each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in so far as it involves justice. the friendship between a king and his subjects depends on an excess of benefits conferred; for he confers benefits on his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep (whence homer called agamemnon ‘shepherd of the peoples’). such too is the friendship of a father, though this exceeds the other in the greatness of the benefits conferred; for he is responsible for the existence of his children, which is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing.
these things are ascribed to ancestors as well. further, by nature a father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over descendants, a king over his subjects. these friendships imply superiority of one party over the other, which is why ancestors are honoured. the justice therefore that exists between persons so related is not the same on both sides but is in every case proportioned to merit; for that is true of the friendship as well. the friendship of man and wife, again, is the same that is found in an aristocracy; for it is in accordance with virtue the better gets more of what is good, and each gets what befits him; and so, too, with the justice in these relations. the friendship of brothers is like that of comrades; for they are equal and of like age, and such persons are for the most part like in their feelings and their character. like this, too, is the friendship appropriate to timocratic government; for in such a constitution the ideal is for the citizens to be equal and fair; therefore rule is taken in turn, and on equal terms; and the friendship appropriate here will correspond.
but in the deviation-forms, as justice hardly exists, so too does friendship. it exists least in the worst form; in tyranny there is little or no friendship. for where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled, there is not friendship either, since there is not justice; e.g. between craftsman and tool, soul and body, master and slave; the latter in each case is benefited by that which uses it, but there is no friendship nor justice towards lifeless things. but neither is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a slave qua slave. for there is nothing common to the two parties; the slave is a living tool and the tool a lifeless slave. qua slave then, one cannot be friends with him. but qua man one can; for there seems to be some justice between any man and any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement; therefore there can also be friendship with him in so far as he is a man. therefore while in tyrannies friendship and justice hardly exist, in democracies they exist more fully; for where the citizens are equal they have much in common.
