16th, 1917.

"your excellency's authority in regard to mr. house duly availed of. he told me wilson considered this pronouncement of imperial government supremely valuable. as regards further developments of wilson's efforts for peace, i can say nothing definite. this much only is certain, that at present moment president has no other thought than that of bringing about peace, and will endeavor to achieve this end with the utmost energy and all means in his power. a further pronouncement of wilson's is expected almost immediately; it will probably take form of a communication to congress. apparently it will consist of an appeal to the american people to help him to enforce peace; in any case both he and house praise the hearst press article, which is written from that point of view. whether means adopted will be to place an embargo on all exports is difficult to say. page 354 maybe the threat of an embargo will be enough to force our enemies to a conference.

"from the above it is clear that we cannot afford to have any difficulties over the old u-boat question. as regards the question of armed merchant vessels, i hope to arrive at a modus vivendi. but we must be careful not to act hastily and carelessly, so as not to create conflict before president has taken further steps. remarkable as this may sound to german ears, wilson is regarded here very generally as pro-german. his note was traced to our influence, and gerard's speech strengthened this impression. this speech is in accordance with instructions which mr. gerard is receiving. our present enemies have gone literally raving mad, and leave no stone unturned in order to put obstacles in wilson's way. this explains the attacks against the president, as also the scurrilous attempt engineered by the republicans to charge the administration with stock exchange speculations. without any justification, of course, my name also was mentioned in this regard. the german embassy, as is well known, is held responsible for everything by our enemies in this country."

at the same time as the above telegram, i wrote the following report describing the prevailing political attitude in washington:

cipher report

"washington, 14th january, 1917.

"ever since the presidential election the political situation here has not changed. apart from the question of ending the world-war, the public mind has not been constantly or earnestly concerned with any matter.

"congress has dealt with the customary budget proposals, page 355 and the fruitless negotiations about the mexican question drag slowly on.

"meanwhile, the attitude towards ourselves, which after the sussex incident took a decided turn for the good, has slowly improved. this change in the public temper can be observed on all sides. it is true that it is only very slightly noticeable, if at all, in the press, and our most rabid opponents are driven, owing to the general improvement in german-americans' relations, to ever more violent attacks against us. since president wilson dispatched his peace note, our enemies' fury knows no bounds. without exaggeration, it can be said that this note voices the spirit of almost the whole american people.

"only wall street and the anti-german ring, as also their friends in the press, are dissatisfied and are endeavoring to put obstacles in the president's way. in these circles, which are always under english influence, the belief has taken root, that mr. wilson has fallen under german spell. the well-known anti-german republican, senator lodge, boldly expressed this view in the senate; but he could not prevent the senate from voting in favor of mr. wilson's peace note, by a huge majority.

"the public mind is engaged principally with the question why precisely the president dispatched his note immediately after the german offer of peace. it is well-known that this note had been prepared for some time, and would have been sent off at christmas, quite irrespective of our own proposals, although, in view of mr. wilson's inclination to temporize, and to treat all questions somewhat dilatorily, this is by no means certain. i believe that the president's principal motive was his pressing desire to play the r?le of mediator—a prospect which seemed to be imperilled if our enemies agreed to page 356 deal directly with us. this may possibly explain why that particular moment was chosen, for which our enemies regard mr. wilson so unfavorably. a cartoon published by that most anti-german paper, the new york herald, depicts mr. wilson's dove of peace as a parrot, faithfully babbling out the german proposals.

"apart from the choice of this particular moment for its expression, the president's desire to bring about peace is in any case very comprehensible, seeing that he was re-elected principally on the basis of this programme. furthermore, the americans are genuinely alarmed by the extension of japanese power in the far east, and finally, since our rumanian victories, mr. wilson has ultimately come to the conclusion that our enemies are no longer able to defeat us. one is constantly hearing the opinion expressed, both by members of the cabinet and other friends of the president, who enjoy his confidence, that neither of the belligerent parties will now be able to achieve a decisive victory, and that further bloodshed is therefore useless.

"as already stated above, the anti-german party is doing its utmost to put every possible obstacle in mr. wilson's way, while the press does not cease from repeating that the peace note is to be regarded as a menace against germany. it is thus hoped to stiffen our enemies' backs, by dazzling them with the expectation of america's entry into the war; much, too, is made of the argument—and this was particularly so in the senate—that mr. wilson's intervention was imperilling the traditional policy of the united states, which rests primarily upon the monroe doctrine, and upon the principle of non-interference with european affairs. finally, a scurrilous attempt has been made by the republican party to attack wilson in the flank, by getting a notorious stock exchange speculator publicly to proclaim that members page 357 of the administration, who knew beforehand of wilson's action, had taken advantage to speculate heavily upon it. as this man could, however, produce no proofs, he simply made himself ridiculous.

"i have already frequently called attention in my report to the fact that the prolonged war hysteria over here has created an atmosphere of gossip and tittle-tattle, which at other times would have been regarded as impossible. for instance, even quite responsible people believe that i have obtained for cash certain compromising letters of wilson's in order to be able to get a hold over him by this means. senator lodge, in his own house, privately expressed the view that this was a credible rumor, and then turned it to account in the senate. the president is so terribly put out by this and other similar machinations on the part of the republicans, who refuse to grant him the fame of the peace-maker, that he recently kept away from a public festival, because mr. lodge was to be the principal speaker there.

"owing to the incredible rumors which are bandied from mouth to mouth here, i regarded it as necessary to bring an action against one notorious swindler and blackmailer. i wanted to convince public opinion that the embassy had nothing to fear. i intend doing the same thing in the case of all future attempts at blackmail, once we have got a clean slate in regard to all compromising questions. our enemies will, however, persist in leaving no stone unturned in order to cast a slur upon the embassy, for their principal object is to succeed in bringing about my recall, or the rupture of diplomatic relations with germany. once they have accomplished this, they are convinced that it will be an easy matter to draw the united states into the war.

"as is well known, president wilson received a reply from the entente, in response to his peace move, which page 358 contained conditions utterly unacceptable to us. messrs. wilson and house regarded these conditions as 'bluff,' and were as convinced, as they had previously been, that the entente would accede to a peace by arrangement. people frequently alluded in those days to the fact that in the last anglo-american war of 1812-1814, the english, very shortly before the peace settlement, had proposed unacceptable peace terms which they suddenly allowed to drop later. i also believed, and believe still, that the entente were perfectly well acquainted with the political situation in germany, and wished by proposing such conditions to strike panic amongst us and compel us to declare an unrestricted u-boat war. the entente never diverged from its one object, which was to draw the united states into the war, and thus to bring about a decision. moreover, the negative reply sent to our government by the entente had sufficed to achieve this object; for the final resolution to declare an unrestricted u-boat war was formed before the peace conditions framed by the entente became known in berlin."

on the 19th of january i received official notice that the unrestricted u-boat campaign would begin on february 1st, and i was to give the american government notice accordingly on the evening of the 31st january. after all that had happened, i could but regard this intimation as a declaration of war against the united states, and one which, in addition, put us in the wrong; because it put an end to the peace overtures made by mr. wilson, which had been started with our approval. i did my utmost to try to get the berlin resolution cancelled, or at least to obtain a postponement of the date on which it was to come into force, and with this end in view i sent the following telegram to berlin:

page 359 cipher telegram

"washington, 19th january, 1917.

"war inevitable in view of the proposed action. danger of rupture could be mitigated by the fixing of a definite interval of time, say one month, so that neutral vessels and passengers may be spared, as any preliminary and timely warning seems impossible if present programme is carried out. i shall have to give the password for unnavigable german steamers on february 1st, as effect of carrying out of my instructions here will be like declaration of war, and strict guard will be kept. in any case an incident like that of the lusitania may be expected soon.

"if military reasons are not absolutely imperative, in view of my telegram 212, postponement most urgently desirable. wilson believes he can obtain peace on the basis of our proposed equal rights of all nations. house told me again yesterday, that wilson proposed to take action very shortly, for in view of our declaration regarding future peace league, etc., he regards prospects of a peace conference as favorable."

in my efforts to avoid a breach with the united states, the president helped me to the extent of making a communication to the senate on january 22nd, which he personally read to them in solemn session. in this communication, mr. wilson exhaustively developed his programme of a "peace without conquest." as the president officially communicated this proposal to all the belligerent powers on the same day, it was to be regarded as a fresh and most solemn step towards peace. as, on the other hand, it is also a document which expresses most plainly mr. wilson's desires and mentions before his entry into the war, i quote it verbatim below. those page 360 who read it to-day cannot help feeling that certainly no more scathing criticism of the versailles peace has ever been written,—a peace which contained all the signs of having been imposed upon the vanquished, and against which the president's communication was a warning.

"on the eighteenth of december last i addressed an identical note to the governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. i spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. the central powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. the entente powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. we are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. we are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. in every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted.

"i have sought this opportunity to address you because i thought that i owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our page 361 international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

"it is inconceivable that the people of the united states should play no part in that great enterprise. to take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. they cannot in honor withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. they do not wish to withhold it. but they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

"that service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. it is right that before it comes this government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a league for peace. i am here to attempt to state those conditions.

"the present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. the treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth page 362 guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. we shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, i feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late.

"no covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the new world can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of america could join in guaranteeing. the elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the american governments, elements consistent with their political faith and with the practical convictions which the peoples of america have once for all embraced and undertake to defend.

"i do not mean to say that any american government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. i only take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. mere agreements may not make peace secure. it will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it. if the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind!

page 363 "the terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. the question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? if it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? only a tranquil europe can be a stable europe. there must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

"fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. the statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. but the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all,—may not be the same on both sides of the water. i think it will be serviceable if i attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

"they imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. it is not pleasant to say this. i beg that i may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. i am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. it would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. only a peace between equals can last. only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a page 364 common benefit. the right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

"the equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. but no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

"and there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. no peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. i take it for granted, for instance, if i may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

"i speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principle which has always been held page 365 very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in america, but for the same reason that i have spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly indispensable,—because i wish frankly to uncover realities. any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. it will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind. the ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. the world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

"so far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. with a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from a free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

"and the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. the freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of peace, equality, and co-operation. no doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. there can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. the free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. it page 366 need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

"it is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. and the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation. difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. there can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. the statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. the question of armaments, whether on land or sea is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

"i have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance. perhaps i am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. i am speaking as an individual, and yet i am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great government, and i feel confident that i have said what the people of the united states would wish me to say. may i not add, that i hope page 367 and believe that i am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty? i would fain believe that i am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

"and in holding out the expectation that the people and government of the united states will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as i have named i speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

"i am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of president monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

"i am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. there is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. when all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

"i am proposing government by the consent of the page 368 governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the united states have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

"these are american principles, american policies. we could stand for no others. and they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. they are the principles of mankind and must prevail."

in helfferich's account of these matters, the author charges this appeal of mr. wilson's with having favored the entente side, because in it the conditions laid down are regarded as an acceptable basis for peace. when i returned to germany the imperial chancellor advanced the same argument in my presence; i have heard it repeated again and again at home, and among other places, before the examination committee of the national assembly. it seems to me that this view is rather a berlin fable convenue. there is no word in the document which would justify one in drawing such a conclusion. the president stated simply that he had invited both belligerent parties to define the conditions under which they would make peace, and that the entente had replied fully to the invitation, whereas the central powers had not submitted their terms. he then proceeded to say that in so far as the conditions insisted upon by one side had become known, we had advanced a step nearer to the discussion of peace. if we read the wording of the document without prejudice, and in connection with the views expressed by american statesmen, page 369 it becomes abundantly clear that the president regarded the terms laid down by our enemies as maximum conditions, and further, that he believed that we also would submit our maximum terms, and finally come to an agreement by adopting a middle course.

herr helfferich makes a similar charge against wilson's note of the 18th december, owing to the threats that it contained. but this charge strikes me as being just as gratuitous as the first. the threats were uttered in london quite as plainly as they were in berlin. the charge of partiality would have been justified only if the threats had been contained simply in the version of the note which was sent to berlin.

besides, in all entente countries, it was maintained that both the note of the 18th december and the appeal of the 22nd january revealed partiality for the central powers. the diplomats of the entente in washington were quite beside themselves with anger, and plainly revealed their displeasure to mr. wilson. i am not concerned now with criticizing the president's efforts for peace in retrospect. the fact that mr. wilson became our personal enemy after the 31st january, 1917, and that he consented to the peace of versailles, is no proof of the contention that, before the 31st january, 1917, he would have proved a similar failure as a peacemaker. the president's spiteful censure and treatment of us, both during the war and at versailles, may be explained psychologically, by the fact that we rejected his efforts as a mediator, and declared the u-boat war.

mr. wilson's personal sensitiveness and egocentric nature played an essential part in all the negotiations. when the french and english press derided the president, in november, 1916, after the first cables had announced the election of mr. hughes, mr. wilson was deeply mortified. a further improvement in his attitude page 370 towards us followed, when we showed that we were favorably disposed to his mediation for peace. the fact that germany relied on him, stimulated his self-esteem to such an extent that he became, to a certain degree, interested in bringing about a peace that would be satisfactory to germany. nor should the interest he showed in this matter be underrated. i openly confess that it was also my ambition to assist in restoring peace, in order to save our country from the catastrophe that threatened to overtake it, and to spare the world any further suffering. to this day i am still convinced that, had the germans skilfully conducted their share in these peace negotiations, we should have achieved all we wanted to achieve. the happy personal relations which, in that case, would have prevailed between mr. wilson and the german representatives at the peace conference, would, in view of the element of chance, which is so conspicuous at such congresses, have turned the scales in our favor to a surprising extent. on the other hand, i was, and am still, of the opinion that the peace which would have been settled at that time, would not have satisfied the public opinion of the moment in germany. but i attached no importance whatever to this consideration. he who practises politics in the interests of his native country, must be ready at any moment to plunge like curtius into the abyss, in order to save his nation. this, however, is what made curtius immortal. besides, in a few years, if not sooner, the german people would surely have realized that "peace without victory" constituted a victory for germany.

after the 31st january, 1917, mr. wilson was incapable of an impartial attitude towards germany. he saw red whenever he thought of the imperial government, and his repugnance against it knew no bounds. even to-day the bitter feeling still rankles within him, that the german page 371 government deprived him of the glory of being the premier political personage on the world's stage. it goes without saying, that at versailles the entente exploited with a vengeance both this attitude on the part of the president, and his peculiar idiosyncrasies. intercepted wireless messages from paris had made us aware of the fact that the original american interpretation of the fourteen points entirely agreed with our own; and thus we in berlin were filled, not without reason, with certain hopes of america's help. but mr. wilson, who would have acted more wisely had he never gone to versailles, sat there alone, facing three european statesmen, for whom he was no match. they played upon his weakest point, by suggesting to him the view that, in addition to the german government, the german people, who were guilty, too, should also be punished, and that the obligation to punish the guilty took precedence of the fourteen points. had mr. wilson, after january, 1917, really come to the definite conclusion that he held the proofs of germany's war guilt and lust of world empire? whereas, theretofore he had considered the question of war guilt impartially, he now agreed that the germans would have been able to obtain a reasonable peace through his mediation, but had rejected it and chosen to declare the u-boat war instead, in order to achieve a complete victory. consequently, the germans had not been concerned all this time with bringing about a reasonable peace, but with gaining the empire of the world, a conclusion from which their war guilt was also to be inferred. it was as the result of these ideas that mr. wilson preached the crusade against militaristic and autocratic germany, who wanted to achieve the mastery of the world. only by means of the belief in a crusade could the peace-loving american people be prevailed upon to wage war.

regarding the effect upon the senate of the president's page 372 appeal, i sent the following telegram to the foreign office:

cipher telegram

"washington, january 23rd, 1917.

"wilson's appeal has met with general approval in senate, and is regarded as a further energetic step in peace movement. only our wildest opponents have again attacked president as a pro-german. almost throughout views expressed about appeal contain the wish that central powers will also state their peace terms now. house also begged me urgently that this might be done, either publicly or secretly. then wilson would immediately propose peace conference; president also seems inclined to conclude the bryan treaty with us. time is now, alas, too short, otherwise treaty might perhaps have helped us to avert war.

"as result of proposed unrestricted u-boat war, peace movement will presumably come to an end. nevertheless, it is possible on the other hand that wilson will make redoubled efforts for peace, if a time-limit be allowed. i should like to leave no stone unturned in order to avert war with united states. as i understand the situation, our refusal to submit our peace terms arises out of the fear that they may appear too moderate to public opinion in germany. would it perhaps be possible, before opening the unrestricted u-boat war, to state the peace terms, which we should have submitted at the peace conference we proposed, and to add, that, in view of our enemies' insolent rejection of our scheme, we could no longer abide by these moderate terms? and then we might hint that, as victors, we should demand an independent ireland. a declaration of this sort would win over public opinion on this side, as far as this is page 373 possible, and might perhaps also satisfy public opinion in germany."

the day after the president had read his appeal to the senate, i received a telegram inviting me to visit mr. house in new york. during the interview the colonel read me a memorandum of mr. wilson's, in which the president formally offered us to act as mediator, in order to bring about a peace by arrangement. the memorandum left me in no doubt whatever that mr. wilson was certain of being able to achieve this end. with the utmost possible speed i sent the following telegrams about my interview with mr. house, by three different routes to berlin, on the assumption that it was impossible for us to abide by our former resolve:

(1) cipher wireless telegram

(most urgent)

"washington, 27th january, 1917.

"after having had very important conference request most urgently postponement till my next two messages received. suggest reply by wireless."

(2) cipher telegram

"washington, 26th january, 1917.

"wilson offered officially, but in first place privately, to mediate for peace, on basis of his appeal to senate, that means without interference with territorial terms of peace. wilson's simultaneous request for communication of our peace terms not to be regarded as private.

"i am wiring with full particulars through state department. to begin u-boat war without previous negotiations regarding above proposals would among other things put us seriously in the wrong, and owing to page 374 wilson's personal sensitiveness, would make prevention of rupture quite impossible."

(3) cipher telegram

"washington, 27th january, 1917.

"house suddenly invited me to visit him on behalf of wilson, and told me the following as an official message from president:

"first of all, wilson offers privately to mediate for peace on basis of his appeal to senate, i.e., therefore without interference in territorial terms of peace. wilson's simultaneous request to us to submit our terms of peace is not to be regarded as private. house revealed to me following thoughts of the president. our enemies had openly expressed their impossible peace terms. thereupon president had, as a direct contrast to these, developed his programme. now we are also morally bound to make our peace terms known, because our desire for peace would otherwise appear insincere. after your excellency had informed mr. wilson that our peace terms were moderate, and that we agreed to second peace conference, president thought he had given expression to our wishes in his appeal to the senate.

"wilson hopes that we shall communicate our peace terms to him, which might be published both in germany and over here, so that they could become known immediately all over the world. if only we had confidence in him, president was convinced that he would be able to bring about both peace conferences. he would be particularly pleased if your excellency were at the same time to declare that we are prepared to enter the second peace conference on the basis of his appeal. our declaration might be shown to have been actuated by wilson's having sent us a direct request for our peace terms. page 375 president is of opinion that note sent to him by the entente was a piece of bluff which need not be taken seriously. he hopes definitely to bring about peace conferences, and quickly too, so that the unnecessary bloodshed of the spring offensive may be averted.

"to what extent your excellency will and can meet wilson, it is impossible to tell from this side. meanwhile i urgently beg leave, to submit the following remarks for your consideration. if the u-boat campaign is opened now without any further ado, the president will regard this as a smack in the face, and war with the united states will be inevitable. the war party here will gain the upper hand, and the end of the war will be quite out of sight, as, whatever people may say to the contrary, the resources of the united states are enormous. on the other hand, if we acquiesce in wilson's proposal, but the scheme nevertheless comes to grief owing to the stubbornness of our enemies, it would be very hard for the president to come into the war against us, even if by that time we began our unrestricted u-boat war. at present, therefore it is only a matter of postponing the declaration for a little while so that we may improve our diplomatic position. for my own part, i confess that i am of opinion that we shall obtain a better peace now by means of conferences, than we should if the united states joined the ranks of our enemies.

"as cables always take several days, please send instructions by wireless, in case telegraphic privileges 157 cannot be used on february 1st."

i had hoped that the communication of the president's appeal through mr. gerard, would have led to a postponement of the unrestricted u-boat war. this, however, was not the case. i can pass over all that happened in berlin at that time, and all the deliberations which led to page 376 the ultimate decision, for not only did i not take part in them, but they have also become general knowledge since the taking of the evidence before the examination committee of the national assembly. i need only mention here that i received the following reply to my proposals, from the imperial chancellor:

cipher telegram

"berlin, 29th january, 1917.

"please thank president on behalf of imperial government for his communication. we trust him completely, and beg him to trust us likewise. germany is ready to accept his secret offer of mediation for the purpose of bringing about a direct conference of the belligerents, and will recommend similar course to her allies. we wish our acceptance of offer, as well as offer itself, to be treated as quite secret.

"a public announcement of our peace terms is at present impossible, now that entente has published their peace terms which aim at the degradation and annihilation of germany and her allies, and have been characterized by president himself as impossible. we cannot regard them as bluff, as they entirely agree with professed opinions of enemy powers expressed not only before, but afterwards. they also correspond exactly with the objects for which italy and rumania entered the war, and as regards turkey, with the assurances made on behalf of russia by both england and france. so long as these war aims of our enemies are publicly maintained, it would be impossible to interpret public announcement of our own peace terms, as anything else than a sign of weakness which at present does not exist, and would only lead to a prolongation of the war. in order to give president wilson a proof of our confidence, however, tell him just for his own private information page 377 the terms on which we should have been prepared to take part in peace negotiations, if the entente had accepted our offer of peace on the 12th december, 1916.

"the restitution to france of that part of upper alsace occupied by her. the acquisition of a strategical and economic safety-frontier-zone, separating germany and poland from russia.

"colonial restitution in the form of an understanding which would secure germany colonial possessions compatible with the size of her population and the importance of her economic interests.

"restoration of those parts of france occupied by germany, on condition that certain strategic and economic modifications of the frontier be allowed, as also financial compensation.

"restitution of belgium under definite guarantees for the safety of germany, which would have to be determined by means of negotiations with the belgian government.

"economic and financial settlement, on the basis of exchange, of the territory invaded by both sides, and to be restituted by the conclusion of peace.

"compensation for german undertakings and private persons who have suffered damage through the war.

"renunciation of all economic arrangements and measures, which after the peace would constitute an obstacle in the way of normal commerce and trade, with the conclusion of corresponding commercial treaties.

"the freedom of the seas to be placed on a secure basis.

"the peace terms of our allies coincide with our own views, and observe the same limits.

"we are, moreover, prepared to enter the international conference which he wishes to invoke after the war on the basis of his communication to the senate.

page 378 "your excellency will give president these details at the same time as you hand him note relating unrestricted u-boat war, and will inform him as follows:

"if his offer had only reached us a few days earlier, we should have been able to postpone opening of the new u-boat war. now, however, in spite of best will in the world, it is, owing to technical reasons, unfortunately too late, as far-reaching military preparations have already been made which cannot be undone, and u-boats have already sailed with new instructions. form and content of enemy's reply to our offer of peace, and the note of the president, were so abrupt and harsh, that, in view of the life and death struggle which has once again been proclaimed against us, we cannot any longer delay the use of those means which appear to us best calculated to end the war quickly, and for the relinquishment of which we could not have taken the responsibility in the face of our whole nation.

"as the order regarding the unrestricted u-boat war shows, we are prepared, at any moment, to make every possible allowances for america's needs. we would beg the president to prosecute—that is to say, pursue, his plan notwithstanding, and declare ourselves ready to discontinue the unrestricted u-boat war the moment we are completely assured that the president's efforts will lead to a peace that would be acceptable to us.

"bethmann-hollweg."

i immediately communicated the peace terms contained in this telegram to mr. house, and i still cherished a small hope that he would, after all, perhaps, be able to exercise a favorable influence over the president. truth to tell, he actually went to washington in order to take part in the deliberations which were to decide the attitude which america was henceforth to adopt towards us. page 379 apart from the fact that the secrecy covering the communication of our peace terms deprived them of all diplomatic value, the simultaneous declaration of the unrestricted u-boat war gave the death-blow to all hope of maintaining peace. as herr von betmann-hollweg declared before the examination committee of the national assembly: "it was perfectly clear to the authorities in germany, that the decision to prosecute the unrestricted u-boat war would destroy all chance of further efforts on the part of the president to bring about peace. the u-boat war meant rupture, and ultimately war with america. the discussions between general head quarters and the political leaders had turned upon this question for years. that which led to the decisive step being taken was, that general headquarters was firmly resolved to face even the risk of america's entry into the war, and that it wished to use the circumstances as a trial of strength with the political leaders."

on january 31st, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, i handed mr. lansing the official communication about the u-boat war. this was my last political interview in america. we both knew that the end had come, but we did not admit the fact to each other. the secretary of state contented himself with replying that he would submit my communication to the president. i cherished no illusions regarding the expected outcome of this interview, for the ultimatum of april 18th, 1916, no longer allowed of any chance of preventing the rupture of diplomatic relations. consequently on the morning of the 31st january, i had already given the order that the engines of all ships lying in american harbors were to be destroyed. i had already been given instructions to this effect at the time of the sussex crisis, and these instructions had now been repeated from berlin. as a matter page 380 of fact it was, dangerous to allow of any delay, for on the evening of january 31st our ships were already seized by the american police. as far as i know, however, all of them without exception were made unfit for use before this occurred.

on the 3rd february, at twelve midday, mr. wilson announced to a joint meeting of both houses of congress, the rupture of all diplomatic relations with germany, and at the same time my pass was brought to me by a higher official of the department of state.

thus war was decided upon, even if it was not immediately declared. everything that followed amounted only to preparation for war or war propaganda. nothing except the abandonment of the u-boat campaign could have prevented war.

it has frequently been asserted that the notorious mexico telegram led to the war with the united states. i do not believe this is correct. the telegram was used with great success as propaganda against us; but the rupture of diplomatic relations—as i have already pointed out—was, in view of the situation, equivalent in all circumstances to war. i had nothing to do with the mexico telegram, which took me completely by surprise. it was addressed, in the usual way, direct to the legation in mexico, and passed through the embassy at washington on the same day on which i received the notification that the unrestricted u-boat war was to be declared. i had neither the right, nor was it my duty, to hold up the telegram, although i disapproved of its contents. but even if i had held it up, i should have served no useful purpose. as i afterwards heard from a certain englishman, there was an office in england which deciphered all the telegrams which we sent over the english cable and this office placed all their intercepts at the disposal of the american government after the rupture of diplomatic page 381 relations. there is nothing surprising in this, for we also deciphered all enemy telegrams which we were able to intercept. nowadays there is no cipher which is absolutely safe, if it has been in use for some time. at that time, however, i did not know that all our cipher telegrams were being read by the english. if, therefore, i had held up the mexico telegram in washington, its contents would have been revealed to the american government by the english, notwithstanding, and no one would have believed that the message had not been forwarded in some way to mexico. moreover the telegram, as is well-known, was only conditional; the instructions it contained were only to hold good if the united states came into the war. i strained every nerve, at that moment, to prevent this from taking place. if i had been successful, the mexico telegram would have served no purpose. i am therefore able to say, with a clean conscience, that i did everything that stood in my power, to remedy the error committed in the dispatch of the telegram.

in helfferich's account of these events, the author says:

"if count bernstorff was, and apparently is still, of the opinion, that wilson was actually engaged in trying to bring about a peace which would have been acceptable and tolerable to us, and with a promise of success, this can only be explained as the result of the enduring effect of suggestion, which, acting upon him for two years, had had no really adequate knowledge of home opinion to counteract it. as the communication between berlin and the german embassy in washington was completely cut off, it is not surprising that our representatives on the other side of the vast ocean should have lost touch with their fellow-countrymen struggling for their lives, and page 382 should have failed to retain the proper standpoint in regard to what was either necessary or tolerable."

to this i should like to reply, in the first place, that the unrestricted u-boat war did not in the least bring the german people either what was necessary or tolerable. furthermore, not only i myself, but almost all those gentlemen who returned with me to germany, had the feeling, on reaching home, that we in america had formed a much clearer notion of the true state of germany, than those of our fellow-countrymen who had been living at home; for they had been completely cut off from the world by the blockade. after we had seen the conditions prevailing in germany, we could understand even less than we had before, why the imperial government had not snatched with joy at the chance of making peace.

as to the question whether we should have obtained an acceptable and tolerable peace through mr. wilson's efforts, i am still firmly convinced to-day, that this would have been the case. the president would not have offered to mediate if he had not been able to reckon with certainty upon success, and he was better situated than any german, to know the attitude of the entente. in his farewell letter to me, mr. house wrote:

"it is too sad that your government should have declared the unrestricted u-boat war at a moment when we were so near to peace. the day will come when people in germany will see how much you have done for your country in america."

moreover, later on, mr. bonar law publicly admitted in the english parliament that great britain would have collapsed financially, if american help had not saved her. the war-spirit in france, during the year 1917 was simply upheld by the hope of american help, and finally, page 383 in march, the russian revolution broke out. if we had accepted wilson's mediation, the whole of american influence in russia would have been exercised in favor of peace, and not, as events ultimately proved, against ourselves. out of wilson's and kerensky's peace programme, we might, by means of diplomatic negotiations, easily have achieved all that we regarded as necessary. my conviction that we could in the year 1917 have obtained a peace which would have been acceptable to ourselves, is based not so much on wilson's good will, as upon the fact that, without american help, the entente could not possibly have achieved a victory.

against this view, the argument is advanced that the united states would in any case have entered the war, in order to avoid a german victory. i have already pointed out, that according to my view, no "german peace" was any longer possible after the first battle of the marne. besides, it was precisely the object of the policy which was directed at american mediation, to prevent the united states from entering the war.

at the present time, even mr. wilson himself is produced as crown-witness in support of the view that america would have entered the war against us whatever might have happened. in the discussions about the peace treaty, which the president held in the white house on the 19th august, 1919, much stress is laid upon a certain passage in particular, which gives the impression that mr. wilson would have wished america to enter the war, even if germany had not declared the unrestricted u-boat campaign. almost without exception, all the german national newspapers interpreted the short dialogue in question between the president and senator mccumber in this way, and the deutsche tageszeitung even went so far as to regard it as a striking proof of what they called wilson's "a priori resolve to have war with germany."

page 384 i must most emphatically reject this interpretation of the passage under discussion, which was turned to account by some papers in america in the political fight.

in the first place i should like to point out that it is obviously inadmissible to take the above-mentioned passage out of the context, and to regard it in itself as an interchange of views between mr. wilson and mr. mccumber. it ought, on the contrary, to be judged in conjunction with the passage that precedes it.

the proposition for discussion was the president's motion that the league of nations made it obligatory upon all states united, under it, to take common action against any country guilty of a breach of international law. senator harding, one of the keenest opponents of the league of nations, suggested the idea in the debate that it was impossible for a sovereign state like the united states of america to have her moral obligation in any international conflict dictated to her by an external body consisting of the council of the league of nations. driven into a corner, mr. wilson had to acknowledge this fact; but he emphasized the point that in spite of this the value of the league of nations was in no way impaired. he said:

"the american republic is not in need of any advice from any quarter, in order to fulfil her moral duty; but she stabilizes the whole world by promising in advance that she will stand by other nations who regard matters in the same light as herself, in order to uphold justice in the world."

following upon this, senator mccumber then tried to confute the president's theory, by applying it practically to the most recent events in the world's history. he page 385 referred to the last war, at the outbreak of which there was no league of nations in existence, and the following discussion took place:

mccumber: would our moral conviction of the injustice of the german war have drawn us into this war, if germany had been guilty of no aggressive acts, and, what is more, without the league of nations, for of course we had no league of nations then?

wilson: as things turned out, i hope that it would finally have done so, mr. senator.

mccumber: do you believe that, if germany had been guilty of no act of injustice against our own citizens, we should have come into this war?

wilson: i believe it.

mccumber: you believe that we should have come in whatever happened?

wilson: yes.

it is abundantly clear that with his first answer, "as things turned out, i hope that it"—that is to say, america's moral conviction of the injustice of the german war—"would finally have drawn us into the war"—the president lays the emphasis on the words "as things turned out." there can be no doubt that he meant to say: "as things turned out in regard to his efforts for peace," the first ready concurrence of the imperial government, notwithstanding, was thwarted at the decisive moment. with such a government, mr. wilson seems to imply, it was impossible in the long run for america to remain on terms of peace. from that time henceforward—there can be no question of any earlier period, because up to that moment he had been in constant negotiation with us—he regarded the imperial government as morally condemned. then, however, he calls to mind very clearly page 386 the feeble war-spirit of the american people in the spring of 1917, which, as is well known, had to be whipped into the war by propaganda on a prodigious scale. that is why the president says he "hopes," that the moral conviction of the american people regarding the injustice of germany's cause would finally have triumphed over his readiness for peace expressed so brilliantly as late as november, 1916. his words are, therefore, to be regarded as a reflection in retrospect, not as a proof of an à priori intention to urge the united states into the war in any circumstances.

truth to tell, if mr. wilson had really been striving to declare war against us, he would, of course, only have needed to nod in order to induce his whole country to fight after the lusitania incident, so great was the war feeling at that critical time. later on, the president concentrated all his efforts upon the idea of being the peacemaker of the world, and even made such prominent use of the motto, "he kept us out of the war," in the campaign for his re-election, that it is quite unthinkable that all this time he should have secretly cherished the intention, ultimately, to enter the war against germany. in this matter, the fact that after the rupture of diplomatic relations between america and germany, mr. wilson really did urge on the war by every means in his power, proves nothing. for, after january 31st, 1917, wilson himself was a different man. our rejection of his proposal to mediate, by our announcement of the unrestricted u-boat war, which was to him utterly incomprehensible, turned him into an embittered enemy of the imperial government. but this is by no means a proof of the contention that, before the date named, he was secretly watching for an opportunity to make war upon germany. neither does it excuse the president for having allowed himself at versailles to be convinced of page 387 the alleged complicity of the german people in the general war-guilt. theretofore he had certainly always differentiated between the autocracy, as also militarism, on the one hand, and the german people on the other. at versailles he suddenly advanced the theory that the germans must be punished for their crimes, and not only those among them who were responsible, but also the innocent german people, who neither desired the breach of belgium's neutrality, nor understood the moral consequences of the u-boat war, nor were aware of mr. wilson's mediation for peace.

the above dialogue is also interesting from the standpoint that the president is most clearly convinced that the entente could not have conquered without american help. if to-day he concludes therefrom that america would have been obliged ultimately to join in the war, in order to punish germany, in former days he concluded that his duty was to bring about a peace without victory. if he had succeeded in doing this, all of us, friend and foe alike, would now be living in a better world than the present one. it would be the world as we had been shown it in a vision of the future on the 22nd january, 1917, and not the world of the peace of versailles, blooming with starvation, bolshevism and nationalistic hatred.

in his memoirs, herr von tirpitz says that of all the practical advantages which i declared would follow from a compliant attitude on our part, not one had fallen to our lot. but i must confess, i was not aware that the u-boat war had brought us any advantages either. its results have been a heavy moral debt and a huge bill of costs that the german people must pay. and how could the policy which i recommended have yielded practical results, seeing that i was never able, or even allowed, to carry it through? never at any time was the u-boat war really given up. every time a diplomatic success was in page 388 view, an incident occurred which made it necessary to start one's labors all over again.

other people have said that as i was not in agreement with the policy of the imperial government, i ought to have resigned my office. this view does not take into account all the facts of the case. as long as herr von jagow was secretary of state for foreign affairs, i worked in complete harmony with him. we both worked together in trying to avert war with the united states. i knew as little as herr von jagow himself did, whether we should succeed in scoring every point in the policy we pursued, for the secretary of state was in perpetual conflict with the military and naval authorities. if i had heard in time that herr von jagow's resignation had occurred in connection with the question of the u-boat war, and was the result of it, i should have resigned at the same time as he did; because my name was identified with the idea of american mediation for peace. moreover, up to the 9th, or rather the 19th, january, 1917, i was completely in accord with the imperial chancellor; for herr von bethmann-hollweg declared before the examination committee of the national assembly:

"the whole of my work in connection with wilson's efforts for peace was, indeed, directed towards rendering the threat of a u-boat war unnecessary, by bringing about a peace movement which would, of course, have some promise of proving successful."

these words amount to a complete approval of the policy which i pursued in washington. when, therefore, on the 19th january, i received the note informing me of the intended opening of the unrestricted u-boat campaign, i could not tender my resignation, for i regarded it as my duty to the german people, to resist until the page 389 last the unrestricted u-boat war, and, if possible, to avert a breach with the united states. when, on the 31st january, 1917, the u-boat policy had definitely triumphed, i had no further chance of resigning my office, seeing that owing to the immediate rupture of diplomatic relations it was lost to me.

the various reasons, for and against mr. wilson's mediation, were all thrashed out in great detail in this country, before the examination committee of the national assembly, in the winter of 1916-17. and, according to the evidence given, the decisive cause of the failure of the scheme was the distrust which the most influential statesmen felt towards the president. if any confidence had been felt in mr. wilson, herr von bethmann-hollweg would have opposed the adoption of the u-boat war, and would have allowed the president's efforts for mediation to pursue their course. as a witness before the committee, he himself said:

"there can be no doubt, now that we can look back upon events, that we should have done better had we placed our fate in president wilson's hands, and had accepted his offers of mediation."

as i have already pointed out, the factor which in my opinion was largely responsible for determining the course we ultimately adopted was the under-estimation and ignorance of america which was so widespread in germany. from the very first moment the problem was not properly understood by the german nation. the fact was overlooked that the most important battle of the war was taking place in washington, and when the tragedy reached its climax, no one believed that, with all her political, military and economic power, the united states of america would ever enter into the war.

page 390 finally, it has been pointed out as an objection to my view, that, after all, the entente would have rejected wilson's efforts at mediation. i am no longer in a position to prove the contrary to-day, and it is, of course, just possible, that the president and mr. house were mistaken in assuming as much as they did. if at that time, however, we expected the entente to reject mr. wilson's offer of mediation, we should at all events have postponed the u-boat war, and accepted american intervention, in order to improve our diplomatic position in washington, before having recourse to the ultima ratio. it seems to have been our destiny that all our most important decisions of the war were the outcome of military and not of political considerations. on the entente side, the converse was always true, and that is why, though it suffered many military reverses, the entente won the war.

in pursuing the policy i advocated, i was influenced by considerations, which now, in conclusion, i should like to sum up as follows:

(1) it was no longer possible to achieve a decisive german victory after the first battle of the marne, that is why german policy should have been directed towards obtaining "peace without victory"; and, as things turned out, such a victory was only to be obtained by means of american mediation.

(2) the personality of mr. wilson played no decisive part in determining my attitude. i never once reckoned upon his personal friendliness towards ourselves; for i knew him too well to suppose him capable of pro-german tendencies. i expected nothing more from him than that he would play america's game—america's and no other country's—supported by the public opinion of the united states. american policy, however, pursued the object page 391 of a "peace without victory," from the standpoint of practical politics, in order that, neither germany nor england should attain to a superlatively powerful position. a "peace without victory" of this sort, under american patronage, would have left the united states in the undisputed position of the first political power in the world. to this, there was added certain other reasons of an ideal political nature, owing to the fact that both mr. wilson and the great majority of the american people wished to put an end to all the bloodshed and misery.

(3) the beginning of the unrestricted u-boat war was bound, as things had developed, to lead automatically to the rupture of diplomatic relations with the united states.

(4) as matters stood in america, the rupture of diplomatic relations was equally bound automatically to bring about war with the united states.

(5) war with the united states had to be averted at all costs, because america's help meant giving our enemy such an overwhelming preponderance of power, that a german defeat became an absolute certainty.

(6) the political situation was such that, the acceptance of the american offer of mediation was the only means of preventing the united states from entering the war.

(7) if america did not enter the war, the entente were not in a position to beat us.

(8) if mr. wilson had succeeded in bringing both belligerent parties to the conference table, a sort of hubertsburg peace[*] would have been concluded. in page 392 view of the situation, a peace unfavorable to ourselves was unthinkable. who, at that time, could have compelled us to accept terms which we regarded as incompatible with germany's position in the world? herr helfferich before the examination committee of the national assembly, expressed the view that in the end mr. wilson would have forced peace upon us with the butt-end of a rifle. but whence would he have obtained this butt-end? he had not one, and it took him a year to create an army. no one who is familiar with the united states can believe that it would ever have been possible to drive the americans into the war, once a peace conference had assembled. for then it would only have been a matter of deciding the fate of one or two pieces of territory or colonies, in which the americans would not have felt the slightest interest. naturally, we should have had to restore belgium and accept the disarmament programme, etc. but we had already declared ourselves ready to take these measures, and, as regards disarmament, etc., this reform was inevitable, in view of the economic position of all the countries concerned. if america had not entered the war, no one could have forced us to accept less advantageous terms than the status quo ante, with possibly some mutual compensation.