the return home
after the rupture of diplomatic relations, i entrusted the care of our interests to the swiss legation, and from that time i did not speak a word to any american official except to the assistant secretary of state, breckenridge long, who accompanied us as far as the boat at new york. from the majority of those gentlemen with whom i had official relations, however, i received very friendly letters of farewell.
the principal passage in the letter from lansing, the secretary of state, was as follows:
"i shall bear in mind all your earnest efforts in the cause of peace, and will gladly recall our personal relations, which, in spite of the difficulties of the situation, were always a pleasure to me."
in view of the conditions prevailing at the time, the preparations for our departure took a long time. it was only with difficulty that we were able to obtain the necessary accommodation for the large number of german officials and their families on the danish ship friedrich viii. the business of getting the necessary paper—such, for instance, as the entente's safe conduct—also necessitated lengthy negotiations, which were conducted by the swiss legation with the assistance of prince hatzfeldt, the secretary of the embassy. our departure could only take place on the 14th february.
it was not pleasant to be obliged to remain eleven days longer in washington. the moment the rupture of diplomatic page 394 relations occurred, the secret police took possession of the embassy, and shadowed every one of my movements. these precautionary measures were supposed to guarantee my personal safety; but i should have been quite safe without them, for all americans behaved towards me with perfect propriety and courtesy. our personal friends did not allow the rupture of diplomatic relations to make any difference in their attitude towards us. until the very day of our departure, my wife and i were the daily guests of american friends. even the press, with but a few exceptions, maintained a friendly attitude; for all the journalists knew that i had worked hard to maintain peace. as an example of this, i reproduce below an article from the new york tribune, which is one of the leading anti-german papers in america. i give the article, somewhat abbreviated, in the original, in order to preserve its american character:
"diplomacy and friendship twin arts of bernstorff.
"departing german envoy, target of critics here and at home, quits post with brilliant record and many personal friends.
"the sailing of friedrich viii. invites the cordial obituary style, though diplomatic deaths are supposed to warrant no sadness. and yet, curiously enough, count bernstorff probably finds himself leaving when more people are personally for him and fewer against him than at any time in the last two years. a less distinguished diplomat would not have had the art to stay so long.
"a letter from washington, dated june, 1915, is in my desk. it tells incidentally about the visit of a friend to the ambassador shortly after his interview with the president. 'it's coming out all right,' the count said cheerfully, his melancholy eyes lighting up, and the anxious lines etched in his face during the months past page 395 lightening. 'no, they're not going to get rid of me yet for a while,' referring to the press clamor for his dismissal.
"'i'm glad of that,' answered the friend. 'then you'll stay and get some more degrees.' (eight american universities had honored him.) 'oh,' he answered with a gesture, 'i may leave by degrees.' it is winning to catch an excellency at puns.
"at his departure many persons—close friends of the last eight years and newspaper correspondents—are going to miss his amazing charm and the easy candor of his talk. he has had an intimate directness in his dealings with all sorts and conditions of people, that only a personage of magnetic personality can adopt.
"sheer charm alone can forget caste consciousness. count bernstorff has had none of the patent heavy regard for himself that makes three-quarters of official germany a chore to meet. 'i'll put you through' the little telephone girl, at his favorite new york hotel used to say promptly, when his excellency was asked for, and knew that she was safe.
"reporters will miss seeing him teeter informally by the embassy fireplace as he interviewed them, or gave out a significant something from behind a hastily-raised newspaper.
"the insistent friends of germany, heavily friendly and advisory, will miss his english, very soft with an attractive ghost, now and then, of a lisp. he learned it in london, his first language, for he was born there fifty-five years ago. his father, count albrecht was on service as ambassador to the court of st. james.
"count bernstorff came to america from his post as consul-general in cairo. he was stationed there in the trying diplomatic period of anglo-french rapprochement and the rise of naval competition between the english page 396 and the german empires. by many, count bernstorff is credited with saving turkish egypt and most of the moslem world to the german balance. they say he did it over coffee with khedive abbas hilmy, who never, never was bored by his wit, nor failed to appreciate the graces bred down from thirteenth-century mecklenburg of the tall herr consul-general. and in return from the moslem count bernstorff may have caught some of his comforting regard for kismet.
"the man is more than a little fatalist. 'what happens must happen,' he was wont to say, as he sorted the threatening letters from his morning correspondence. and again: 'what difference does it make? they've killed so many that one more can make no difference.'
"he goes back to berlin now, there as here different things to different people. a rank social democrat i have heard him called in drawing-rooms, where news of his earnest plea to his government for a liberal lusitania note had leaked out.
"it has not been easy for him to construe and weigh the american situation for his government, and have his judgment taken, any more than it has been easy for mr. gerard to convince the german foreign office that the american notes were really meant. often the same agent knocked both men and got in ahead of either as the authority on what america would do.
"a certain american baroness, egeria to the american journalists in berlin, who has no use for bernstorff or gerard or zimmermann, has been one of his many cockle burrs. most of the german-americans who chose to protest about the shipment of munitions and all of pro-submarine germany plus an aspirant or two for his post—all of these have been busy against him. and the americans are legion who have seconded the hate. he himself has been silent, with an occasional wry smile over it all. page 397 he has never excused himself when attacks on him, personally, followed german actions against which he had counselled.
"he has tried over and over again to explain to the german foreign office the temper of the american people, whose sentimentality is so different from that which prevails in the hanover-bremen-leipzig breast. the hamburger-nachrichten has reviled him. it has been hard to see with hamburg eyes what count bernstorff must know—that hardly a diplomat alive could have stayed so long on friendly terms with washington, through these two years, or reaped so heavy a harvest of understanding from his study of poker and baseball as well as american commerce and institutions. people like to write—i, too—of his melancholy eyes, his gently cynical estimates of most dreamers' hopes. over one circumstance he has been always hopeful. he has clung always to the hope that america neutral would be a leader in the erection of peace machinery, eager that every diplomatic transaction should perhaps have the possibility of an instrument. his real object in leaving, i am sure, is that not again will he turn over a communication from the american state department to read a faint hope of peace between lines."
apart from the measures taken for our security, our departure from washington and new york was not very different from what it would have been in ordinary times, had i been moving to take up my duties in another country. many friends came to the railway station at washington, and on the boat at new york. telegrams and letters of farewell came in hundreds, and our cabins were full of presents, consisting of baskets of fruit, flowers, cigars, books, beverages of all kinds, which are the custom at leavetakings in america. in these circumstances, page 398 and after all that i have described in the foregoing pages, i was nota little astonished when, about a year later, the american war-propaganda department began to hold me responsible for proceedings which were partly simply fiction, and for the rest of a kind that had occurred without any assistance from me whatever. i can understand perfectly the wish of the american propaganda department to create a war spirit, just as the same department in all belligerent countries strove to do; nevertheless, it was not necessary to adorn the war propaganda with unjustifiable personal attacks. nothing happened after my departure from america to prompt such attacks. a few of my telegrams were, to be sure, deciphered and published in order to prove that i had hatched a conspiracy. when the military and naval attachés were compelled to leave the united states, i could not very well avoid discharging the whole of the naval and military business myself. but this does not prove that i had previously had any dealings with these matters, even admitting that the naval and military attachés had been guilty of illegal practices, which, despite all the uproar created by enemy propaganda, i do not believe to have been proved. once the fever of war has died down, no one, presumably, will feel any interest in devoting any attention to such questions. if, however, later on, anyone should feel inclined to investigate the "german conspiracies," and "german propaganda," in the united states, in an impartial spirit, he will be astonished to find how many fantastic fictions were brought to the notice of the investigation committee of the senate, and what small justification lay at the bottom of the charges made against the german embassy.
when, on the afternoon of the 14th of february, we took to sea, we had no idea that we were to enjoy the hospitality of the gallant steamer friedrich viii., and page 399 its amiable captain, for four long weeks. ever since the establishment of regular lines of passenger steamers between america and europe, we must certainly have broken all records in regard to the length of time we took to complete the journey. there were on board the friedrich viii., in addition to the whole of the staff of the embassy, together with their wives and children, the complete personnel of the consulates, as also a few native germans, who for some reason or other, happened to be in america and had not yet had an opportunity of returning home. a few scandinavians completed the list of the passengers. the total number of germans was approximately two hundred. according to the wording of the safe conduct which we had been granted, we were allowed to take with us our personal belongings and "a reasonable amount of money." we were expressly forbidden to carry any papers.
the first twenty-four hours of the journey were the most pleasant. the sea was calm and the weather was not too cold, and on the following evening we reached halifax, which was the port at which we were to be examined. it was selected in order that we might not have to enter the war zone. here we had the first taste of the vexations of the journey. our captain wanted to enter the port; but he was ordered to anchor outside. on the following morning the authorities allowed us to enter. we were placed under the supervision of the english cruiser devonshire, and i cannot help admitting that the english naval officers discharged the undignified and distasteful duties imposed upon them with great courtesy. the canadian officials, on the other hand, behaved with the utmost disrespect and boorishness. they appeared to be accustomed to dealing only with immigrants and stowaways.
i do not know to this day, why, in spite of our safe page 400 conduct, we were held up twelve days in the bedford basin, which, with its encircling snow-clad hills, was completely shut off from the rest of the world. the examination in itself could not adequately account for this strange and uncustomary behavior, particularly towards an ambassador: for although the ship's coal was ultimately sifted in the search for contraband goods, if any good-will had been shown, the examination could have been finished in three to four days at the outside. i suppose, however, that the delay was intended to serve political ends. the english probably wanted to keep us shut up in halifax until the united states had entered into the war. they were perfectly well aware of my views, and feared that in berlin i might after all succeed in effecting an understanding with the american government. as, however, developments in the united states dragged on very slowly, and at first only an armed neutrality was contemplated, the english were ultimately obliged to allow us to continue our journey, because they could not very well keep us confined for weeks.
personally, i cannot complain of the treatment to which i was subjected at halifax, for i was the only one among all my fellow passengers of german nationality who had not to submit to having my person searched, and was only required to sign a declaration that i was carrying no papers. everybody else—even my wife—had to consent to being searched, an operation which was performed in a humiliating manner, and which led to many an unpleasant scene. even little huberta hatzfeldt, who was only three months old, was stripped of her swaddling clothes. the canadian authorities assessed the "reasonable sum of money" allowed at ninety dollars a head, and confiscated all moneys above that sum as contraband. in this way, countess manfred matuschka lost 25,000 dollars, which, in ignorance of the regulations, she had page 401 brought with her. the sum was to be deposited with a canadian bank, but has probably been lost forever by its owner. as i was forbidden to have any communication whatsoever with the outside world, i was not able to carry out my intention of lodging a complaint at washington regarding this breach of the safe conduct that had been granted to us.
at last, however, our imprisonment came to an end, and we were allowed to pursue our journey. amid the cheers of all on board, including particularly those of our excellent captain, who felt the affront we had received very deeply, we weighed anchor. judge of the almost panic-stricken disappointment of all the passengers, therefore, when at the end of a few knots, the ship turned back on her course! to the great relief of all concerned, however, it appeared that we had only forgotten to take on board the wireless telegraphy apparatus which had been taken from us at halifax. from that moment, apart from very bad and cold weather, we continued our journey without further incident. we took a sweeping curve northward, then sailed down the norwegian coast without meeting either an enemy ship or a german submarine. some of the neutral passengers were so much terrified of the latter, that they did not retire to their beds for many nights at a stretch.
at ten o'clock in the morning we landed in the snow in christiania. meanwhile the mexico telegram had been published in washington, and michaelis, the german ambassador, in accordance with instructions, came on board, in order to learn from me whether i could offer any explanation of the fact—that is to say, whether i suspected treachery on the part of any of my staff. it is indeed plain from the oft-quoted reports of the committee of the senate, that a host of underhand tricks must have been played, particularly in the post office; page 402 nevertheless, i am of opinion that in this case the explanation which i gave above is the correct one. the telegram in question, like many others, was presumably deciphered by the english. from the experience gained during the war, we have learned that the diplomacy of the future will never be allowed to rely, for important matters, upon the secret of a cipher; for skilful experts are now able to discover the most complicated code, provided that they are able to intercept a sufficient number of telegrams. over and above this, owing to our isolation in washington, we were able to alter the cipher but very seldom. as to the suggestion of treachery on the part of any member of my staff—i never believed in this at the time, nor do i believe in it now. in very hard times they all proved themselves to be thoroughly loyal and efficient.
we had to remain in christiania longer than we expected, because the route across the sound to copenhagen was entirely ice-bound. finally, with the help of ice-breakers, even this obstacle was overcome, and after a day's halt at copenhagen, we at last reached berlin via warnemünde. we had received an extremely hospitable and cordial welcome at christiania and copenhagen, at the hands of the ambassadors, michaelis and count brockdorff-rantzau—we also had an opportunity of convincing ourselves that the feeling in denmark and norway had turned against us just as sharply as in america. the balance of power was, however, different. if our neutral neighbors had not been living in fear of german power, they would at this time have responded to mr. wilson's call, and would have broken off all diplomatic relations with us. i believe that the president was hoping that events might take this turn, and that he would thus be spared the need of waging war. if all the countries in the world were to declare war against germany and her allies—this is what was assumed in washington—the page 403 economic pressure would alone suffice to compel the central powers to yield. the policy proposed was similar to the one which, in the future, the league of nations would pursue against any refractory member of its body, and which the entente proposes to adopt to-day against bolshevist russia. the great length of time which it took the united states to enter the war is, in my opinion, to be explained in this way. the idea was to wait and see how things would develop. meanwhile, thanks to the mexico telegram, war-propaganda in america was being worked with great success, and the military preparations made such steady progress, that even if economic measures did not prove sufficient to end the war, the united states would have obtained the army they had longed for for so many years, as also the fleet of war and merchant ships, for which in times of peace congress would never have voted the necessary funds.
on the evening of the day after our arrival in berlin, i was received by the imperial chancellor, with whom i had a long interview. it was on this occasion that herr von bethmann-hollweg informed me that he could not help consenting to the u-boat war, as the german people would never have understood it if we had concluded an unsatisfactory peace, without attempting to bring about a happy decision by means of the last and most effective weapon in which the nation felt any confidence. he also said that he would have been unable to go before the reichstag with an offer of mediation from mr. wilson, because such intervention would not have been popular, public opinion would not have liked it, and it would only have been accepted by the social democrats. herr von bethmann-hollweg declared that the reichstag would have "thrown him out." this was the very expression he used. but this did not explain why, a few weeks previously, mr. wilson's mediation had seemed desirable, if, page 404 as a matter of fact, it was impossible to get the reichstag to agree to it. meanwhile, the political situation at that time has been completely elucidated by the evidence which herr von bethmann-hollweg gave before the examination committee of the national assembly. in his account of the interview he had with me, he spoke as follows:
"as regards my interview with count bernstorff, on his return from america, i should like to make the following remarks: i cannot recall all the details of the conversation i had with count bernstorff. count bernstorff has revealed in his evidence what i said to him, and i have no doubt that he has accurately reproduced my actual words. my duty was—and this is an idea i already touched upon earlier in the day—once the policy of an unrestricted u-boat war was resolved upon, never to reveal to anyone any doubts as to the efficacy of the scheme. in this case, too, i had to say, we shall achieve something by means of it. and that is why in my conversation with count bernstorff, i did not reveal my inmost feelings on the subject—there was no need for me to do so—but simply referred to the reasons which could be adduced in favor of the u-boat war."
the reception which i was given in berlin, certainly at first left nothing to be desired. the imperial chancellor, on the occasion of our first meeting, had thanked me in a very hearty manner for my work in washington, and a few days later, proposed that i should go on an extraordinary mission to stockholm. on principle i was quite prepared to do this, seeing that the recent outbreak of revolution in russia, and the prospective international socialist conference in stockholm, would offer fresh possibilities of peace, and an opportunity for useful page 405 work. from various things i had noticed in berlin, i gathered that—as the evidence before the examination committee proved—the imperial chancellor would have preferred to give up the idea of the u-boat war, and to accept american intervention in favor of peace, but that he was compelled to give in, owing to the overwhelming advocacy of the u-boat campaign. it was to be hoped, therefore, that with the expected speedy failure of u-boat tactics, herr von bethmann-hollweg would snatch at the next opportunity of making peace. as he remained in office, in spite of the u-boat war, his chief motive for so doing must certainly have been that "after his departure the whole of the power, both of external and internal politics, would have gone over without resistance to the machinery of war-fever." i regarded any policy as the right one, which arrived at a prompt conclusion of peace, provided that we did not make any confession of weakness by ourselves initiating fresh offers of peace. we had already erred once in this way. but in stockholm it seemed likely that opportunities might occur of winning either the russians or the foreign socialists over to a movement in favor of peace.
as i heard nothing, either about the stockholm mission, or about an audience with the kaiser, which i was led to expect in connection with it, i went at the end of a few days to find out what had happened, and i was told that the kaiser had declined to sanction my mission to stockholm. although i had a second interview with the imperial chancellor, i was never able to ascertain definitely the reason of the kaiser's anger against me. since, however, general ludendorff, simply on the grounds of my particular views, made his "impassioned" attack on me before the examination committee of the national assembly, i have no longer been in any doubt whatsoever as to the nature of the influence that was at page 406 work at general headquarters. at the time, i only suspected the prevalence of some such feelings in that quarter, because i had heard it whispered that the monarch did not like my "democratic views." the reasons for the kaiser's anger, which were given me officially, were of too trivial a nature to be even plausible.
i must next refer to the dispatch box of the swedish legation in washington. at new york herr ekengren had put on board the steamer friedrich viii. a box containing swedish telegrams, which was to be forwarded to its destination.
this box, the very existence of which we germans knew nothing about, was taken possession of by the british authorities in halifax, and dispatched to england. the london newspapers then reported that a dispatch box, belonging to count bernstorff, and containing documents of the german embassy, had been opened there. although the mistake, whether intentional or the reverse, was very soon elucidated, someone had laid the matter before the kaiser in a distorted light. apparently the kaiser was allowed to form the suspicion that the opening of the box had betrayed the secret of the mexico telegram.
a further reason for his displeasure, at the time, was told me subsequently at constantinople by the kaiser himself. he said that i had "let him down most dreadfully," when i had recommended mr. gerard as american ambassador to berlin. i ought never to have supported the nomination of such a "tammany hall" creature. if he—the kaiser—had only known at the time who gerard was, and what tammany hall could be, he would never have accepted this ambassador. in constantinople i was able to reply to the kaiser pretty fully, as the interview took place during a somewhat long journey on the bosphorus. i certainly did recommend page 407 mr. gerard in due course, but only after he had already been selected as ambassador by mr. wilson. before he had been chosen i was not asked. if at that time—in the year 1913—i had advised the rejection of mr. gerard, it would only have created a lot of unnecessary ill-feeling, as was the case at the nomination of mr. hill. it is the custom in america to select the ambassadors from politically influential circles of the triumphant party; irrespective of whether tammany hall or any other organization is concerned.
moreover, in 1903 i believed that mr. gerard would be welcome in berlin, for social reasons alone. everybody knew that the kaiser liked to have ambassadors who entertained on a lavish scale. mr. gerard was the only man, among all the candidates of that day, who seemed fitted for this and in a position to live up to it, while his rich and amiable wife was admirably suited to help him in his task. before the war, an american ambassador in berlin really never had any political business to transact, for it was the tradition with the united states government to conduct all negotiations almost exclusively with the diplomatic corps in washington. in 1913, therefore, i had no reason to advocate the rejection of mr. gerard in berlin. unfortunately, it was precisely in the social sphere that he had, before the war, experienced certain disappointments in berlin, which, as far as we were concerned, might have been avoided, and it is possible that mr. gerard may have been influenced by these regrettable incidents. in any case, the ambassador did not like berlin, and he took too little pains to conceal the fact. mr. gerard was not the sort of man to be able to swim against the tide of anti-german feeling, once it had become the proper thing in america to be pro-ally. as to whether any other united states ambassador would have shown less hostility to us, however, may be page 408 reasonably doubted. i have already singled out the adlon dinner as a proof of the fact that mr. gerard could behave differently.
be all this as it may, the reasons which were alleged genuinely to justify the hostile attitude of general headquarters towards myself, struck me as not being sufficiently weighty. i say "general headquarters" intentionally, for the kaiser was manifestly only prejudiced against me by the usual whisperings that characterized the wilhelminian epoch.
nevertheless, i had conducted the most important negotiations of the war, and the monarch must, in any case, have had the wish to hear the report of it all from the person chiefly concerned. besides, the kaiser knew as well as i did, that in washington i had pursued the policy of which he and the chancellor were actually in favor. otherwise, the imperial memorandum, which was sent to me about the u-boat war, and to which i have already referred, would be inexplicable. meanwhile, however, this policy had not been able to prevail against the preponderating influence of the military party, who demanded the u-boat campaign. now, of course, i have no longer any doubt that the views which general ludendorff expressed against me before the examination committee of the national assembly, simply as his personal opinion and without proof, constituted more or less what was suggested to the kaiser at this time. briefly, they wished to make me the scapegoat for the united states' entry into the war, and this, despite the fact that all that i had prophesied in regard to american policy had proved correct, and all that my opponents had prophesied had proved wrong. in their efforts to accomplish this end, they found that a poisonous mixture could be brewed out of my efforts for peace, and my well-known democratic views, which the kaiser was not able to resist.
page 409 the unhappy monarch unfortunately never once realized that the "democrats" were his best friends. the imperial power could, in the long run, only be upheld, if it found both its support and its counter-weight in a strong democracy. like friedrich wilhelm iv., william ii. was also unable to adapt himself to the changing circumstances of his time. the one-sided composition of his entourage, which was always recruited from among people who held his own views, was, at all events, chiefly to blame for this.
although the imperial chancellor had told me that he would overcome the kaiser's displeasure in regard to myself, almost two months elapsed before i was received at general headquarters, and even then, it was only because a question had been asked about the matter in the reichstag. when i saw the kaiser, towards the beginning of may, in kreuznach, the american question was of interest merely to historians, and no longer to politicians. consequently, my interview with the monarch, which took place on a walk, was not of very great moment. with his customary skill, the kaiser steered clear of any attempt to enter deeply into the political problems of the hour, and behaved towards me, for the rest, just as affably as he had been wont to do in the past.
i had made the journey to kreuznach in the company of my late friend, ballin, whom i was never to see again. whereas i was invited to lunch at the imperial board, herr ballin was only asked to dinner.
among the many and various charges which were brought against me in my washington days, was the allegation that i was principally an agent of ballin's. i had, in cordial agreement with herr ballin, always energetically supported the interests of german shipping companies; but even my most bitter enemies can only justify their charge against me for the period preceding page 410 the war. for, during the war, herr ballin had no influence at all, either in america or at home. he was, for instance, kept aloof from the kaiser, because he was regarded as an "interested party" and as a pessimist. on the occasion in question, a high official of the court said to me at the imperial table that if i was seeing ballin again before i left kreuznach, would i please tell him that he was not to speak so pessimistically to the emperor as he was wont to do. the emperor ought not to be allowed to hear such stuff, otherwise he would lose nerve. this little passage of conversation is a proof of the carefully "insulated" position in which, as everyone knows, the kaiser was kept.
after lunch i paid a visit to both of our great army commanders, whose acquaintance i made for the first time on this occasion.
"bowing to necessity rather than to my own personal tastes," i must now, unfortunately, enter into personal matters, which hitherto i have diligently avoided in this book. i cannot, however, help referring here to the utterly unwarranted attacks made upon me by general ludendorff, in his evidence before the examination committee of the national assembly, with the view of refuting my own account of the interview which we had at g. h. q. at all events, the general so completely lost control of himself before the examination committee, that this possibly explains his false interpretation of my evidence.
to deal first with the reason which actuated me in visiting general ludendorff, i reproduce below the dialogue which took place thereanent before the examination committee:
delegate dr. cohn: was your interview with field-marshal hindenburg and general ludendorff brought page 411 about by any particular person or persons—either by yourself, by the imperial chancellor, or by the foreign office; or was it purely accidental?
witness count von bernstorff: it was the outcome of the circumstances. i received a telegram which informed me, through the foreign office, that i was to report to the kaiser at kreuznach on the 4th of may. now, field-marshal hindenburg and general ludendorff were also present at the lunch table, and i felt that i was bound in courtesy to pay a visit to the two gentlemen after the meal.
delegate dr. cohn: good. if i understand you correctly, my lord, g. h. q. did not even feel the need of speaking with the ambassador just recently returned from america?
witness count von bernstorff: no. i never received any summons for that purpose.
i abide by these utterances to this day, because i actually remained seven weeks without being summoned to an interview with general ludendorff, and then only visited him of my own free will, on the occasion when i reported to the kaiser. in these circumstances, therefore, i was entirely justified in describing my visit as simply an act of courtesy. in view of the circumstances, i might perhaps say: an act of super-courtesy.
i do not dispute general ludendorff's statement that i had expressed the wish to see him; for if i had not had the wish, i should have left kreuznach without paying him a visit. as, however, general ludendorff, in his evidence before the examination committee, allowed it to be plainly understood that, owing to the difference of our views, he did not like to have anything to do with me, i will at once emphasize the fact, that my wish to see him was actuated by purely official motives. in politics page 412 i have at all times laid all personal feelings entirely aside, and, have thought only of the business and the interests of my country. while i was kicking my heels in berlin for all those weeks, waiting upon a summons to the emperor, i was urged by many people to try and obtain an interview with general ludendorff, in order to enlighten him regarding american affairs, as in this respect he was very badly informed. the latter fact, has, at all events, been substantiated by general ludendorff himself, in his evidence before the committee. the gentlemen who urged me to obtain this interview, themselves made efforts to bring it about. but these efforts were of no avail, and i therefore regarded them as too insignificant to be mentioned in my own evidence. in all my utterances before the committee, i refrained from all allusion to personal and subjective matters.
general ludendorff has further maintained that i impugned his honor by declaring that, generally speaking, he did not wish to conclude peace. i naturally never made such a nonsensical statement. immediately after my visit to general ludendorff at g. h. q., i made notes of the essential passages of our interview; because i suspected, what in my opinion has since become a certainty, to wit, that the general wished to heap all the blame of the war with america upon my shoulders. every impartial reader who examines the notes given below, will be forced to admit, that they contain nothing whatsoever except assertions, which have been confirmed by all the evidence given before the committee of the national assembly; that is to say:
(1) that i wished to accept mr. wilson's offer of mediation.
(2) that the imperial government—that is to say, g. h. q. or whoever was responsible for taking the final page 413 decision—did not wish to accept mr. wilson's offer of mediation, in order to declare the unrestricted u-boat war instead.
(3) that the naval authorities had declared themselves in a position to bring about a desire for peace in england in five months from the 1st of february.
my notes about the interview i had with general ludendorff ran as follows:
general ludendorff received me with the following words:
"in america you wanted to make peace. you evidently thought we were at the end of our tether."
i replied:
"no, i did not think that; but i wanted to make peace before we came to the end of our tether."
whereupon the general said:
"we, however, did not want to. besides, it would not have been surprising if you had thought that we had come to the end of our resources. the communications you received, which i read from time to time, certainly led to that conclusion."
later on in the conversation, general ludendorff asked me when, in my opinion, the americans would participate in the war with great force. i replied that in twelve months a large american army was to be expected in france, and that this army would be organized with comparative ease. to this the general rejoined that in that case we had ample time to end the war meanwhile; for the u-boats would force england to a peace in three months. he had received absolutely certain information on this point. when i was on the point of leaving, general ludendorff repeated this remark very positively.
page 414 though the sense was the same, the actual wording of my evidence before the examination committee differs somewhat from that of the notes given above. this is explained, however, by the fact that i spoke quite freely, and therefore prefaced my remarks with the words: "so far as i can remember, and so far as i am able to say, under oath, the conversation was more or less as follows," etc.
i did not enter into the personal views which general ludendorff thought fit to express in his evidence before the examination committee; for i am of the opinion that the duty of the committee was simply to establish the real truth by an inquiry into the facts. it is open to the committee to put to me any questions they like concerning my activities in washington, and i will answer them frankly; but i think that a quarrel between witnesses about their own personal opinions would have been an undignified spectacle, in which i distinctly refused to participate. i gladly leave it to the reader of the present volume to form his own ideas regarding my work in america.
in may, 1917, i left g. h. q., feeling quite convinced that for the moment there was no room for me in german diplomacy; for the only policy which i regarded as right, had no prospect of being realized. after my return from america, i was placed on half-pay. i was therefore at liberty to return home, however unwilling i may have felt, at that moment of great tribulation for my country, to give myself up to a life of ease and idleness. during my period of rest, a reichstag resolution was passed, and there was a change of chancellors.
when herr von kühlmann, who is a friend of mine, took over the foreign office, he summoned me by telegram to berlin, and told me that the imperial chancellor, michaelis, was going to offer me the post of ambassador page 415 in constantinople. some years previously herr von kühlmann and i had worked together in london. we had been on very good terms, and since then i had never lost touch with him. as he assured me very positively that he had taken over the foreign office in order to conclude peace, i felt no qualms about returning once more to diplomatic duties. i did not, however, conceal from herr von kühlmann, that i expected that there would be very strong opposition at g. h. q. to my being employed again on foreign service. the secretary of state was of the opinion that we might confidently leave this side of the question to the imperial chancellor, who at that moment was on his honeymoon, and was therefore admirably situated to carry things through. my interview with herr michaelis only made me more eager than ever to undertake the mission to constantinople. he said to me that he was offering me a very difficult and unpleasant billet, for i should have to wring concessions from the turks with the object of bringing about peace. this view of the situation corresponded entirely with my own. contrary to my expectations, the imperial ratification of my appointment arrived; but the monarch also seized the opportunity of making certain remarks about my democratic views, without, however, withholding his signature from my credentials.
in september i set out for constantinople, where thirty years previously i had started my diplomatic career, and where i was now to end it.
